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NOTE ON SPELLING 
 
The pinyin system of romanization is used throughout the text of this study.  
However, certain proper names and titles of publications, where they are normally 
written in other forms of romanization, have not been uniformly changed to the 
pinyin system.  Exceptions have also been made in the cases of some historical 





Canton Guaranty System. The system under which members of the hong 
merchant guild were made subject to unlimited 
liability on a collective basis for the debts of failed 
members of the guild.  This collective guaranty was 
enforced from 1780 until 1842. 
Canton System. The set of rules under which the Chinese government 
managed the monopolized maritime trade between 
Canton and the West between 1684 and 1842. 
Chop. An official stamp or permit, and by extension any 
official document bearing a seal-impression or stamp; a 
trademark, or mark of quality in East Asia.  From 
Hindi chhäp. 
Cohong. The hong merchant guild.  While this was an informal 
organization for much of the period of the Canton 
System, it enjoyed official recognition and independent 
powers in 1720-1721 (Cohong of 1720) and again from 
1760-1771 (Cohong of 1760). 
Comprador. A Chinese subject employed by European traders to 
serve as an agent to supply provisions. 
Foreign factories. The business premises and residences of the foreign 
traders at Canton. 
Hong merchant. A member of the small group of Chinese merchants 
who were licensed by the Qing government to trade 
with Western merchants at Canton on a monopoly 
basis. 
Hoppo. Western term for the Commissioner of the Guangdong 
Province Maritime Customs.  The term is a corruption 
of part of the Hoppo's Chinese language title: Duli 
Guangdongsheng Yanhaidengqu Maoyishuiwu Hubufensi 
(Commissioner of the Board of Revenue [Hu Bu], in 
Charge of the Customs Duties on the Trade of the 
Maritime Area of the Province of Guangdong). 
Security merchant. Those hong merchants who secured foreign vessels 
and were held responsible by the Chinese government 
for the conduct of the crew of such vessels and for the 
customs duties that were owed. 
Shroff. Private Chinese money changer, frequently involved in 
transactions to confirm the weight and quality of the 




Singsongs. Pidgin English term used to describe European luxury 
objects such as musical boxes, mechanical toys, clocks 
and watches which were purchased from Europeans at 
Canton and sent as official gifts to the Court in Beijing 
Tael. Chinese unit of account for silver, equivalent to a 
Chinese ounce (liang).  On its accounts, the British East 
India Company treated the Spanish dollar as equal to 
0.72 tael. 
Thirteen hongs. Common reference to the group of licensed hong 
merchants, and to their business premises at Canton. 
Whampoa. The outer port of Canton, in the Pearl River, located 
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CHAPTER 1:  
INTRODUCTION 
Transfers of goods and ideas at ever increasing speed are hallmarks of the modern 
globalized economy.  Goods originally brought cultures in contact.  By land and by 
sea, in orderly exchanges and through deception and violence, products moved 
about the world.  This process connected societies in the premodern East and West.  
Across the globe, people gradually became aware of the existence of different 
material cultures, foods and traditions.  The movements of goods, and their bearers, 
affected imaginations and altered societies.  Initially a trickle, the traffic was diverse 
in scope, ranging from the humble potato carried from colonial Peru to fine 
porcelain exported from imperial China.  Over centuries it grew into the torrent that 
is modern international trade.  The transcultural effects of this movement of goods 
are well known and have received much scholarly attention.1 
The flow of ideas has received less attention.  The economic significance of ideas 
is well recognized in the modern world, shrunken as it has been through 
improvements in the speed of communications, travel, and the shipment of goods.  
Rights in ideas are challenging physical goods for primacy in market valuation.  
“Intellectual property” constitutes a great part of the value of leading companies in 
many nations today.  Ideas developed elsewhere have profound influence 
worldwide, in disparate fields such as medicine, telecommunications, 
entertainment, manufacturing, computers, law and banking.  The flow of ideas is 
now comparable in importance to the flow of goods. 
Great debates have been joined concerning innovation and the movement of 
ideas, especially from West to East.  Specific conditions which favored scientific and 
technological development in the West in and after the fifteenth century have been 
noted,2 as has the failure of Eastern science to continue the strong creative pace it 
demonstrated through the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.3  Some of the facts that 
figure in these debates provided intellectual cover for nineteenth century 
imperialism, and as such the subject matter is sensitive.  Western pretensions to 
innovative superiority have proven especially controversial in the areas of business 
and finance.  The stern treatment of Asian nations by Western creditors in the 1997 
Asian financial crisis sparked anger, and the apparent unraveling of parts of the 
Western financial model in the cycle of international economic crises that began in 
2007 has left that model much discredited in the East.4 
Some of these sharply contrasted and simply expressed notions of the spread 
and influence of ideas may simply reflect the present inadequate state of study of 
the subject matter.  Our understanding of the transit of ideas between East and West 
is limited,5 in contrast to the abundant attention that has been paid to the movement 
of goods, both practical and artistic in character.  While the tangible is by its nature 
more obvious than the intangible, it was not physical goods alone that traveled in 
the past. 
1A. Subject and Framework 
This study examines one example of the international flow of ideas.  It considers a 
Chinese idea that came to New York State at a moment of banking and currency 
crisis in the early nineteenth century.  A practice used by the Qing government to 
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regulate monopolized business inspired the first American bank deposit insurance 
statute, the Safety Fund Act of 1829.  Joshua Forman, a respected former judge and 
legislator, told the New York legislature that: 
“The propriety of making the banks liable for each other was suggested 
by the regulation of the Hong merchants in Canton, where a number of men, 
each acting separately, have by the grant of the government the exclusive 
right of trading with foreigners, and are all made liable for the debts of each 
in case of failure.  The case of our banks is very similar; they enjoy in 
common the exclusive right of making a paper currency for the people of the 
state, and by the same rule should in common be answerable for that paper.  
This abstractly just principle, which has stood the test of experience for 
seventy years, and under which the bond of a Hong merchant has acquired a 
credit over the whole world, not exceeded by that of any other security, 
modified and adapted to the milder features of our republican institutions, 
constitutes the basis of the system.”6 
The New York statute became the basis in turn for national bank deposit 
insurance in the United States, implemented in 1933.  Bank deposit insurance has 
since spread worldwide, and is now found in about one hundred nations.  The 
progress of this “American” innovation was notably slow in Asia until very recent 
years, having been adopted, for example, by Taiwan but still not in China. 
While this early transplant of a Chinese idea to the United States of America has 
received slight attention as a footnote to U.S. banking history, its full history has 
never previously been examined.  This work is the first study of the origins and 
experience of the Chinese idea of collective financial responsibility at Canton and of 
its adoption and transplantation in the United States during the years through 1933.  
It seeks to answer several questions about this transplant.  First, was the Chinese 
idea of collective legal responsibility for debt accurately transmitted to the New 
York legislature in 1829?  Second, was the actual experience of the guaranty system 
at Canton accurately transmitted to the New York legislature in 1829?  Third, do 
either the Chinese idea of collective legal responsibility for debt or the experience of 
the guaranty system that was enforced at Canton offer lessons for contemporary 
bank deposit insurance?  In addition, with respect to the history of collective 
guaranty at Canton during the years 1780-1842, it asks:  Who won, who lost, and 
why? 
Consideration of the foregoing questions has required analysis of certain topics 
which have not previously been considered on their own.  This is the first study of 
the collective guaranty of debt that was enforced between 1780 and 1842.  It is the 
first study of the development and implementation of the regulations that 
constituted the Canton System from 1684 to 1842, and also the first study to set that 
system in the national Chinese context and to consider it as an operating system.  
Also new is the analysis of the debt collection rules that were made available to 
foreigners under the Canton System, and how they worked.  The methodology of 
this study required the analysis of every instance in which hong failure resulted in a 
call on the collective guaranty, both as to the circumstances of the original 
underlying debt and creditor interests and as to the draw on the guaranty fund and 
its consequences. 
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Debt, and various modes of guaranty of debt, individual and collective, are 
concepts of ancient origin.  Guaranty systems, collective guarantees and early forms 
of proto-insurance are not exclusive to imperial China.  They have existed in 
numerous places around the world at various points at time, sometimes with long 
pedigrees, as for example in ancient Rome and the Middle East.  This study simply 
examines the course of one such idea as it traveled and was transformed as it went 
from China to the United States and then across the world.  Other similar ideas have 
existed at other places and times and may indeed be relevant to certain adoptions of 
deposit insurance in providing a historical, cultural and legal context to such 
adoptions.  These are nevertheless outside the scope of this work. 
This first chapter introduces the reception of a Chinese idea by the State of New 
York in the context of parallel financial crises which occurred in the year 1829.  
Chapters Two and Three address, respectively, why and then how the system of 
collective financial guaranty that was enforced at Canton was developed.  Chapters 
Four through Seven examine the Chinese system of unlimited financial guaranty as 
it operated at Canton during the eventful years 1780 to 1842.  Chapter Eight traces 
the development of the idea in the United States, as it progressed from a state law 
guaranty program to national deposit insurance during the years 1829 to 1933.  
Chapter Nine provides a brief sketch of the international history of bank deposit 
insurance since 1933,7 and is followed by an Epilogue, numbered as Chapter Ten. 
The “hong merchants” were the small group of Chinese merchants who were 
licensed by the Qing government to trade with Western merchants at Canton on a 
monopoly basis.  The system of enforced unlimited collective guaranty of individual 
private debt is referred to in this study as the “Canton Guaranty System.”  This 
concept is distinct from, but also was a key part of, the “Canton System,” a term 
which refers to the rules by which the Qing government managed the monopolized 
maritime trade between Canton and the West.  The Canton System evolved 
gradually through rules set down starting in the early 1700s, first formalized on 
imperial approval in 1760.  The Canton Guaranty System began in 1780 as an 
amendment, imposed over hong merchant resistance, to trading rules that were 
otherwise long in existence. 
The experience of bank deposit insurance is relatively young, and so is its 
history.  There is an enormous literature on various aspects of the sometimes 
troubled history of deposit insurance in the United States, but no full length history 
as of yet.  While the quality of this material is typically quite high, a great part of it 
has been written as part of a debate that has run for over eighty years about the 
propriety of and reforms to the deposit insurance system of the United States.  Much 
of the rest is framed as technical analysis of banking issues, presenting history in 
tandem with mathematical formulae.  Generally speaking, this is a banking 
literature, written by people concerned about banking for consideration by others 
with comparable interests.  The Chinese origin of bank deposit insurance is well 
recognized in this literature, but the topic has received almost no further comment.  
To the extent the idea has been addressed, a complete accuracy of transmission to 
New York State has been assumed, as well as a total success in operation at Canton.  
Writing in 1957, during what is now recognized to have been a period of calm in the 
American history of bank deposit insurance, banking historian Bray Hammond 
stated that “[t]he sorry consummation of the [New York Safety] Fund was not the 
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fault of the principle underlying it, which the Chinese had applied with so much 
more success than the hasty New Yorkers.”8 
This lack of attention may reflect, in part, objective difficulties in accessing 
source materials.  Much of the Chinese history and experience of collective financial 
liability was kept hidden from contemporaries.9  The ethnic Manchu Imperial 
Household Department (neiwufu), the employer of the Hoppo who directly 
supervised the Canton trade, the manager of several highly profitable businesses 
monopolized by the Chinese state for the benefit of the imperial court, and the 
recipient of a large part of the receipts of the Canton maritime customs, was largely 
invisible to the Chinese people.  In the words of Chang Te-ch’ang, its affairs were 
kept secret, “almost a shrouded mystery.”10  Our knowledge of this and other key 
Manchu administrative institutions has been and continues to be greatly advanced 
by modern work with Chinese archival sources by scholars such as Chang, Preston 
Torbert,11 Mark Elliott,12 and others, but much remains to be known. 
The Western experience of the Canton trade and the operation of the collective 
guaranty was also largely kept secret from contemporaries.  The foreign traders 
were engaged in a high value, long-distance intensely competitive trade.  They were 
compulsive diarists of the business they did, maintaining detailed current records 
and reporting to and corresponding with others about such affairs.  These records 
were proprietary and highly confidential when they were made.  They were never 
shared with competitors, and the China traders certainly avoided public attention.  
Edward Delano, a clerk with the American firm of Russell & Co., thus wrote his 
brother in 1841: “If you think of ‘putting into print’ – my remarks &c. upon men and 
things in general and China in particular, I may be under the disagreeable necessity 
of discontinuing my remarks relative thereto – for be it known unto you that the 
Americans who write home and have their letters published – are severely – (I mean 
their letters) criticized – and the small community of true blooded Yankees resident 
here, enabling them to discern the author without much difficulty.”13 
In addition, the passage of centuries has exacted a heavy toll on the trade records 
that were kept.  Private Chinese records of the Canton trade have been almost 
entirely lost, along with the great part of the records kept by Qing officials, 
casualties of fires, wars and domestic disruption.14  As a consequence, the history of 
hong merchants is written primarily with information drawn from Western records.  
While much of the Western records have also been lost, staggering amounts yet 
survive, in repositories scattered across the world.  The volume and diffusion of 
these records, alone, pose substantial challenges to scholarship.15  One consequence 
of the state of surviving primary source material is that our knowledge of the 
activities of the hong merchants is fragmentary.  They are seen as if in freeze frame 
photography, caught at given moments in particular transactions about which little 
else may be known.  They are also seen from the standpoint of the records 
themselves, that is to say, in the light of the purpose for which records were 
required to be kept and maintained.  Much information survives about crisis points, 
such as demands for the payment of defaulted debt and the exercise of guaranty 
rights, and less about the precise circumstances under which the obligations at issue 
in a given crisis had come to exist. 
As many of these records are devoted to problems arising in the trade, such as 
loans past due or failures to perform as agreed, our knowledge of the hong 
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merchants therefore focuses primarily on the expense side of the hong merchant 
ledgers.  No hong firm records have been found.  With not a great deal more than 
fragments of transaction records from which inferences may be drawn, scholars 
have been left to make rough estimates of hong firm profit.16  This understanding is 
at least two steps removed from the trade in which these Chinese merchants were 
engaged -- both by the passage of time and by the fact that it typically comes from 
non-Chinese sources.  As a result, in this study, care has been taken to distinguish 
between sources which show specific experiences and sources which just say that 
things happened or are otherwise conclusory.  The transactions and obligations at 
issue under the Canton Guaranty System were accounted for in the silver currency 
in which the trade was done, i.e., dollars (Spanish) or taels (Chinese ounce).  There 
was inflation during the period of this study, but it was at a modest level.17 
1B. Previous Research 
Generations of scholars have accepted the challenge posed by all of the scattered 
source materials left by the participants in the Canton trade.  Patient research and 
the responsible reporting of that work has begun to dispel the nostalgic and often 
counterfactual fog that has too long obscured the history of Western trade with 
China.  Hosea Ballou Morse opened up the records of the British EIC in his 
Chronicles of the East India Company Trading to China, 1635-1834, published in 
five volumes between 1926 and 1929.18  Louis Dermigny delved into French sources, 
producing the equally monumental La Chine et L'Occident: Le Commerce A Canton 
Au XVIIIe Siècle 1719-1833, published in four volumes in 1964.19  Jack Wills and 
Leonard Blussé have both brought forward large amounts of information from 
Dutch records, in numerous published works.  Jacques M. Downs, who examined 
the scattered and bulky records of China traders from the United States, published 
his invaluable The Golden Ghetto: The American Commercial Community at 
Canton and the Shaping of American China Policy, 1784-1844 in 1997.20  The work of 
these and many other scholars has improved our understanding of the actual 
conduct of the Western side of the trade. 
The history of the Chinese side of the trade has also been transformed through 
the work of generations of scholars.  This process has been especially arduous, as so 
many of the original Chinese records have been lost.  The work began with Henri 
Cordier, a French academic whose career started as a clerk with Russell & Co. in 
Shanghai.  Cordier’s pioneering article, “Les Marchands Hanistes de Canton,” was 
published one hundred and ten years ago in 1902.21  Liang Jiabin, a Chinese scholar 
whose grandfather had been a hong merchant, devoted much of his career to 
disentangling their history.  Liang wrote the History of the Thirteen Hongs of 
Canton (Guangdong Shisan Hang Kao), an important source which was published in 
two editions in Chinese, the first in 1937 and a revised edition in 1960.22  Ann 
Bolbach White produced the first history of the hong merchants in a Western 
language, “The Hong Merchants of Canton,” her 1967 University of Pennsylvania 
doctoral dissertation.  White synthesized Western and Chinese source material, 
including records of the imperial court in Beijing.  Her work stands as a useful 
introduction to hong merchant history.23  Dilip Kumar Basu followed with “Asian 
Merchants and Western Trade : A Comparative Study of Calcutta and Canton 1800-
1840,” a doctoral dissertation completed at the University of California, Berkeley, in 
1975.  Basu’s work remains the leading analysis of the vital trade that was 
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conducted between Calcutta and Canton.  It is also a key hong merchant work, both 
for the archival materials Basu brought to the topic and his understanding of the 
business problems the hong merchants faced.24 
Hong merchant scholarship has taken enormous strides since these works were 
prepared.  Two studies, published in the 1990s, began the process of opening up 
hong merchant history in such a manner that events that occurred between 1683 and 
1843 can begin to be understood in meaningful individual detail.  Kuo-tung 
Anthony Ch’en completed The Insolvency of the Chinese Hong Merchants 1760-
1843 as his Yale University doctoral dissertation in December 1989, and the work 
was published in 1990.  Noting that prior studies had been particularly weak on this 
topic, Ch’en examined hong merchant insolvency, which he called “the 
characteristic phenomenon of the history of the Hong merchants.”25  Ch’en’s work 
includes individual histories of many but not all of the hong firms.  The year 1997 
saw the publication of Weng Eang Cheong’s Hong Merchants of Canton: Chinese 
Merchants in Sino-Western Trade 1684-1798.26  The fact-rich Cheong volume is a 
historical study of the evolution of the hong merchant guild between 1683 and 1798.  
With the appearance of the Ch’en and Cheong works, hong merchant scholarship 
had generated studies comparable in depth and quality to the work produced by 
leading scholars of the Western side of the trade.  Neither study attempts a 
regulatory or legal analysis of the Canton System, or of the collective guaranty of 
debt that was enforced at Canton between 1780 and 1842.  The two works ask 
different questions about distinct but overlapping historical periods.  While they 
contain considerable information about the subject matter of this study, that 
information is found in varied contexts throughout the pages of these volumes. 
Like computer science, modern hong merchant scholarship has shown an ability 
to process large amounts of data at substantially higher levels of detail at regular 
intervals.  The knowledge of the 1970s was greatly improved upon in the 1990s, and 
this process is recurring.  The hackneyed old notion of unitary hongs doing a strictly 
individualized business under exotic trading names in accordance with the dictates 
of all-powerful Western firms is falling away.  The work of Paul A. Van Dyke, 
notably The Canton Trade: Life and Enterprise on the China Coast, 1700-1845 
(2005)27 and Merchants of Canton and Macao: Politics and Strategies in Eighteenth-
Century Chinese Trade (2011),28 offers a view of a more complicated hong merchant 
world.  This understanding shows hong merchants conducting substantial trade 
unconnected with their business with the West, illuminates shifting alliances among 
and competition between hong merchant families, and shows that the hong 
merchants traded variously on their own, in joint ventures, and in partnerships.  
Each of these elements can be found in the work of Ch’en and Cheong, and in some 
of the earlier studies as well, but an integrated picture is now coming together.  As a 
result, the hong merchants are coming to be seen less as idiosyncratic curiosities of 
“Old Canton” and instead to be understood in the context of the larger Chinese 
trading world in which they did business.  The present study seeks to continue these 
trends in recent scholarship by examining the regulatory and business experience of 
the regime of collective liability for foreign debt at Canton and placing it in an 
international context. 
This study also seeks to place the regulation of the hong merchants in the overall 
context of Qing regulation of businesses monopolized for the benefit of the imperial 
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court.  Hints of the importance of national regulation appear in the literature.  Liang 
Jiabin quotes his grandfather -- the hong merchant Kinqua -- as having told him that 
“The licensed merchants of the hong system were much like the Salt Merchants.”29  
Liang -- and Kinqua -- are correct.  The system under which the hong merchants 
were licensed and regulated is notably similar to the systems under which the 
Manchu Imperial Household Department (neiwufu) managed the monopolized salt 
and ginseng businesses for the benefit of the imperial Court in Beijing.30  Indeed, the 
subject matter of this study -- collective financial responsibility among merchants for 
debt -- itself appears to have been a neiwufu transplant to Canton.  It was first 
imposed on the head merchants of the ginseng monopoly in Manchuria in 1739, as a 
mutual liability to pay the state the value of any deficiency in the quality or quantity 
of collected ginseng.  The practice then continued, presumably having been judged a 
success.  A little over a decade later, collective liability was introduced in a 
preliminary manner in three aspects of the Canton maritime customs during the 
1752-59 administration of Hoppo Li Yongbiao, a neiwufu bondservant. 
The 1829 reception of a Chinese idea by the American State of New York was 
thus one stage in a long chain of transplants.  Traditional Chinese concepts of 
collective responsibility had been employed by the Imperial Household Department 
as part of its regulation of several businesses monopolized for the benefit of the 
Emperor.  After having been tested in the ginseng administration, and applied in 
certain aspects of the administration of the hong merchants in the 1750s, collective 
liability for the foreign debt of individual hong merchants was imposed on the guild 
on a general basis in 1780.  The idea traveled to New York State in 1829 where it was 
adapted and used as a basis of the first bank deposit insurance program, which 
operated from 1829 to 1866.  Various American states subsequently adopted 
guaranty fund bank insurance, inspired by the New York example, which existed 
for different periods and with uniformly poor success over the following century.  
In 1933, bank deposit insurance was implemented on a national level in the United 
States, under a system that adopted from and improved upon the guaranty fund 
model that was introduced in New York in 1829.  Explicit bank deposit insurance 
programs have since been adopted in over one hundred countries worldwide, all 
based upon but varying in degrees from the “American” model of 1933. 
This originally Chinese idea has traveled far, through Manchu, American and 
other hands.  It has been repeatedly adapted to local situations, and has been used 
by many different societies at different times and places.  Its reception in the West 
was as part of a contemporary trend of interest in Chinese ideas.  This trend has 
been described by scholars such as Donald Lach and Edwin Van Kley, in Asia in the 
Making of Europe (1993)31 and A. Owen Aldridge, in The Dragon and the Eagle: The 
Presence of China in the American Enlightenment (1993).32  This international chain 
of uses and adaptations of a legal idea also conforms with the concept of “legal 
transplants” that was introduced by the scholar Alan Watson in his 1974 book under 
that title.33  Drawing principally from his substantial knowledge of Roman law, 
Watson showed the wide influence and diffusion of transplanted legal ideas.  
Moved from one place to another, in whole or in part, understood or 
misunderstood, transplanted legal ideas have often thrived in their new home.  
Watson tells us that “A successful legal transplant -- like that of a human organ -- 
will grow in its new body, and become part of that new body just as the rule or 
institution would have continued to develop in its parent system.”  Under this 
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criterion, this series of transplants achieved technical success at any number of 
stages of its journey across time and cultures. 
The idea arrived in the United States in the context of parallel financial crises 
that occurred in the year 1829.  At Canton, in China, the group of hong merchants 
who were licensed to conduct China's maritime foreign trade was depleted in 
number, deep in debt, and experiencing difficulty recruiting new members.  In the 
State of New York, in the United States of America, a series of bank failures had 
raised concerns about the trustworthiness of the paper currency the state permitted 
private banks to print and circulate.  Each crisis was different, and each was 
addressed by the responsible local authorities.  Although the world was closely 
bound by ties of international trade in 1829 and information was moving with 
increasing speed between East and West, news of these crises did not travel.  Just as 
the crisis in New York was unknown in Canton, the crisis in Canton was likewise 
unknown in New York. 
1C. The 1829 Crisis in the State of New York 
The New York crisis was primarily about currency.  As the early United States 
lacked domestic sources of silver, the nation depended on private bank notes and on 
imported silver coins for its money supply.   The bulk of the money in circulation in 
1829 was paper banknotes issued by private banks.  There were no national 
banknotes, and would not be until 1863.  Bank failures, which became more 
common as banks themselves became more common, caused immediate pain on the 
street.  When a bank failed its banknotes failed as well.  New York had experienced 
multiple bank failures in the late 1820s, despite various attempted reforms including 
the imposition of double liability on the shareholders of failed banks.  While some 
muttered against the use of paper banknotes at all, they were a practical necessity 
given the shortage of silver and the rapidly developing nation's voracious appetite 
for money.  The critical issue became keeping the paper currency sound, i.e., 
assuring the ready convertibility of banknotes into coined silver or gold. 
Individual states licensed private banks which in turn issued banknotes.  Tested 
by early bank failures, the states developed differing approaches to supervision of 
the proliferating banks and their circulating paper.  The leading states recognized 
both that a sound currency supported commerce, and that it would spur economic 
development.  In the nineteenth century much of the business of America was 
focused on development -- of land, infrastructure, trade and manufacturing.  That 
development required an adequate supply of sound money. 
A banking crisis was looming when Martin Van Buren was sworn into office as 
Governor of the State of New York on 1 January 1829.  Alarmed about the condition 
of the state's banks, the legislature had denied all applications for either the issuance 
or renewal of bank charters in 1827 and again in 1828.  The charters of the majority 
of New York's banks were up for renewal within the next two or three years, and 
there was deep concern that some of these banks were in an unsafe condition. 
At this juncture, Governor Van Buren was approached by Joshua Forman with a 
proposal for a bank deposit insurance program.  Forman was a respected public 
figure with financial experience developed as a lawyer, merchant, judge, real estate 
developer (founder of the City of Syracuse), legislator, and proponent of public 
improvement projects, notably the Erie Canal of which he was an early advocate.  
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The Governor was impressed, and by the end of January 1829 he had submitted 
Forman's proposal to the legislature as “worthy of your deliberate attention.” 
The plan took its inspiration from the “regulation of the Hong merchants in 
Canton, where a number of men, each acting separately, have by the grant of the 
government the exclusive right of trading with foreigners, and are all made liable 
for the debts of each in case of failure.”  According to Forman, the Canton Guaranty 
System had “stood the test of experience for seventy years” and had given the hong 
merchants rock solid credit worldwide.  The promise to pay of a “Hong merchant 
ha[d] acquired a credit over the whole world, not exceeded by that of any other 
security.”  The plan he proposed, which called both for deposit insurance and for 
public supervision of the insured banks, made rapid progress through the New 
York legislature.  It was approved with amendments in March and was signed into 
law on 2 April 1829.  Under the Safety Fund system, every bank chartered by the 
State of New York was required to remit one half percent of its paid-in capital to the 
Safety Fund annually until it had contributed a total of three percent of capital to the 
fund.  If a bank failed, its assets would be liquidated and the Safety Fund would pay 
as much as was necessary to satisfy all claims against the failed bank. 
1D. The Crisis in the Chinese Port of Canton: 1829 
The year 1829 found the experiment with unlimited collective liability for foreign 
debt at Canton approaching its fiftieth anniversary under great stress.  Since the 
early 1700s, the conduct of China’s maritime trade with the West had been vested in 
a small monopoly group known as the hong merchants.  The Chinese government 
required the hong merchants to monitor foreign merchants and to collect taxes as a 
condition of their trading license.  In addition to conducting an enormous import 
and export trade, these merchants also functioned as a bottom tier of the Chinese 
civil bureaucracy, serving as “quasi diplomats” (in the words of Weng Eang 
Cheong), mediating between restive Western traders and officials posted to Canton 
by the Qing government. 
Success as a hong merchant thus required both: (1) strong skills as an 
export/import commodity trader; and (2) knowledge of and the ability to work 
within the regulatory constraints of the “Canton System,” the rules which governed 
China’s maritime trade with the West.  The “Canton System” was thus similar to 
many regulated businesses of the present day.  Knowledge of government 
regulations combined with the ability to work smoothly with sometimes demanding 
regulators could be every bit as important as skills in the stated line of business. 
By 1829, the viability of the hong merchant monopoly was threatened.  The 
volume of trade had soared since 1780, but so too had financial demands on the 
hong merchants individually and as a guild.  Since 1780, the hong merchant body 
had been required to pay all the foreign debts of any member who became 
insolvent.  The mechanism used for repayment was the Consoo Fund, maintained 
by the guild, which was to have been funded through a levy imposed on the trade 
(the hangyong), originally set in the amount of three percent (3%) but often collected 
in a higher amount.  The original stated purpose of this tax was to fund the guaranty 
of foreign debts as well as other obligations due from the hong merchants to the 
Qing state.  The burden of taxation on the hong merchants, both collective 
(hangyong) and direct (individual exactions) had since grown, driven both by 
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mounting needs of the government in the difficult years of the early nineteenth 
century and by official venality.  The high level of taxation had driven much 
legitimate trade -- in tea and other commodities -- outside the monopoly and into 
the hands of unlicensed “outside shopmen.”  The outside shopmen offered sharply 
lower prices for quality staple goods, and arranged either to smuggle them onto 
purchasers' ships or to deliver the discounted goods through weak “junior” hongs 
(while bribing hong proprietors and customs officers to look the other way).  This 
unlicensed competition reduced effective tax collections and had the effect of 
increasing the tax burden on the residual legal trade. 
At one time, membership in the thirteen hongs had been seen as a path to riches.  
By 1829, however, the prospect of becoming a hong merchant had long lost 
attraction on the streets of Canton.  The official trading license was expensive, came 
with a high risk of financial loss (and dreadful penalties after failure), offered little 
prospect of a reasonable return on investment, and, even if one succeeded against 
these odds, it had been impossible since at least 1815 to retire from the guild or to 
withdraw one’s capital. 
As of 1829 the hong merchant body had dwindled to seven firms, of which only 
three were truly solvent.  In that year, Governor-General Li Hongbin directed the 
hong merchants to recruit substantial people from among their friends.  While the 
call produced some shaky recruits, it did not strengthen the hong merchant guild or 
arrest its decline.  Individual hong merchant failures continued in the years that 
followed, and their debts continued to be shifted to the surviving hongs under the 
collective guaranty.  Within thirteen years, the Canton System and the Canton 
Guaranty System were over, terminated by the treaties signed at the end of the First 
Anglo-Chinese (Opium) War of 1839-1842.  Licensed “hong merchants” had no 
further role in the maritime foreign trade of the port of Canton.  The total accrued 
liability for foreign debts of failed hong merchants as of 1842 was discharged with a 
lump sum payment of $3 million in cash delivered to the British consul at Canton on 
23 July 1843. 
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CHAPTER 2:  
SOURCES OF THE CANTON GUARANTY SYSTEM 
The early Manchu rulers of China had no interest in banking regulation.  Their goals 
were to first complete the “great enterprise” of conquest and then to consolidate 
control over the entire nation.  After years of careful preparation, the Manchus took 
Beijing in 1644 and achieved a surprisingly rapid conquest of Northern China.1  
Progress was much more difficult in the coastal south, far from Beijing, where the 
struggle raged on another forty years.  After the devastated region had been 
brought under control, the Kangxi Emperor opened the south to maritime foreign 
trade.  The regional economy responded quickly and positively to the stimulus.  The 
Manchus sought the benefits of trade, but at the same time felt it important to 
maintain order among the traders and to assure the flow of customs tax revenues to 
Beijing.  During the eighteenth century a body of rules, known as the Canton 
System, was evolved to advance these objectives.  The regulatory structure that was 
developed for Canton drew on both Manchu and Chinese traditions.  A collective 
guaranty of foreign debt -- the Canton Guaranty System -- was imposed in 1780 as a 
modification of those rules. 
2A. Conquest and Pacification 
The Manchu began as a Jurchen Mongol tribe in the Liao valley in what is now 
Northeast China, a region of forest, steppe and agricultural lands.2  Under a series of 
talented and aggressive rulers, notably the “great progenitor” Nurhaci (1559-1626), 
they rose rapidly from their original position, as one of a number of tribes 
contending for regional prominence, to a potent military force with ambitions to 
control China itself.  Nurhaci organized a coalition of Jurchen Mongol tribes under 
his Aisin Gioro clan as leader, and bound them together culturally and militarily.3  
The coalition was defined as “Manchu,” which involved the creation of a written 
Manchu language (an adaptation of Mongol script).  It was consolidated under a 
military system in which Manchu forces were organized in eight “banner” 
formations.4  These banner forces carried out the “great enterprise” of conquest.  The 
banner system was then adapted to control and to defend China itself. 
Trading relations contributed to the rise of the Manchu and funded the cost of 
conquest.  Their homeland was rich in natural resources, which the Jurchen 
Mongols exploited through hunting, fishing and agriculture, and active 
participation in regional trade in products such as furs and ginseng.5  Several 
principal Manchu leaders, including Nurhaci, had early experience as traders.6  The 
clan gradually developed an expertise in the ginseng trade and accumulated a 
monopoly of the import licenses issued by the Ming to sell their scarce and prized 
wild ginseng in China.7  Rich profits realized from satisfying the enormous late 
Ming demand for high quality ginseng purchased weapons and contributed directly 
to the rise of Manchu military power.8  The Japanese scholar Inaba Iwakichi 
therefore observed that the Qing dynasty “rose on ginseng and fell on opium.”9 
On 26 April 1644 the last Ming Emperor committed suicide by hanging himself 
atop Coal Hill in the Forbidden City in Beijing.  The capitol had fallen to rebels 
under Li Zicheng the day before.  Manchu forces then streamed through the Shanhai 
Pass into China and defeated Li Zicheng's army in a great battle on 27 May 1644.  
The victorious Qing army entered a stunned Beijing without a fight.  Mark Elliott 
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offers a vivid description of the Manchu entry on 5 June 1644.  Local residents “no 
doubt stared in curious amazement at the shaved foreheads and dangling queues of 
the Manchu soldiers riding by, daggers at their waists and short recurve bows of 
horn and wood by their sides.”10 
Stalwarts of the Ming Dynasty made their last stand against the Manchus in 
South China.  Contending forces included Manchu military, Ming remnants, 
peasant rebels, turncoats, and commanders who were honored by the Qing for their 
services by being named hereditary feudal princes.  The Manchu forces were soon 
caught up in bloody repression of local rebellions against the imposition of the 
queue, a traditional hairstyle of the northeast in which the forehead was shaved and 
remaining hair was wound up as a long braid.11  In the south, the land was a 
constant challenge to the Manchu cavalry, which made difficult progress through 
often mountainous terrain with few roads and a countryside intersected with rivers 
and canals.12  The city of Canton, in Qing hands as of January 1647, soon thereafter 
rose in rebellion.13  It was besieged by Manchu forces under Shang Kexi for ten 
months in 1650.  The defense was broken with an artillery barrage on 24 November 
1650, after which the invaders plundered Canton with a horrific slaughter of the 
populace.14  The city was devastated, but was gradually reconstructed by the 
Manchu rulers. 
“Local tradition affirms that the burial of the dead, neglected by the 
conquerors, was brought about by the exertions of a Buddhist priest, who 
attempted, single handed, to convey the corpses outside the city gates and 
give them decent burial.  While engaged in his task -- carrying a corpse on 
his shoulders -- he was met by Shang Kexi, who asked him jeeringly whether 
he intended to bury all the slain?  The priest replied that he did not look at 
the magnitude of the task or attempt to calculate its possibility; he merely did 
what was in his power and left the rest to Heaven.  The spirit of the reply is 
said to have so pleased Shang Kexi, that he ordered the camp-followers to 
lend the priest their aid, and thus the bodies of the slaughtered were heaped 
in one huge pile and burned outside the east gate of the city, where the ashes 
were buried beneath an enormous mound which still exists and bears the 
significant name of the General Grave.”15 
Much of the forty year struggle for control of South China took place along the 
coast.  Initially, as later described by the Kangxi Emperor (who reigned from 1661 to 
1722), “the following ports were opened for trade: Tianjin in Zhili, Dengzhou in 
Shandong, Yuntaishan in Jiangsu, Ningbo in Zhejiang, Zhangzhou in Fujian, and 
Macao in Guangdong.  Later on, it was only maritime rebellions that necessitated 
closing these ports.”16  Resistance on and near the Island of Taiwan was led by 
members of the family of Zheng Chenggong (Koxinga), who were and had long 
been heavily involved in international trade.17  The Qing banned maritime trade in 
1656, seeking to strangle the Taiwan resistance.18  Zheng forces attempted a major 
assault on Nanjing from the sea in September 1659, which triggered a more forceful 
crackdown.19  From 1661 through 1683, in order to prevent supplies from reaching 
the Zheng forces on Taiwan, the Qing directed and fiercely enforced a wholesale 
removal of the coastal population as much as ten miles or more inland from the 
adjacent mainland coast.20  The only exception was Macao, which was spared from 
this exercise of conquering will by a combination of good fortune and determined 
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diplomacy.21  The Qing ordered all oceangoing vessels burned; “not an inch of wood 
is allowed to be in the water.”22  The coast was devastated and the population 
suffered terribly.  One source records that: 
“People continued to drift around, unable to figure out how to survive.  
Fathers and sons, husbands and wives, abandoned each other; with 
anguished cries they parted ways.  A son for a peck of grain, a daughter for a 
hundred cash for purchase by the powerful.”23 
As was observed by the Dutch Embassy of 1655-57, “you may ride in some 
Places [in Guangdong Province] for several miles together, and not see a Town or 
Village Standing, only great heaps of Stones, and the Ruines of many Places, which 
have been formerly very famous for Trade.”24  The Zheng forces finally surrendered 
on Taiwan in October 1683, after a crushing naval defeat by Qing forces under 
admiral Shi Lang.25  Two years earlier, Manchu forces had suppressed the Revolt of 
the Three Feudatories, which marked the end of the era of the semi-independent 
princes appointed by the Qing in the early stages of conquest and their feudal 
privileges.26 
The Qing rulers recognized that trade would help restore the badly damaged 
Guangdong economy and build the loyalty of the people.27  In contrast to the Ming, 
which distrusted and indeed prohibited foreign trade for most of its history, the 
Qing had a positive view of trade founded in long beneficial experience in regional 
trade from the Manchu homeland.28  The Kangxi Emperor strongly favored 
economic restoration of coastal regions in the interests of maintaining public order.  
In his directives, the Emperor encouraged officials to seek to achieve “prosperous 
people through trade” (tongshang yumin),29 to “enrich the state by developing trade” 
(tongshang yuguo), and to “cherish merchants” (xushang).30  These objectives have 
deep roots in Chinese thought.31  The Qianlong Emperor observed in 1748 that it 
was generally better to leave matters concerning the market to the people and allow 
free circulation of goods because government interference, however well 
intentioned, often failed to improve matters.32  In 1683, however, the need for 
stimulus was urgent.  Not only the south, but all of China suffered under an 
economic depression in the early Kangxi period, worsened by the heavy costs of 
suppression of the Revolt of the Three Feudatories.33 
As of December 1683, two months after the victory on Taiwan, the Qing began to 
lift the ban on Chinese navigation overseas.  At least fifty large and small coastal 
ports in four provinces were opened to foreign trade.34  The Kangxi Emperor 
believed that opening these ports would benefit the national economy and also the 
livelihood of the general population (guoji minsheng).35  Trade in military supplies 
and goods which were believed to be potentially useful to rebels, only, was still 
banned.36  Of the newly opened ports, Xiamen [Amoy], Guangzhou [Canton], Macao 
and Ningbo attracted Western traders.  At times, these ports competed among 
themselves for Western business.37  Initially, “the ships were few and the customs 
duties meager,”38 but the region enjoyed a rapid recovery under Kangxi's open trade 
policies.39  Coastal residents returned, agriculture was restored, devastated junk 
fleets were rebuilt, and foreign and regional trade rapidly increased.  Between 1685 
through 1688 some 467 private  Chinese vessels sailed to Japan; during the prior 
four years only twelve ships had made the voyage.40 
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As the Kangxi Emperor later explained, “Why have I opened trade along the 
coast?  The development of maritime trade will benefit the people of Fujian and 
Guangdong.  As the people of these two provinces get rich and commercial 
commodities smoothly circulate, this prosperity will benefit other provinces.”41  The 
powerful recovery that flowed from the trade liberalization policies of the late 
seventeenth century parallels China's late twentieth century economic revival in the 
wake of the “Cultural Revolution” of 1965-1971.  Trade was encouraged by the 
modern Chinese political leadership -- ‘to get rich is glorious’ -- as a means to spur 
recovery and maintain social order in those difficult years.  In each case commerce 
was used to ignite the extraordinary energy of the Chinese people and to restore 
economic health after a period of crisis.  The economies of these two eras were 
profoundly different, but the results of liberalization were the same. 
In implementing an open trade policy, the Kangxi Emperor rejected Ming 
Dynasty policy that restricted foreign trade to limited business conducted in tandem 
with missions bearing tribute to the Chinese Emperor.  The “tribute system” 
continued, but under Qing Dynasty policy it was separated from foreign trade.42  
The Kangxi Emperor acted to assure that tax revenue from foreign trade would flow 
smoothly to the Qing state.  In 1684 the maritime customs system (haiguan) was 
defined as having jurisdiction over the taxation of goods exported and imported by 
maritime ships, and trusted Manchu officials were appointed as the heads of the 
crucial Guangdong and Fujian maritime customs.43  China's growing maritime 
foreign trade yielded substantial customs revenues thereafter.  Scholarly estimates 
place the value of trade between China and nontribute countries in Europe and 
Southeast Asia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries at more than 
5.4 million taels ($7.5 million) annually.44 
The Qing recognized the dangers inherent in maritime trade.  Successful as 
conquerors after a forty year struggle, they knew that anti-Manchu feeling existed 
among the majority ethnic Han population.  The new rulers were wary that trade 
might facilitate contact with rebels who had escaped to the nearby Philippines and 
South China Sea (nanyang).  They were equally watchful for anti-Qing or other 
unconventional ideas, coming from abroad, which might stir up the coastal 
population. 45  Further rebel activity in and near Taiwan led to reimposition of the 
ban on regional overseas trade in 1717.  It was then gradually lifted in the years 
through 1727.46  During this later ban, European ships continued to be allowed to 
call at Chinese ports, and general Chinese trade with Japan, the Ryukyu Islands 
(including Okinawa) and Annam (Vietnam) was also continued.47 
As masters of a newly pacified land, the Qing rulers closely watched and were 
wary of the sometimes aggressive and seemingly uncivilized conduct of some of the 
Westerners who came to China to do business.  Their burgeoning maritime 
commerce served Chinese interests, but the behavior of certain foreigners caused 
Qing officials to think constantly about public order and national defense.  The first 
English expedition to China, which reached Canton in 1637 under Captain John 
Weddell, made itself memorable by using gunfire to force its way into the Pearl 
River.48  In 1724 the hong merchant Youngqua was placed in chains by the Hoppo  
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Figure 1. The Kangxi Emperor , reigned 1661 to 1722. 
(The Palace Museum, Beijing). 
20 CHAPTER 2 
after his French tenant drew his sword on one of the Hoppo’s officers.49  In 1742,  
Commodore Anson of HMS Centurion threatened to force his way up the Pearl 
River to Whampoa.  In response, an old law was revived prohibiting foreign 
warships beyond the Bogue forts.  Regulations were announced banning the 
firing of ships’ guns in port and requiring commercial vessels to surrender their 
cannons while in port, but these rules were largely ignored.50  Commodore 
Anson then took his reprovisioned warship out to sea where he captured the 
annual Spanish galleon from Acapulco to Manila, Nuestra Señora de Covadonga, 
laden with £1,500,000 in silver.  Anson brought his prize back to the Pearl River, 
where he disputed the customs duties assessed by the Chinese on the Centurion 
and the captured galleon.51  After the 1754 death of a British sailor in fighting 
between French and British sailors, the Canton officials assigned what came to be 
called “French Island” to the French for recreation and “Danes Island” to the 
British and Danes for the same purpose.52  On 17 August 1781 Captain John 
McClary of the English country ship Dadoloy captured the private Dutch ship 
Goede Hoop at the Whampoa anchorage.  The Dutch protested to the Chinese, 
who scrambled some 2,000 troops and assembled a flotilla of private and 
government vessels which hemmed in the captured vessel while angrily 
demanding an end to this offense against Chinese sovereignty over inner waters.  
The Governor-General, Governor and Hoppo wrote the English supercargoes on 
9 September 1781, stating: “This is to give notice to the supercargoes of the 
different nations in order that they may inform their countrymen that the 
Emperor will not suffer them to bring war into his dominions, and that whoever 
does so in the future shall be treated as an enemy.”  Captain McClary then 
yielded his prize to the cheering Chinese flotilla and sailed off.  He carried with 
him an iron chest containing pearls and gold consigned by Armenian merchants 
in India, with an invoice value of 89,128 rupees.  Not long thereafter, Captain 
McClary further irritated the Chinese authorities by plundering a Canton junk he 
seized in the Bangka Straits, claiming that the goods he found on it were actually 
Dutch property.53  On 19 March 1787, The hong merchant Howqua I (Lin 
Shimao) was taken hostage by a putative private creditor.  He was held in the 
Imperial Factory by Mr. Dormer, purser of the Nottingham (a vessel Howqua I 
had not secured), who claimed that his hostage had somehow agreed to guaranty 
a failed transaction “with Small Merchants and Persons of that Description.”  He 
had no proof of guaranty, and the hong merchant refused to sign the new 
guaranty Dormer demanded.  Howqua I was released, Dormer was 
reprimanded, and the EIC ordered the disgruntled supposed creditor to leave 
Canton on the next ship.54  In 1808 thirteen British warships landed hundreds of 
soldiers and occupied a fort at Macao on the pretext of protecting Macao from 
the French navy.  The Chinese authorities cut off British trade and marched an 
army in response, which caused the British forces to depart.  Governor-General 
Wu Xiongguang was removed from office and ordered banished to Xinjiang for 
failure to respond sternly enough to the British occupation.55  On 21 April 1833, 
private British country trader James Innes set fire to the Customs House, using 
rockets and blue lights, to express outrage at official inaction against a Chinese 
who he claimed had assaulted him.56  The preceding is simply a collection of 
incidents, not a comprehensive catalog of aggressive activities.  Fights -- notably 
among foreign sailors or between sailors and the local population -- occurred 
regularly, as did occasional murders of Chinese by foreigners, often enough in 
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these brawls.57  The Qing government had been given reason to consider 
Westerners a potential external risk to domestic order. 
The Qing were also concerned about the potentially disruptive internal effects of 
unfair or deceptive business practices by Chinese who traded with Westerners.  In 
the present, they saw shadows of the abusive trading practices that arose in the 
illicit maritime trade of the late Ming period.  The wokou (“Japanese pirate”) 
depredations of the mid to late 1500s were a particularly bitter memory.  The wokou 
were Japanese and Chinese who had traded between China and Japan.  As foreign 
trade was illegal, and subject to periodic crackdowns, the sea traders relied on 
prominent Chinese families which began to use the strained situation against 
them.58 
“They received payment in advance from the Japanese traders but never 
delivered any cargoes or kept the cargoes without paying the cost.  Waiting 
off coast in vain, the Japanese traders were desperately worried about the 
consequences if they went back to their lords with empty hands.  With no 
other alternative, they resorted to violence.  The prominent official families, 
acting for their own advantage, urged the local administration to expel them 
by force.  But at the same time, they played the tricky game of deliberately 
informing their partners of the imminent military attacks just to make sure 
they could manage to escape in time for the gratefulness of the Japanese 
might bring them further benefit.  After several similar occasions, the 
Japanese merchants became aware that they had been cheated.”59 
Vengeance by the Japanese traders escalated into large-scale raids, and even 
expeditions inland or up the Yangzi River, which caused terrible damage and took 
years of effort and great expense to suppress.60   The Qianlong Emperor had the 
history of unpaid foreign merchants turning to piracy in mind during the years in 
which the Canton Guaranty System was developed.  In a 1777 edict which harshly 
criticized official handling of a relatively minor foreign debt case, the Emperor 
stressed the foreign relations importance of the matter. 
“Moreover, our resolution of this point is not just for the particular case at 
issue.  It comes after reflecting deeply on the fact that the dynasties of Han, 
Tang, Song and Ming, during their last years, came to ignore the proper way 
of showing benevolent disposition towards people from afar.  When the 
foreign people were weak and incapable [to fight against China], [the rulers 
of the said dynasties] despised them and insulted or ill-treated them; while 
when they were strong and [China] got into trouble [with them], then [the 
Chinese rulers] showed their fear and sought for some kind of concession.  
[They] went with this type of appeasement, and acted without thinking.  
Consequently, serious ruptures occurred, and [the state of affairs] became 
unredeemable.  The failure of the Song as well as the fall of the Ming was 
caused by mistakes of this kind.  How can we not take warning [by these 
precedents]?”61 
2B. The Organization of Merchants Engaged in Maritime Trade 
Official management of Chinese merchants engaged in foreign trade from Canton 
dates from 1686, after the opening of foreign trade.  In that year Governor Li 
Shizhen licensed a group of successful merchants as foreign goods firms (yanghuo 
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hang).62  The thriving business of these official merchants is described in a 
contemporary poem by Chu Dajun (1630-1696): 
“Ocean-going ships compete to export the wares of official merchants 
As Shizimen opens on the two oceans 
The Guangdong silks and satins are highly prized 
And silver piles up in the thirteen hongs.”63 
In these early years, the leading Chinese traders were spry and entrepreneurial.  
Their ships came and went from many places, notably the Philippines, Batavia and 
Annam (Vietnam).  Some did business with Westerners in China, but that trade was 
insignificant.  Early Chinese specialists in European trade were itinerant, associated 
primarily with home ports in neighboring Fujian Province such as Xiamen [Amoy] 
or Quanzhou.64  They traveled to the ports European vessels visited according to a 
seasonal rhythm that long marked the trade.  Their developing European business 
was fit into a timetable with other mercantile activities.  The Western season began 
with the arrival of foreign ships with the southwest monsoon in about May or June 
and ended at the latest by mid-January when the ships left with the northeast 
monsoon.65 
European trade was exempted from the renewed ban on overseas navigation 
which was imposed by the Kangxi Emperor from 1717 through 1727.  The ban took 
the bloom off the regional junk trade and ended hong merchant involvement in it, at 
least for that period.  While trade with Japan was also exempted, it too suffered, due 
to the austerity regime of the Japanese Shogun Yoshimune and falling Chinese 
demand for imported Japanese copper.66 
From the early days of the trade, there was a divergence between the poetic 
image of hong merchant wealth and the less opulent reality of conducting trade 
between two worlds.  While little detail survives about the finances of the early 
hong merchants, some became greatly indebted to foreign and domestic creditors.  
The unresolved burden of this debt -- and mounting interest on it -- placed an 
ongoing burden on their businesses.  For example, many of the hong merchants are 
known to have been deeply in debt to official patrons and Armenian and other 
creditors in the early 1720s, in large part due to losses on tea shipments to Batavia.67  
The British EIC noted in its records in May 1723 that “almost all the merchants are 
broke, and there are not above two or three to be depended on for a contract.”68  In 
July 1723, the EIC noted that Suqua, Cowlo and several other merchants who had 
just arrived from Xiamen (Amoy) stated “that they have built large Hongs at Amoy, 
in order to live there, for that they can’t bear the impositions of the Mandarines 
here, any longer, and wish the English would go there.”69  The causes of hong 
merchant debt in the early 1700s were similar to those noted a century later: 
inadequate capitalization, heavy exactions by government officials, high operating 
and living expenses, and lack of business credit. 
The lack of affordable domestic credit was a severe problem.  The general trend 
of hong merchant history from the early 1700s forward is of a growing trade, and 
that trade is believed to have been generally profitable.70  The demands of carrying 
on this increasing and highly competitive business strained hong firms from the 
start, and many turned to Western merchants for high interest rate credit.71  
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Foreigners extended credit in the form of cash loans, which were used to finance 
large volume purchases, or in the form of import goods to be paid for in the future.  
Some domestic suppliers extended credit for large purchases by hong merchants, 
but a deposit was normally required.72  Prior to the 1760 ban on foreign debt and 
mortgages, some foreign loans were secured by mortgages on real estate owned by 
hong firms.73  The seemingly chronic indebtedness of the hong merchant firms had 
become a serious issue for the Western traders by at least the 1750s.74 
The hong merchants had few other credit options.  The principal lenders in 
China during this period were either family members or pawnshops.  The latter 
grew in number and respectability during the eighteenth century, rising from 9,904 
in 1723 to about 25,000 by the early 1800s.75  Idle government funds were advanced 
to pawnshops to be lent out at interest, under a policy known as fashang shengxi (put 
the fund with merchants to produce interest).76  There was no such thing as 
commercial finance.77  George Staunton noted in 1810 that it was a “frequent 
practice in China, to lend upon pledges; and [that] accordingly, the shops of money-
lenders, where deposits may be made of any kind of personal property, are 
extremely numerous in all parts of the empire, and, in general, upon a scale of 
greater respectability than establishments of a similar nature in Europe.”  He 
viewed the high interest rates and scarcity of credit in China as resulting from the 
“comparatively vague and undefined” state of property rights under Chinese law 
and difficulties enforcing such rights, adding: 
“In a state of things so unfavorable to the accumulation and transfer of 
property, there cannot at any time be much floating capital; and the value of 
that capital, as far as it is denoted by the interest which it bears, it is natural 
to expect, will be high in proportion to its scarcity.  In other words, where 
there are many borrowers and few lenders, and where it forms no part of the 
system of the government to grant to the former any peculiar degree of 
protection or encouragement, it seems a necessary consequence, that the 
latter will both demand and obtain a more than ordinary compensation in 
return for the use of his property.  Trade, therefore, as far as it requires such 
aid, cannot be so extensively carried on, as it is in those countries, in which 
there being more available capital, that capital is procurable at a cheaper rate, 
and accordingly a smaller return of profit found adequate to the charges of 
commercial adventure.”78 
Undercapitalized hongs generally lacked the collateral required for pawnbroker 
loans, or did not have rich family members to call upon, or had previously drawn as 
much as family resources could bear.  Credit was not to be had within the guild 
except on rare occasions.  The wealthy hong merchants were reluctant to lend to the 
lesser merchants, because they could not offer good security, and were often 
patently unstable.79  So it was that the hong merchant Goqua II (Xie Yuren of the 
Dongyu hang), who had long borrowed from the British EIC as a lender of last 
resort, turned again to the EIC for credit in June 1828, saying that “no one [else] will 
help me with a loan.”80 
The difficult trading conditions of the 1720s led firms with a history of trading 
with Westerners to respond by building up that side of their businesses, exploiting 
existing connections in ports such as Manila and Batavia and good working 
relations with European traders.  These were also years of outreach by Western 
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national trading firms, which worked to develop more direct and therefore more 
efficient trade from the China coast to Europe.81  As Canton became the lead port for 
China's developing trade with the West, the formerly itinerant Chinese traders 
began to settle there, along with returning overseas Chinese traders with close ties 
to the Philippines and Batavia.  The seaport was in flux.  Newcomers were rising to 
prominence in Canton's trade with the West, notably Puankhequa I (Pan Zhencheng 
of the Tongwen Hong) who had lived and worked for years in Manila.82  The foreign 
trading community took root and grew up on the west side of Canton, in the area 
where the trading ships offices of the former Song and Ming dynasties had been 
located.  These establishments became famous as the Thirteen Hongs and the 
Foreign Factories, the business premises of the Chinese and Western traders 
respectively.83 
In the early 1700s, China's trade from Canton with Western merchants was 
managed through a series of chief merchants -- notably Hunsunquin, Cawsanqua 
(Cudgin), and Suqua (Cumshaw).  Each had close ties with officials and used those 
ties to control or to obtain advantage in trade.84  In the early years monopoly trading 
rights were sometimes purchased by an individual or group from the Canton 
officials.85  The favored purchaser might in turn subcontract trading rights with 
particular ships to other merchants.86  Individuals who traded under the name 
“Emperors Merchant” appeared at several foreign trade ports, seeking to enforce 
monopoly trading rights said to have been acquired from the Kangxi Emperor’s 
fourth son, the future Yongzheng Emperor.  The Emperor's Merchant who arrived 
at Canton in 1704 was an unsuccessful salt merchant who had acquired a monopoly 
of that season’s trade for 42,000 taels ($58,333).87  He sought to assert a general 
monopoly of Canton’s foreign trade, but was rebuffed through the joint efforts of 
the European and Chinese merchants.88 
To secure a collective monopoly of the Chinese side of the trade, a combination 
of the hong merchant body was attempted at Xiamen (Amoy) in 1704, at the behest 
of the local Emperor's Merchant.  The organization did not last long.89  In the course 
of the 1700s, the hong merchants tried on several other occasions to organize as one 
body that could negotiate on a more equal footing with the European trading 
corporations.  In December 1720, a three-tiered guild of sixteen hong merchants 
known as the Cohong was organized at Canton with the support of the Hoppo and 
other officials.  As described by Weng Eang Cheong: 
“The members were graded into three groups of five, five and six 
merchants according to their wealth and ability.  Admission to the third and 
lowest grade cost 1,000 taels; presumably the price for entry to the other 
grades was higher.  Outsiders, known as shopkeepers, had to pay a levy of 40 
per cent and 20 per cent respectively, to participate in the tea and porcelain 
trades monopolized by the Hong merchants; newly arrived merchants were 
required to observe the guild’s practices and prices.”90 
The Cohong monopolized the tea and porcelain trades at Canton and set 
practices and prices which had to be observed by all foreign trade merchants.  
Establishment of the guild seems to have been motivated by the desire of the 
incumbent traders to control their rising local competitors (the former itinerants), as 
well as to manage external trade with the increasingly powerful European chartered 
companies.91  Although the organization was promptly dissolved in July 1721 under 
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British East India Company pressure, its three tiered organization and the distinct 
functions of each tier governed the conduct of trade for many years thereafter.92 
As Canton's maritime trade grew, official management of these outer seas 
merchants (the waiyang hang or yang hang) was separated from management of the 
junk trade merchants.  Business with Western traders was monopolized in the 
hands of the outer seas hong merchants.  The junk trade merchants were distinctly 
organized as the native ports hongs and as the Guangdong and Fujian hongs.  The 
business of the merchants of the native ports hong (bengang hang) was international, 
specialized in trade with and tribute from Southeast Asia.  The business of the 
merchants of the Guangdong and Fujian hong (fuchao hang) (Fu-jian, Chao-zhou 
hong) was regional, specialized in trade north up the coast.  The history of these two 
sea trading hong organizations is obscure, but these hong merchants did business 
with the merchants of the outer seas hong, and appear to have been regulated in a 
similar manner.93  Many other guild organizations existed at Canton during this 
period, and were subject to government regulation.  Popularly known as the 
“seventy-two hang,” the actual number of regulated guild organizations is said to 
have numbered ninety-seven firms.94 
Virtually all of the Western firms doing business in China in this era were 
themselves state-chartered monopolies.  Major European trading firms included the 
Dutch (Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie) (“VOC”),95 French (Compagnie Française 
des Indes Orientales),96 and Swedish (Svenska Ostindiska Companiet)97 East India 
Companies, as well as the aggressive and ultimately dominant British East India 
Company.98  Each of these companies had monopoly rights in their home market, 
granted by the state. Lesser players included the Danish East India Company 
(Asiatiske Kompagni),99 and private merchants operating under “flags of 
convenience,” including the Imperial or Ostend Company (Ostender Kompagnie) 
(operated by private traders under a charter purchased in 1717 from the Austrian 
Emperor),100 the Prussian or Emden company,101 and companies chartered by Genoa 
and by Tuscany.102  These entities attempted to avoid monopoly rights existing in 
their promoters' respective European home countries.  Private Spanish traders from 
Manila initially enjoyed privileged access to the important Chinese ports of 
Quanzhou and Xiamen [Amoy], granted early in the Qing period.103   The various 
European East India companies competed among themselves, in Europe and in 
Asia,104 and repeatedly sought to use their individual and collective power to seek 
economic advantage in trading with the licensed merchants of Canton.  The scale of 
their operations grew strongly during the eighteenth century.  While historical 
measurements of international trade are imprecise, various estimates have been 
offered.  Trade between Canton and Europe is said to have grown “at the rate of 4 
percent a year between 1719 and 1806, meaning that the volume of trade doubled 
every eighteen years.”105 
2C. Official Roots of Collective Responsibility 
The orderly conduct of maritime foreign trade at Canton was of direct personal 
importance to the Emperor at Beijing.  Tax revenues from the trade were an 
important source of income for the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu), 
which funded court operations.  The Emperor used Imperial Household 
Department personnel, posted to Canton, to monitor affairs at the port.  While the 
procedures used to control and tax trade at Canton were distinctive, they were 
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hardly unique.  Elements of this system are similar to the structure of other 
monopolized businesses which were managed by the Imperial Household 
Department for the benefit of the Court, notably the important salt and ginseng 
monopolies.  Each of these monopolies licensed merchants to trade in the 
monopolized matter, and held these merchants collectively responsible for unpaid 
taxes and other financial obligations to the state.  The Chinese hong merchant 
scholar Liang Jiabin quotes his hong merchant grandfather as having said that “The 
licensed merchants of the hong system were much like the Salt Merchants.”106  Liang 
was right. 
The Imperial Household Department (neiwufu) was at once the Emperor’s 
personal treasury, the principal landlord, primary employer of workers and 
artisans, and the ultimate recipient of much national tax revenue collection.107  Its 
key purpose was to maintain control of resources and enterprises to assure the 
financial stability of the imperial court.108  Most of the Department's personnel were 
Manchu.109  It was largely made up of bondservants (baoyi), a hereditary class 
organized in banners under the Manchu system.  The significance of bondservant 
status varied by banner and ethnicity and changed over time.  Many of the non-
Manchu baoyi had come into the organization as captives and were originally held in 
slave-like conditions.  At all times all bondservants owed a duty of service to the 
Court.110  Jonathan Spence calls the Department the Emperor's “personal 
bureaucracy.”  Spence's invaluable study of the service of the bondservant Cao Yin 
to the Kangxi Emperor shows that communication within this bureaucracy could be 
direct and frank.111  “The bondservants worked for the Emperor only; just because 
they were his servants, he protected them and appointed them to lucrative office, so 
that at some indeterminate point servility became prestige.”112  Spence posits that a 
significant purpose of the Emperor's use of this bureaucracy was to keep close 
watch on his household funds.113  From the early 1700s, the major customs and salt 
administration offices were usually held by Imperial Household Department 
bondservants, who were regularly moved from one post to another.114  The Hoppo 
often had prior experience elsewhere as a superintendent of customs or salt 
censor.115 
The Imperial Household Department operated several schools which educated 
the sons of bondservants of the upper three banners for service in the Department.116  
A small baoyi elite stood at the head of the Department, holding high office in 
Beijing or important financial positions in the provinces.117  While the Department 
worked with other units of the government under a policy called “Government and 
Imperial Household working in unison” (gongfu yiti), little about it was known to 
contemporary Chinese.  Its affairs were kept secret.118 
Taxes were collected by the Qing government under a quotum system.  At 
Canton, customs taxes were assessed and collected as regular quotum (zheng’e) or as 
surplus quotum (yingyu).119  Regular quotum proceeds went to the Ministry of 
Revenue (Hu Bu).  Surplus quotum went to the Imperial Household Department 
(neiwufu), bypassing the provincial government and the Board of Revenue.120  While 
the assessment of regular quotum did not formally change from 1686 to 1843, the 
amounts collected as surplus quotum and related charges increased substantially 
over the years.121  Surplus quotum revenue from the Canton customs averaged 
855,500 taels ($1,188,194) annually during the period 1796-1821, representing 38% on 
 SOURCES OF THE CANTON GUARANTY SYSTEM 27 
 
average of national annual surplus quotum collection during that period (2,261,301 
taels [$3,140,695]).122  These revenues represented a significant part of the court's 
annual budget.  Regular quotum revenue from the Canton customs exceeded 
1,000,000 taels ($1,388,889) annually by 1796.123 
The process by which the growing maritime trade of the port of Canton was 
taxed for the benefit of the Qing state was quite complicated, evolved over many 
years, and was a continual subject of vexation to Western traders who bemoaned the 
lack of a uniform customs table.124  Such a table did exist, an official list of import 
and export goods and applicable duties charged per unit (not by value), but these 
charges had been fixed as of 1727 and represented a small part of the total duties 
payable by any given ship.125  The Hoppo sought to maintain an equivalent balance 
between import and export duties charged.  An excess of one over the other, such as 
heavy export duties contrasted with minimal import duties, might indicate 
smuggling.126  The largest charges in terms of cash outlay were “anchorage” or 
“measurement” fees (assessed per vessel based on length and width measurements 
against which a uniform 20% discount was applied) and “cumshaw” or port charges 
(including the “emperor's present” which was 1,950 taels [$2,708] for English 
ships).127  Surtaxes and supplements proliferated over time, ultimately exceeding the 
basic duty many times over.128  The most prominent added charge was the tax 
imposed on the trade in 1780 to support the Consoo Fund (the hangyong levy), 
which ranged from as little as three percent to as much as seven percent depending 
on the exigencies of the moment.129  Other significant charges, such as “native 
tribute” of 55,000 taels ($76,389) due to the Emperor, as much as 100,000 taels 
($138,889) annually for singsong curiosities sent to Beijing, and the expense of forced 
purchases of ginseng which the Imperial Household Department had sent to the 
Hoppo for sale, all were deducted from the Consoo Fund.130  To encourage the 
importation of rice, a significant import duty discount was given to vessels carrying 
large rice cargoes.  Western traders made creative use of this rule in the open waters 
at Lintin Island, offloading inbound cargoes of opium onto waiting storeships and 
taking on waiting rice cargoes for a short and tax-advantaged last leg of their 
voyage into Chinese waters.131 
Customs duties were not collected on a current basis by the Qing government.  
They were required to be paid annually on the last day of the fiscal year of the 
Canton customs, a date that fell sometime between September and early November.  
In 1794, for example, the fiscal year ended on September 18th (the 25th day of the 
8th moon), triggering the collapse of Gonqua's tax-delinquent Eryi hang.132  Many 
financially troubled hong merchants took advantage of customs tax funds which 
were not due to be paid for up to twelve months, either by diverting them to other 
uses or by the expedient of “purchasing the privilege” of paying duties owed by 
others.  When a hong merchant “purchased the privilege” of paying duties he 
received a discounted (smaller) sum from a third party and accepted in return the 
legal obligation to pay the customs duties due from the third party to the 
government in full on the due date.  In reality this was a high interest rate short 
term loan, from a powerful and unforgiving involuntary lender (the Qing 
government).133  The consequences of treating duties as an interest-free loan from 
the state were frequently disastrous for the weak hongs. 
28 CHAPTER 2 
Tax collection performance was an important criterion for evaluating the work of 
Qing officials134  The quotum system provided a motivation to understate or delay 
actual proceeds so as to avoid creating a new benchmark and a higher quotum for 
the following year which might prove impossible to pay.135  Under the Qing statutes, 
if customs revenues came in at 10% (or more) below prior year revenues in any 
given year, the responsible officials could be held personally liable for the deficiency 
and also subjected to severe beating for the offense.136  This discouraged custom 
collections by the Hoppo in peak years of the trade.  During the 1780s, for example, 
trade surged.  Gross stated collections from the customs (shizheng) increased from 
450,000 taels ($625,000) in 1780 to 750,000 taels ($1,041,667) in 1786, and might have 
been greater than that.137  The Hoppo regularly halted trade at Canton once the tax 
quotum was reached during these years, lest increased trade generate a higher 
quotum target for future years.138  These revenues, and other fees and charges that 
were levied on foreign trade, contributed to the reputation of Canton postings 
among Qing officials as opportunities to grow rich.  Officials who had built up 
personal debts to the Imperial Household Department for failure to meet required 
tax quota at other postings were often appointed to the Canton customs.  The 
Canton position was viewed as an opportunity to pay down existing debt, the post 
rich enough on its own that existing debt was unlikely to get worse.139 
The ginseng monopoly, closely monitored by the Imperial Household 
Department, was an important traditional source of income for the Manchu rulers.  
To protect their homeland source of prized wild ginseng, the Qing closed 
Manchuria to immigration from China in 1668 and built “the famous willow 
palisade which stretched for several hundred miles in a great arc from the Wall at 
Shanhaiguan to the north of Kirin and southeastward to the Yalu river.”140  Wild 
ginseng production was organized for the benefit of the court, and bondservant 
officials of the Imperial Household Department were required to act as monopoly 
product salesmen.  Starting in 1757, a quantity of prime ginseng was sent annually 
to the officials in charge of the Lianghuai and Changlu salt monopolies, the 
Superintendents of the Imperial Silk Factories, and the Hoppo in charge of the 
maritime customs at Canton.  Each was responsible to sell his allocation, and to 
return cash proceeds to Beijing.141 
The ginseng monopoly was run by licensed merchants, who sent diggers into the 
Manchurian woods to find and return with the increasingly scarce fragile wild 
ginseng.  Overharvesting caused ginseng yields to decrease sharply through the 
1700s and into the early 1800s.  As of 1739, the Court imposed collective 
responsibility on the ginseng merchant group.  The body was made collectively 
liable for the actions of any one member of the merchant group, and was forced to 
guarantee that both the quality and quantity of ginseng collected would meet an 
overall quotum.  As official quota were set high, it was hard to meet them.142  Where 
a given quotum was not met, the guarantor had to pay an amount set by the Court 
as equivalent to the value of the shortfall.  To the extent he was unable to do so, the 
other merchants had to pay the deficiency.143  As of the early 1800s, diggers who 
failed to meet quotum were charged a penalty assessment of fifty ounces of silver 
for each ounce of ginseng by which they failed to meet quotum.  Few diggers could 
pay.  The Court directed the officials to collect, when necessary, from the merchants 
who had guaranteed the diggers.144  Shortfalls became so severe that the officials 
were personally charged for failing to meet quotum, together with the ginseng 
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merchants.  The quality of the ginseng received by the Court in 1811 was so poor 
that the officials and merchants were made to purchase that entire crop, as the 
Imperial Household Department could not sell it at a premium price.145  These 
strictures applied up to and through the process of receipt and grading of harvested 
ginseng in Beijing.  As Van Jay Symons relates: 
“Government directives regarded all those involved in grading ginseng 
and transporting the root to the court to be guarantors of the quality of the 
harvest.  Punishments established were so stringent that if cultivated ginseng 
was found in the tribute-grade ginseng sent to the court, even the Manchu 
Generals-in-Chief, Lieutenant-Generals  .  .  .  , Civil Governor of the 
Manchurian Province of [Fengtian]  .  .  .  , and the Vice President of one of 
the Six Boards  .  .  .  who was specially sent to assist in the grading process 
were subject to three step demotions in rank and transference to another 
post.  They might also be required to make good any loss suffered by the 
court due to the poorness of the quality of the ginseng.”146 
The wholesale value of the annual ginseng harvest, which is estimated to have stood 
at between 128,000 taels ($177,778) and 208,000 taels ($288,889) in 1709, had plunged 
to 20,000 taels ($27,778) by the mid 1800s.  More than half of the licensed ginseng 
merchants had been rendered insolvent by the first half of the nineteenth century.  
Of the 400 ginseng merchants in Shengjing in 1800, fewer than 150 remained in 
business as of 1847.147 
The enormous wealth of the licensed salt merchants was well known in Qing 
China.  In a directive to the Canton officials, the Qianlong Emperor stated that 
“there is no comparison between [the wealth of] these [Guangdong hong] merchants 
and that of the Liang-huai salt merchants.”148  Tax revenues generated from the salt 
administration were far greater than those from the Canton customs.  Ping-ti Ho in 
his study of the salt merchants states that taxation of the Lianghuai merchants 
generated 36,370,968 taels ($50,515,223) for the imperial treasury during the period 
1738-1804, nine times as much as the 3,950,000 taels ($5,486,111) paid by the hong 
merchants during the period 1773-1832.149  Lianghuai, in east central China, was the 
most important salt administration region, far exceeding all other regions in 
production, sale and revenue.  Ho states that the salt merchants “owed their wealth 
and power to the monopoly which was granted to them by the government.”  The 
salt monopoly was abolished in 1831.150 
Tax revenues from the salt administration were assessed on a quotum basis in 
accordance with general Qing policy.151  The salt merchants were divided into two 
categories, factory merchants who produced salt, and transport merchants who 
distributed and sold salt.  A group of about thirty leading merchants were chosen as 
head merchants of each, and these head merchants were held collectively 
responsible to pay taxes that were not paid by individual licensed salt merchants.152  
These individual merchants were guaranteed by the head merchants, and were 
required to register annually with the Lianghuai salt administration under the name 
of their head merchant guarantor.153  The Lianghuai salt merchants contributed to a 
substantial “common box” fund which was used to pay various fees assessed by the 
salt administration officials.154  This resembles the Consoo Fund of the Canton hong 
merchants, although it was not supported by a tax on trade and it is not known 
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whether collective responsibility to the officials for unpaid salt taxes was paid from 
the Lianghuai “common box.” 
The common thread among these various Imperial Household Department 
enterprises was the bondservant administrators that shuttled between them.  The 
Department was a small bureaucracy.  Many of these administrators, particularly 
the leaders, would have been familiar with each others' work, reputation and ideas.  
This personal familiarity began with early training in Department schools and 
continued as bondservant administrators worked together with or succeeded each 
other in office.  For example, many Hoppos were appointed to Canton for a one year 
term.  Of necessity that service closely tracked the policies and procedures of 
preceding Hoppos. 
As discussed at above, at pages 25-26, 28-30, collective responsibility to pay 
money to the state was imposed on the head merchants (zongshang) of the salt, 
ginseng and foreign trade monopolies run by the Imperial Household 
Department.155  We may be sure that these merchants did not welcome this 
additional liability.  The hong merchants certainly did not in 1780.  The Department 
was more closely involved in ginseng administration than in salt affairs,156 
presumably because the salt business was thriving -- in its “golden age” in Ping-ti 
Ho's words157 -- while the ginseng business was in decline.  Whatever the reason, we 
know more about collective responsibility in the ginseng business.  It was imposed 
on the head ginseng merchants in 1739, as a mutual responsibility to pay the state 
the value of any deficiency in quality or quantity of collected ginseng.  This predates 
the practice at Canton by about fifteen years.  The date of imposition of collective 
liability for unpaid taxes among the salt merchants is uncertain. 
We do not know how Imperial Household Department managers judged the 
experience of collective liability in the ginseng monopoly in the years after 1739.  It 
appears to have been seen as a successful risk control measure, for it was continued 
and tightened in practice over the next hundred years.  It is therefore possible that 
the practice of collective liability in monopoly administration was first tested in the 
ginseng business (and possibly the salt business as well), and introduced at Canton 
only after it was judged to have been successful.  The sudden appearance of 
collective liability in three aspects of administration of the Canton maritime customs 
in 1754-1755 suggests that these practices were specific innovations by Li Yongbiao, 
a bondservant who was first appointed to Canton as Hoppo in 1752.158 
2D. Collective Responsibility in Chinese Tradition 
Collective responsibility dates from early Chinese history and has its roots in 
military organization.  The practice of penalizing soldiers for the failures of 
comrades within defined groups can be traced back to the unifying first Emperor 
Qin Shi Huang Di.  This practice developed into the registration of household units 
which were held mutually responsible for conscription, policing and taxation duties 
owed to the state.  As a large part of the tax revenues of the primitive state were 
used to support the military, there was an immediate early connection between 
personal military service and the collection of taxes needed to support the military 
forces that defended the state.  Whether mustered in person or in the form of taxes 
paid, the early Chinese state based its defense on principles of collective 
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responsibility laid equally on all of its subjects.  Modern Chinese financial collective 
responsibility thus finds its origins in the taxation policies of the primitive state.159 
The best known example of collective responsibility in Chinese tradition was the 
baojia system.  This ancient program of social registration and responsibility was 
continued during the Qing Dynasty and is a near relative of the hukou system of 
household registration still in use in modern China.160  Collective responsibility was 
observed in other ways as well.  Among urban merchants, the concept of group 
liability to the state to pay something like taxes was recognized in the practice of 
hangyi payments.  The government allowed a trade to be monopolized or controlled.  
The merchants in return accepted collective responsibility to pay hangyi to the state, 
dues in lieu of goods or services, plus other sums sought by the officials.161 
The Western traders encountered collective responsibility in its raw form in Qing 
criminal cases, and spoke harshly about it.162  When they encountered the concept in 
its commercial aspect -- the enforced collective responsibility of Chinese subjects for 
illegal hong debts due to foreigners -- most embraced it warmly. 
Kung-chuan Hsiao, a leading scholar, describes the baojia system of Qing China 
as a device the state used “to watch and check the number, movements, and 
activities of the people, through agents selected from the local inhabitants 
themselves.”  Like the Canton System, it was designed to address public order 
concerns.  In a 1757 edict, the Qianlong Emperor stated that the system had been 
instituted to suppress sedition and maintain peace among the law-abiding.163  Under 
the baojia system, Qing households were registered in succeeding decimal units 
(groups of ten) up to the level of a bao, of which a baozhang was appointed head.164  
All adult males were required to register and to report crimes and criminals.  Failure 
to report brought punishment not just on the individual, but also on all of his 
neighbors in the ten person registered group.165 
In its original concept, the baojia system involved social registration and 
monitoring, but not financial matters.  A separate lijia system, intended to be distinct 
but in practice often overlapping, registered households in groups for tax 
purposes.166 According to a popular Chinese story, the god of wealth had originally 
been a lijia tax gatherer.167  The baojia and lijia systems were inconsistently 
administered, were sometimes confused in practice, and declined through the 
course of the Qing dynasty.168  Efforts to reinvigorate the systems were occasionally 
made, notably the Qianlong Emperor's 1757 direction to the Governors-General and 
Governors to report on and improve local baojia compliance.169  To improve 
reporting, as of the early 1800s, baojia heads had to sign written pledges of mutual 
responsibility.170  The precise meaning of such pledges is uncertain.  A pledge of 
mutual responsibility was required from relatives of the defaulted bengang hong 
merchant Wayqua in 1777, which was a promise that the hong’s foreign creditors 
would be repaid.171  Pledges later became a key part of drug trade suppression 
efforts in the years leading into the Opium War.  Household baojia groups were 
required to sign pledges in 1838 that members were not involved with opium, 
which became antecedents of the bonds Lin Zexu sought to obtain from British 
merchants soon thereafter.172 
The Qing used a modified version of the baojia system to register seagoing 
vessels.  This system followed Ming Dynasty practice by organizing vessels in 
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decimal groups under appointed headmen.  Under a 1707 regulation the groups 
pledged to guarantee each other and were mutually responsible for their conduct 
and activities while at sea.  If any ship in the group was involved in piracy all were 
punished unless the errant vessel was denounced.  Ship owners were also required 
to have their vessels guaranteed by a firm recognized by the officials at the port of 
departure.173  Relatives, neighbors of crew members, and even members of the crew 
of the vessel itself could be required to be guarantors of a merchant ship, a situation 
Gang Zhao calls “a sort of financial hostage-taking.”174  As Andrea McElderry 
correctly notes, “[s]ecurity concerns, fears that supplies might go to potential rebels 
overseas, and worry over domestic grain shortages” lay behind this strong 
regulation.175  These concerns carried over into the regulation of merchants who 
traded overseas.  Head merchants were appointed among groups of merchants 
involved in trade with Japan and the Southern Seas (nanyang) from various Chinese 
ports in the years after 1728, and these leaders were held mutually responsible for 
enforcing various government regulations and guarding against piracy.176 
Licensed brokers (yahang) played a vital role in local markets in the Qing period, 
and were required to guarantee due completion of transactions in which they were 
involved including financial responsibility in case of default.  To be licensed, 
brokers were required to have guarantors of their solvency and personal conduct.  
These guarantors could be held liable along with the brokers if a problem arose.  
Guarantors who reported misdeeds by brokers whom they had guaranteed might 
escape punishment.177 
Collective responsibility was also enforced among Qing officials.  Among some 
officials, like the three commissioners who managed the imperial textile factories in 
Nanjing, Suzhou and Hangzhou, it was imposed on the basis of status.  Without 
fixed rank and having been specially appointed by the Emperor, the textile 
commissioners were considered to be bound in a special relationship of mutual 
responsibility and surveillance.178  Otherwise officials were subject to “joint liability” 
(lianzuo) under Qing administrative law, which implies a mutual obligation.  
Officials could be held liable for the actions or omissions of their subordinates -- 
whether or not they were involved and whether or not they had knowledge -- for 
failure of their overall duty of supervision.179  In this light, we may surmise that 
Qing officials considered application of collective responsibility among the 
monopoly merchants to be entirely fair.  The officials themselves were subject to 
collective responsibility with their colleagues.  They were also subject to the tax 
penalty rule that made them personally liable to pay any deficiency in the tax 
quotum established for their term in office.  To fund these respective exposures, 
Qing officials had only their salary and the various fees and exactions they were 
able to collect while in office.  By contrast, the head merchants could draw on the 
presumably bountiful profits of the trade from which the liability arose, and could 
cushion collective liability by spreading it out among the entire responsible group.  
The Qing officials likely reminded the merchants that many of them had sought out 
and purchased official rank, and that some burdens came with the honor of an 
official title. 
The topic of collective responsibility leads directly into that of guaranty; i.e., 
exactly what the group members were held responsible for.  Here the records 
become somewhat obscure.  This uncertainty may result from vagaries in records of 
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actual practice, is perhaps also one of translation, and may just as well reflect 
defenses or justifications asserted after the guaranteed affairs went awry.  
Assurances freely offered on a sunny day are often found to be riddled with 
conditions -- not plainly expressed until after the skies have darkened.  As Sybille 
van der Sprenkel notes, a gradation of meaning existed in China between a 
guarantee that was in the nature of a promise to exercise suasion and a guarantee 
which meant that cash would be paid following default by the primary obligor. 
“The two forms of guarantee existed side by side -- no doubt varying also 
with locality -- and care had to be exercised (as European merchants found 
when they came up against the system in the nineteenth century) to know 
what was intended.  Sometimes the responsibility of the guarantor was 
limited to bringing pressure on the debtor to pay up, as is indicated by a 
saying current in Hupei, ‘A go-between cannot undertake to produce 
children, a guarantor cannot undertake to repay money.’”180 
The word “guaranty” also has multiple and nuanced meaning in the English 
language and legal tradition.  It can mean a firm commitment to pay money, the 
subject matter of this study.  It can also mean something less definite, an offer to 
vouch or confirm.  For this and other good reasons, a “guaranty” must usually be in 
writing and signed before it has legal effect in Anglo-American law.  “Guaranty” 
(bao) has a similar gradation of meaning in Chinese, but what may seem to be one 
word -- bao -- in Pinyin romanization may yet be one of three different words 
distinguished by separate characters and tones.  As analyzed by Lien-sheng Yang, 
three characters must be distinguished:181 
“(1) Bao () (third tone), meaning ‘security, guarantee of no failure.’  This 
character is used in the Chinese term baojia, and also in the Canton trade terms 
which are translated in English as ‘security merchant’ (baoshang) () and 
‘security merchant system’ (baoshang zhidu) (). 
(2) Bao () (first tone), meaning ‘to contract, to guarantee certain 
achievement.’ 
(3) Bao () (fourth tone), meaning ‘reciprocity, retribution, etc.’” 
Lien-sheng Yang states that the first character bao (保), defined as meaning 
“guarantee of no failure,” was used throughout Qing political, social and economic 
life.  “Taking civil service examinations, entering officialdom, securing a loan, 
applying for a passport, to name only a few examples, all required guaranty from 
persons of certain standing or from shops or firms  .  .  .  up to a certain grade.”182   In 
most of these cases, however, default did not trigger an unconditional obligation of 
financial performance by the ‘guarantor,’ either individually or on a collective basis.  
Over two centuries have passed since the high years of the Canton Guaranty 
System, and we know little of the original content of Chinese promises of guaranty 
to foreigners.  It does seem clear, as Van der Sprenkel states, that confusion existed 
as to the content of guarantees, and that there were more than a few ways such 
confusion might have arisen. 
Elements drawn from both Manchu and Chinese traditions were used by the 
Qing government in framing the regulatory structure of the Canton System and of 
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the system of collective liability for foreign debt (the Canton Guaranty System) 
during the period 1684 through 1780.  When the Kangxi Emperor decided to open 
Southern China to maritime trade in the years after 1683 he drew on Manchu 
experience that regional trade, properly regulated, could both promote general 
prosperity and advance state objectives.  Public order concerns, much on the mind 
of the new rulers in the wake of the forty year struggle to conquer Southern China, 
dictated that overseas trade would need to be closely regulated.  The trade 
regulations which were promulgated in the century after China was opened to 
foreign trade in 1683 drew on Chinese and Manchu traditions, and were 
administered by a Qing bureaucracy which was comprised of Han Chinese and 
ethnic Manchu officials. 
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CHAPTER 3:  
EVOLUTION OF THE CANTON GUARANTY SYSTEM 
The rules used to manage China's maritime foreign trade with the West began to be 
assembled shortly after completion of the Manchu conquest.  They were formulated 
in a time of trade liberalization, after a forty year period of conquest, during which 
the maintenance of internal order was a major concern of the new rulers.  This 
process, which took place principally between 1684 and 1780, produced a set of 
governing regulations with layers of official supervision which came to be known as 
the Canton System.  The system evolved through experiments and a series of crises 
between and among national officials, local officials, Chinese merchants, and 
Western trading firms operating on the China coast.  At its core, the Canton System 
was founded upon reliance by the Qing state on a group of official merchants (guan 
shang) who had specific duties to and ties with the government. 
3A. Official Management of Maritime Foreign Trade 
Close relations between powerful local officials and the leading foreign trade 
merchants dates from the earliest days of the Qing.  During the conquest period, 
local officials were interested in maintaining internal order and in securing trade 
revenues, either through direct participation in trade or by licensing and taxing 
official merchants.1  Merchants wanted protection, and to increase their own profits 
by controlling parts of the trade.2  Various types of favored relations between 
officials and merchants accordingly developed during these years.  Certain 
merchants associated with the transitional princes of the coastal provinces of 
Guangdong and Fujian came to be known as “King's Merchants” by foreign 
traders.3  The Dutch term used to describe these official merchants was “factoor,” 
which can mean either an agent or an active partner in partnership (with a 
governmental sponsor).4  In Guangdong Province, long before the 1683 adoption of 
“open door” policies by the Kangxi Emperor, Shang Kexi, the “Prince Pacifier of the 
South” (ping nan wang), recognized official merchants (guan shang), who paid for the 
privilege of trading with foreigners.  Shang Kexi's official merchants collected 
customs taxes, which were forwarded to Beijing.5  During the period of his control, 
Shang Kexi had considerable indirect and direct involvement in trade from Canton 
and Macao and accumulated an enormous personal fortune, then estimated at one 
million taels ($1,388,889).6  When the princes were abolished in 1681, patronage 
shifted.  The leading foreign trade merchants now became associated with new 
official patrons, i.e., the “Tartar-General's Merchant,” the “Viceroy's Merchant,” and 
so forth.  In the early 1700's, several “Emperor's Merchants,” associated with Beijing 
patrons including the future Yongzheng Emperor, attempted to involve themselves 
in and to assert seasonal or product monopolies of foreign trade with the West in 
several coastal cities, including Canton.7 
This close relationship, at first evidenced by the use of trading names which 
emphasized the merchant's tie with a leading official, was always at the heart of the 
Canton System.  Over the years, it changed in several ways.  For the merchants, 
their choice of a trading name was both an important expression of  brand identity 
and a key marketing device in dealing with Westerners who did not speak Chinese.  
In the early 1700s, that brand identity shifted from the former connection with a  
  












Figure 2. Shang Kexi, The Prince Pacifier of the South.  
(From Johann Nieuhof, Die Gesantschaft der Ost-Indischen Geselschaft in der 
Vereinigten Niederländern an der tartarischen Cham und nunmehr auch 
sinischen Keiser, Amsterdam, 1666, reproduced from Lach & Kley, Asia in the 
Making of Europe, Volume III, Book Four, plate 323.) 
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specific individual patron (i.e., a prince) to status group membership (i.e., one of the 
official merchants).  In their trading names, the hong merchants came to generally 
adopt the suffix “qua” (guan, as in guan shang), indicating official merchant status.8  
Examples include the trading names Beau Khequa (Li Guanghua of the Ziyuan 
hong) (d. 1758), Puankhequa I (Pan Zhencheng of the Tongwen hong) (1714-1788) 
and Howqua II (Wu Bingjian of the Yihe hong) (1769-1843).  Invocation of a specific 
champion quickly became obsolete.9  Thus “qua,” denoting official status, became a 
core statement of brand identity among the hong merchants of Canton.  Hong 
merchants also established official status connections through the purchase of civil 
rank.  In the early days of the trade, when such ties had more business significance, 
local Europeans often added the prefix “Mandarin” to the trading names of hong 
merchants who held official titles.10  In hong merchant portraits, badges of 
purchased official titles, such as embroidered square surcoat decoration, hat, or 
button are commonplace. 
All of the leading hong merchants held official titles.11  According to scholar Ann 
Bolbach White, more than half of all of the individual heads of hong firms 
purchased official title and rank.12  Puankhequa I purchased a title, and was 
awarded the Blue Sapphire Button of a third rank official in about 1780 for military 
campaign contributions.13  Eequa (Wu Zhaoping of the Fengtai hong), Wayqua (Ni 
Hongwen of the Fengjin hong) (purchased Jiansheng title), Yngshaw (Yan Shiying of 
the Taihe hong), and Kewshaw (Zhang Tianqiu of the Yuyuan hong), each 
purchased titles and degrees.14  The senior hong merchants Howqua II, Mowqua II 
and Puankhequa III all proudly held hualing -- peacock feathers -- conferred as a 
special reward for their 1832 public service contributions for the suppression of a 
Yao rebellion in Guangdong Province.15 
Each such transaction tied the official merchant more closely to the supervising 
Qing officials.  The merchant thus became explicitly linked in and beholden to a 
chain of command that ran from the Emperor in Beijing down to the individual 
hongs in Canton.  The purchase contributed to the coffers of the state.  As the 
purchase was almost always of an expectant or honorary title, no duties devolved 
on the purchaser.  Yet the acquisition of title raised the status of the titled merchant 
in local Canton society, and its loss carried great social stigma.16 
The administration of China's foreign trade with the West was supervised by 
civil officials, who were appointed by and reported to Beijing.  Key officials were the 
Governor-General (also known as the Viceroy), the Governor and the Hoppo.  Their 
offices were all located at Canton.  These officials were assisted by the weiyuan (a 
military official attached to the Hoppo), by their respective staffs, by military 
officers posted to Canton, and by district (xian) magistrates in matters of local 
administration.17  Jurisdiction was divided by district among the magistrates of 
Nanhai district (Canton), Panyu district (including Whampoa) and Xiangshan 
district (including Macao), with the respective magistrates sometimes acting jointly 
in judicial matters involving foreign trade.18 
Most important in the daily management of trade was the Commissioner of the 
Guangdong Province Maritime Customs, the official Western traders called the 
Hoppo.  The Western term is a corruption of part of the Hoppo's Chinese language 
title: Duli Guangdongsheng Yanhaidengqu Maoyishuiwu Hubufensi (Commissioner of 
the Board of Revenue [Hu Bu], in Charge of the Customs Duties on the Trade of the 
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Maritime Area of the Province of Guangdong).19  First appointed at Canton in 1684, 
the Hoppo played a key role in the management of maritime foreign trade under the 
Qing Dynasty.  The post of Hoppo was typically held by an ethnic Manchu, on a one 
year assignment from Beijing.  In the years after 1750, this increasingly regularized 
post was exclusively held by members (baoyi) of the Imperial Household 
Department (neiwufu), appointed from and reporting directly to the Imperial Court 
in Beijing.  The Canton customs administration, known as the yuehaiguan, eventually 
consisted of five sub-stations and some sixty collection points.20  The Hoppo stood at 
the top of a large bureaucracy which was in constant contact with the Chinese and 
foreign traders.  As described by Dilip Basu, the Canton Customs administration: 
“was led by a head clerk (jincheng) who presided over upwards of two 
hundred writers (danshu).  On the seventh moon of every year, they drew lots 
as to who should be deputed to the seventy-odd customs houses in the 
province.  The losers remained to act as tide-waiters, examining goods daily 
brought up to or sent down from Canton.  The Hoppo usually did all his 
business through the head clerk who often bought the office for a five year 
tenure.  He acted as the Hoppo’s alter ego, charging a Hongist $1,000 to get 
an appointment with the Hoppo.  Next to the head clerk, were three 
accountants with five in the office of records, ‘each of whom has to pay a fee 
of two or three hundred dollars.’  The Hoppo’s Customs House posse 
consisted of seven head runners who required ‘seven or eight hundred 
dollars to get this appointment.’  Each head runner had thirty assistants 
under him.  Every year the two hundred-plus among them drew lots ‘to 
ascertain who shall be sent to the outer customs-houses, who shall go to 
watch alongside the ships, and be, what is at Whampoa called, Hoppo-men, 
and who shall attend daily at the shipping off or receiving goods at the 
Hongs.’  Then there were numerous personal servants and attendants at the 
Hoppo’s establishment.  Their number varied ‘according to the number of 
persons recommended by the various official men in Canton, who have 
dependents to be provided for.’  There were four ‘superior ones’ (dangshang) 
who received duties and four ‘personal confidants’ (qinxin) who went around 
inspecting customs-houses for the Hoppo.  No doubt each and every one of 
these jobs yielded a handsome amount in perquisites and profits.”21 
The Hoppo's close Beijing connections, notably the personal privilege of being 
able to present memorials directly to the Emperor, gave him considerable 
independent power.  These Court links are said to have given the Hoppo 
functionally equal status with the Governor-General (zongdu) (of the provinces of 
Guangdong and Guangxi) and the Governor (fuyuan) (of the province of 
Guangdong).22  The original function of the Governor-General was military.  Like 
the Hoppo, the Governor-General was typically an ethnic Manchu.  He served as 
supreme commander of the forces maintaining order in his viceroyalty.  While civil 
affairs were supposed to be handled by provincial Governors, Governors-General 
often became involved in such matters.23  Between 1750 and 1792, the Governor-
General of Guangdong and Guangxi was co-supervisor of the Guangdong Maritime 
Customs, but he rarely interfered with customs matters.24  When problems with 
foreigners arose, initial decision was reserved to ethnic Manchu officials.  Thus, 
when the armed frigate Sea Horse (Captain Panton) arrived at Canton from Madras 
in September 1779 seeking to collect debts from hong merchants, the matter came 
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before Governor Li Zhiying, a Manchu bannerman and Imperial Household 
Department member.  Governor-General Yang Jingsu (Han Chinese) was 
excluded.25 
3B. The Security Merchant System and Origins of Collective Responsibility 
The activities of security merchants or fiadors are recorded in the 1720s, but are 
believed to be of earlier origin, possibly derived from trade at Macao.26  The practice 
was initiated at Canton in the 1730s, a period during which officials sought to 
improve their control of foreign trade.  In order to strengthen official control, Weng 
Eang Cheong observes, “the Hoppo, perhaps unintentionally, had to strengthen the 
merchants' control of the foreigners and the trade.”27  As of the 1730s, hong 
merchants made their commitment to stand security by a written contract delivered 
to the Hoppo after the measurement (for tax purposes) of each arriving foreign 
ship.28  By about 1735, foreign traders at Canton were required to engage a hong 
merchant to stand as security for each ship.29  These security merchants (bao shang) 
were given a monopoly of the ship's business, were bound to assure orderly trade 
and the good conduct of its crew, and were held liable as guarantor for full payment 
of all import and export duties on the ship's cargo.30  This monopoly was porous 
within the guild.  Foreign merchants often traded with other hong merchants (who 
would sometimes make payment to the original security merchant), as is evident 
from the pattern of purchases among various hong merchants seen during the 
controversy over liability for the purchase cost of “singsongs” in 1754 (discussed at 
page 54. 
The security merchants were licensed by the government.  Little is known about 
the definition and form of this license right.  No license records have survived.  The 
license seems to have been a non-transferable personal right, granted to one man,31 
to operate a non-limited liability enterprise as a hong or security merchant.  Its 
issuance appears to have involved written undertakings by the licensee, specific 
commitments made to the state.  This is evidenced by amendments, as when the 
hong merchants were compelled over strong protest to assume collective 
responsibility for debts in 1780, and in entrance terms, as when the five new hong 
merchants of 1782 agreed to guarantee each other (because the incumbents refused 
to do so) and in the 1760 registration rules for five merchant groups of outside 
shopmen. 
License issuance was tightly controlled by the Canton officials.  One reason was 
that the licensee merchants were expected to perform security duties for the state 
(risk management).  A second reason was the revenue the state received upon the 
issuance, transfer, assignment or withdrawal of license rights.  The amount of these 
fees varied with the strength of the applicant and the circumstances of the moment, 
but the amounts involved were significant.  Admission fees ranged from $30,000 to 
$80,000, and are said to have reached as high as $200,000 in some cases.32  Transfer 
or assignment fees ranged from $30,000 to $100,000 to the high of $500,000 charged 
to Howqua II (Wu Bingjian) for license transfer to his son in 1826.33  Withdrawal or 
retirement was almost impossible.  Yanqua was allowed to retire in 1804, fee 
unknown.  Puankhequa II is said to have paid $500,000 in 1807 for permission to 
retire, but the authorization granted him was later revoked.34  Licensing fee 
revenues were shared among the Governor-General, the Governor, the Hoppo, and 
their assistants.  The Hoppo and Governor-General are said to have received the 
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largest share.35  It has been argued that the issuance of hong licenses was motivated 
primarily by fee revenues, as evidenced by a concentration of license issuance 
among just a few Hoppos, many of whom had reached Canton indebted to the 
Imperial Household Department.  Of the thirty-six hong merchants licensed 
between 1760 and 1843, twenty-nine were licensed during the terms of office of only 
six Hoppos (of the thirty who held office in this period).36  For various reasons, 
including but not limited to these fees, there was a sharp decline in the quality of the 
licensees accepted during these years.  Scholar Kuo-tung Ch'en accordingly 
observes that “over time those who were appointed came from lower and lower 
strata of society: a number of Hong merchants made in the course of the nineteenth 
century, or their partners, had been opium-dealers, linguists, compradores, and 
even a domestic; similar backgrounds cannot be found for the Hong merchants of 
the eighteenth century.”37 
The security merchant system (baoshang zhidu) received its original imperial 
approval in 1745, on a memorial submitted by Governor-General and Hoppo Ce 
Leng (a Manchu).  In approving the system, the Qianlong Emperor directed that the 
security merchant group should be limited to wealthy and respectable men, to 
safeguard the payment of state revenues they were required to guarantee.38  The 
timing of approval suggests that national security concerns were directly involved.  
Reports of a Dutch massacre in 1740 of some 10,000 ethnic Chinese at Batavia had 
horrified China.  Proposals to impose economic sanctions against the Dutch by 
closing or restricting foreign trade had been made and seriously considered in 
Beijing.  The Qianlong Emperor rejected sanctions in 1742 after careful 
consideration.  During this volatile period, the Hoppo cautioned two Dutch ships 
that it would be wise to trade at Macau to avoid trouble at Canton.39 
The foreign trade monopoly of the licensed hong merchants was defined a 
decade later in three edicts issued jointly at Canton in May 1755 by Governor-
General Yang Yingzhu, Governor Honian and Hoppo Li Yongbiao.40  A parallel 
edict, issued in January 1758, enforced the monopoly by requiring European ships to 
trade exclusively at Canton.41  The occasional practice of issuing joint edicts by the 
three senior Canton officials manifested their combined resolve and the importance 
of the subject matter.  The two exceptions to the new monopoly rules were at Macao 
and Xiamen (Amoy), where foreign trade was permitted to be conducted, but only 
by the Portuguese and Spanish respectively.42  These edicts, and other measures 
defining hong merchant responsibilities which were put in place during the period 
roughly from 1735 through 1758, are properly viewed in the context of controls that 
were imposed on the Hoppo during the same period.43  The Canton System was 
being regularized on direction from above.  As Weng Eang Cheong observes, 
“[a]fter 1760, the emphasis of the [Hoppos's] function shifted to the interpretation 
and enforcement of laws and guidelines to the system.”44  In the first half of the 
eighteenth century, foreigners were able to obtain personal audiences with the 
Hoppo at his residence in Canton.  From the 1750s forward, access to the Hoppo 
was channeled through the hong merchants or linguists who received and 
transmitted foreign petitions.45 
As of 1755 the hong merchant monopoly of maritime foreign trade, which had 
begun as seasonal rights purchased by leading merchants and had since evolved 
into an informal combination of the merchant elite, was formally recognized 
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without time limit.46  The 1755 edicts maintained the existing three-tiered structure 
of the outer seas merchant (waiyang hang) guild.  The thirteen merchants of the first 
and second tiers had the exclusive right to trade with foreigners under the state 
enforced monopoly, becoming known collectively as the yang hang (foreign [trade] 
firms).47  The six senior merchants of the first tier also had the right to serve as 
security merchants for foreign ships, evidently in order of seniority.  These senior 
merchants -- Beau Khequa, Chai Suequa, Chetqua, Chai Hunqua, Sweetia and 
Puankhequa -- now came to be called capital merchants by foreign traders.  The 
seven junior merchants of the second tier were allowed to trade and ship abroad, 
but not to secure foreign ships.48 
Each arriving vessel was assigned by the Hoppo to a hong merchant, who was to 
serve as its security merchant.  As new business tended to be welcome, the 
assignments were generally accepted, but refusal was possible as in the 1754 general 
refusal to secure incoming EIC ships carrying singsongs in their cargo.  Assignments 
were usually made according to a seniority list, with the turn to secure going first to 
the senior merchants. 49  Assignments of EIC ships, which had once been negotiated, 
evolved over time into an agreement under which security merchants were assigned 
to EIC vessels in rotation.50  The cargo of a foreign ship could be sold to any of the 
hong merchants, although it became customary to pay the vessel's security 
merchant the fixed sum of $700 for his expenses and risk.51  It was the duty of the 
hong merchants to cause foreigners whose vessels they secured to comply with the 
rules of the Canton System.  The hong merchants could be and were punished for 
infractions by Western traders whose vessels the secured, variously fined or 
imprisoned or both, depending on the gravity of the offense.  Their role was thus 
“quasi-diplomatic,” in Weng Eang Cheong's apt phrasing.52  When the system 
worked, the hong merchants themselves and all the various Chinese engaged in 
dealings with foreigners were supposed to report any untoward activity they 
observed.  As described by Jacques M. Downs, 
“Thus the comprador collected information from his coolies, cooks, 
guards, and the shroff and reported to the linguist, who, in his turn, 
informed the mandarinate.  In this way local officials had a reporting service 
that delivered data independently of the Cohong.”53 
Collective responsibility for debt among the Canton hong merchants makes its 
first appearance in 1754-1755.  The burden varied among the three tiers of the guild.  
The senior merchants of the first and second tiers were made subject to limited 
collective responsibility.  The capital merchants of the first tier were collectively 
liable, among their own group only, for customs duties due to the state but not paid 
by any member of the group.54  The exact date when the first tier was made 
collectively liable for unpaid customs duties is uncertain.55 
The second imposition of collective financial responsibility concerned the heavy 
cost of subsidizing opulent imported gifts sent by the Canton officials to Beijing.  
When an uproar arose among the security merchants, who were outraged by the 
excessive burden they were forced to bear individually for the purchase of 
“singsong” curiosities, Hoppo Li Yongbiao directed in 1754 that this expense would 
henceforth be shared collectively.56  The word “singsong” is a pidgin English term 
used to describe European luxury objects such as musical boxes, mechanical toys, 
clocks and watches which were sent as official gifts to the Court in Beijing.57  Many 
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of these elaborate presents, notably mechanical clocks produced in London, have 
survived.  They are popular exhibits at the Forbidden City today, much as they were 
delighted upon two centuries ago.  These objects were a matter of immediate 
interest to the Hoppo upon the arrival of any Western trading ship, and the selection 
of singsongs and direction to the security merchant to acquire desired objects was 
an official priority.58  Their acquisition was originally funded with a general levy on 
foreign trade.  Over time, the Hoppos shifted to a system of coerced purchase 
directly from the hong merchant who secured the ship that had the desired object on 
board, sometimes paying as little as 25% of cost.59  This penalized the security 
merchant responsible for a vessel with “singsongs” in its cargo, for that merchant 
alone paid the great part of the purchase cost of these gifts.60  The high cost of these 
prized objects, which in the case of the British EIC came to China exclusively as the 
private venture cargo of its officers, became a management problem for the EIC 
which grew concerned that the expense of buying private cargo from its own ships 
might ruin the hong merchants.61  The hong merchant body was openly restive 
about this unequal and unpredictable burden by the early 1750s.62  In 1754, four 
merchants refused to serve as securities for six British EIC ships, due to potential 
losses on the inbound “singsong” cargo they carried.  Tsai Suequa alone said that he 
might be willing to secure these vessels, but only temporarily and jointly with other 
merchants who did significant trade with the secured ships.63  The Hoppo 
responded in August 1754 by directing that the burden would be shared, 
presumably among the first and second tier hong merchants only.64 
Collective liability for foreign debts -- unlimited in amount -- was imposed on 
the third tier shopkeepers under the 1755 edicts.  In order to be allowed to trade 
with foreigners, shopkeepers had to register in groups of five with the Nanhai xian 
magistrate.  Registration required the written commitment, from all members of 
each five person group, that each would be jointly liable for any unpaid foreign 
debts of other members of the five person registered group. 65  The officials declared 
that their concern was that the shopkeepers were not always truthful in their 
dealings with foreigners, but they were also concerned that Western trade was 
increasingly being conducted outside the guild.  It was believed, correctly, that 
much of this traffic was not being reported and that customs duties were being 
evaded.66  Repeated crackdowns on shopkeepers sought to protect the hong 
merchant trade monopoly, to suppress or inconvenience smuggling, and to defend 
the collection of maritime customs revenues. 
It is unclear whether the 1755 regulation imposing collective responsibility on 
registered third tier shopkeepers was enforced.  It is not known if any shopkeeper 
was ever held collectively liable for debt, whether for customs duties or for amounts 
due to foreign traders.  Nor is it known how long and how carefully, if at all, the 
1755 shopkeeper registration regulations were observed.  By definition, the debts for 
which the shopkeepers might be held collectively responsible were small.  This was 
inherently a minor business.  The Canton officials would soon be required to devote 
much more attention to the substantial debts incurred by merchants of the first and 
second tiers of the outer seas merchant (waiyang hang) guild. 
3C. The Formal Regulation of Maritime Foreign Trade 
The European trading corporations chafed under the restrictions of the Canton 
System.  The monopoly regulations of the 1755 edicts were found particularly 
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irksome.  Foreigners saw the new rules as tending to increase their costs, including 
official exactions levied on the trade.67  The British EIC repeatedly protested to the 
Canton authorities, and certain of its officers came to believe that its petitions might 
be more successful if they could only reach the Emperor's attention. 
The British East India Company tried in 1757 and again in 1758 to reopen trade 
up the coast at Ningbo, where it had done business as recently as 1736.  It hoped to 
take advantage of lower customs duties and reduced inland goods transportation 
costs available at that port.68  This initiative was favored by domestic Ningbo 
interests, but they lost out in Beijing to a range of economic,69 internal order,70 and 
partisan concerns which favored concentrating and managing China's Western 
trade at Canton in the south.71  Efforts were thereafter made to discourage foreign 
trade at Ningbo, starting with sharp increases of customs fees.72  The Qianlong 
Emperor issued edicts in December 1757 and January 1758 first closing Ningbo to 
European trade, and then expelling the British.73  British representatives at Canton 
were given a written “obligation” in which they were asked to agree not go to 
Ningbo in the next season, which they refused to sign.74 
The British EIC decided in 1758 after further unsuccessful local protests to 
directly petition the Emperor in Beijing.75  A petition was prepared, in formal 
Chinese, seeking the right to trade at ports other than Canton, and detailing a string 
of grievances with trading conditions at Canton including the unsettled debts of the 
first tier hong merchant Beau Khequa (Li Guanghua of the Ziyuan hong) who had 
died insolvent in 1758.76  The petition was placed in the hands of James Flint, a 
Chinese speaking EIC employee, who sailed north on a small 70 ton snow ironically 
named Success (which was lost at sea with all hands on its return to Canton).77  
Turned away at Ningbo, Flint continued north to the port of Tianjin, about seventy 
miles from Beijing, where he presented the petition to local officials on 21 July 
1759.78  The first memorial reporting his appearance, sent to Beijing on 23 July by 
Zhili Province Governor-General Fang Guangcheng, commented that Flint “is an 
insignificant barbarian from a small country; if there does not really exist an 
injustice, how would he dare to bother us with his petition?”79  An edict to the 
Grand Council, issued the same day by the Qianlong Emperor, reported that the 
incumbent Hoppo Li Yongbiao had been ordered removed from office and that 
senior officials had been dispatched to go quickly to Canton and conduct a careful 
joint investigation.  “This affair concerns the foreign barbarians, and the prestige of 
the empire is involved.  You must investigate thoroughly in order to manifest 
imperial justice.”80  Flint himself traveled back to Canton by courier horse with one 
of the investigating officials.81 
The official investigation, conducted from September through November 1759, 
focused on public corruption and on identifying the Chinese who had prepared the 
petition presented by James Flint.  Liu Yabian, a minor Sichuan trader who was 
indebted to the British EIC, was identified as translator.  Liu was publicly executed 
on 6 December 1759 pursuant to Imperial edict.  James Flint was ordered 
imprisoned at Macao for three years, and then forever banished from China.82  These 
punishments reflected the severe violation of Chinese law involved in an attempt to 
communicate directly with the Emperor in Beijing.83  Incumbent Hoppo Li Yongbiao 
and his weiyuan were impeached for corruption and removed from office.  Property 
found in the Hoppo's official mansion was confiscated. 84  This discipline is said to 
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have had the effect of finally stamping out any further direct participation by 
officials in the trade.85  The politically well-connected Governor-General Li Shiyao, 
who had advised the Court early in August 1759 that there would be no further 
troubles with foreigners and that their “speech and manner were respectful and 
obedient,” remained at his post and was appointed acting Hoppo.86  The 
investigating officials proposed some administrative reforms to be made to Chinese 
procedures and changes in port charges at Canton, but little came of them.87 
The lasting consequence of James Flint's 1759 petition was a tightening and 
formalization of the rules of the Canton System.  On 28 March 1760, “Regulations 
for the Control of Trade at Canton” (the fangyi zhangcheng) were announced at 
Canton.88  These regulations, which were at once a restructuring and a codification 
of existing practice, had been solicited and approved by the Qianlong Emperor.89  
Translations of the 1760 Regulations are attached to this study as Appendix A (a 
modern translation by Lo-shu Fu) and Appendix B (a contemporary translation 
prepared for the British EIC).90  Together with orders issued jointly by the Hoppo 
and the Governor-General, the 1760 Regulations formalized security merchant 
control duties and improved the competitive position of the outer seas merchant 
guild (the waiyang hang).  Collective responsibility for customs duties not paid by an 
individual merchant was now applied to the full guild (no longer just among the 
upper tier members).91 
The 1760 Regulations dealt with the thorny issue of hong merchant debt by 
declaring foreign loans to be illegal.  “If the people of this Country do hereafter on 
any pretence whatsoever take up money of Foreigners, he [the Emperor] requires 
that they should be severely punished  .  .  and that all the Goods also of those who 
borrow money be Confiscated.”92  All accounts between foreign traders and hong 
merchants were required to be settled before a foreign ship left Canton.93  The 
regulation directed prosecution of violations of the loan ban under “the law by 
which we punish criminals who communicate with a foreign country, borrow 
money or hold their goods or money without payment”94 -- the Qing Code 
substatute under which many hong merchants were ordered banished to Ili in 
distant Xinjiang.95  The confiscation penalty, which the regulation provided for 
separately and in addition to punishment under the substatute, created confusion.  
Debtors usually had little left to “confiscate.”  Did the confiscation provision give 
the government the right to seize the debtor’s last remaining assets, in derogation of 
the rights of other creditors?  Or did it mean that the interest of the foreign lender in a 
loan made in violation of the law was subject to forfeiture96 -- either by being voided 
(held unenforceable) or by being taken by the Qing government (“confiscation”)?  
Chinese officials stated in 177997 and again in 178098 that European loans were 
subject to forfeiture under the 1760 Regulations as approved by the Emperor, but 
the threatened penalty was never enforced.99 
Also in question is whether the 1760 loan ban was violated by the mere act of 
borrowing money from a foreigner, even though the loan was being repaid.  The 
answer to this question seems to be no.  First, the applicable substatute punished 
nonpayment.  Second, the ban itself was modified -- changed to a cap of 100,000 
taels ($138,889) -- by an imperial edict issued in 1794 in the case of Gonqua (Shi 
Zhonghe, also known as Shy Kinqua II, successor head of the Eryi hong).  As of 
1794, only debts in excess of 100,000 taels required immediate payment.100  Although 
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hong debts after 1794 often exceeded 100,000 taels, no hong merchant was ever 
punished simply for being so indebted (although many were).  As of 1815, the 
disclosure of debts and a plausible payment plan seem to have been all that was 
required for a Chinese debtor to be in technical compliance with the loan ban.101  
Payment default, not the loan itself, triggered the severe penalties provided for 
under the “cheating foreigners” substatute. 
As a practical matter, there would have been little upside for the Canton official 
who acted to enforce the loan prohibition against foreign lenders during the period 
of the Canton Guaranty System, 1780-1842.  As discussed in Chapter Two (see page 
27) customs taxes were collected and remitted to Beijing on a quotum basis, and if 
there was a material deficiency, officials had to pay it out of their own pocket.  This 
was perhaps the principal risk involved in holding public office in imperial China.  
In this context enforcement of the loan ban, while theoretically possible, became 
problematic.  The consequences of enforcement were potentially ruinous, to the 
system and to the official personally.  First, the mere refusal to enforce foreign loans 
would have brought an uproar from the foreign community at Canton.  The 
foreigners had come to view the collective guaranty of hong merchant debt as a 
cornerstone of the Canton System.  For their part, Qing officials long used relief 
under the collective guaranty as a means of placating the restive Western traders.  
While loans to hong merchants were unlawful, the officials enforced them 
nevertheless, if sometimes with a lecture about the need to respect Chinese laws.  
Foreign traders would have taken any change as an abrogation and might have been 
expected to respond sharply.  A stoppage of foreign trade might be expected, as 
happened in 1829-1830.  Second, any stoppage of trade would reduce the amount of 
collected taxes flowing to Beijing, with the enforcing official liable for the deficiency.  
Personal financial ruin was thus a possible consequence that had to be considered in 
deciding whether to actively enforce the loan ban.  Third, many years’ experience 
had shown that when the foreign trade of Canton was interrupted, unemployment 
soared and social disorder followed.  The domestic order consequences of trade 
interruption may have been the most frightening prospect that officials weighed in 
considering enforcement of the loan ban.  Collectively, this range of dismal 
prospects may have suppressed any inclination to enforce the loan prohibition the 
officials continued to proclaim to all concerned.  It was safer, indeed almost the only 
viable choice for Qing officials at Canton, to ignore the foreign loan problem and 
leave it for a later day.  There was plenty of money on the Canton waterfront.  
Officials who chose not to stir up trouble could draw their share and move along 
quietly to another posting.  The risk of substantial personal liability if there was a 
disruption of trade, and the ability to do well for the moment while hoping that 
problems might solve themselves with time, discouraged enforcement of the loan 
ban against foreign lenders. 
Under the 1760 Regulations, foreign merchants were barred from sending 
messages into the interior of China, or adopting any means of determining inland 
commodity prices.102  Administrative enforcement of this rule is said to have barred 
the hong merchants, as well, from further direct contact and negotiation with inland 
suppliers.103  Foreigners were prohibited from hiring Chinese servants, except “the 
Established Linguists and Compradores.”104  This enforced a prior rule that 
foreigners were not allowed to study or translate Chinese, except in the imprecise 
pidgin language form used by the merchants and licensed linguists.105  These 
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Chinese restrictions on communication by foreigners can be compared to an existing 
rule, imposed by the Hoppo in 1731 on foreign request, which prohibited the hong 
merchants from communicating directly with Western firms in Europe.  The earlier 
rule had its origins in foreign complaints about the repeated efforts of Tan Hunqua 
(Chen Fangguan) to complain directly to the EIC and VOC about alleged 
overpricing and kickbacks in contracts made between other hong merchants and 
local representatives of the European firms.  Paul Van Dyke sees the 1731 
communication rule as “one of the first policies to clearly lay down the foundation 
of the system that disadvantaged Chinese merchants in international trade 
compared to their foreign counterparts.”106 
When resident at Canton, under the terms of the 1760 Regulations, foreign 
traders had to reside at properties owned and maintained by hong merchants.107  In 
the off-season, foreign traders were still required to leave, but they were now 
officially permitted to stay at Macao as an alternative to traveling all the way 
home.108  Provincial coastal defenses were ordered strengthened, to prevent further 
disorders.  Contingents of troops near the foreign anchorage at Whampoa were 
ordered to be increased, and were directed to stand constantly on duty from the 
arrival through the departure of the foreign ships.  The Panyu district (Whampoa) 
magistrate, charged with keeping the foreigners in order, ultimately assessed and 
collected a weekly fee from the trade for these ongoing control efforts.109 
The provisions barring foreigners from lending money to hong merchants, and 
requiring the foreigners to reside at Canton in properties owned by hong merchants, 
ended the occasional former practice of hong merchants mortgaging real property 
as security for foreign loans.  While such loans continued to be made, the ban on the 
transfer or mortgage of hong properties was respected, presumably because the 
Nanhai magistrate would no longer accept the necessary mortgage documents for 
filing.  This meant that the loans foreigners extended to hong merchants after 1760 
were entirely unsecured (without lien protection).110 
Five in number, the 1760 Regulations are the earliest promulgated form of the 
“Eight Regulations,” the set of rules which governed the maritime foreign trade of 
Canton through 1842.111  These rules are the public face, presented openly to the 
Western traders, of the far larger body of laws, edicts, rules and procedures which 
guided the Canton officials and the hong merchants in the management of foreign 
trade.  The Eight Regulations are only seen in histories in summary form, such as 
the abridged version of the 1835 regulations that William C. Hunter included in his 
1882 book The ‘Fan Kwae’ at Canton, which is attached to this study as Appendix 
E.112  (Complete versions of the 1831 Regulations and the 1835 Regulations are 
attached to this study as Appendix C and Appendix D respectively.)  The shortened 
versions of the Eight Regulations have tended to focus on rules of personal conduct, 
rather than the trade regulations themselves (which were not always restated in 
later enactments).  This abridgement process has had the effect of trivializing and 
sometimes producing comic effects entirely absent from the original Chinese 
regulations.  For example, per Hunter, Rule No. 2 of the Eight Regulations (1835) 
provided that “Neither women, guns, spears, nor arms of any kind can be brought 
to the Factories.”113  This seeming equation of women with weaponry is the product 
of summarization, the reductio ad absurdum combination of two distinct parts of the 
original three paragraph Rule No. 2. 
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William C. Hunter, who had long experience at Canton as a clerk and then 
partner with the American firm of Russell & Co., states that the foreigners assumed 
that the Eight Regulations were “in force always,” although some of the rules “came 
to be disregarded by the foreign community.”  He recounts that the Eight 
Regulations “were now and then brought to the Factories by a Linguist, as an 
intimation that they were not to be considered a 'dead letter.'114  The Chinese 
authorities admitted that some of these rules were being ignored by all concerned.  
The 1831 version of the “Eight Regulations” opens with the statement that “through 
length of days they [the 1760 Regulations] have gradually been neglected and the 
execution of them relaxed.115  The 1835 enactment, produced four years later, refers 
to the rules of 1760, 1810 and 1831, adding that “during the length of days they have 
been in operation, either they have in the end become a dead letter, or there have 
gradually sprung up unrestrained offenses.”116  Some of the rules, such as the bans 
on collecting inland price information and on learning Chinese, would have been 
fairly easily evaded and also difficult to enforce.117 
R. Randle Edwards, a historian of Chinese law, states that the “Eight 
Regulations” “were not simply posted on the wall in the Chinese language but were 
delivered, translated, and fairly well understood by the European community.  .  .  .  
Comparison of some of these translations with the original Chinese documents 
reveals that most of the translations are faithful renderings of the original; some are 
superbly done.”118  While this is true, the regulations were neither modern in style 
nor models of clear presentation.  The trade regulations reached the foreigners in the 
elaborate form in which they had been presented to the Emperor for approval, 
framed as a Memorial to the throne, with a preamble, with explanations and reports 
of official investigation, and often with what might otherwise be considered strictly 
internal directives to Chinese civil and military officers (for example, coastal defense 
directives in Rule No. 5 of the 1760 Regulations).  The regulations are thus typical of 
legal enactments in imperial China, having been framed from the perspective of the 
state, either from within looking out (“barbarian merchants”) or from the top 
looking down (“for them to obey and act accordingly”).119  Penalties to foreigners 
that might result from the violation of particular rules may be suggested, but they 
are rarely provided for in detail, and often no penalty for violations appears at all.  
No fixed order is observed in the various iterations of the regulations.  Given rules 
appear and disappear in different versions, with rules which were not repeated still 
remaining effective.  The rule prohibiting foreign debt is unusual as it appears in 
most versions, albeit continually renumbered (Rule No. 3 in 1760, No. 2 in 1831, and 
No. 7 in 1835).  Yet even in the 1835 Regulations it appears only as an allusion in a 
separate rule (“or incur debts to the barbarians”), not as a full restatement.  Nor was 
there a consistent number of rules.  The number eight (of trade regulations), as with 
the number thirteen (of licensed hong merchants), appears to represent little more 
than the use of a number considered auspicious in Chinese tradition.  The “thirteen 
hongs” only rarely attained the number of thirteen.120   The “Eight Regulations,” as 
revised from time to time, also rarely -- if ever -- stood at that number. 
The personal conduct and residence components of the “Eight Regulations,” 
which increased with the passage of time, loom large in the popular memory of the 
Canton System.  The foreign traders found them particularly irksome.121  Today they 
might be thought of as akin to school dormitory (parietals) or “nanny state” rules.  
The Qing state acted like an overprotective parent, and the foreign trader children 
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showed no gratitude whatsoever.  The foreigners were not allowed to enter the city 
of Canton.  During the trading season of about four to five months they were 
confined to a foreign enclave on the waterfront at the Western edge of the city, with 
the exception of escorted visits to parks, not more than three times monthly, and 
sometimes to hong merchant residences by permission.122  Their river travel was 
closely monitored, although foreign officers in properly flagged service boats were 
usually permitted to pass through the customs checkpoints without inspection.123  
Foreigners were originally prohibited from hiring any Chinese employees, except 
“the Established Linguists and Compradores,”124 but were later allowed to hire up to 
eight registered servants per factory property to perform specified duties.125  With 
the passage of time, more personal conduct rules were added, prohibiting women 
from visiting the foreign factories,126 restricting boating on the river,127 barring use of 
sedan chairs,128 and so forth.  The foreign traders muttered about and ignored or 
evaded these rules as best they could.  They were inconveniences which burdened a 
trade that was profitable for the foreign merchants, and generally well managed.   
The American China trader Robert Bennet Forbes, writing at the end of 1831, 
praised the Canton System by comparison with the London alternative.  “[W]ho 
would barter the present free trade in all descriptions of goods for a regular 
commercial system of duties, entries, permits, etc., myriad of forms, like those in 
London?  The facilities of trade have always been remarkable here and those who 
have had most experience are perfectly willing to put up with a continuation of the 
same.”129  Business went on. 
Under the regime of the 1760 Regulations, the competitive position of the hong 
guild was strengthened against the Western merchants.  It was now officially 
recognized as an independent body, the gonghang (or Cohong).130  Little is known of 
the details of its internal organization.  Some contemporary Westerners spoke of the 
hong merchants acting through the Cohong of 1760 in a ‘corporate capacity.’  This 
did not signify a legally independent corporate body in the modern sense, but 
simply that the Cohong acted as a unified body which set prices and maintained 
collective discipline in dealings between its members and the Western firms.131  The 
hong merchant scholar Weng Eang Cheong describes the Cohong of 1760 as having 
been 
“more like an exclusive club, with members paying different fees for 
different classes of membership entitling them to different privileges in the 
trade.  Privileges could be inherited by succeeding heads of the firms as in 
corporate membership, but the shares were not negotiable in the open 
market.”132 
A French correspondent, writing in December 1760, stated that ownership of the 
Cohong was held in 75 shares priced at 1,000 taels ($1,389) each, for an initial 
capitalization of 75,000 taels ($104,167).  Puankhequa I, who became Chief 
Merchant, held twelve shares.133  The new body of about ten became known as the 
waiyang hang merchants, all of whom were eligible to serve as security merchants.  
Those merchants who would not accept the terms of the Cohong were forced into 
the non-Western trading bengang hang or fuchao hang or made to retire entirely.134  
Ton Anqua, who strongly opposed the Cohong, was arrested by the Governor-
General, and finally ordered to move with his family back to Quanzhou in Fujian  
  








Figure 3. Chinese people reading notices posted on a wall. 
Sketch by George Chinnery, October 1841.  (Private collection.  Photograph by 
courtesy of the Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.) 
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Province.135  The only criterion for nomination to the guild was that a prospective 
merchant must be “rich and financially sound” (yinshi), as previously.136  As under 
the 1755 regulations, shopkeepers were still excluded from the hong merchant 
monopoly of the principal articles of trade.  Shopkeepers could trade only in less 
important articles such as porcelain and silk fabric.137 
Puankhequa I, who became Chief Merchant, was a driving force behind the 
creation of the Cohong of 1760.  The EIC believed that he was motivated by his own 
debts, which had grown large by the late 1750s.138 Puankhequa I had close influence 
with Governor-General Li Shiyao and a deep distrust of foreigners dating to having 
seen Chinese abused by the Spanish when he traded in the Philippines.139  
Governor-General Li Shiyao is said to have received a cut from the increased 
revenues enjoyed by the new Cohong, and presumably the new Hoppo Yu Bashi 
did as well.140  A footnote to the British EIC translation of the 1831 Regulations, 
inserted by Morse, mentions a “tradition” that Governor-General Li Shiyao “had a 
share in Puankhequa’s house.”141 
The foreign community vigorously protested against the introduction of the 
Cohong of 1760.  Western company representatives variously complained, 
negotiated and stalled, delaying the landing of their inbound cargoes.  The Chinese 
stood firm, maintaining a united front and insisting upon uniform prices.142  By the 
middle of August 1760 Hoppo Yu Bashi demanded to know why the foreign ships 
had not yet begun to unload.  He stated “that the new procedure had been 
approved by the Emperor, and that conformity was imperative.”  The Hoppo 
added, perhaps fatefully, that “the Association was designed to make the Merchants 
jointly answerable for every trouble, great or small, that the Europeans might 
occasion.”143   The foreign community finally landed their cargoes and traded, thus 
accepting the new terms upon which the Canton trade would be conducted 
thereafter.144 
During the same time period in which the Chinese government promulgated the 
1760 Regulations and recognized the Cohong of 1760, the unpaid debts of the 
deceased Ziyuan hong merchant Beau Khequa were finally resolved.  It is unclear 
from surviving records precisely when and how this occurred.145  Beau Khequa's 
British EIC debt had stood at 50,000 taels ($69,444) on his death in 1758.146  In 
proceedings before the Nanhai and Panyu magistrates, the Taihe hong merchant 
Sweetia -- who had traded on joint account with Beau Khequa -- was held liable for 
half of the debts of his deceased sometime joint venture partner.  This liability arose 
either from Sweetia’s relationship with the deceased hong merchant as joint venture 
partner, or from the deceased’s occasional practice of acting as joint guarantor with 
other merchants in connection with specific business that they transacted.  The hong 
merchant Chowqua paid off Beau Khequa’s 10,600 tael ($14,722) mortgage loan to 
the EIC in January 1759 and various foreign creditors accepted private settlements.  
Sweetia agreed to assume additional debt in exchange for new business with foreign 
firms, and to maintain good customer relations.147  The entire hong merchant body 
was ordered by the government to pay tea duties owed by the Ziyuan hong, funds 
for which had been advanced by the EIC but diverted by the failing firm and not 
paid to the state.  The hong merchants raised these funds through an ad hoc 
surcharge on the trade.  This levy is considered to  have been a prototype for the 
later surcharge in support of the Consoo Fund that was established in 1780.148  The 
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Ziyuan hong settlements piled more debt onto Sweetia's already weak Taihe hong, 
which owed creditors 118,800 taels ($165,000) as of 1759.  Sweetia then died in 1761.  
The burden of this debt and its accumulating interest contributed directly to the 
1780 failure of the Taihe hong under successor proprietor Yngshaw (Yan Shiying).149 
A pattern in hong merchant debt cases, which recurs in cases after 1780, is 
evident in the 1759-1760 resolution of debts of Beau Khequa's Ziyuan hong.  First, 
most of the hong's debt was not “paid” at all but rather was assumed (with the 
burden of paying interest) by another hong merchant.  Second, that debt assumption 
was tied to the transfer of existing contracts between the debtor and foreign firms to 
the assuming hong merchant (aiding the rescuer).150  Third, the dead weight of this 
assumed and still interest bearing debt then became a material factor in the later 
failure of the rescuer. 
The merchants of the 1760 Cohong stood their ground and maintained price 
unity for several years.  While the guild enjoyed some trading prosperity, most of its 
members remained in difficult financial condition, burdened with old debt.  An 
employee of the British EIC noted in 1761 that “[m]ost of the merchants are 
considerably in our debt.”151  Some borrowed still more from foreigners, and at high 
interest, despite the stern prohibitions of the 1760 Regulations.152  These debt 
problems received little official attention, except in 1762 and 1764 when the Hoppo 
suspended trade until guild debts were cleared, which of course did not really 
happen.  Records that the Canton officials allowed inland tea merchants to contract 
directly with foreigners in 1764 for as much as 30% of that year's business, in breach 
of the Cohong monopoly, are a strong indication of instability (i.e. the licensed 
merchants lacked the capital to complete that year's tea contracts on their own).153  
Hong merchant debt to private Western creditors continued to grow and be ignored 
through the late 1770s, although many of the creditors were closely affiliated with 
European trading companies at Canton and should have understood the 
consequences.154 
Just ten years after the organization of the Cohong of 1760, it was dissolved at 
the behest of Puankhequa I, its original proponent and leader.  Puankhequa told the 
British EIC in 1768 that he would buy all of its cotton that season at a higher price 
than that set by the Cohong, as he had been unable to persuade his colleagues to 
raise the price to be paid by the guild.155  In 1771, Puankhequa procured the formal 
dissolution of the body.  The EIC advanced 100,000 taels ($138,889) to Puankhequa 
which he used to motivate Governor-General Li Shiyao to this purpose.156  After 
dissolution, the right to serve as security merchant was now extended to all viable 
hong merchants, who would be assigned to vessels by seniority by the Hoppo.157  
While this ended the former priority rights of the capital (senior security) 
merchants, that priority meant little in practice.  Of the original six, most had died, 
failed or withdrawn from trading by 1771.158  Although dissolution of the Cohong 
was hailed as a success by the British EIC, its historian Earl Pritchard instead 
records the 100,000 tael bribe as having accomplished a “disaster” for EIC interests.  
The dissolution of the Cohong of 1760 “broke the bargaining power of the Hongists, 
prices decreased, and the demands of the officials fell upon the merchants 
individually instead of collectively.”159  These destabilized market conditions led 
directly to the “Chinese debts” crisis of 1779-80, and spectacular hong merchant 
failures in its wake.160 
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The difficult post-Cohong decade of the 1770s was marked by several hong 
failures, which were brought before the local magistrates and resolved according to 
Chinese law.  The hong merchant body had no liability for the debts of Sy Anqua 
(Seunqua II) whose Zhufeng hong was determined to be insolvent early in 1775, or 
for the debts of Coqua whose Guangshun hong failed in 1778.  In both cases, assets 
were liquidated and applied first to the payment of arrears of customs duties due to 
the government, and then to the claims of foreign creditors.  The business of the 
Zhufeng hong was determined to be viable.  Governor-General Li Shiyao directed 
Sy Anqua (Seunqua II) to continue trading for the benefit of creditors and to pay 
192,018 taels ($266,692) in allowed foreign claims over ten years without interest.  
The foreign loans were not confiscated, nor were the foreign lenders otherwise 
punished by the Chinese officials.  Only one 10% installment was subsequently 
paid.  When foreign creditors later complained of nonpayment the Canton 
authorities noted their procedural failure to either acknowledge or accept the 
payment plan, but expressed hope that when the young Cai Zhaofu (later Seunqua 
III) “grows up and gains money by his business, he shall pay his father’s debts.”161  
Net assets of the hong merchant Coqua after liquidation and payment of his 
customs duty debt stood at under 14,400 taels ($20,000), as against 1,028,239 taels 
($1,428,110) in creditor claims.  The EIC's 11,530.630 tael ($16,015) claim was a small 
part of this total.  The hong merchants resisted EIC efforts to persuade them to 
assume Coqua’s debts in proportion to their business with the Company, but agreed 
that the merchant who took up Coqua’s EIC business might become liable for those 
debts.  The hong merchant Munqua (Cai Shiwen of the Fengyuan hong) took on and 
satisfied Coqua's EIC debts over two years, contributing to the imminent failure of 
his own Fengyuan hong.  As in the 1775 Sy Anqua case, the EIC and other foreign 
creditors failed to participate or assert claims in the 1778 proceedings on debts of 
Coqua's Guangshun hong.  This was later found to constitute a waiver of their 
rights as creditors.162 
A pivotal moment came in 1776-77, when the EIC pressed to collect another 
relatively small debt -- 11,725.75 taels ($16,286) owed by Wayqua (Ni Hongwen of 
the Fengjin hang).  The Fengjin Hong was originally a bengang hong, but was 
licensed as an outer seas hong after the 1771 dissolution of the unified Cohong.  The 
EIC's repeated attempts to collect this debt, starting in the spring of 1772, resulted in 
a late 1776 report from Governor Li Zhiying to the Board of Punishments in Beijing.  
The Governor advised that Wayqua had been deprived of his purchased Jiansheng 
title, and punished by beating.163  The Governor saw the offense as simply involving 
bad debt,164 but the Board disagreed.  As the case involved foreigners, the charge it 
considered applicable was the more serious crime of “collaborating with foreigners 
and cheating them out of their money.”165  The Board recommended, and the 
Emperor agreed, that Wayqua should be beaten, and imprisoned, and given a year 
to pay his debt, failing which he would be banished.  In his 3 January 1777 approval 
edict, the Emperor dismissed Wayqua's commercial defenses to nonpayment.  
“Excessive borrowing is no way to cherish foreigners.”166  The Qianlong Emperor 
stressed the foreign relations importance of the matter, invoking precedents from 
the Han, Tang, Song and Ming Dynasties. 167  As foreigners were barred from 
presenting their grievances in Beijing, the Emperor told the Governor and the 
Governor-General that the duty therefore fell upon them to 'show benevolence.’  
The officials were ordered to be fairminded in cases involving foreigners, and not to 
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show partiality to Chinese parties.168  “If governing officers are petty, permitting 
local ruffians to insult people and never giving redress for complaints that are 
brought to them, can [foreigners] help but despise and laugh at such a governor or 
governor-general?”169  The Emperor criticized Governor-General Li Shiyao for his 
negligence in the matter.  Governor Li Zhiying was reprimanded by the Board of 
Punishments for his handling of the case.170 
Wayqua was jailed and beaten in response to the Imperial edict.  He died in 
prison at Canton on 30 June 1777, likely due to judicial beatings, before the 
banishment order was carried out.  Relatives came forward with 6,000 taels ($8,333), 
leaving a 5,725.75 tael ($7,952) balance due to the British.  Canton officials, from the 
provincial level down to the xian level, were ordered to pay the remainder out of 
their salaries.  The officials recouped this sum from the hong merchant body.171  This 
forceful resolution, albeit in a small matter, served to encourage private British 
“country traders” with large claims arising from high interest loans to hong 
merchants to come forward.172 
3D. Debt Collection Under the Canton System 
In the years after the 1759 failure of the Flint mission, the British EIC redirected its 
attention from improving trading conditions toward strengthening its bargaining 
position at Canton.173  One of the tactics it employed was to use Chinese legal 
process to collect unpaid hong merchant debts, thereby seeking redress for its 
“trouble[s], great or small.”  At least in this respect, the EIC and other foreign 
traders accepted Hoppo Yu's invitation and the text of the 1760 Regulations, which 
invited bringing infractions of the new rules to the “Knowledge of the 
Mandarines.”174 
The procedures for debt collection that were made available to Western creditors 
differed from the normal debt collection process available to Chinese citizens.  In 
many ways it was a special form of justice, significantly better than most Chinese 
could obtain from their own officials.  To the extent that they were preferred, 
foreign creditors either did not realize they were getting a better deal, or tended to 
view their preferential treatment as justified given other inconveniences of the 
Canton System.  The foreigners certainly disliked the Chinese law that was enforced 
through this process.  While harsh penalties for unpaid foreign debt tended to 
operate in their favor, Chinese rules reduced the collectability of foreign debt by 
requiring creditor participation in the debt process (or claims were considered to 
have been waived) and barring the collection of interest in excess of the principal 
amount of a claim (yi ben yi li).  Twenty years after promulgation of the 1760 
Regulations, as a result of the “Chinese debts” crisis of 1780, foreigners were given 
the further benefit of a collective guaranty of the payment of hong debt, enforced by 
the state against the entire hong merchant body. 
In imperial China, debt might be collected either through public process, entered 
through the doors of the magistrate’s yamen, or through private process, which took 
the form of mediation or other procedures administered by guilds or local village or 
family groups.175  Contracts were in frequent use,176 business disputes were 
common, and large amounts of private litigation occupied the time of Qing 
magistrates.177 
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The sources of law varied.  A considerable body of customary law or guild or 
kinship rules existed which was applied in private process.178  The law that was 
applied in public cases included the Qing statutes, substatutes, reports of decided 
cases, and also imperial edicts.179  The Qing statutes, notably the Qing Code (da qing 
lu li), were organized according to the departments of government and, as such, 
reflected the perspective of the Emperor.180  Statutes (the lu) might be applied if they 
addressed the situation.  Substatutes (the li), which were detailed rules based on 
prior interpretations or decisions, were instead to be applied if they more precisely 
addressed the problem.181  In all sections of the Qing Code “the arrangement is 
consistent: a lu or general law is stated and then followed by li, specific conditions 
for its application or for exemption from its provisions, and then by commentary to 
explain both.”182  Enforcement of the Qing Code was by specified punishments.  This 
has caused it to be called a penal code, which is an inadequate explanation of its 
function, for many civil elements are included.183  As explained by Qing Code 
scholar William C. Jones, 
“The aim [of the drafters of the Qing Code] seems to have been to create a 
sort of giant grid on which any legally relevant act, such as eating another’s 
melons, including all the ways of varying the basic fact pattern, such as the 
relationship between trespasser and owner, could be located.  When this was 
done properly, the precise punishment required would be discovered.  If no 
punishment could be found, the act was not legally significant.  This is 
similar to a finding in Western law that no action lay.”184 
The location of some statutes within the Qing Code can seem a little strange.  The 
relatively few Articles devoted to commerce and industry are in the section of the 
Qing Code devoted to the Board of Revenue (Hu Bu).  Sybille van der Sprenkel 
speaks of this arrangement as being “rather as if our commercial law were an 
appendix to the Inland Revenue Department regulations.”185  The Code stood 
nonetheless as an integrated whole, reflecting the attitude of the Emperor in his 
administration of the officials who governed China.  It thus was, per William C. 
Jones, 
“in part a collection of rules that deal with particular fact situations, 
sometimes in great detail.  Nevertheless, it is not just a compendium of rules.  
The rules themselves have been refined and harmonized to a considerable 
degree.  General principles have been factored out.  It is, in other words, a 
true code, and as such can be taken to represent the considered view of some 
of China’s leading jurists as to ways to think about law, to think about what 
law is.  It was to show the way to analyze legal problems and to provide 
methods for applying legal rules to them.”186 
Local magistrates were vested by the Code with authority in debt disputes.  The 
Code specified certain debt rules and penalties, and it regulated markets in a limited 
way.187  At least officially, public judicial process under the Qing Code preempted 
local and informal dispute resolution.188  In particular, it provided for severe 
punishment of those creditors who did not use the public process but instead 
attempted “self help” debt collection by using (unauthorized) violence to take 
property from debtors.189 
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Public judicial process was initiated by accusation, which was made in the form 
of a written petition presented at the magistrate’s yamen (office compound).  The 
magistrate was required to investigate the facts, question the witnesses, and render 
a preliminary decision in the dispute.190  He had to ascertain 
(a) whether the defendant was in fact guilty of the action of which he 
stood accused (and, if so, a confession of guilt had to be extracted from him); 
(b) which section of the [Da Qing Lü Li] covered this misdeed; and (c) 
circumstances which were relevant to determining his degree of criminality.  
He then had to decide according to (b) and (c) what punishment was 
appropriate.191 
Much of this work was performed by unpaid or underpaid yamen clerks, who were 
notorious throughout China for exacting heavy fees from those involved at every 
stage of the proceedings.192  Beating to obtain a confession was permitted, but only 
during trial.193  “At the trial the parties and witnesses were flanked by guards 
wielding bamboo staves and other implements and were required to remain in a 
kneeling position on the ground before the magistrate’s high bench.”194 
“The proceeding could be quite dreadful for everyone, including the 
complainant.  All persons concerned, including witnesses, were usually 
imprisoned under appalling conditions pending final conclusion of the 
matter.  The term which when translated is the innocent word ‘interrogate’ 
often involved torture.  Even the lightest punishment -- beating -- could be 
crippling or even fatal.”195 
Even conscientious and even-tempered magistrates administered a law that was 
largely unknown to the populace governed by it.  This was expressed in the saying, 
“Of ten reasons by which a magistrate may decide a case, nine are unknown to the 
public.”196  The preliminary decision of the magistrate, once rendered, required 
higher review and approval before it could become final.197  If the outcome was a 
finding that the original accusation was false, then the punishment for the crime that 
was charged was to be imposed on the accuser under the principle of fan zuo.  
George Staunton, writing in 1810, viewed this sanction as similar to Western 
penalties for willful perjury.  Sybille van der Sprenkel agrees that it at least 
appeared to act in the interests of justice, but submits that fan zuo “probably in fact 
worked against it, i.e. as a deterrent to denouncing the influential but no protection 
to those who needed it.”198  As she explains, 
“The unavoidable consequence of a legal case once started was 
punishment for at least one person.  It could end in punishment for the 
accused, if judged guilty; if he were not, punishment would be assigned to 
the unjustified accuser; it was also likely that witnesses would, during the 
course of the proceedings, incur punishment, while the magistrate was 
exposed throughout the case to the risk of reprimand or degradation for 
making a mistake in procedure or in application of the code.”199 
From a Confucian standpoint, simply being involved in a lawsuit, even with a 
legitimate grievance, was somewhat disreputable, as a disruption of natural 
harmony was involved.200  The harsh treatment of participants in legal process was 
thus somewhat intentional, an attempt by the system itself to cause the maintenance 
of the condition of (at least apparent) harmony in society that was the Confucian 
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ideal.  Confucius himself is said to have stated: “In hearing cases I am as good as 
any one else, but what is really needed is to bring about that there are no cases.”201  
The Kangxi Emperor (reigned 1661-1722) once challenged the very ideal of justice in 
litigation.  He had expressed concern that: 
“law-suits would increase to a frightful amount, if people were not afraid 
of the tribunals, and if they felt confident of always finding in them ready 
and perfect justice.  As a man is apt to delude himself concerning his own 
interests, contests would then be interminable, and the half of the Empire 
would not suffice to settle the lawsuits of the other half.  I desire therefore 
that those who have recourse to the tribunals should be treated without any 
pity, and in such a manner that they shall be disgusted with law, and tremble 
to appear before a magistrate.  In this manner the evil will be cut up by the 
roots; the good citizens, who may have difficulties among themselves, will 
settle them like brothers, by referring to the arbitration of some old man, or 
the mayor of the commune.  As for those who are troublesome, obstinate, 
and quarrelsome, let them be ruined by the law-courts -- that is the justice 
that is due to them.”202 
Such was justice for the average subject of the Emperor of China.203  The lack of 
any reliable or convenient system for collecting debt certainly discouraged risk 
taking in the form of the general extension of credit, as discussed at pages 21-22 
above.  When a hong merchant was owed money by a foreign debtor, he had little 
recourse under Chinese law, and the foreigner was usually overseas.  The hong 
merchant Conseequa thus ended up mired in disastrous litigation trying to collect 
from debtors in the United States, as discussed at pages 141-146, above.  In an 1814 
petition in which he sought assistance from the American President, Conseequa told 
James Madison that “[w]hen such Debtors come to, or reside in, China, he cannot 
claim the aid of the Laws of the Imperial Dynasty in his behalf.  They prohibit such 
confidences, as he has placed in Subjects of the United States.”204  Collection even by 
hong merchants from hong debtors was difficult.  So it was that in 1767, when 
Puankhequa I was asked by the British EIC and agreed to pay off a debt due to the 
EIC from his guild colleague Conqua (Chen Shiji of the Yuanlai Hong), Puankhequa 
requested (and was granted) the accommodation of having the bond (promissory 
note) from Conqua for the amount due plus interest made payable to Mr. Robert 
Gordon, surgeon to the EIC.205  While the EIC’s 1780 discussion of the Conqua note 
says that it arose in a “peculiar circumstance,” notes payable to Europeans as 
designees for Chinese were drafted occasionally, and by this stratagem the 
sophisticated Puankhequa created an obligation that could be enforced -- by its 
European holder -- against Puankhequa’s Chinese debtor. 
Normal Chinese procedures were modified when Western creditors sought to 
collect debts from hong merchants.  They were not “treated without any pity,” but 
rather had their complaints heard and acted upon.  Westerners who used the 
Chinese public debt collection process were not penalized for presenting their 
petitions to the wrong official in the local hierarchy,206 were not beaten by yamen 
staff, were not forced to kneel when present at hearings, and were not penalized if 
their accusations were later determined to be untrue.  They were required to present 
an accusation, a written petition that was usually submitted to the Hoppo.  In most 
cases, the Hoppo referred the dispute to the local magistrate with appropriate 
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jurisdiction for investigation and initial decision.  This was usually the magistrate of 
the Nanhai xian (Canton).  The initial questions considered by the magistrate -- 
whether the foreign petitioner had extended credit and whether the hong merchant 
debtor had failed to pay the debt -- were usually not a point of contention, though 
the true amount of unpaid debt was often disputed.  After investigation, creditors 
and the hong debtor presented their cases at a trial before the magistrate.  Process in 
the investigatory and trial stages of proceedings on foreign debt complaints seems 
to have been somewhat ad hoc, simpler in smaller cases and more elaborate in larger 
or more complicated cases.207  The debt complaints of Western creditors were 
received and adjudicated according to an established process which in many ways is 
comparable to the debt collection process that then existed in their home nations.208 
Chinese creditors typically came in as participants in foreign debt cases and 
joined foreign creditors in demanding payment.  The domestic creditors tended to 
have better information about the activities of the indebted firm than did the foreign 
petitioner.  The local creditors were also in a better position to press the yamen clerks 
to forcefully investigate debtors, their relatives, or employees or other witnesses 
who might assist in the recovery of assets or funds.  Surviving records show that it 
was the domestic creditors who generally pressed the yamen staff for the physical 
beating of debtors to force them to pay debts.  The records do not indicate that this 
tactic produced appreciable added value for creditors except as a means of 
sometimes reaching into the pockets of horrified relatives and friends of the beaten 
debtors. 
A critical initial determination by the magistrate concerned the solvency of the 
debtor, i.e., whether there was any reasonable prospect that the hong would be able 
to pay its debts within a reasonable time.  Where the business of the indebted hong 
was determined to be viable, it was invariably ordered to continue trading to 
generate a dividend for creditors.  Business goodwill or reorganization value was 
thus realized for creditors.  Where the hong was not viable, its assets were 
liquidated and used to pay creditors in order of priority: customs debt first, paid to 
the government, and unsecured debt second, paid to foreign and domestic 
creditors.209  The magistrate also directed punishment of the debtor, meted out 
according to the type of offense that was found to have occurred, and the terms of 
repayment to creditors.  Under the regime of collective responsibility, starting in 
1780, the magistrate first tried to get foreign creditors and the surviving hong 
guarantors to reach an agreement on repayment terms.  If agreement could not be 
reached, the magistrate imposed a repayment schedule, a series of equal annual 
payments by the hong merchant body, without interest.  These various orders were 
assembled as a preliminary decision by the magistrate, which was submitted to his 
superiors for review and approval (or modification).  Records of the hong merchant 
debt cases invariably reflect long periods of time during which the debtor and 
creditors alike waited for final judgment from Beijing. 
In contemporary records, the Chinese debt process described in the preceding 
two pages is sometimes spoken of as involving the “bankruptcy” of the hong 
debtor.  Historians have picked up this usage.  The failed hongs were certainly 
“bankrupt” in the sense that they could not pay their debts.  The term “bankruptcy,” 
however, implies an established public legal process for the permanent resolution of 
debts that brings in and binds the debtor and all affected creditors.210  While the 
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Chinese process involved domestic creditors in debt cases filed by foreign creditors, 
it served no such public end.  It was not a bankruptcy system.211  This study 
accordingly avoids the use of the term “bankruptcy,” and uses the terms 
“insolvency” or “debt” by preference. 
To foreign creditors, the most important part of the magistrate’s decision was the 
allowance or disallowance of claims.  In these often controversial rulings, the 
magistrate applied settled Chinese laws concerning debt.  The most important of 
these was the rule that recoverable interest could not exceed the principal amount of 
the loan (yi ben yi li).212  A joint communication from the Governor and Hoppo, 
dated 29 February 1780, “reminded” foreigners of this provision of Chinese law.213  
(On at least two other occasions, in 1801 and in 1821, Canton officials provided 
instruction in Chinese law by having parts of the Qing Code translated into English 
and delivered to the local head of the British EIC.)214  Many foreign claims were 
slashed under the rule of yi ben yi li.  Full analysis of the practical consequences of 
the rule is beyond the scope of this study, but a few may be noted.  First, the rational 
creditor who believed that the debtor (or guarantor) had the ability to pay a given 
debt had good reason under this rule to cooperate with the debtor during the period 
that interest was accruing but did not yet equal the amount of principal.  This 
creditor would expect the loan to be profitable, i.e., to receive full return at the 
agreed interest rate, during this time period.  Second, at some point as the interest 
total neared the Qing statutory cap this expectation of profit ceased.  The prospect of 
loss now beckoned, if the debtor defaulted and debt collection by Chinese public 
process was required.  This would be a real loss to the extent the creditor had other 
profitable uses for its funds.  Third, when the amount of interest exceeded the 
amount of principal (the statutory cap), any hope of legal profit in return for 
cooperation with the debtor ceased.  An economic incentive for aggressive collection 
efforts thus existed during the time period when the amount of accrued interest 
approached the principal amount cap above which there could be no recovery by 
legal process -- in order to liquidate and collect the loan in full.  If assets were 
believed to exist in an amount sufficient to pay the debt in full, whether held by the 
debtor or by the hong merchant body as his collective guarantors, there was no 
incentive for further cooperation.  Finally, the rule tended to promote extralegal or 
secret collection activity from that point forward.  The creditor’s only remaining 
hope to collect further interest would be to collect it from the debtor through private 
action kept away from the magistrate and out of the knowledge of other potentially 
affected creditors. 
In criminal matters involving foreigners, by contrast, the Qing did not assert 
criminal jurisdiction, except in cases in which a Chinese citizen was killed.  
Otherwise, as R. Randle Edwards succinctly explains, “the foreign community was 
held responsible for maintaining order in its ranks and the Chinese government was 
not particular about how it was accomplished.”215  Where a foreigner was the victim 
of a crime committed by a Chinese citizen, the Qing authorities typically responded 
quickly and severely.216 
  











Figure 4. The trial of the Neptune sailors. 
Chinese artist, ca. 1807.  (Collection of Anthony and Susan Hardy.  Photograph 
by courtesy of the Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.) 
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When a Qing official was presented with a foreign petition complaining of 
unpaid debt owed by a Chinese citizen, the crucial question he had to address was 
identification of the offense to be charged under the Qing Code.  When Beijing 
identified errors in the decisions made in hong debt cases, it was apt to be that the 
wrong offense had been charged, resulting in the wrong punishment.  Such 
mistakes, and the officials who made them, were subject to correction and harsh 
criticism.  These were crucial matters, for, as William C. Jones notes, “determination 
of the proper punishment was the fundamental task of the law” under the Qing 
Code.217  Precisely such an imperial rebuke was issued in 1777 -- three years before 
imposition of collective liability among the hong merchants for the foreign debts of 
failed guild members -- in the relatively minor 11,725.75 tael ($16,286) debt case of 
Wayqua (the Fengjin hong).  Wayqua had been ordered punished for his default by 
beating, by being ordered to repay the debt, and by being stripped of his purchased 
Jiansheng title.  Revocation of purchased official title was required when its holder 
was sued for debt, and Qing practice required that the disgrace be reported to the 
Board of Punishments in Beijing.  Governor Li Zhiying accordingly reported the 
matter and its disposition, in which he had applied the normal bad debt penalties.218  
The Board, and the Emperor, strongly disagreed with his handling of the matter.  In 
their view, the appropriate punishments were beating, imprisonment for one year, 
and banishment to Ili (in Xinjiang) if the debt had not been paid within that year.  
As the case involved foreigners, the applicable charge was the crime of 
“collaborating with foreigners and cheating them out of their money”219 -- the same 
substatute the 1760 Regulations specified for punishment of violations of the foreign 
loan ban.  In his 3 January 1777 edict, quoted above (and at length in Chapter 2 at 
page 20), the Qianlong Emperor sharply rebuked the officials involved for their 
failure to apply the correct offense and penalties.  The Emperor singled out the 
negligence of Governor-General Li Shiyao, “a remarkable performance  .  .  .  for one 
who had always been so diligent in the handling of barbarian affairs.”220  The 
Emperor emphasized the foreign relations and defense implications of the 
mistreatment of maritime traders to whom Chinese were indebted.  The Wokou raids 
of the late Ming Dynasty, and their perceived relation to dynastic decline, stood as a 
living instruction to the Qing rulers of China. 
The charging tension seen in the Wayqua matter haunted hong merchant debt 
cases through the years of the Canton System.  The applicable punishments were 
quite different, depending on whether the matter was seen as one of common bad 
debt, or as involving cheating foreigners.  The nature of the latter offense, as Joanna 
Waley-Cohen has observed, “bordered, at least, on political territory.”221  The choice 
was stark: 
Common bad debt.  Such cases were prosecuted under the authority of 
Articles 24 and 345 of the Qing Code (concerning illegally obtained property) 
(zang), which were applied in debt cases by analogy.222  Punishment in 
common bad debt cases included: a restitution order, beating, imprisonment 
for a half year (and/or being forced to wear the neck yoke, also called the 
cangue), with the possibility of release after the half year period if the debtor 
satisfied the magistrate that he truly lacked the ability to pay the debt.223  As 
noted at above, at page 71, debtors in common debt cases (such as Wayqua) 
were also stripped of their purchased official titles, but that disgrace occurred 
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as a matter of administrative practice, not as a punishment for violation of 
the Qing Code.  
Cheating foreigners.  The term “collaborating with foreigners and 
cheating them out of their money” (jiaojie waiguo kuangbian caiwu) is the short 
title of the li (substatute) that was applied in most of the hong merchant debt 
cases.  It is found in the part of the Qing Code devoted to the Board of War, 
organized as the first substatute under lu (statute), Art. 224, entitled 
“Interrogating Spies” (panjie jianxi).224  There is no standard translation of the 
title of this substatute, which has been rendered in variant ways,225 such as 
the “law by which we punish criminals who communicate with a foreign 
country, borrow money or hold their goods or money without payment,”226 
or the law “which punishes criminals who plot with a foreign country, 
borrow money or hold their goods or money without payment.”227  The 
punishment directed for violation of this substatute included: a restitution 
order; beating, imprisonment for a year, and banishment to Ili if the debt had 
not been paid within that year.228  Banishment to Xinjiang, itself, was an 
extraordinary penalty under Qing law -- ranking second only to execution.229 
Some of the Canton officials believed that the penalties that were applied in 
common bad debt cases were proper in hong merchant debt cases as well.  This was 
true in the Wayqua case in 1776, in the Hingtae case in 1837,230 and probably on 
other occasions.  Leniency tended to favor domestic economic interests.  Yet the 1760 
Regulations and the edict in the Wayqua case, both directly issued by the Emperor, 
mandated the harsh punishments of a substatute that at least nominally sought to 
protect foreigners as a special class (penalizing “collaborating with foreigners and 
cheating them out of their money”).  The true objective of this “protection,” 
however, was to prevent Chinese subjects from becoming so beholden to foreigners 
that they would work to advance foreign interests.  In a memorial sent to the 
Emperor at the time of adoption of the 1760 Regulations, Li Shiyao expressed 
concern that indebted hong merchants tended “to be very toadying and obsequious 
[to foreigners] so as to invite their favour.”231  An 1815 joint memorial to the throne 
from the Governor-General, Governor and Hoppo expressed concern about the 
economic consequences of the control foreign lenders achieved over “treacherous” 
Chinese subjects: 
“As the people of Kwangtung rush towards profits like ducks, the first 
thing to do is to scrutinise the treacherous people of China.  .  .  .  However, 
now, there are ten hong merchants but only three or four are really affluent.  
The rest, though they are guaranteed by their colleagues, are not rich but 
simply hold the position as hong merchants.  After they have assumed their 
positions, as they are incompetent in doing business, they fall into debts to 
the barbarians inevitably.  As they owe the barbarians money, they have to 
buy goods on credit from merchants in other provinces in order to clear the 
debts owed to the barbarians.  Debts accumulate and become too large an 
amount to be returned.  Consequently, they are controlled by the barbarian 
merchants.  The fixing of the price of goods will as a result be unfair and the 
merchants from the other provinces will suffer in the process.  The current 
rule is that when foreign ships are leaving, they will receive the chop from 
the customs superintendent's office which will receive a note on which is 
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written “no debt between each other”.  But this has become a formality and 
cannot be trusted any more.”232 
Maintaining domestic public order was the true objective of the protection of 
foreigners provided in the “cheating foreigners” substatute.233 
Many Chinese hong merchant debtors were punished in accordance with the 
“cheating foreigners” substatute during the period 1777 through 1842.  Although the 
substatute specified only one (1) set of punishments, the indebted hong merchants 
had actually committed two (2) distinct offenses: 
being indebted to foreigners in violation of the substatute (the rule of the 
Wayqua case); and 
violating the loan ban imposed by the 1760 Regulations. 
Each of these offenses specified that violations would be punished as provided 
in the “cheating foreigners” substatute.  In cases in which offenders were Chinese, 
this was easily accomplished.  So it is that Wayqua in 1777,234 Yngshaw and 
Kewshaw in 1780,235 Eequa in 1791,236 Wyequa in 1796,237 Fonqua in 1809,238 
Gnewqua II, Ponqua and Ashing in 1811,239 Pacqua in 1828,240 and Manhop II in 
1828,241 were all severely punished and ordered banished to Ili.  Little is known of 
the fate of the hong merchants in Xinjiang except for a report that was prepared for 
the Qianlong Emperor in 1795.  The Emperor had asked about the condition of these 
exiles.  The local officials in Ili reported that the former hong merchants, because 
they were literate, had been put to work as bookkeepers in the government 
boatyards and were thus able to support themselves.242 
The correct prosecution of foreign offenders under these rules was problematic.  
Violation of the 1760 loan ban, by definition, involved two parties (a foreign lender 
and a Chinese debtor).  Yet the members of the class that stood protected by the 
criminal substatute (which penalized cheating foreigners) were equally offenders 
when the 1760 loan ban was violated.  There was never any doubt that the 
substatute provided for severe punishment of Chinese subjects who violated the 
loan ban, but it was unclear whether the same applied to foreigners.243  Senior 
Canton officials stated that loans made by foreign lenders were subject to forfeiture 
(confiscation) as a punishment for violating the ban on loans to hong merchants.  
While this was said repeatedly, that stern sanction was never imposed.244  No 
foreign lender was ever penalized.  The opposite took place: loans made in violation 
of the 1760 ban (as regularly restated in the Eight Regulations) were enforced.  Not 
only were the loans enforced against the original debtors (who stood in pari delicto as 
equal violators of the ban) but they were enforced against other innocent members 
of the hong guild after 1780 as a matter of collective responsibility.  The threatened 
penalties for foreign violations of the loan ban proved illusory, and the warnings 
proved meaningless as well. 
Perhaps it is that the Qing Dynasty officials were caught in an enforcement 
dilemma not unlike that which confronted their Ming predecessors.  The debts that 
were owed by Chinese to Japanese traders in the Ming period, which some Chinese 
refused to pay (provoking the Wokou depredations), were incurred in a foreign trade 
that was illegal under Ming law.  Creditor and debtor alike equally violated Chinese 
law by engaging in this trade.  In the Qing period, the debts that hong merchants 
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owed to Europeans were incurred through extensions of credit in violation of the 
1760 ban (as restated in the Eight Regulations).  Once again, creditor and debtor 
alike were in equal violation of Chinese law.  Yet the Qing -- unlike the Ming -- 
permitted foreigners to collect these debts using the Chinese public debt process.  
The foreigners seem to have enjoyed some type of legal shelter when they came 
before Qing courts.  We can only speculate as to the reason.245  Perhaps it is that the 
magistrates believed the foreigners were protected under the “cheating foreigners” 
substatute which seemed to favor them as a class in debt cases.  Perhaps the 
increasingly common practice of delivering goods on credit (to be paid for in the 
future) was seen as outside the loan ban, although the delivery of goods represented 
an extension of credit that required the same payment in the future as a cash loan.  
Perhaps Qing officials recognized the heavy dependence of both the Chinese state 
and the Chinese economy on maritime foreign trade, and were loathe to take any 
action that might result in either the suspension or interruption of this internally 
important commerce. 
Whatever its reason, the policy choice that resulted in Qing officials not only 
failing to enforce the loan ban they repeatedly proclaimed against foreign lenders, 
but actively assisting foreigners in collecting the large loans they made in violation 
of the ban, provided a dangerous lesson.  The inference that all Chinese prohibitions 
were as likely to be meaningless as meaningful could be drawn from this 
experience.  This conclusion was indeed drawn by some Western traders.  This 
erroneous instruction in local law played at least some role in the brazen 
development of the opium trade in and near Canton.  In 1806, a private British 
country trader stated that “there are few things in China that cannot be had by 
paying for them.”  Speaking of the opium trade, an employee of the British EIC said 
in 1835 that “It could safely be stated that there was no officer of the Canton 
Government whose hands were clean.”  The importation of opium was illegal under 
Chinese law.  That prohibition, as with the empty prohibition of foreign loans to 
hong merchants, was repeatedly proclaimed to the Westerners at Canton.  Opium 
had first been banned by an edict issued in 1729, and again by an edict issued in 
1799, but the prohibition was spottily enforced, only notably in the crackdown of 
1821 which drove the trade out to Linton Island.  In daily practice, the opium ban 
was easily evaded by smuggling and functionally 'waivable' with well placed 
bribes.  The illegal trade in opium, as with the illegal loans to hong merchants, grew 
large.  It thrived in an atmosphere in which some foreigners believed that no 
prohibition imposed under Chinese law had any real meaning, except perhaps as 
the excuse given by officials for requests for higher fees to allow the practice to 
continue.  This belief held sway at least until the year 1839, when Commissioner Li 
Zexu arrived at Canton from Beijing angry at pretty much all of the local officials 
and merchants and authorized to act finally and utterly to enforce the opium 
prohibition.246  The crackdown he instituted led into the First Anglo-Chinese 
(Opium) War of 1839-1842, which brought on the trade disruptions and the social, 
internal order and economic consequences the Canton officials had long sought to 
avoid.247 
3E. The 1780 Crisis and Imposition of the Collective Guaranty 
Starting in the 1760s, many of the hong merchants borrowed significant amounts 
from private Western creditors.  These loans were at high interest, many from 16 to 
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20 percent per annum, and some at rates as high as 40 percent.  More loans were 
made in 1773-74, when the British EIC was unable to offer bills on London to private 
parties. The high return on money attracted capital to Canton from as far away as 
France.  Substantial loans were made by British and French traders and investors.  
The principal British creditors said that their loans were the proceeds of fortunes 
made in India, sent to China in order to be transferred home as EIC bills, but which 
had been lent to Chinese debtors as the EIC was temporarily unable to remit private 
funds to London by company bills.248  The 1775 default of Sy Anqua (Seunqua II) 
frightened the creditors, who refused to lend or to extend the maturity of existing 
loans, and tried to collect amounts then due.  The debtor hong merchants found 
themselves in a vice.  They could not pay old debts, could not make new or 
refinancing loans, and found it increasingly difficult to pay even basic operating 
expenses.249  According to an EIC investigation at Canton in 1779, the total debt 
claimed by British country traders and supercargoes representing private interests 
then stood at $4,347,300.250  With French creditor claims, which are estimated to have 
exceeded $600,000,251 the total face amount of foreign claims against hong merchants 
stood at about $5 million as the crisis broke. 
Four of the principal Madras traders sent a representation to London on 17 
December 1777, complaining of unpaid “Chinese Debts” and seeking active 
assistance from the British EIC.  The traders warned of a danger of general 
bankruptcy among the hong merchants, and reported that the French were also 
seeking governmental assistance in collecting Chinese debts.  On 23 December 1778, 
the Court of Directors in London sent instructions to the supercargoes at Canton to 
do all in their power, consistent with the interests of the EIC, to help collect these 
private debts.252 
In July of 1779, the Madras creditors pressed for help from Rear Admiral Sir 
Edward Vernon, commander-in-chief of the British fleet in India, promising him ten 
percent of the amount of debt collected through his efforts.253  The Madras creditors 
took heart from the forceful resolution of the Wayqua case by the Qianlong Emperor 
and from a 1779 letter from Jean-Baptiste-Joseph de Grammont, a Jesuit missionary 
in Beijing, to a missionary in Macao which stated that if the Emperor knew of the 
debts to Europeans he would see that they were paid at once.254  Admiral Vernon 
accordingly dispatched the frigate Sea Horse under Captain John Alexander Panton, 
which reached Canton on 23 September 1779.  His arrival dismayed the local EIC 
servants.  The Supercargoes warned Captain Panton that his representation to the 
Canton officials would result in the bankruptcy and banishment of several hong 
merchants, as well as the restoration of the Cohong, but Panton intended to 
persist.255  Concerned that he was about to damage the EIC’s ongoing trade, the 
Supercargoes presented Panton with a formal protest on 19 October 1779 warning 
him that he would be held responsible in damages “for all losses of Goods, Monies, 
demorrage [demurrage] for detention of Ships, and every ill consequence that may 
(and we think will) attend the present premature representation to the Viceroy of 
Canton for Debts owing to private Persons from the Chinese Merchants.”256  The 
hong merchants sought private negotiations.  They offered Panton $40,000, 
unsuccessfully, to withhold his letter and remonstrance.257 
On 22 October 1779, Captain Panton appeared before Governor Li Zhiying and 
Hoppo Tu-ming-a, with representatives of the major foreign trading companies.258  
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The local trading company chiefs presented a petition asking that their business not 
be harmed by Panton’s conduct.  They were asked if they had any claims to make 
against the debtor hong merchants, for their companies or on behalf of individual 
citizens of their countries, and they said no, with the exception only of the EIC.259  As 
described by Samuel Shaw, 
“[H]is Excellency [Governor Li Zhiying] assured Captain Panton that 
proper inquiries would be made; and likewise told him, that the emperor, in 
1760, having been informed of the distresses occasioned to the merchants, in 
consequence of borrowing money from the Europeans at a high premium, 
had issued an edict, forbidding such loans upon any conditions, under 
penalty to the European of a forfeiture of his money, and of banishment to 
the Chinese, -- a circumstance well known to all the Europeans and Chinese 
in Canton, the edict having been published in the usual manner, and 
translated into several European languages.  He added, that, 
notwithstanding this flagrant violation of the emperor's edict, his Majesty 
should be made acquainted with the present application, and Captain Panton 
might come back for his answer the succeeding year.”260 
On 6 November 1779, Captain Panton received the reply of the Governor and 
Hoppo, stating that “Justice [will] be done agreeable to Imperial Laws.”  He 
departed for Madras on 8 November 1779, emptyhanded.261  Before departure, the 
Captain issued a proclamation, forbidding the lending of money to the Chinese by 
British subjects.262 
Captain John Alexander Panton was not the only foreigner who vexed the 
Canton authorities in 1779-80.  There was also the remarkable Abraham Leslie, a 
junior surgeon employed by the British EIC, who had lent much of his savings to 
Coqua at high interest, and stood to lose $11,000 in his insolvency.  On 4 October 
1779, with loaded pistols in hand, and the support of several Lascars and large dogs, 
he seized Coqua’s hong and all its contents.  Leslie posted his name above the door 
and raised a blue flag reading “Leslie, an English merchant, has taken possession of 
this hong until he is paid,” in English and in Chinese.  He then remained in 
possession for two (2) years, refusing orders by Chinese officials to vacate the 
premises, and orders by the EIC to return to quarters.  After debt proceedings were 
commenced against Yngshaw, Leslie broke the official seals that secured the door to 
Yngshaw’s shuttered hong and seized it on 22 September 1780, now as agent for a 
third party creditor.  Again, he posted signs, stating that possession had been taken 
until the creditor was paid.  He took down the lanterns marked with the name of 
Yngshaw's hong (Taihe) and replaced them with lanterns marked with his name in 
Chinese.  The Chinese carpenter who helped Leslie prepare the signs was put in 
irons for the translation offense.  Leslie put up a sign in English advertising rooms 
for rent, the income to be applied to reduce debt, and rented a room in the Taihe 
hong to an English captain from a private ship.   He defied Chinese and EIC 
demands to vacate both hong premises, and posted Laskar guards to prevent 
approach.  The Chinese authorities grew increasingly frustrated that the British 
either would not or could not control their own employee.  “[S]carcely a month 
passed in which the Chinese authorities did not demand angrily why the 
supercargoes did not coerce him into being obedient to the laws and doing right and 
justice.”  At the end of 1780, the incumbent Governor, Li Hu, offered $17,500 as a 
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lump sum in satisfaction of the Coqua, Yngshaw and Kewshaw debts, to induce 
Leslie to yield up the premises.  Leslie accepted, and the money was paid through 
Puankhequa on 17 January 1781, but he then refused to leave.  Abraham Leslie was 
finally arrested, delivered to Macao, imprisoned there for a period of time, and 
deported.263 
On 29 February 1780, three months after Captain Panton returned to Madras, the 
Governor and Hoppo issued a joint communication: 
“The Select Committee were ‘reminded’ of the Imperial Decree of the 25th 
year of Kienlung [Qianlong] (1760), by which the taking of loans at interest 
by Chinese from Europeans, or by Europeans from Chinese, was strictly 
prohibited under penalty of banishment (transportation) to Ili for the 
Chinese, and forfeiture of the loan for the Europeans; they were also 
‘reminded’ of the provision of Chinese law that accumulated interest should 
not be allowed to exceed the original principal of a loan, i.e. that no loan 
should be more than doubled by interest.  A statement was to be drawn up, 
distinguishing between money lent before and money lent after the twenty-
fifth year; and efforts were to be made to effect a settlement.”264 
All of the supercargoes and creditors claimed ignorance of the decree prohibiting 
foreign loans.265  An accounting of foreign debt, distinguishing between loans made 
before and after the date of the 1760 edict, was requested, and provided.  At a 22 
March 1780 meeting of the Hoppo and EIC representatives, the Hoppo “appeared 
surprised at the largeness of the Sum; which he observed greatly exceeded” the 
debtors’ estimates.  Negotiations ensued, but the private British creditors, 
emboldened by armed naval support from Madras, rejected the Chinese 
proposals.266 
The sums involved in the “Chinese Debts” crisis of 1779-80 were large indeed.  
British creditors asserted $4,296,650 [3,093,588 taels] in claims, including substantial 
accrued interest.  The amount of the claims of other nationals is unknown, but the 
claims of French citizens alone have been estimated at over $600,000.  It appears that 
claims of foreigners other than the British were not paid in the wake of the crisis.  In 
the 22 October 1779 audience before Governor Li Zhiying and Hoppo Tu-ming-a, 
the other trading company chiefs had stated that they had no such claims.  The 
Dutch, Danish, French and Swedish communities were dismayed that the dividend 
to pay claims was funded by a tax put on their trading; “for, though there were 
creditors of the bankrupt Chinese among their respective companies’ servants, yet 
they did not dare avow their claims, and of course were entirely excluded.”267 
All the hong merchants were involved.  The primary debtors were Yngshaw 
(Yan Shiying of the Taihe hong), Coqua, Seunqua III (Cai Zhaofu of the Yifeng 
hong), and Kewshaw (Zhang Tianqiu of the Yuyuan hong), who owed, respectively: 
$1,354,713, $1,151,299, $634,784 and $438,735 to British creditors.268  The Seunqua III 
debt was largely the original principal amount plus accruing interest brought 
forward from the 1775 failure of his father Seunqua II's Zhufeng hong.  Yngshaw's 
hong had long struggled under the burden of debts assumed by former proprietor 
Sweetia in the Beau Khequa settlements of 1759-60.  In addition to debt to British 
creditors, Yngshaw owed customs duties and $1,300,000 to Chinese creditors.269  
Puankhequa I paid off his $75,672 debt on 28 February 1780.270 
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Yngshaw, Kewshaw and Munqua (Cai Shiwen of the Fengyuan hong) had their 
debts brought before the magistrates in 1780, in proceedings evidently instigated by 
Puankhequa when debt settlement negotiations stalled.271  Puankhequa is said to 
have paid officials 30,000 taels ($41,667) to speed the Yngshaw and Kewshaw 
matters, seeking to acquire their properties cheaply in a distress sale.272  Munqua 
avoided bankruptcy by entering into and performing a plan under which his British 
creditors agreed to accept payment of their $141,112 in claims over three years with 
5% interest.  Munqua then assaulted Puankhequa, unsuccessfully trying to kill him 
“with a dagger to the chest.”273 
The spectacular failures of 1780 left six surviving hong merchant firms, only four 
of which had appreciable business -- Puankhequa, Chowqua, Shy Kinqua and 
Munqua.  The Canton officials put intense pressure on these merchants to agree to 
resolve the massive debts of their failed guild colleagues.  Hoppo Tu-ming-a 
ordered them to come to his office, daily, waiting from morning to night, but never 
received by him.  This was a ruinous diversion from active business.  The Hoppo’s 
deputy, the weiyuan, questioned the merchants over and over about paying the 
debts of the bankrupts.  The merchants adamantly refused to do so.  Their collective 
responsibility as security merchants was limited.  They might be required to pay 
unpaid customs duties only, but not all debts incurred by other hong merchants.  
The weiyuan, increasingly exasperated, said he would disgrace the merchants by 
putting chains upon their necks unless they signed an agreement to assume these 
liabilities.  The four merchants replied by offering to surrender their licenses and 
withdraw from foreign trade.  The surviving records offer no further detail as to the 
persuasive force that was put to bear on the hong merchants in these “negotiations,” 
but they were pressed very hard by the officials.  If they did not agree, their lives 
would be made miserable.  The four hong merchants ultimately gave in and signed 
an agreement assuming collective liability for foreign debts.  The final terms did not 
represent total surrender, but they rather reflect negotiation with the Canton 
officials.  The hong merchants agreed to accept liability for the foreign debts of 
failed colleagues, as demanded.  For their part, the officials agreed to impose a new 
tax on the trade that would be used to support a newly created guaranty fund, to be 
maintained by the hong merchant body under state supervision.  The fund was 
supposed to cover debt repayment on a current basis and in the future.  The hope 
was that the burden on the guild would be minimized, with the repayment expense 
being passed on to foreign customers in the form of the new tax.274 
In theory, the collective guarantee of foreign debt accomplished a Confucian 
ideal.  Should a debt problem arise, a guaranty payment would solve it.  Any 
occasion for dispute and legal process would be obviated, and harmony would be 
maintained between the Chinese and foreign trading communities.  Unfortunately, 
the results of the actual practice of collective liability for debt did not conform with 
Confucian theory. 
In addition to collective liability for foreign debts, which was enforced against 
them by the state, the hong merchants were also burdened with two other types of 
guaranty liability to foreign traders.  The first type of guaranty was based on 
kinship.  There was an expectation that, to the extent possible, sons, near relations, 
business co-venturers, and even other merchants who were close friends would step 
forward and pay the debts of a failed hong merchant.  This was generally conceived 
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as a social duty.  However, where property was held in common, whether in a joint 
venture or by a family group, collective liability might exist under Chinese law.  In 
that situation, “the [common] debts of the father became the debts of the sons, who 
themselves could be held accountable for the others’ bad business dealings.”275  The 
second type of guaranty existed in the tea trade, which was the heart of the export 
business of Canton.  Here a liberal return credit had long been customary in cases of 
defective or substandard teas, an effective guaranty which could be held applicable 
even to teas shipped years earlier.  Numerous examples of this practice appear in 
the records of the British EIC, and also in the records of collection suits by hong 
merchants against American debtors.276  “By the mid-eighteenth century, it was 
generally assumed by all companies that any tea that could not sell in Europe for the 
normal going market prices must have been in some way contaminated when it was 
packed, and so the Chinese merchants must bear the loss.  What this meant, of 
course, was that in practice, Chinese merchants guaranteed the profitable sale of 
every chest they sold to the companies.”277 
In the wake of the “Chinese Debts” crisis, the claims of foreign creditors against 
the stricken hong merchants were decided under Chinese law.  Aggressively 
pressed by foreign creditors, the terms of claim resolution by the Chinese authorities 
were firmly expressed as well.  European claims against Coqua were entirely 
disallowed, on the basis that they had been waived by not being asserted when 
Coqua was petitioned against in 1779.  Claims for accumulated interest were 
slashed, under the traditional rule capping allowable interest at no more than the 
original principal amount of the loan.  The amount of “Chinese Debts” thus ordered 
repaid was about twenty percent of the face amount of stated claims.278  The result 
was reported in a 15 May 1780 joint memorial to the Emperor by Governor Li 
Zhiying and the Hoppo.  After referral to and upon the joint recommendation of the 
Li Bu (Civil Office) and Xing Bu (Justice Office) in Beijing, the memorial was 
approved by the Qianlong Emperor on 7 July 1780.279  The hong merchants thus 
assumed approximately 600,000 taels ($833,333) in British creditor debts of Yngshaw 
and Kewshaw, which they thereafter paid without interest in ten annual 
installments, completed in 1790.280 
The Imperial Edict of 7 July 1780 required that in future the hong merchants 
should fix uniform prices and be under direct official supervision.  To accomplish 
this, the merchants of the outer seas guild (waiyang hang) would henceforth meet at a 
stated place under the direction of the Weiyuan.  The Hoppo's representative would 
have a say in prices, levies and perquisites voted at meetings, as well as access to the 
books of member merchants.  This knowledge facilitated subsequent exactions by 
the Canton officials, timed “as they found the trade able to bear.”281  Meetings of the 
merchants of the outer seas guild took place at their guild hall (gongsuo), which the 
foreign traders called the Consoo House, a grand building of stone and polished 
teak with several interior courtyards filled with flower gardens.282 
The hong merchants were required to establish a fund for payment of the 
Yngshaw and Kewshaw debt, and other common obligations.  The foreign traders 
called it the Consoo Fund, after the name of the guild hall where it was initially kept 
in specie in a chest or chests.283  The merchants of the native ports hong (bengang 
hang) were likewise ordered to establish a Consoo Fund in 1780, and it too was 
funded by a levy on trade.  Some of these merchants incurred considerable foreign 
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debt, which exhausted their distinct Consoo Fund, and with that the native ports 
hong was ordered abolished in 1795.  Individual outer seas hong merchants were 
subsequently ordered to pay the remaining debts of the native ports hong 
merchants on a rotating basis, which was done until about the year 1803.284 
The purpose of the Consoo Fund of the outer seas guild (waiyang hang) was to 
pay charges sought by the government from the hong merchants.  These included: 
Payments on account of unpaid customs duties or foreign debts incurred 
by insolvent hong merchants; 
Governmental demands for funds for public service projects, such as 
military defense or flood relief; 
The collective obligation of all members to share in the cost of purchasing 
singsong curiosities as official presents for the Emperor; an 
Fees, donations and gratuities paid each year to various officials. 
Each hong merchant was required in 1780 to make an initial 6,000 tael ($8,333) 
contribution to establish the fund.  The Consoo Fund was also to receive the income 
stream from a set of surcharges on traded goods, which became known as the 
hangyong, or “disbursement for [hong merchant] trade.”  Puankhequa, as head 
merchant, reported the surcharges to the EIC's Council of Supercargoes on 16 March 
1781.285  A few years later,  Hoppo Li Zhiying authorized an increase in the number 
of goods subject to Consoo Fund charges to sixty-nine.286  The only goods not subject 
to Consoo Fund charges were woolens, calicos and iron, articles in which 
Puankhequa had a near monopoly of trade and which he caused to be exempted 
from the levy on the trade.287  This list of import and export items monopolized by 
the hong merchants and surcharged for the benefit of the Consoo Fund was 
continued to the end of the hong system.288 
In August 1780, before the Emperor's edict had arrived, Captain Panton and the 
Sea Horse once again appeared at Canton.  This time Panton had been sent by 
Admiral Sir Edward Hughes, successor to Admiral Vernon, to press the Governor-
General for “a statement of his intentions regarding the debts ‘justly due His 
Majesty’s subjects.’”  The voyage was made in spite of the objection of the Governor 
and Council of Fort St. George (Madras).  Captain Panton was seen in audience by 
the Chinese Governor-General, and he presented Admiral Hughes’ letter to him, but 
no explicit assurances were provided by the Chinese authorities.289  The “Chinese 
Debts” matter was soon resolved with the arrival of the Imperial Edict of 7 July 
1780, discussed above.  The EIC thereafter declined further requests for cooperation 
in the matter of the collection of these debts.290  Earl Pritchard summarizes the 
results of the unfortunate episode: 
“Thanks to the Private creditors’ usurious demands backed up by gun-boat 
diplomacy, of the $4,400,222 claimed by them not over $1,198,189, slightly more 
than the total principal, was ever required to be paid them.  Had they not called 
in the aid of the Navy and had they accepted the supercargoes’ advice in 1779, 
over twice this amount might have been realized, Yngshaw and Kewshaw saved 
from bankruptcy, and the establishment of the Co-hong and the Consoo fund 
prevented.”291 
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At Canton, order finally prevailed.  The two year tempest with foreign creditors 
concerning hong debts stood resolved.  While payment was required to be made by 
the entire guild, it was in an amount substantially less than the total claimed to be 
due by foreign creditors, and was stretched over ten years without interest.  A tax 
had been imposed on the trade to fund debt repayment and also other guild 
obligations to the state.  The Consoo Fund, immediate recipient of the tax, existed in 
the form of cash in chests, secure in the guild hall.  Although the fund did not have 
independent management, employees, or supervision, it was closely watched by the 
hong merchants and by the supervising Canton officials.  While this new 
arrangement – the Canton Guaranty System -- had been imposed on the hong 
merchants under duress, there was reason to hope that the hangyong tax would 
cover all expenses and that little would really change.  A long period of difficulties 
had been resolved and the future looked bright. 
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104 
CHAPTER 4:  
THE FUND IS DRAINED, 1780-1799 
The hong merchant body had reason to be optimistic as of 1780.  In July, the guild 
was recognized by imperial decree and was authorized to fix uniform prices.  
Revenues improved thereafter.  A French observer estimated that higher prices were 
yielding the guild an additional 768,900 taels ($1,067,917) annually by 1786.1  The 
hong merchants had to pay 600,000 taels ($833,333) in debts of Yngshaw and 
Kewshaw, but no interest was due and payments were spread out over ten years.2   
The Consoo Fund had been created and funded, had a cash balance, and the 
hangyong tax on foreign trade assured that money would come into the fund for 
years to come.  The British EIC estimated hangyong tax collection at 300,000 taels 
($416,667) in the year 1781.3 
Unfortunately, several hong merchant firms failed during the twenty year period 
1780 to 1799.  These resulted in substantial foreign creditor claims under the 
collective guaranty.  Seunqua III failed at last in 1784, leaving a 166,000 tael 
($230,555) liability.  The failures of Eequa (1790) and Gonqua (1794) generated 
foreign claims of 255,000 ($354,167) and 600,000 taels ($833,333) respectively.  
Despite the prohibition of foreign debt under the trade regulations, the foreign 
claims were allowed by the Canton officials.  The hong merchants were ordered to 
pay these substantial debts over six years.4  It is recorded that the cash balance of the 
Consoo Fund had been consumed by about 1790.5  When one includes the 1780 
failures of Yngshaw and Kewshaw (debts ordered to be paid over ten years), the 
hong merchant body was held liable for the massive sum of 1,621,000 taels 
($2,251,388) in debts of defaulted colleagues in the period 1780 to 1799.  The problem 
then got worse.  Over the years 1800 to 1842, an additional 6,225,000 taels 
($8,645,833) in debts were charged to the hong merchants.6 
4A. The Hong Merchants, 1780-1799. 
Whether its members had reason to be optimistic or not or not in the year 1780, the 
outer seas guild had shrunk from its normal complement of about twelve members.  
After the spectacular failures of the “Chinese Debts” crisis, only six firms remained 
in business.  Of the six survivors, only four had appreciable business -- Puankhequa 
I, Chowqua, Shy Kinqua and Munqua.  While Puankhequa I seemed wealthy, he 
owed significant debt.7  Chowqua alone had little debt but that was because his firm 
did little business.  He died in 1789 and was succeeded by his son in whose hands 
the family hong failed in 1792.8  Credit for the hong merchants was exceptionally 
tight after the Yngshaw and Kewshaw settlements of 1780.9 
The Canton officials sought to replenish guild membership.  The Hoppo licensed 
twenty hong merchants between 1780 and 1799.  Yet no more than eleven were ever 
guild members at the same time.  Five were appointed in 1782: Sinqua, Geowqua, 
Pinqua, Seequa and Lunshaw.  As the incumbents refused to extend their collective 
debt guaranty to these five, the Hoppo made them guarantee each other.  This 
contractual firewall did not last long.  These five soon failed and the incumbents 
ended up having to contribute to Consoo Fund payment of their debts in the 1780s 
and 1790s.  As Weng Eang Cheong dryly notes, “the Hoppo had his way after all on 
this point.”10 
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While all of the merchants who were licensed between 1780 and 1799 had some 
background in the trade, they were all undercapitalized, “men of straw” per 
Cheong.11  Each had failed by 1799, along with three of the four firms that had 
survived the debt crisis of 1780.  Weng Eang Cheong calls this “a wholesale 
extinction of merchants recruited before 1790.”  He rightly sees in this turnover the 
end of an era of “merchant bureaucrats” who mediated between the Canton 
authorities and the various European trading companies, and the advent of 
merchants adapted to the very different trading world of the nineteenth century.12  
The January 1798 failure of Geowqua (Wu Guozhao of the Yuanshun hong), himself 
“a trader of little importance,” had transitional significance.  As a trader, he “was 
the last of a type and a generation of Hong merchants.”13  Geowqua's nephew 
Puiqua, who later rebranded himself with a different trading name as the proprietor 
of the Yihe hong, went on to become a giant of the new era, the senior hong 
merchant Howqua II (Wu Bingjian).14 
4B. The Demands of Government, 1780-1799. 
Defaulted foreign debt was not the only government directed expense that came out 
of the Consoo Fund, or out of the tills of individual hongs.  Guild members were 
continually forced to pay other official fees and exactions.  The government quickly 
recognized the Consoo Fund as a convenient source to tap for state needs.  These 
soared in the difficult years of the 1790s and early 1800s.  Public needs charged to 
the Consoo Fund included hegong zhuan (Yellow River works), jigu zhuan (drought 
and famine relief), tanggong zhuan (coastal defense maintenance), military 
supplementary taxes, flood relief, and other occasional needs.15  In addition, the 
Canton officials required heavy payments from the hong merchants to support local 
public operations and for their personal use.  The draw from the Consoo Fund and 
the hong merchants in these two directions was enormous, and grew as the years 
passed. 
It was an objective of the Canton Guaranty System, as with most if not all 
modern bank guaranty programs, that the tax imposed on participants would be 
sufficient to cover all of the expenses of the guaranty fund.  The intention as of 1780 
had been that the three percent (or more) hangyong tax would cover all collective 
expenses, including the guaranty of defaulted foreign debt.  Under the Canton 
scheme, in contrast to modern bank guaranty programs, there was never any 
systematic effort to predict future losses or other amounts that would need to be 
paid from the Consoo Fund or to adjust the tax according to anticipated draw on the 
fund.  The enormous cash demands of the first twenty years emptied the fund and 
appear to have exceeded the ability of the tax to cover draw from the Consoo Fund 
on a current basis.  To the extent the hangyong tax did not cover these expenses, they 
had to be taken from the resources of individual merchants.  As individual hong 
merchants -- many of whom lived on the edge -- failed to make good by paying their 
respective obligations to the Consoo Fund on time and in full, the burden fell the 
more heavily on those who could pay.16  This added cost of doing business 
necessarily meant higher prices, in order for the hongs to survive.  Contemporaries 
learned during the 1790s that debt payment under the collective guaranty had an 
immediate and possibly destabilizing effect on the marketplace.  This recognition is 
explicit in the reluctance EIC officers expressed about commencing debt 
proceedings against hong merchants in the first decade of the 1800s.17 
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There is no surviving comprehensive list of government exactions from the hong 
merchants, or of total annual draw from the Consoo Fund, but some highlights are 
known.  Total draw from the Consoo Fund is recorded at 272,500 taels ($378,472) in 
1793 and 279,788 taels ($388,594) in 1796.  In each of these years, 100,000 taels 
($138,889) was for singsong gifts to the Court in Beijing, 55,000 taels ($76,389) was 
“native tribute” to the Emperor, and 25,000 taels ($34,722) was for military use in 
Sichuan.  In 1793, 50,000 taels ($69,444) went for military expenses in Fujian.  Debt 
repayments were 42,500 taels ($59,028) in 1793 (Eequa) and 99,788 taels ($138,594) in 
1796 (Gonqua).18  As the domestic situation grew troubled in the 1790s, the hong 
merchants were hit with charges for military mobilization.  The campaign in Taiwan 
(1787) cost 300,000 taels ($416,667) (or possibly 400,000 taels -- $555,555 -- sources 
disagree), the campaign against the Gurkhas (1792) cost 300,000 taels ($416,667), the 
campaign in Huguang (1799) 120,000 taels ($166,667), and the campaign in Sichuan 
and Shenxi (1800) another 120,000 taels ($166,667).19 
Weng Eang Cheong sees the increased trade and hong merchant profits of the 
decade of the 1780s as having given rise to official expectations which led in turn to 
a steep increase in official exactions.”  As Cheong recognizes, the reasons for this 
increase were somewhat complicated.  Among Qing officialdom, postings were 
sometimes spoken of in terms such as feique or meique (rich post), zhongque (medium 
post) or jique (lean post).  Many officials took a rich posting as an opportunity to 
require fees or exactions to meet legitimate expenses of office, many of which were 
not officially provided for, and also to build up some private wealth.  This was 
understood and expected within a certain tolerance,20 but customary limits were 
pressed and exceeded by a national climate of venality that existed in the late 1700s 
and thereafter.  During his six month term as Hoppo in 1795, Shuer is said to have 
exacted $240,000 from the hong merchants for his own use.21  Sun Shiyi and Fu 
Kangan arrived at Canton from Beijing in 1784 charged with investigating abuses in 
the trade and taxation; both left richer, one said to have received seventeen piculs of 
gold for clean reports on the local officials and merchants.22  Sanyizhu, whom the 
hong merchants considered to have been a relatively mild Hoppo, managed in two 
years to exact more than $600,000 from the hong merchant body for himself (as of 29 
November 1803).  Exact amounts of official exactions in subsequent years are 
unknown, but are estimated by Kuo-tung Ch’en to have been in the range of from 
200,000 to 300,000 taels ($277,778-$416,667) annually.23 
  Officials used rich postings as opportunities to pay down their own debts to the 
state.  The Imperial Household Department (neiwufu) repeatedly posted officials to 
Canton who owed large debts to it, anticipating beneficial results.  As but one 
example, Li Zhiying was posted to Canton as Hoppo in 1781 after he had incurred a 
256,000 tael ($355,555) personal debt to the neiwufu.  The appointment of five (5) new 
hong merchants in the year 1782, and other exactions of the period, are believed to 
have been motivated by his desire -- need -- to generate funds with which to pay 
this substantial debt.24  The British EIC was doubly pleased with the quality of the 
1782 appointees.  Some were men of substance, and the EIC hoped that collectively 
the new merchants “will at least alleviate the [burden on] the other merchants & 
perhaps preserve some of them from ruin by contributing to the exorbitant demands 
of the Mandareens which are now become almost intolerable.”25  The neiwufu 
practice of posting indebted officials to Canton continued for decades.  All of the 
Hoppos posted to Canton between 1813 and 1828 arrived with customs deficiency 
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debt in baggage, in amounts ranging from 136,000 taels ($188,889) to 324,000 taels 
($450,000).  Xiangshao, who served as Hoppo from 1813 to 1818, had incurred tax 
collection arrearages in his prior service as salt censor of Changlu and 
Superintendent of the Huaian Customs, which he paid off during his service at 
Canton.26 
Had these exactions been publicly exposed and criticized, one can imagine the 
officials noting in defense the opulent lifestyles and excesses of the hong merchants 
themselves.  The foreign merchants certainly noted hong merchant high living with 
disapproval, especially when they were creditors holding unpaid bills.  Perhaps 
these outward signs of prosperity inspired the Canton officials to ask the merchants 
to help the state and its servants just a bit more than they might otherwise. 
4C. Trading Conditions, 1780-1799. 
The trading world of Canton changed markedly during the twenty year period 1780 
through 1799.  The English share of trade soared, in part the result of enactment of 
the Commutation Act in 1784 and in part the result of a cycle of wars which began 
with the February 1793 declaration of war by France on Britain and the 
Netherlands.27  This marked the end of the period of competition by continental 
European trading firms at Canton, and the substantial importations of silver into 
China with which they paid for much of their export cargoes.28  The advent of 
United States trade with China, which began in 1784, proved well-timed as the 
American traders brought considerable bullion (specie) to buy their export cargoes.  
This period also saw the beginning of the rise of private country traders, who 
carried India goods to China with the blessing of the EIC.  Toward the end of this 
period, pirate activity and social instability began to increase in South China.  
Demands by the Canton officials for payments from the hong merchants, both for 
military defense and for venal purposes, increased in turn.  So it is that much at the 
same time as the British successfully stimulated both trade and the domestic 
demand for tea by slashing customs duties (the Commutation Act), the Qing 
marched off in the opposite direction, gradually increasing both the direct and 
indirect tax burdens on the hong merchants and the trade conducted within the 
Canton monopoly. 
The most important changes in the maritime trade of Canton in this period 
concerned Great Britain.  It had responded to the high debts and poor performance 
of the EIC by attempting the then radical remedy of cutting taxes on goods being 
brought into England in order to increase trade.  Under the Commutation Act of 
1784, import duties on goods coming into England and export duties on such goods 
leaving England were reduced from over 100 percent to 12.5 percent.  Prices fell, 
consumer demand soared, and the formerly troubled EIC was able to undersell all 
competitors in its home market.  British imports from China quadrupled in the 
following decade, with tea comprising ninety percent of the total.  EIC scholar Earl 
Pritchard believes that it was this increase in demand that caused the great increase 
in tea prices noted in the mid-1780s, not the re-establishment of the Cohong in 1780 
which the EIC blamed.29  The sharp increase in EIC domestic tea sales meant 
commensurate losses for the continental firms which had long supplied British 
smugglers.30 
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The EIC was now directed by statute to sell British woolen goods in China, and 
those exports soared.  Unlike cotton, for which substantial Chinese demand existed, 
woolens were not attractive to Chinese buyers.  The EIC accordingly adopted a 
practice of directly tying the sale of its woolen imports to its export purchases of tea 
from the hong merchants (a practice called “truck”).  The hong merchants adopted 
various strategies in turn for dealing with truck goods.  Sometimes their own tea 
acquisitions might be tied to the sales of British woolens to inland tea merchant 
suppliers, after the EIC method, truck thus following truck.  In general, the truck 
business was unfavorable for the hong merchants.31 
In the decade after 1784, the EIC exported more than two thirds of the tea that 
came out of China.  The hong merchants thus became more dependent than ever on 
this single dominant firm.32  The rising force of the EIC is reflected in the respective 
debts between it and the hong merchants.  Debtor in the 1780s, the EIC then became 
a massive creditor in the 1790s (itself a portent).  In the 1780s, the EIC was indebted 
to the hong merchants in amounts ranging from 266,560 taels ($370,222) in 1782 to 
1,352,292 taels ($1,878,183) in 1787.  The EIC then swung into surplus, with guild 
members now owing money to it.  Hong merchant debt to the EIC soared in the 
1790s to a high of 1,606,669 taels ($2,231,485) in 1793.33 
The private country traders, who exported opium, cotton and other India goods 
to China with the approval of the British EIC, grew in importance during this 
period.34  The massive exportations of Indian opium and cotton to China relieved 
the EIC of the need to bring in silver to fund its tea exports.  In the words of trade 
historian Michael Greenberg, “the resources of India were utilized to finance the 
purchase of China tea for England.”35  The country traders bought opium from the 
EIC in Calcutta, and carried it to China under a license granted by the Company.  As 
Greenberg notes, 
“From 1816 there was a clause in that license declaring it to be void if any 
opium other than the Company's were carried.  But in the sailing orders of 
every Company's Indiaman bound for China was embodied a strict 
prohibition against carrying opium, 'lest the Company be implicated' with 
the Chinese!  By 1800, the East India Company had perfected the technique of 
growing opium in India and disowning it in China.”36 
Measured by value, raw cotton imported into China more than tripled during the 
years 1780-1785 and then tripled again during the years 1795-1815.37  Trading in 
cotton and opium could be difficult and was subject to sharp price variation.38  
Bulky light cotton became known as the “white tiger” and dense compact opium as 
the “black tiger.”  Much money could be made or lost in these commodities and the 
country traders developed a reputation for sharp trading practices.  There were big 
winners and big losers in this trade, such as the hong merchant Eequa, who was 
brought down in 1790 by unsuccessful cotton speculations. 
The early United States voyages to China provided competition for Chinese 
export goods as well as liquid funds, both welcome in the Canton marketplace.39  As 
the Americans lacked products for which there was much Chinese demand, they 
instead brought great amounts of specie (silver coins) with which to buy export 
goods.  Where a European needed time to sell his woolens, cotton, spices, or other  
  












Figure 5. The foreign factories at Canton in about 1780. 
Oil on glass painting by a Chinese artist.  (Private collection.  Photograph by 
courtesy of the Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.) 
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imports before he could buy Chinese export goods, the American, cash in hand, was 
by contrast often ready to buy immediately on arrival.  The Americans 
experimented with ginseng and fur imports for the Chinese markets as alternatives 
to shipping silver coins.  United States ginseng was considered low grade, and the 
New England forest supply was quickly depleted.40  The rush to supply furs for the 
Chinese market wreaked ecological havoc on the Pacific Northwest coast where vast 
numbers of sea otters were slaughtered.  The resulting oversupply at Canton, where 
top quality pelts were no longer a rarity, caused prices to plummet.41  Until the 
development of opium as a profitable import cargo in the early 19th century, 
Americans brought silver coins to China as a matter of commercial necessity.  This 
association of United States traders with hard cash seems to have made the 
Americans especially inviting candidates for credit when they wanted more goods 
than they had coins to pay for at the time of sale. 
The Chinese economy experienced difficulties toward the end of the twenty year 
period 1780-1799.  Devastating flooding along the Yellow River sharply suppressed 
Chinese consumer demand for woolens in the period 1794-95.42  Pirate activity 
became a serious problem along the coast of Guangdong Province in the 1790s.43  
The Canton officials accordingly pressed the hong merchants to fund government 
works ranging from flood control and relief, to military preparedness, to pirate 
control.  The state saw the Consoo fund as a convenient liquid source for the 
immediate payment of pressing needs.  Such demands on the fund and individual 
merchants only increased, as, for example, the problem of coastal piracy grew worse 
in the years that followed. 
Starting with the hangyong levy of 1780, and then through frequent exactions or 
supplements, the Qing gradually increased the tax burden on trade conducted 
through the hong merchant monopoly.  The natural result of tax increases was that 
legitimate goods -- those sold by the licensed monopoly traders -- became more 
expensive.  The Americans and a small but growing number of English private 
traders were increasingly attracted to Chinese merchants who were not guild 
members.  These “outside shopmen” undercut the foreign trade monopoly, selling 
tea and other export goods at prices perhaps 10 to 15 percent less than hong 
merchants. 
Outside shopmen often traded under the cover of an inadequately capitalized 
hong merchant through the use of the hong's seal or chop.  Sometimes they engaged 
in smuggling, occasionally paying money to low level customs officers to make sure 
they looked the other way.44  Outside goods were quality goods, as the American 
trader Samuel Russell pointed out in a March 1821 letter to Edward Carrington: 
“outside men  .  .  .  take particular pains to select the best and choicest 
teas, and they are all of them so situated that they can ship off their teas at 
Hong duties and will actually sell lower than the Hong merchants, as they 
buy for cash and sell for the same.  They are all of them very tenacious of 
their reputation, and will not put their names on teas that are not good.  We 
should like to do more business with these people than we have it in our 
power to do.”45 
Despite periodic official attempts to defend the foreign trade monopoly, such as an 
1817 crackdown in which over 200 outside shops were shut down and their goods 
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confiscated, the hong merchants continued to lose significant amounts of business to 
outside shopmen competitors.46 
4D. The Collective Guaranty of Debt, 1780-1799. 
There were numerous hong firm failures during the period 1780-1799, only a few of 
which resulted in calls on the collective guaranty.  The 1784 failure of Cai Zhaofu 
(Seunqua III), successor head of the Yifeng hong, was simply the terminus of a slow 
motion train wreck that began ten years earlier.  In 1775 Sy Anqua (Seunqua II) had 
been directed to continue trading for the benefit of creditors and to pay $266,692 in 
foreign claims over ten years.  Only one installment was paid.  When foreign 
creditors complained, the officials noted that they had failed to either acknowledge 
or accept the payment plan, and expressed hope that when the young Cai Zhaofu 
(Seunqua III) “grows up and gains money by his business, he shall pay his father’s 
debts.”47  The young man was not successful.  He had lost the right to secure foreign 
vessels by 1781, then sold the Dutch Hong (his last property) to Pinqua to raise 
money to pay duties, and was finally stripped of his hong license in 1783.  The hong 
merchant body was ordered to pay the foreign debts of the Yifeng hong, 166,000 
taels ($230,555) in total, over ten years.  As he had not personally incurred the debts 
ordered to be paid by the hong merchant guild, Seunqua III was not punished as a 
debtor.48 
The 1790 failure of Eequa (Wu Zhaoping) was the result of speculative cotton 
trading.  Eequa was successor head of the Fengtai hong his father Sinqua had 
founded in 1782.  He had played the system hard and was unpopular within the 
guild.  As of early 1790 he owed over $400,000 to country traders (largely Bombay 
Parsis) and could not raise the funds.  The Parsis petitioned the Hoppo in person, 
with the result that Eequa was jailed, stripped of his purchased degree, and his case 
reported to the Emperor.  The auction of Eequa’s properties yielded enough to pay 
customs duties of 38,520 taels ($53,000) but left the bulk of his 289,100 tael ($401,600) 
foreign debt unsatisfied.  In January 1791 the Hoppo directed repayment of 255,000 
taels ($354,167) in six annual installments, and reported the case to the Emperor.  
The decree of the Qianlong Emperor, issued on 31 May 1791, instead ordered that 
the foreign debt should be immediately paid from customs funds, to be repaid by 
the hong merchants over six years.  Immediate payment from the provincial 
treasury was ordered because the Emperor thought that installment payments were 
not sufficiently favorable to foreign creditors.  The Emperor harshly criticized lax 
supervision by the officials and directed reporting improvements in order to more 
effectively monitor the work of the Canton customs.  Effective as of 1790, double 
blind submission of confidential financial reports was required from the officials 
who supervised the Canton customs.49 
The position of senior or head merchant of the outer seas guild fell open in 1788 
upon the death of Puankhequa I.  His son Puankhequa II refused to succeed his 
father.  The Hoppo ordered Munqua (Cai Shiwen of the Wanhe hong) to take the 
position -- with its burdens -- as he was second in seniority among the hong 
merchants.50  Munqua's hong was not strong.  It had narrowly escaped foreign 
creditor insolvency proceedings in 1780 through agreement to pay creditors over 
time.  Shortly after Munqua was made head merchant, the marginal hong of the 
early Howqua (Lin Shimao)51 failed in December 1788 during a bungled transaction 
with Americans.52  Munqua was required to lead the guild in paying substantial 
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customs duty arrears and in arranging settlements of foreign creditor claims against 
that failed hong in 1789.53  These and other expenses pressed on Munqua as head 
merchant were worsened by business difficulties his firm experienced in the 1790s.  
Munqua then became ill.  In 1795 he let his brother Seequa come in to manage his 
firm’s affairs, which deteriorated further.  Munqua tried to commit suicide and 
failed.  Pressed for payment by tea suppliers, he committed suicide by swallowing 
opium and died on 10 April 1796.  “Everything in his hong was left in confusion.”54  
Seequa was authorized to carry on the hong, with a license “free of every expense,” 
but the firm failed when more customs debt, previously unknown, came to light in 
the summer of 1797.  The Hoppo directed Mowqua I (Lu Guanheng of the Guangli 
hong) to take responsibility for settlement of the hong’s affairs.  The justification was 
that Mowqua I had traded on his own account, but under Munqua’s hong license, 
before becoming a hong merchant in 1792.  Mowqua I carried out the Hoppo’s 
order, but negotiation and compromise were required to make debt assumption 
work.  The hong merchants agreed that the hangyong levy would not be charged 
against new contracts made by Mowqua I in order for him to generate profits to 
recoup his Munqua expenses.55 
The 1795 collapse of Gonqua's hong was triggered by a request for extension of 
the 18 September 1794 deadline for paying customs taxes to the government.  
Gonqua (Shi Zhonghe) (also known as Shy Kinqua II), successor head of the Eryi 
hong founded in 1788 by his father Shy Kinqua I (Shi Mengjing), had enjoyed 
exceptionally trusting relations with the British EIC.  In October 1794, he admitted 
having dipped into 94 sealed chests of EIC funds (containing $470,000) that had 
been entrusted to his care.  He was also in arrears to his tea suppliers.  The EIC 
nevertheless decided to work with Gonqua and to complete his tea contracts, to 
mitigate the loss.  About three weeks earlier, Gonqua had petitioned Hoppo Shuxi 
for an extension of the customs tax payment deadline.  The Hoppo asked for and 
received a statement of financial condition from Gonqua, which listed the following 
Eryi hong assets and their values: 
Asset Value 
House and paddy grounds 608,856 taels 
New and old unsold teas 229,428 taels 
Unsold goods in warehouse 130,075 taels 
Collection of watches and clocks (singsongs) 222,650 taels 
Debts owed by Europeans 118,160 taels 
Debts owed by shopkeepers 50,000 taels 
Debts owed by Chinese 9,388 taels 
Credit from the Consoo Fund 70,000 taels 
Share of Loqua’s property 40,000 taels 
Few hong merchant statements of financial condition have come to light.  Gonqua’s 
is known because its contents were leaked from the Hoppo's yamen (office 
compound), sending Chinese creditors into a panic and accelerating the collapse of 
the Eryi hong.56 
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The Hoppo responded to these disclosures and the alarm of the hong's Chinese 
creditors by directing the five principal hong merchants (Munqua, Puankhequa II, 
Geowqua, Mowqua and Puiqua) to manage and liquidate its affairs “without having 
recourse to the Emperor” if possible.  According to the English supercargoes, the 
Hoppo was “very anxious that the business should not reach the Emperor’s ears.”57  
In entrusting Gonqua's hong to liquidating agents or trustees, the Hoppo replicated 
the process that had been initiated two years earlier in response to the 1792 failure of 
the Yuanchuan hong of Loqua (Chowqua II).  The four trustees appointed in the 
prior case had operated that hong, sold assets including Loqua's famous Honan 
gardens, and fully completed creditor settlements by 1797.58  Gonqua's debts 
however were far larger.  He owed almost 200,000 taels ($277,778) in customs duties 
alone.  The EIC estimated total foreign debt at 1,735,465 taels ($2,410,368): 1,000,000 
taels ($1,388,889) to it; 310,465 taels ($431,201) to American and country ships; and 
425,000 taels ($590,278) in promissory notes (time obligations).  There is no 
surviving estimate of Gonqua's tea merchant and other domestic debts, but they 
were certainly large as well.  Some recoveries were made for the benefit of creditors, 
notably teas and nankeen cloth valued at more than 600,000 taels ($833,333) which 
were delivered to the EIC by Wyequa (Shi Huailian), Gonqua's brother and 
advisor.59  The five trustees for the Eryi hong (three of whom were also trustees for 
the Yuanchuan hong) did what they could, but could not harmoniously resolve the 
affairs of the Eryi hong. 
Gonqua demolished the prospects for any further foreign business on 10 April 
1795 when, to the outrage of his foreign creditors, he gave his tea merchant creditors 
the title deeds to his houses and estates, in near proportion to the debts owed to 
each of them.  The title deeds were later redeemed from the tea merchants upon the 
payment of over 100,000 taels ($138,889), chiefly in gold, delivered on behalf of 
Gonqua by Wyequa in May 1795.60  The EIC and other private creditors responded 
by petitioning the Hoppo, complaining of the unpaid debts of Gonqua's Eryi hong. 
Gonqua's failure, the second largest in the history of the trade, was reported to 
the Emperor late in July 1795.  After payment of customs debt from the liquidated 
assets of the hong, 600,000 taels ($833,333) remained due to foreign creditors.  The 
hong merchants were ordered to pay this sum in six annual 100,000 tael ($138,889) 
payments.61  The amount due to the EIC each year (28,532 taels) ($39,628) was 
actually paid by book entry, not in cash; “it was agreed that in each season the 
supercargoes should debit each merchant’s account with the sum payable by each to 
the Company.  This was acceptable to both sides.”62 
Gonqua and Wyequa were arrested by the Nanhai magistrate soon after the debt 
petition was filed.  They were allowed to stay in a rented house, under guard, for a 
fee.63  On 23 June 1795, at his request, Gonqua was brought to Macao by the 
Magistrate, where he begged to speak with President Henry Browne of the EIC's 
Select Committee.  Browne at first refused, but relented, and went to the 
Magistrate's office.  He spoke for a few minutes with the Nanhai Magistrate, and 
then Gonqua was brought in.  As noted by the EIC in its records, Gonqua 
“immediately prostrated himself and repeatedly hit the Ground with his 
forehead, with all the appearance of that abject Humiliation which Criminals 
in this Country are obliged to submit to, till ordered by the Mandarin to rise, 
who with all his Attendants and the other two Merchants [Munqua and 
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Puankhequa] immediately left the room.  He then again attempted to 
prostrate himself, to entreat the Compassion of [Browne], who prevented 
him.  .  .  .  This Prisoner was habited in a coarse Jacket & drawers, with white 
[mourning] Shoes, but no Stockings, his Hair was grown to a considerable 
length [instead of being shaven clean] a Chain round his Neck and on both 
his wrists, and his whole appearance squalid, and suited to the part he was 
intended to act, though it is impossible not to feel for a Man under such a 
Reversal of Fortune, and such Sensations would be more particularly excited 
in those who have lived with him in Habits of Friendship, and confidential 
intercourse, [Browne] could not help remarking an appearance of Art & 
Studied distress, which greatly diminished their force.”64 
Creditors believed that Gonqua and Wyequa had hidden funds, and that the 
Hoppo and Governor-General could recover the money.  These were fatal beliefs.  
Gonqua was held in prison at Canton, where he died on 27 February 1796, as the 
result of repeated beating by the Hoppo’s agents, forcefully “pressing” him as 
demanded by angry tea merchant creditors.  Gonqua “had suffered the Bastinado 
three times, the last of which was on the Face, & so severe as to cause a violent 
inflammation in consequence of which all his teeth dropped out: this was succeeded 
by the fever which after a duration of two days put an end to [his] existence  .  .  .”  
His brother Wyequa was banished to Ili on 22 January 1796, and appears to have 
survived in exile.65 
The Gonqua case has been reviewed in detail because records of this case are 
unusually complete.  The cause of his failure remains unclear.  Unlike Eequa (who 
failed in 1790), Gonqua seems to have been well liked and highly trusted.  His 
failure may be no more than the result of business losses built up over time.  
Gonqua could mask losses easily as he was thought to be solid, and doubtless he 
yearned for better days ahead.  When the crisis broke, the foreigners were relatively 
relaxed.  They had always liked the man, and had the benefit of the collective 
guaranty to pay his debts.  Gonqua's uninsured domestic creditors were furious, 
and all the more so for the breach of the high confidence that had long existed.  
Historians have picked up some of this antidebtor fury, as well as the absolute belief 
as of 1795 that Gonqua and Wyequa had hidden a “considerable fortune.”66  The 
evidence however equally supports an opposite view of the circumstances. 
Gonqua died in prison, under the horrific circumstances related above.  Wyequa 
was banished to Ili in distant Xinjiang, itself a miserable venue.  It is true that 
payments for the benefit of creditors came in from these debtors or their relatives, 
but the amounts of the payments decreased sharply over time.  First, 600,000 taels 
($833,333) was paid -- in teas and nankeen cloth.  This would seem to have been 
trade merchandise.  Next, 100,000 taels ($138,889) was paid -- largely in gold.  Might 
this have been family savings?  Finally, 1,680 taels ($2,333) was paid almost a decade 
later by Wyequa's mother Madame Cai -- trying to end her son's banishment.  Might 
these funds have been her own?  It is quite possible that each of these payments 
were outside funds, paid by family members or others who cared for Gonqua or 
Wyequa and hoped to halt or forestall the judicial beatings to which they were 
subjected.  If the debtors actually had funds in “secret storage,” those funds appear 
either to have been tapped out quite early or to have been so effectively secured that 
the debtors themselves could not get at them in their hour of need.  One would 
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expect the debtors to have done everything they could to save themselves by 
bringing in cash from every possible source.  Indeed, the purpose of the judicial 
beatings was to motivate them to do just that.  It is hard to conceive of Gonqua 
choosing death over emptying his private savings account.  It may therefore be 
more constructive to think of these three payments as a mirror of the process of 
equity contribution into the Eryi hong business -- but thrown into reverse operation.  
First back in were current trading assets (goods).  Next back in were accumulated 
profits from prior trading, held as savings (largely in gold).  Last back in was the 
original family money that started the hong, a small amount assuredly, but 
representing the seed from which the large tree had grown that fell in 1795. 
As hong merchant firms continued to fail, the Consoo Fund came under pressure 
in the 1780s and 1790s.  This reflects business pressures on the guild, including the 
end of the era of competing European state trading corporations at Canton, also 
increased piracy, and the old problem of inadequate capitalization.  More 
fundamentally, the reduced state of the Consoo Fund reflects the frailty of the 
guaranty system that was adopted in 1780.  Neither the Consoo Fund nor the 
hangyong tax that supported it had any independent existence or protection.  While 
the fund and the tax were closely monitored by the hong merchants and by the 
state, each supervisor had a severe conflict of interest.  The interests of foreign 
creditor beneficiaries of the fund, whether existing or potential, was a first concern 
of neither.  Government officials often dipped into the Consoo Fund for their own 
needs, and the monitoring function helped them to know when best to draw.  
Payments to the state were among the original list of purposes of the fund.  State 
needs soared during these years, reflecting civil disorder and a climate of venality 
that existed in the late years of the Qianlong reign.  For their part, the hong 
merchants had no motivation to keep the fund at a maximum level.  As with certain 
modern private pension schemes, they paid in the minimum that was required.  The 
hong merchants were under stress, and doubtless felt it wise to hold onto their 
funds and invest the money for return rather than to simply deposit cash that would 
then sit idle in Consoo Fund chests.  The hangyong tax was duly collected from the 
trade and paid into the fund but it was consumed by current expenses.  There was 
no surplus, and the chests of the Consoo Fund were empty by the end of the 1700s. 
As reviewed immediately above, foreign creditors made substantial claims 
against the fund during the period 1780-1799.  These claims were largely allowed by 
the Canton officials and were directed to be paid by the hong merchants despite 
their origin in loans that were illegal under Chinese law.  Even with these benefits, 
foreign creditors began to understand, during the 1790s, that nothing came free 
under the guaranty scheme of 1780.  Foreign traders, and their customers, paid the 
costs of the Canton Guaranty System.  They paid the general tax on the trade, the 
hangyong, and were also subject to indirect price increases which tended to follow 
foreign demands for collective guaranty payments from the empty Consoo Fund 
chest.  This understanding drove the foreign response to the hong merchant 
insolvencies of the early years of the 1800s, when trading conditions grew even 
more difficult. 
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CHAPTER 5:  
THREE PLAGUES: WAR, PIRACY AND LITIGATION, 
1800-1814 
In the first twenty years of the regime of hong merchant collective liability for debt 
the process was direct.  There were many hong firm failures.  In the lesser cases, 
liabilities rolled on to successors or were settled.  In major cases, the claims of 
creditors were determined through Chinese public debt process and the other hong 
merchants were ordered to pay allowed claims against failed guild members over 
time without interest.  Under the public process, the hong merchant body was held 
collectively liable for 1,621,000 taels ($2,251,388) in defaulted foreign debt during the 
period 1780-1799. 
During the next fifteen years, the period 1800-1814, wars in Europe and in Asia, 
piracy along the South China coast, and bad debts and collection litigation in the 
United States afflicted both Chinese and Western participants in the Canton trade.  
As but one example of the problems of these years, two American ships were seized 
by Danish privateers in 1810 with $128,000 in goods owned by Chinese merchants.  
One carried $58,000 in tea that was owned by Puiqua (also known as Howqua II) 
and $32,000 in tea owned by Conseequa.  The other carried $38,000 in tea that was 
owned by various Canton merchants.1  The hong merchant Puiqua was financially 
sound as of this date, the exception who could tolerate the loss.  As of 1810, 
Conseequa was embroiled in severe debt problems compared to which his $32,000 
Danish loss may have seemed almost negligible.  In this difficult period, foreign 
creditors generally avoided the use of Chinese public process to collect hong debts, 
for fear that heavy calls on the collective guaranty might bankrupt the entire hong 
merchant guild. 
The basic trade system, outlined at page 55 above, stood unchanged.  When a 
foreign vessel arrived at Canton it was assigned to a hong merchant who became 
responsible (as security merchant) for customs duties owed by the ship, and also for 
the conduct of its crew and officers.  Customs duties were levied under a complex 
set of rules, applied beginning with the measurement of the arriving vessel, which 
the foreign traders found difficult to understand.  The sale of the ship’s import cargo 
and the purchase of its export goods did not have to be with the hong merchant 
who secured the vessel, but that merchant usually received some payment from the 
hong merchant with whom the ship’s business was done.  The Canton trade was of 
national significance to China, and a large number of types of commodities were 
exported and imported.  Tea was the leading Chinese export of the period, but 
many other products were shipped, for example, rattan mats, bulk and fine 
porcelain, and fireworks.2  The principal import products included specie, rice, and 
cotton, as well as illegal and untaxed opium brought in from India and Turkey.  
Transactions with Chinese merchants were carefully negotiated.  Initially this was 
the work of the supercargo (the commercial officer of the Western vessel), but with 
time firms with local contacts and trade expertise arose at Canton which contracted 
directly with the hong merchants as agents for distant foreign principals. 
Under the Canton System, the hong merchants were required to report to the 
local officials as a condition of the foreign trade monopoly.  The Chinese official 
most immediately concerned was the Hoppo, the Superintendent of Maritime 
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Customs.  The Hoppo reported directly to the Imperial Household Department in 
Beijing.  The two other senior officials at Canton, the Governor-General (also known 
as Viceroy) and Governor, occasionally become involved in more serious issues or 
disputes involving foreign trade.  When a claim was made by a foreign creditor 
under the collective guaranty, and it was directed to be paid by the hong merchant 
body, that order was not final until it had gone up through the Canton officials and 
received ultimate approval from Beijing. 
While the process of the Canton System thus remained much the same as in 
prior years, the trade itself took on a new character in the years 1800-1814.  The era 
of competition among chartered European state trading corporations had come to 
an end, and the British East India Company was now the dominant foreign trading 
company at Canton.  Independent traders, from the United States, Great Britain, and 
other nations, were rising in importance.  Although their ships tended to be smaller, 
they arrived in increasing number and their activities altered the trade.  The hong 
merchants were forced to adjust to the demands of the powerful British EIC and 
also to changes brought on by the private foreign traders.  The illegal trade in opium 
was on the rise, and the trade monopoly of the hong merchants was increasingly 
evaded through transactions with outside merchants.  Specie carried to Canton by 
vessels from the United States helped replace the bullion that had formerly been 
brought in by European trading corporations, and made the supercargoes of 
American ships desirable trading partners.  Howqua II built strong alliances with 
Americans in these transitional years, avoiding the extension of credit and 
continuing to prosper.  Conseequa also traded heavily with independents, but 
extended large loans to Americans, ending up a casualty of these difficult years. 
5A. The Hong Merchants, 1800-1814. 
The outer seas guild was in a frail condition in 1800, reduced by the failures of the 
last years of the eighteenth century.  It had eight members.  Puankhequa II (Pan 
Zhixiang of the Tongwen hong) and Mowqua I (Lu Guanheng of the Guangli hong), 
both in sound condition, were the senior merchants.3  The other six members were: 
Yanqua (Ye Shanglin of the Yicheng hong) (est. 1792); 
Puiqua (Howqua II) (Wu Bingjian of the Yihe hong) (est. 1792); 
Gnewqua II (Zheng Chongqian, successor proprietor of the Huilong hong); 
Ponqua (Ni Bingfa of the Dacheng hong) (est. 1792); 
Chunqua I (Liu Dezhang of the Dongsheng hong) (est. 1794); and 
Conseequa (Pan Changyao of the Liquan hong) (est. 1796).4 
Yanqua, who had prospered in his decade as a hong merchant, sought and 
obtained the Hoppo's permission to retire in 1804.  This was the first successful 
withdrawal by a hong merchant with his capital since 1760.  The EIC saw this as a 
positive sign, which might encourage “respectable” people to join the guild without 
the fear of becoming trapped by it.5  The portent however had no significance.  
Mowqua I attempted to retire in 1804, but was thwarted and obliged to continue in 
business until his death in 1812.  Three years later Puankhequa II is said to have 
paid $500,000 to obtain permission to retire, but the authorization granted him in 
1807 was revoked in 1815.  Howqua II asked for but was denied permission to retire 
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in 1807, and ended up as head hong merchant in 1812 upon the death of Mowqua I.6  
Even in “retirement,” Yanqua and his family continued to be pressed by the Canton 
officials to pay money for state needs.7 
The Hoppo reported the weakened financial condition of the hong merchant 
body to the Court in the Spring of 1813.  The Memorial alarmed senior officials and 
it was soon proposed that two or more senior hong merchants should be appointed 
as managers of the guild, with general powers over contracts and pricing.  The 
British EIC adamantly resisted, refusing to unload its ships in response, until the 
proposal was withdrawn as of February 1814.8 
Of the eight members of the guild of 1800, only four survived through 1814: 
Puankhequa II (recalled to business in 1815); Puiqua (Howqua II); Chunqua I; and 
Conseequa.9  As of 1813 Conseequa was on life support as one of the five junior 
hong merchants who were placed in receivership by the EIC and other foreign 
creditors that year.  Conseequa's experiences as a debtor at Canton and as a creditor 
in numerous courts in the United States, a remarkable and instructive story, is 
discussed at pages 141-146 below.  Of the seven hong merchants who were admitted 
to the guild between 1800 and 1814, four ended up subject to the junior merchant 
receivership of 1813 (along with Conseequa): Goqua I (Xie Jiawu of the Dongyu 
hong);10 Loqua (Exchin II);11 Manhop I and II; and Poonequa.12  Inqua, admitted in 
1802, failed in 1810.  Fonqua (Mu Shifang of the Wancheng hong), who was 
admitted in 1807, failed in 1809 in part because the $70,000 he paid for a hong 
license left him with little operating capital.13  Fatqua I (Li Xiefa of the Wanyuan 
hong) had exactly the same problem but struggled on with financial assistance from 
Mowqua I, to whom he was related, and others.14  The perhaps happy exception, 
Kinqua I (Kingkua I) (Liang Jingguo of the Tianbao hong), although financially 
stressed and said to have been involved in the dangerous practice of “purchasing 
the privilege” of paying customs duties in the period 1813-1815, survived and 
remained in business for years thereafter.15 
Two of the eight members of the guild of 1800 were immediately troubled.  
Gnewqua II was considered on the edge of failure in the seasons ending 1800 and 
1801, but was rescued by a $20,000 loan from other hong merchants to pay customs 
duties in 1801.16  Ponqua's Dacheng hong had resorted to desperate practices 
including “purchasing the privilege” of paying customs duties owed by outside 
shopkeepers or the agents of country traders.  It was near collapse by the end of the 
1802-03 season, burdened with over $2.1 million in debt.17  Ponqua reached an 
agreement with creditors under which the claims of his Chinese creditors would be 
deeply discounted and all debts would be paid over a period of years, and brought 
in help to operate the hong.18  The Gnewqua II and Ponqua businesses struggled 
along.  The EIC decided that it would prefer to continue to work with Gnewqua II 
and Ponqua, rather than see them collapse with negative consequences for the entire 
trade.19 
5B. The Demands of Government, 1800-1814. 
Demands made by the Canton officials on the Consoo Fund and on the hong 
merchants individually increased significantly in the troubled years of the early 
nineteenth century.  As noted by British EIC historian Hosea B. Morse, the Consoo 
Fund “was drawn on so heavily to supplement ordinary taxation that it was not 
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available for the very purpose for which it had been established” -- paying the debts 
of failed hong merchants.20  Of the climate of official “squeeze” that developed at 
Canton and across China in this era, John King Fairbank states, “[s]een more 
sympathetically, the dynasty after 1800 was, no doubt, clutching at every straw to 
maintain itself.”21 
The records of the British EIC show that payments out of the Consoo Fund 
increased dramatically in the early years of the nineteenth century.  There were no 
disbursements to pay foreign debts from 1801 to 1808, as the debts ordered to be 
paid over time in the late 1700s had been satisfied.  (See Table 2, at page 168.)  The 
three failures of 1809-1810 generated 1,706,000 taels ($2,369,444) in foreign claims, 
ordered to be paid over a period of years.  Despite the magnitude of these claims, 
there is no record of any attempt ever having been made to adjust the hangyong tax 
on the trade to these losses, or to assess future risk or to adjust the amount of tax in 
accordance with any estimation of risk.  Foreign creditors were deeply concerned 
that despite the passage of eight years since the satisfaction of the last of the claims 
ordered to be paid in the 1790s, and the collection of a tax for the benefit of the 
Consoo Fund, that the fund was unable to satisfy the claims that arose in 1809-1810.  
The British EIC made a determined effort at this time to understand the fund’s 
income and the expenses, and the limited information that survives concerning 
Consoo Fund finances for the period are products of that effort.  The EIC 
determined as of 1813, “though with some difficulty,” that total annual payments 
from the Consoo Fund in recent years had been as follows:22 
1806-1807 691,000 taels   ($951,722) 
1807-1808 592,000 taels   ($822,222) 
1808-1809 740,000 taels   ($1,027,778) 
1809-1810  885,000 taels   ($1,229,167) 
1810-1811 619,000 taels   ($859,722) 
1811-1812 763,000 taels   ($1,059,722) 
1812-1813  698,000 taels   ($969,444) 
In the years 1802 and 1803 “native tribute” remitted from the Consoo Fund to the 
Emperor soared to the amount of 150,000 taels ($208,333) annually, rather than the 
usual 55,000 taels ($76,389).  This is said to have followed a series of confrontations 
between the strained hong merchants and Hoppo Jieshan, who sought retribution 
against the guild by reporting their “voluntary” agreement to a sharp payment 
increase to the throne.23  In the years 1805 and 1806, for which there is more detail, 
55,000 taels in “native tribute” went to the Emperor annually, plus singsong gifts to 
the Court in Beijing (expenses of 150,000 taels in 1805 and 200,000 taels in 1806), and 
5,400 taels ($7,500) annually for presents to high officials.  Boat construction for anti-
pirate operations cost 30,000 taels ($41,667) in 1805 and 70,000 taels ($97,222) in 1806, 
and Yellow River flood control and relief cost 37,500 taels ($52,083) in both 1805 and 
1806.  Other military expenses, local and national, were 80,000 taels ($111,111) in 
1805 and 81,666 taels ($113,425) in 1806.24  Total draw from the Consoo Fund for 
these purposes is recorded at 357,900 taels ($497,083) in 1805 and 449,566 taels 
($624,397) in 1806. 
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In 1817 six of the junior merchants, who sought financial support from the 
British EIC, were required by the EIC to disclose the payments that had been made 
out of the Consoo Fund during the prior ten years.  The detailed list they provided 
of payments from 1807 through 1816 shows that a total of 3,438,057 taels ($4,775,079) 
had been paid out of the Consoo Fund during this period.25  The annual total ranged 
from a high of 568,000 taels ($788,889) in 1811 to a low of 194,166 taels ($269,675) in 
1807.  The average annual draw was 343,805.7 taels ($477,508).  Foreign debt 
payments totaled 1,338,000 taels ($1,858,333), or 39% of total payments out of the 
fund during the ten year period.26  The only consistent annual expenditure was 
55,000 taels ($76,389) in “native tribute” sent to the Emperor, amounting to 16% of 
total payments from the fund over the ten year period (550,000 taels) ($763,889).  
Other significant recurring expenses were: Yellow River flood control and relief, 
553,500 taels ($768,750) (16% of the total);27 piracy suppression efforts, 339,800 taels 
($471,944) (1807-1812) (10% of the total);28 military expenses, local and national, 
329,757 taels ($457,996) (10% of the total);29 and Shandong Province famine relief, 
90,000 taels ($125,000) (1814-1816) (3% of the total).  Nonrecurring expenses 
included: 120,000 taels ($166,667) for presents for the Emperor's birthday in 1809; 
and 73,700 taels ($102,361) in non-foreign debt expenses resulting from Gnewqua's 
failure, including arrears of customs duties and his own arrears due to the Consoo 
Fund itself (all amounting to 193,700 taels [$269,028] or 6% of the total).  While their 
disclosure might be questioned both on the basis of whether these junior merchants 
had access to complete and accurate Consoo Fund data, and of the bias inherent in 
disclosure to the EIC in support of pleas for loan support, the numbers provided 
generally square with other information available about the amounts of and trends 
in government exactions . 
5C. Trading Conditions, 1800-1814. 
The first quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of high risk and potentially 
high reward for merchants engaged in foreign trade.  The Napoleonic Wars, fought 
in Europe and Asia, had a substantial effect both on foreign trade with China and on 
the domestic Chinese economy.  The flow of silver to China, the lifeblood of the 
trade, was repeatedly interrupted.  The Embargo of United States trade imposed on 
22 December 1807 halted the shipment of American silver until it was lifted in 
March 1809, in the course ruining many American merchants who traded with 
China.  The flow of American silver was also impaired by the War of 1812, fought 
between Britain and the United States until 1815.  Revolts in Spanish America 
sharply cut the historic flow of South American silver via Manila, and the opening 
of trade between India and London raised prospects of quick return in that trade 
which drew funds away from China.  The maritime trade of Canton was 
accordingly affected by a serious cash squeeze in the years 1800 to 1814.  Foreign 
traders responded by developing the use of private notes and bills to finance a trade 
which to this point had largely been conducted in cash.30  The hong merchants had 
no such easy alternative. Their debts to foreign creditors soared through this period. 
Already a problem in the 1790s, coastal piracy grew worse yet, at once a 
symptom and a cause of problems with the regional economy.  The pirates 
(ladrones) had large numbers of ships and operated with impunity.  Seaborne trade 
was disrupted and at points in 1802 and 1805 pirate fleets threatened Canton and 
the foreign factories.  U.S. Consul Edward Carrington reported in 1807 to Secretary 
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of State James Madison that “The Coast of China and particularly the entrance to 
this Port, have for a long time been infested by China Ladrones or Pirates, in very 
alarming and considerable forces.”  Government forces proved largely useless 
against the pirates, until coordinated action finally bore fruit with a mass pirate 
surrender in April 1810.31 
The hong merchants were severely affected by these trading conditions.  As the 
American merchant Peter Snow related in an August 1811 letter to Edward 
Carrington, “The Hong Merchants with a few exceptions as you may have 
anticipated before your departure are in a bad state -- all but Mouqua Houqua and 
Chunqua are unable to pay their duties, and some of them I am told are in want 
even of the common necessaries of life.”  He spoke of an outside shopman.  “Old 
Tuckee pays me a visit about once a week -- he says that China Man this time to 
muche hot for money -- and chin chins hard for your ship to come -- I tell him no 
fear.  He heaves a heavy sigh and departs.”32 
Many American traders were troubled as well.  Large numbers had been ruined 
by the Embargo, which held their vessels idle in port running up bills while 
depriving them of the revenues to pay those and other expenses.  They lacked funds 
to pay loans taken before the Embargo, and perhaps more distant creditors could be 
more easily ignored.  As Helen of Troy is remembered as the face that launched a 
thousand ships, the Embargo of 1807-09 should be remembered as the force that 
launched innumerable lawsuits.  With many Americans debtors having defaulted 
on loans made to them by Chinese merchants before the Embargo, credit now 
available to Americans at Canton was constricted,33 and many lawsuits were 
brought in the United States by Chinese merchants to collect these debts.34  Chinese 
who filed collection actions in American federal and state courts in the early 
nineteenth century include the hong merchants Chunqua I, Conseequa, Loqua 
(Exchin II), Howqua II and Pacqua (Exchin III), along with the outside merchants 
Cowqua, Eshing, Keetshing, Kingling, Namshing, Thonching and Youqua.35 
5D. The Collective Guaranty of Debt, 1800-1814. 
Heavy demands were placed on the collective guaranty during this troubled period, 
all in its later years.  Proceedings after the 1809 failure of Fonqua resulted in 259,000 
taels ($359,722) in allowed foreign claims, which were ordered to be paid by the 
hong merchant body in three annual installments without interest.  The 1810 
proceedings on the insolvencies of Gnewqua II and Ponqua produced an additional 
1,447,000 taels ($2,012,609) in allowed foreign claims, which the hong merchants 
were ordered to pay in ten annual installments without interest.  In all of these 
cases, the Canton officials recognized and directed the payment of claims that arose 
from extensions of credit that were illegal under Chinese law. 
The total collective guaranty liability that was assessed in the fifteen year period 
1800-1814 is 1,706,000 taels ($2,369,444), which averages at 113,733 taels ($157,963) 
annually.  While this sum might not seem that bad for hard times, the collective 
guaranty liability, as an annual average, was up sharply from the prior twenty year 
period.  Total collective guaranty liability assessed to the hong merchant body in the 
period 1780-1799 was 1,621,000 taels ($2,251,388), an average of 81,050 taels 
($112,569) annually.  The average annual assessment under the collective guaranty 
  











Figure 6. Porcelain pillbox in the form of a Spanish dollar. 
Chinese artist, ca. 1830-1840.  (Private collection.  Photograph by permission.) 
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for the period 1800-1814 was 32,684 taels ($45,394) more than in the earlier period, a 
forty percent (40%) increase.36 
The first imposition of collective liability after 1800 was in a case in which the 
hong merchant body complained about the sharp practices of country traders with 
weaker members of the guild.  Fonqua (Mu Shifang) had become deeply indebted to 
country traders within two years of opening his Wancheng hong.  In 1809 the hong 
merchants were pressed by two Parsi creditors, Hormajee Dorabjee and Dosabhae 
Monackjee, to pay these debts, or else they would petition the authorities.  The guild 
saw the debts as excessive, and replied that the creditors had taken advantage of 
Fonqua's weakness by overpricing Indian goods they sold him on credit.  Members 
would agree to pay this debt, but a levy of one tael per picul would need to be 
imposed on imports of Indian cotton to cover the cost.  With negotiations thus at an 
impasse, word of the proposed cotton levy reached the EIC which told the guild it 
would be an unacceptable burden on the country trade.  The creditors then 
petitioned Hoppo Changxian and Governor-General Bailing about the Wancheng 
hong debts, as they had threatened.  The Governor-General directed the hong 
merchants to reach an agreement with the creditors.  This brought on a second 
round of negotiations, opening with a proposal by the hong merchants to pay the 
debt in three equal annual installments without interest.  Several proposals were in 
turn rejected by the creditors, who finally accepted the last proposal.  Just then, the 
Governor-General issued an order in which he directed payment of Fonqua’s debts 
in three equal annual installments without interest (the hong merchants’ opening 
offer).  In a joint memorial to the throne, the Governor-General, Governor and 
Hoppo reported that the matter had been resolved under the precedents in which 
hong merchants who violated the 1760 debt prohibition and borrowed money from 
the foreigners and engaged in intrigue with them were punished under the law 
concerning criminals who plotted with a foreign country and cheated foreigners of 
their goods and money.  Fonqua’s assets were liquidated, he was stripped of his 
purchased official title, and he was banished to Ili.  The hong merchants were 
ordered to assume 259,000 taels ($359,722) of Fonqua’s debts.  These debts were paid 
in three annual installments, the second having been significantly delayed due to 
the 1810 failures of Ponqua and Gnewqua.  Fonqua’s EIC debt was satisfied by 
delivery by Mowqua to the EIC of teas of equivalent value.37 
The difficult period 1800-1814 saw two notable attempts to evade the Canton 
Guaranty System.  In form and in substance, each is quite different from the types of 
behavior which are seen as attempts to escape the restrictions of modern bank 
guaranty schemes.  The first was the 1810 receivership of the hongs of Gnewqua II 
and Ponqua.  That evasion was terminated almost immediately with the arrest of the 
Chinese subject who acted as receiver for the British EIC, discussed in the following 
pages.  The second was the 1813 receivership of five junior hong merchants, 
discussed at pages 130-131 below.  As the latter attempt did not directly interfere 
with hong operations under official monopoly license, it was allowed to run its 
course.  The element that these evasions have in common with certain modern 
examples is that each failed, with the result that large – and probably increased – 
claims ended up being filed, allowed and paid by the hong merchants under the 
Canton guaranty process. 
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5D1.  The Abortive 1810 Receivership of Gnewqua II and Ponqua. 
The EIC became aware in 1809 that two massively indebted hongs were about to 
fail.  Resort to the collective guaranty threatened to shift a debt burden exceeding $2 
million onto the other hongs, many of which were themselves troubled.  That 
summer, Ponqua (Ni Bingfa of the Dacheng hong)38 had been petitioned against for 
$240,000 due to the Parsi merchant Hormajee Dorabjee.  The Governor-General 
ordered the hong merchants to pay this debt in three annual installments.39   In 
November 1809 the EIC learned that Ponqua had not used the proceeds of woolens 
it had delivered to him to pay advances to tea merchants, as he was supposed to, 
and concluded that upon the deadline for duties to be paid to the government, 
Ponqua would fail.40  In December 1809 it received word from Ahoy, a recently 
admitted business partner of Gnewqua II (Zheng Chongqian of the Huilong hong),41 
who had fled Canton.  Ahoy reported that he had just learned that this hong owed 
massive secret debt to Chinese creditors, and that Gnewqua II had been borrowing 
money on desperate terms, further jeopardizing its affairs.  By contrast, Ponqua's 
recently admitted partner See Samyee (Shi Sanyo) did not flee Canton until 
February 1810.42 
The EIC decided that it would not petition about the unpaid debts of Gnewqua II 
or Ponqua.  Its concerns, as noted in its records, were realistic. 
“Should these merchants be allowed to break, and the amount of their 
debts to Europeans and for duties fall upon the other Merchants, it is more 
than some of them would be able to support, the Hong generally consisting 
of young Merchants who cannot be expected to do more than discharge their 
own immediate claims; from the accumulated pressure therefore that would 
ensue, it is difficult to say where the evil would end, but it appears certain 
that a total loss of confidence and the most serious difficulties to the trade 
must be the result.”43 
If a debt petition were to be presented, officials would “no doubt either on their own 
authority or by reference to Peking direct the payment of debts to Europeans in a 
certain number of years -- from the magnitude of the debts, six, is perhaps the least 
that can be expected, but more probably eight or even ten.”44 
The EIC determined that it would assume management of the two failing hongs 
and try to pay foreign debts from their operating (liquidating) profits.  It opted to 
act through a receiver, under its direction -- “confidential persons working in the 
interest of the bankrupts, but under the supervision of the Committee.”  The EIC 
further decided to save money by consolidating operations, bringing the business of 
Ponqua’s Dacheng hong under the umbrella of the Huilong hong licensed to 
Gnewqua II.   The hong merchants did not assent to the EIC plan for consolidation 
and liquidation but EIC records state that they “did not resist it strenuously,” either.  
Private foreign creditors agreed to give the plan a chance, but reserved final 
decision.45 
Ashing (Wu Shining), who had been head clerk of Ponqua's hong, was hired by 
the EIC to act as receiver.  He took charge in February 1810, continuing the business 
of the Ponqua and Gnewqua II hongs under the name of the Huilong hong.  He 
made contracts with tea merchants for the new season under his own seal, shengji, 
rather than under the seal of the Huilong hong.  The purpose of the variant seal was 
130 CHAPTER 5 
to prevent creditors of Gnewqua II from seizing these teas if Gnewqua II became 
involved in debt proceedings.46 
The authorities promptly arrested Ashing.  In May 1810 he was brought before 
Governor-General Bailing for multiple violations of Chinese law.  The most serious 
charge was that he had violated the trade monopoly by making tea contracts for 
foreign trade without a government license.  Ashing was also charged with having 
violated the law barring Chinese from working for foreigners.  He had previously 
worked for the EIC as a menial servant, and the receivership was viewed as a 
continuation of that service.  Prosecution was triggered by petitions to the 
authorities from the remarkable number of sixty-four Chinese creditors, 
complaining of the receivership.  For its part, the EIC believed Chunqua I had 
tipped off the authorities, in order to secure the debtors' shares of EIC business.  The 
Governor-General told the EIC that Ashing stood accused of conspiring “and in the 
dark making use of the foreigners wealth [he] carried on Gnewqua’s hong to the 
detriment of the inland tea dealers.”  Ashing duly confessed, providing a detailed 
description of his activities as receiver to the Canton authorities.47 
With Ashing imprisoned, and the receivership terminated, Gnewqua II and 
Ponqua were arrested and their property was seized.  On 6 October 1810, the Hoppo 
entered an order determining the amounts of duties they respectively owed, 
directing the sale of their assets, and ordering the hong merchant body to pay the 
rest of the arrearage of customs duties.  The Hoppo also directed foreign creditors of 
Gnewqua II and Ponqua to file statements of the amount of their claims.  Foreign 
claims, through termination of the EIC receivership, totaled 1,447,000 taels 
($2,012,609).  On 24 November 1810 the Nanhai Magistrate, acting for the Governor-
General, announced that these claims would be paid by the hong merchants in ten 
equal annual installments without interest.  “Protests from the Committee were met 
by indignant surprise that any one should venture to resist or criticize the Viceroy’s 
decree.”  On 18 April 1811, foreign creditors were told that this ruling had been 
approved by the Emperor.48  Gnewqua II, Ponqua and Ashing were ordered 
banished to Ili, in accordance with the law that penalized Chinese citizens who 
plotted with or cheated foreigners, and were stripped of their purchased official 
titles  Given the gravity of his offense, Ashing was subjected to the further 
punishment of being forced to wear the cangue (a form of yoke) for a period of three 
months.  Ponqua died in prison at Canton on 15 February 1811, at the age of fifty, 
before he could be exiled, and Gnewqua II died shortly after arrival in Ili.49  Ashing 
survived and returned to Canton twelve years later in 1823.50 
The EIC made at least one attempt to secure relief for Ashing.  A remarkable 
exchange occurred in April 1811, upon the arrival in Canton of Governor-General 
Songyun.  George Staunton of the EIC knew Songyun, having met him twenty years 
earlier when as a young man he had traveled to Beijing with the British Macartney 
embassy of 1793.  Songyun agreed to see Staunton.  Their private meeting was 
convivial through the moment Staunton presented a written note in Chinese about 
Ashing.  The Governor-General read it quickly.  He looked at Staunton and told him 
that the case “was serious and was already and finally settled” and refused to accept 
the letter.51 
Six months later, it was Songyun who raised the subject of Ashing.  The hong 
merchants had responded to an October 1811 demand for funds to meet national 
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exigencies by complaining that this expense was simply too great on top of the 
burden of the recently failed hongs.  In response, the Governor-General proposed to 
extend the repayment period of the Gnewqua II and Ponqua debt from ten to 
sixteen years.  He sweetened his offer by saying that Ashing and Gnewqua II would 
be freed from prison if the EIC consented.  The EIC refused to modify.  It also took 
the position that it had no right to change the settlement on behalf of other foreign 
creditors.52  While the EIC was concerned about Ashing's plight, its concern had 
only modest cash value. 
In the middle of 1810, while in the midst of dealing with the abortive Ashing 
receivership which itself had been triggered by the flight of the newly admitted 
junior partners of the Dacheng (Ponqua) and Huilong (Gnewqua II) hongs, the 
British EIC learned that yet another hong partner had taken flight.  Now it was 
Inqua (Deng Zhaoxiang) who had fled – he never was found – abandoning his 
Fulong hong and his partner Manhop I (Guan Xiang) burdened with roughly 
700,000 taels ($972,222) in debt to foreign creditors, plus unpaid customs duties and 
debt to Chinese creditors.  Manhop I was pressed to stay in place and to assume 
together with his son Manhop II (Guan Chengfa) the liabilities Inqua had incurred.  
The Manhops did so.  The Hoppo cooperated to the extent of reissuing the Fulong 
hong license in the name of the son as of the end of the 1810-11 season without 
payment of any fee.  The Fulong hong was thus restarted as of 1811, under new 
management, but still mired in debt.53 
5D2.  The 1813 Receivership of the Junior Hong Merchants. 
In the wake of the failure of the Ashing receivership, there was grave concern about 
the viability of seven “junior merchant” firms: Conseequa, Goqua I, Loqua (also 
known as Exchin II), Manhop I and II, Poonequa, Kinqua I and Fatqua I.  Their debts 
were significant. As of March 1809, Conseequa owed 670,769 taels ($931,027) to the 
British EIC alone.54  In 1812, the EIC decided to intervene in the cases of the five 
principal debtors, paying current hong expenses, and deducting them from the 
given merchant’s account at the end of the season.  Under EIC leadership, private 
creditors of these five debtors -- Conseequa, Goqua I, Loqua (Exchin II), Manhop I 
and II and Poonequa -- agreed to work together, appointing three trustees as of 
January 1813 to superintend affairs and pay existing debts.  Private creditors agreed 
“to stop charging any interest on the debts contracted by the five merchants in 
question prior to 1813, and to wait for the gradual liquidation of their claims from 
the commercial profits of these merchants expected in the years to come.”  The EIC 
had effective control over the trusteeship; two of the three trustees were its 
employees (James Molony, junior supercargo, and Alexander Pearson, surgeon), 
and the third trustee, Hollingsworth Magniac, was a British private trader.55  In 
contrast to the receivership of Gnewqua II and Ponqua, the trustees of the junior 
hong merchants did not attempt to operate the subject hongs or to control the 
official hong seal under which these hongs did business.  The EIC increased cash 
flow to the debtors by allocating extra shares of its business to the insolvent 
merchants.  Claims against the trust (all pre-1813) totaled $3,964,297: Conseequa, 
$822,906; Goqua, $341,953; Loqua (Exchin II), $820,610; Manhop I and II, $1,237,681 
(891,130 taels); and Poonequa, $741,147.56 
Yet already by the summer of 1813, the junior merchants were again in trouble.  
In June Conseequa appealed again to the EIC for help paying his customs duties and 
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other sums owed to the government.  The situation worsened with the 17 August 
1813 arrival of a new Hoppo, who refused to take over from the old Hoppo until the 
hong merchants brought their customs duties completely current.  In desperation, 
four of the junior hong merchants (Conseequa, Goqua, the Manhops and Poonequa) 
sought funds at forty percent interest for this need, but even at that premium they 
could not borrow enough money.  The EIC finally stepped in as lender of last resort 
to advance the 166,000 taels ($230,556) required to pay off the customs duties, but it 
had to borrow this sum from Howqua II and Mowqua as the EIC did not have 
sufficient cash in its own treasury.57  Steady payments were made over the years on 
account of the trust debt, in varying amounts according to the ability of the junior 
hong debtors.  The balance due was thus reduced, but the condition of the debtors 
was not materially improved. 
In hong debt cases, during the troubled period 1800-1814, foreign creditors thus 
sought to avoid the Chinese public debt process and having to make claims on the 
guaranty fund.  Whether this is considered simply as an abstention, or rather as an 
evasion of the system, it did not improve matters.  The Consoo Fund enjoyed an 
initial eight years of relief, from 1801 through 1808, during which no payments were 
made on foreign claims.  The debts of the 1790s had been satisfied, and the hangyong 
tax was going into the fund.  Unfortunately, the Chinese government opted to step 
in and take what foreign creditors did not seem to need.  For its part, the state acted 
in response to its own urgent needs, including piracy in the waters off Canton, 
which represented a true crisis in the years leading up to 1810.  The Consoo Fund 
was defenseless, with no independent guardian.  Many of the hong merchants, the 
constituency most immediately concerned with the fund, were themselves 
struggling to survive.  Defending the interests of as yet undetermined creditor 
beneficiaries in the fund that would pay claims arising from the failure of their own 
firms was no priority of members of the outer seas guild. 
As always, there was hope for tomorrow.  While the claims that were ordered to 
be paid from the fund over time were large, the foreign wars were over at long last 
and there was reason to expect a strong rebound in trade.
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CHAPTER 6:  
YEARS OF REBOUND AND OPIUM, 1815-1828 
The collective guaranty liabilities that were imposed during the period 1815 to 1828 
were substantial, but all involved firms which had been in difficult condition in 
1815.  These failures link the period covered by this chapter with the period covered 
by the preceding chapter (1800-1814).  Four of the five junior hongs that had been 
put into receivership in 1813 failed in this later period.  Conseequa failed in 1823 
owing 372,000 taels ($516,336) in foreign debt, which was ordered paid in three 
annual installments without interest.  Pacqua failed in 1826 owing 618,904 taels 
($859,589) in government and foreign debt.  His foreign debt of 477,216 taels 
($662,800) was ordered paid in five annual installments without interest.  Poonequa 
failed in 1827 owing 196,000 taels ($272,222) in government and foreign debt.  His 
foreign debt of 86,000 taels ($119,444) was ordered paid in three equal annual 
installments without interest.  The Fulong hong of the Manhops failed in 1828 
owing 1,054,600 taels ($1,464,722) in government and foreign debt.  Its foreign debt 
of 792,000 taels ($1,099,300) was ordered paid in six annual installments without 
interest. 
During this fourteen year period a growing amount of trade, including but not 
limited to the thriving illegal traffic in opium, was conducted outside of the hong 
merchant monopoly.  Within the guild, winners were becoming more sharply 
delineated from losers.  The hong failures of this period could have been predicted 
from the start, and no new merchants came in to replace the gaps that opened in the 
lower ranks of the guild.  Excessive risk, including but not limited to collective 
liability for the imprudence or business losses of colleagues, discouraged entry. 
6A. The Hong Merchants, 1815-1828. 
The fourteen year period 1815 to 1828 began with the outer seas guild in a troubled 
condition.  Of its eleven members, seven -- almost two thirds of the group -- were 
experiencing financial difficulty.  Five remained under the foreign receivership that 
began in 1813.  Kinqua I and Fatqua I had dodged the receivership but were under 
stress.1  Chunqua I's hong was stable, although it had experienced strain during the 
war years.2  The firms of the three head merchants were also in good condition.  It 
was said in the 1820s that there were only four hong merchants with whom it was 
safe to deal.3 
The Canton officials were concerned about the capitalization of the guild.  The 
retirement of Puankhequa II was revoked in 1815 and he was ordered to resume the 
business of the Tongwen hong.  Puankhequa II, Howqua II and Mowqua II served 
jointly thereafter as the three head hong merchants, although Howqua II stood as 
the true head due to his seniority and “reputed wealth.”4  The guild had thus 
separated, by not later than 1815, into two distinct groups: an upper tier of better 
capitalized firms, which ran the guild, and a lower tier group of impoverished 
hongs, which struggled to survive. 
Within the upper tier, Howqua II stood at the top.  He is often quoted as having 
estimated his net worth at $26 million as of 1834.5  It is sometimes said  
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Figure 7. The senior hong merchant Howqua II (Wu Bingjian), 1769-1843. 
Oil portrait by Lamqua, ca. 1830-1840.  (Private collection.  Photograph by 
permission.)  
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that Howqua was the richest businessman or even the wealthiest man in the world 
at that time,6 propositions which are open to question.  Howqua II most certainly 
did not share this estimate of personal resources with the Canton officials.  Such 
indiscretion would have attracted even more and still greater financial demands by 
the government on him.  It is probable that his many assets, said to have included 
tea plantations in the Wuyi hills, were held in a variety of different names and 
forms, some with family members and some quite possibly with joint venturers or 
partners, and that some would have been subject to debt or obligations in the nature 
of debt.  This is normal.  It is also reasonable to assume that the wealth held by 
Howqua II had been gradually built from the original capital and earnings of the 
Yihe hong founded by his father and run by his brother from 1792 to 1799, and quite 
likely from capital others provided before and since.  Therefore, while it appears 
that Howqua II personally enjoyed business triumphs and fat earnings in the tricky 
years of the early nineteenth century, the wealth that is often spoken of as “his” was 
likely tangled up with amicable claims or interests of immediate Wu kin.  While 
there is no doubt that Howqua II was the wealthiest hong merchant of his time, the 
exact amount and components of his personal net worth remain uncertain. 
At the bottom of the hong merchant body in 1815, in sharp contrast, the 
receivership of the four debtors Conseequa, Manhop II, Poonequa and Goqua I was 
grinding along.  Of these firms, only the Dongyu hong of Goqua I would make it to 
1828, and it continued in business thereafter under successor family members 
through 1843.7  Loqua (Exchin II), the fifth receivership debtor, died on 10 May 1814.  
The license of his troubled Xicheng hong was renewed in August 1814 in the name 
of Pacqua (Li Guangyuan) (also known as Exchin III).  This caused friction between 
Loqua’s immediate family and the foreign trustees, as the family wanted the firm to 
be run by Cheequa, a more skilled businessman, but one who unfortunately did not 
speak English and had had little contact with foreigners.  The trustees instead 
recognized Pacqua, a collateral relative of Loqua, who had been “a frontman in the 
hong.”  Pacqua proved a greater risk-taker than Loqua, and the condition of the 
Xicheng hong did not improve under his management.8 
No new hong merchants were admitted to the outer seas guild during the period 
1815 through 1828.  During the same years, four merchants failed and their hongs 
were closed.  This dearth of replacements stands in sharp contrast to the preceding 
fifteen year period, in which there were nine admissions (1800-1815), and the twenty 
years before that, in which there had been fifteen (1780-1799).9  Entry was certainly 
discouraged by the practice, from at least 1813 to 1829, by which any new hong 
merchant was required to present a guarantee of financial responsibility for unpaid 
taxes signed by all of the incumbent hong merchants before he could join the guild.  
In the crisis year of 1829 the written full commitment rule was relaxed.  The written 
guaranty of two operating firms was all that was thereafter required for admission.10  
The brother of a rich salt merchant is said to have tried in 1828 to form a hong 
dedicated exclusively to trading with Americans, but that venture was not realized.  
The hong merchants opposed the effort because they believed that the true purpose 
of the proposed venture was to act as an agent for outside shopmen who were 
trading with Americans, facilitating and profiting from that growing business.11  
This was an exceptional case, and it is notable precisely as that.  Credible merchants 
had no interest in joining the outer seas guild.  A hong merchant license was seen to 
involve more burden than potential benefit. 
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6B. The Demands of Government, 1815-1828. 
Government officials continued to place heavy demands both on the Consoo Fund 
and individual hong merchants in the period 1815 through 1828.  Unlike the period 
1805 through 1816, for which detailed records exist (discussed at pages 123-24, 
above), direct evidence for this later period is spotty.  In 1815, Hoppo Xiangshao 
promulgated a regulation requiring the use of three expensive shroffs (money 
changers) as exclusive sources for the silver required for tax payments.  This was 
understood as an indirect attempt to squeeze yet more fees from the trade, and 
66,000 taels ($91,667) was paid to the Hoppo to secure withdrawal of the 
burdensome regulation.12 
Early in 1815, financial problems among the hong merchants were reported by a 
secret informant to an imperial censor.  A memorial was sent to the Emperor stating 
that the junior hong merchants were insolvent.  The Governor-General was ordered 
to investigate, and in response he directed the seven junior hong merchants to 
provide statements of their foreign debts and of the time required to discharge 
them.  Although the British EIC declined an invitation to corroborate the disclosures 
made by the seven debtors, the matter was duly concluded.  This positive outcome 
was facilitated by payment of about 100,000 taels ($138,889) to the Hoppo, although 
an uproar arose when word of the bribe reached the Governor-General (Viceroy).  
As described in the EIC records, 
“Puankhequa informed Mr. Plowden [then at Canton] that the Viceroy 
was very favorably disposed to settle the question in the desired manner, 
when some evil intentioned person communicated to the Viceroy that the 
Merchants had subscribed 100,000 Tales for the purpose of bribing the 
Officers of Government throwing much suspicion on the Namhai heen and 
the Quan Choo foo -- that this statement had irritated His Exc'y exceedingly 
and had put a stop to the arrangement taking place.  .  .  .  Altho' there is 
scarcely any affair that can be arranged in China without the good wishes of 
the Officer under whose authority the affair may be being previously 
purchased, still a certain form and shew of justice must be exhibited; and the 
bribe is neither received openly or avowedly, but is generally arranged thro’ 
the medium of some third person.  The Viceroy is stated to be extremely 
tenacious of these external marks of Purity, altho' it is currently said that he 
obtains considerable sums.”13 
While little information survives concerning government exactions during this 
period, an 1839 memorial to the Emperor provides strong evidence that the 
supervising officials recognized that the hong merchants had reached a financial 
limit.  The hong merchants had committed in 1819, voluntarily or involuntarily, to 
pay 600,000 taels ($833,333) for Yellow River flood control work, and then in 1826 to 
pay another 600,000 taels ($833,333) to support the war in Kashgar.  Payment of 
these pledges, absolute on their face, was then repeatedly deferred on imperial 
approval through 1839.  Twenty years later, 136,151 taels ($189,098) of the 1819 
pledge still had not been paid, and none of the 1826 pledge.  Professor Chiang Ting-
fu, who located and published this memorial in 1932, observed that “the mere fact 
that such enormous debts existed and tended to increase was a sure sign that some 
disease was eating away the vitals of the Co-Hong not long before the Treaty of 
Nanking officially pronounced its demise.”14 
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It is apparent that by this time the Qing government had, in effect, recognized 
certain leading hongs as being “too big to fail.”  In better times, these preeminent 
firms would have been pressed to all pay taxes and guaranteed foreign debt on or 
before the payment deadlines that had been set.  While these firms still could have 
been pressed to pay these obligations in full, the officials recognized that a high risk 
existed that they too would then fail and that, without these leaders, the entire 
Canton System would grind to a halt (with resulting unemployment, social disorder 
and disruptions of tax collection).  Functional “too big to fail” status protected, 
notably, the preeminent Yihe hong of the senior hong merchant Wu Bingjian 
(Howqua II) from heavy government exactions.  While this process of restraint 
worked in the opposite from modern “too big to fail” doctrine, under which state 
subsidies are extended directly or indirectly to favored firms, it had an identical 
effect.  By not pressing leading firms to pay tax and other debts it otherwise would 
have demanded, the government protected those firms it recognized as essential to 
the functioning of the marketplace. 
6C. Trading Conditions, 1815-1828. 
The fourteen year period 1815 through 1828 is characterized by relief and 
exuberance.  The long period of war was over.  The silver supply from the United 
States resumed, and some silver also began to come to Canton through Spanish 
trade with ports in Mexico and Peru.  Credit was freely extended, and international 
markets soon tested the exuberantly issued paper.  Pains felt in distant financial 
centers were promptly relayed to China, due to the ever increasing reliance of 
various private traders on financing, notably from London.15 
The Panic of 1819 was the first disturbance of the period.  United States trade 
with China in 1820 dropped to half what it had been the prior year, and the 
American portion of the opium trade which had grown significantly after 1815, was 
reduced to zero in 1820.  The 1821 crackdown on opium smuggling by the Chinese 
government had the effect of moving this illegal commerce just outside the mouth of 
the Pearl River.16  Conducted from storeships off Lintin Island, stationary bazaars 
that were visited by Chinese customers who then did their own smuggling, the 
opium trade continued in large volume, effectively unhindered.  The hong 
merchants, with rare exceptions which occurred primarily before 1821, had no 
involvement in this trade.  It was conducted far from Canton and they were exposed 
public figures.  It was simply too dangerous. 
Throughout the 1820s, the Canton market for Indian cotton was chronically 
depressed.  The stronger hong merchants sought to avoid cotton losses by refusing 
to purchase on their own account, being willing to accept consignments as brokers 
only.  Those who bought found their capital tied up, as they could not sell other 
than at a loss.  Early in 1822, it was said that “[t]he unprecedented scarcity of money 
among the Hong merchants is partly caused by the large capitals locked up in 
cotton.”17  These woes were exacerbated by heavy losses the hong merchants 
suffered in the great fire of 1-2 November 1822, which destroyed large amounts of 
warehoused goods.18 
An international crisis broke in 1825 as the result of an ill-timed decision by the 
Bank of England to tighten credit.  Several important but heavily indebted American 
China trade houses were brought down by the crisis.  The Philadelphia firm of 
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Edward Thomson failed in 1825 and the New York and Canton firm of Thomas H. 
Smith failed in 1827, leaving massive customs debts owing to the government, and 
warehouses of China goods to be sold off into a depressed market.  This was also a 
period of changing consumer taste in the United States, with annual per capita tea 
consumption falling about fifteen percent in the second half of the 1820s, as the rate 
of consumption of coffee rose.  The American trade with China declined in the 1820s 
and 1830s, due to over-investment and the attraction of capital into domestic 
investment opportunities.  All the while, various private traders, including 
Americans, busily continued to bring opium into China.  As earnings from drug 
sales increased, there was less need to bring silver.  American imports of specie to 
Canton declined in the late 1820s and were sharply reduced in the 1830s.19 
6D. The Experience of Conseequa, 1796-1823. 
The case of Conseequa merits added attention.  A prominent example of the new 
type of hong merchant that did business after 1800, the experiences of Conseequa 
and his Liquan hong connect the period 1800-1814 (the subject of Chapter Five) with 
the period 1815-1828 (the subject of this chapter).  Conseequa’s history illustrates the 
core problems that tie together these periods: the inadequate capital of the hong 
merchants; the dominant power of the British EIC as trading partner and as a 
lender; the extension of credit by hong merchants to foreign debtors, and the 
problems that could result from it; and the sometimes involved process through 
which indebted hongs and their foreign creditors sought to avoid resort to the 
Canton Guaranty System. 
A member of the Pan family (Puankhequa), operators of the long-dominant 
Tongwen hong,20 Conseequa long enjoyed good working relations with the British 
EIC.  He also worked closely with the new independents, both Americans and 
country traders.  He was bold and a risk-taker, extending massive trade loans to 
merchants from the distant United States, and becoming involved in one of the few 
clearly recorded transactions in which a hong merchant bought opium -- nine boxes 
purchased for $11,972 from Willing & Francis' ship Bingham on 28 December 1805.21 
  Conseequa rose rapidly, initially trading without a license in the 1780s and 
1790s.  Arrested for this offense in December 1796, he was forced to buy a license.  
The thirty-six year old Conseequa was now proprietor of the Liquan hong, open for 
regular business.22  The French thought highly of Conseequa.  The American view 
was more guarded.  An agent of Thomas Handasyd Perkins of Boston described 
him as “very lavish of promises, very shuffling but rich and doing much business.  
Very liberal credit.”23  The Salem merchant Thomas W. Ward, writing in 1809 as 
Conseequa's business crumbled, was more blunt.  “Rich -- roguish -- insinuating -- 
polite -- sends some excellent cargoes -- some bad Cargoes -- not attentive enough to 
business and a man with whom you cannot talk with safely, as he will promise 
everything & perform what he pleases--not to be seen always.”24 
The new Liquan hong traded with the EIC on a large scale, and also with various 
other foreign merchants.  It often extended credit to American traders, and these 
loans grew into massive amounts.25  In 1815 Conseequa told investigating 
authorities that over $2.5 million was owed to him by American debtors and by the 
private Armenian country trader Gregory Baboom.26  American court records show 
that in April 1808 Conseequa was owed $500,000 by his debtors in the city of 
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Philadelphia alone.27  A [partial] tabulation of Conseequa's loans, prepared in 1987 
from then known records, identifies $420,596 in loans by Conseequa to Americans 
during the decade 1800-1809.28 
The source of the funds Conseequa lent is uncertain.  As of 1800, he had little free 
cash.  He had been a hong merchant for four years, with seventeen years' prior 
history as an outside trader.  A 50,000 tael ($69,400) smuggling fine levied against 
the hong that summer forced Conseequa to borrow from the EIC to meet 
obligations, and left him unable to meet at least one commitment in 1801.  That fine 
was paid, in installments, through the year 1801.29  As of 1800, his accumulated 
trading profits do not seem to have been in the range required to support lending on 
the scale in which the Liquan Hong was becoming engaged.  Yet in November 1805, 
Conseequa told supercargo William Read that he was prepared to make loans of as 
much as $100,000 to $150,000.30 
Conseequa obviously borrowed some of the funds he lent.  This practice is 
common today, and can be useful if controlled.  When credit is available to 
customers, they may buy more.  Profit may increase as well; a financing seller may 
make money as a lender, in addition to the profit from the initial sale.  It is doubtful 
that Conseequa originally intended to finance his foreign customers on a large scale.  
Nor would it seem that he was ever so scientific as to track net gain on the spread 
between his cost of funds and amounts repaid by his customer debtors.  The 
evidence indicates that his purchase financing started modestly in the late 1700s, 
and grew in the early 1800s, presumably supported by good repayment experience 
with early loans.31  The hong's loan exposure almost certainly then grew beyond 
Conseequa's intentions and the knowledge of his other creditors.  We know that 
Conseequa was becoming concerned about his exposure in 1805, even as he bragged 
to William Read about his lending power.  A dispute arose that year between 
Conseequa and the supercargo of the ship Ganges of Philadelphia, “as to the extent 
of the credit, which Conseequa said he did not expect would be so large.”32 
The credit purchase of tea carried risk for the buyer, just as the extension of 
credit to a merchant who lived nearly half a world away involved risk for the too-
often financially insecure hong merchant.  Great care in judging teas was warranted 
in any transaction, and it was extremely important when teas were bought on credit 
late in the Canton season.  Much of the best of the annual tea crop had been 
contracted for by European buyers prior to delivery at Canton, and the rest of the 
best was sold quickly, usually for cash.  In certain years good teas, or better teas of 
particular varieties, were very scarce;33 generally, by late in the season, all superior 
teas were gone.34  With the best quality not easily distinguished by the visiting 
supercargo, at least not without the assistance of an expert taster who would require 
a fee,35 many of the Chinese merchant lawsuits arose naturally from late season 
purchases of tea on credit.  Stephen Girard, the greatest nineteenth century 
Philadelphia China trade merchant,36 doubted that any hong merchant of good 
reputation would sell teas on credit.37  On another occasion, Girard stated that in 
teas 
“lies the great deception and I do not believe that a China merchant of 
good repute & credit who is particular in dealing in the best teas can 
purchase them even cash in hand as low as any other Chinese whose 
principal object is to obtain a long credit [T]his last character may possibly 
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purchase teas at the lowest Cash price pay[ab]le. at 2 or 3 years consequently 
the difference in price will apparently be in his favor but in quality it will 
perhaps prove to be some fifty to 60 Pr cent worse than the tea purchased by 
the Chinese merchant of good repute [T]his I have experience[d] at Antwerp 
in 1804 at the sales of the ship Rousseau's cargo [T]here was a small parcel of 
Souchong tea purchased at Canton of Eshing which sold upwards of fifty pr 
cent more than what was furnished by Conseequa.”38 
The experience of William Read, supercargo of the ship Bingham, who chose to 
rely on his own expertise in buying teas from Conseequa on credit late in the season 
1805-1806, provides a tragicomic example of the wisdom of Girard's advice.  
William Read wrote his principal at the time of purchase that he had rejected the 2 
percent fee required for the services of Mr. Rabinel the tea examiner as “far beyond 
what I thought the services to be rendered merited.”  Read felt confident of his 
ability to make “such a selection of Teas as will render his assistance of little 
consequence.”  A month later he innocently wrote that Rabinel “informs me he has 
written a letter to his friends in Holland which may be of use in the Sales of the 
Cargo, and regrets he could not render you the services you wished, and on such 
terms as would answer your expectations, and consistent with his own and the 
Interest of the Gentn. his assistants in the Factory.”  When the Bingham reached 
Amsterdam and its tea cargo was auctioned, the teas William Read had confidently 
selected at Canton brought a very low price.39 
Having extended massive amounts of unsecured credit to American debtors, 
Conseequa -- presumably already under pressure himself -- grew cross with their 
delays and excuses.  Late in 1807 he handed a group of overdue promissory notes to 
his friend Benjamin C. Wilcocks at Canton, telling Wilcocks to bring them to 
America and to see that the debts were collected.  The Rhode Island merchant 
Edward Carrington, later United States Consul at Canton, vividly described 
Conseequa's resolve in a letter to Samuel Snow, one of Conseequa's debtors.  
Carrington had explained Snow's situation to the hong merchant, and asked that 
Snow be allowed one more season to meet his obligations, but “Conseequa 
pretended to be much disappointed and out of temper in the business.”  Conseequa  
“had given the note [to] Mr. Wilcocks with many others to be sent to 
Am[eric]a. for collection.  I then told him if he would retain it, I would write 
to you I could secure the money would come next season, he said no it would 
not do, that the notes must go.  I spoke to Wilcocks, who applied to 
Conseequa on the subject, but without success.  Your note, with Bently, B. 
Dexter and others in Rhode Island are forwarded by this opp[ortunit]y. to 
Messrs. R.H. Wilcocks & B.C. Wilcocks at Phila[delphia] for Collections.  
Conseequa is very much out with the Am[eric]a[ns]. in consequence of heavy 
claims that have been urged against him for bad Goods furnished to them -- 
he has become the most obstinate, pernicious Merch[an]t. of the Hong, & it is 
almost impossible to move him when he takes a stand.  I have been this 
particular lest you should think I had not attended to your requests.”40 
Wilcocks either traveled with or followed the notes to Philadelphia, where he “made 
application to” several debtors who provided him with $9,000 for Conseequa.  These 
funds, with other monies due to Conseequa, were sent to Canton, but Wilcocks later 
testified that he believed a “great part thereof was prevented by capture from 
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getting into Conseequa's hands.”  Wilcocks delivered the remaining unpaid notes to 
the lawyer Charles Jared Ingersoll for collection.41  The retention of Ingersoll was at 
once the natural choice of a leading and well-connected local lawyer and also an 
inside pick, as Ingersoll was married to Wilcocks' younger sister.42  Chinese 
merchant creditors were generally similarly well advised in their debt collection in 
the United States and commonly retained leading lawyers to represent them in 
court.43 
Disaster ensued.  Three of Conseequa's debtors, warned of imminent suit against 
them, filed a preemptive action in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia 
County seeking to recover damages from Conseequa for poor quality teas allegedly 
sold to them in 1805.  Edward Dunant and Joshua and Thomas Gilpin obtained a 
court attachment of all of Conseequa's assets in Philadelphia.  On 2 and 4 April 1808, 
the Sheriff attached “all the goods and chattels rights and credits of the said 
Consequa in the hands of” some twenty-one merchants, namely, notes payable to 
Conseequa in the total amount of $500,000.  This large sum is a dramatic statement 
of the amount of a single hong merchant's credit to Americans in just one American 
city early in the nineteenth century.44  According to Conseequa's later federal court 
suit against Dunant and the Gilpins, this attachment, which remained in effect 
through 22 May 1809, prevented the debtors whose promissory notes were attached 
from paying him.45  In the meantime, the Embargo which held American shipping 
idle through March 1809 ruined many of Conseequa's debtors. 
Conseequa's collection agent Benjamin Chew Wilcocks is best remembered today 
as the anonymous, “Mr. W____, “ the beneficiary of an act of generosity by Howqua 
II in 1827.  His predicament that year, and Howqua's response to it, is described in a 
famous passage by William C. Hunter:46 
“An American gentleman, who had resided many years at Canton, and 
had possessed a considerable fortune, met with serious losses.  The hope of 
regaining it induced him to continue operations, in which he was materially 
assisted by Houqua.  They had been, as was usually said, in the words of the 
place, ‘olo flen.’  Time passed, considerable sums were placed at the disposal 
of Mr. W____, no reference being made to them by the Hong merchant until, 
at the end of a second or third year, Houqua’s and his accounts were 
compared, and the balance in favor of Houqua was 72,000 dollars.  For this 
amount he took a promissory note and it was locked up in his strong box… 
One day, when on a visit to his Chinese friend, the latter said, ‘You have 
been so long away from your own country, why do you not return?’  To 
which Mr. W____ replied that it was impossible -- he could not cancel his 
note, and this alone would prevent him.  Houqua enquired if the bond [note], 
only, kept him in Canton, and if he had not some means wherewith to 
provide for a residence at home?  The answer was that no other debts 
existed, and he was not without resources -- but the note!!  Houqua 
summoned his purser, and ordered him to bring the envelope containing 
promissory notes from the treasury.  Taking out that of Mr. W____, he said, 
‘You and I are No. 1, “olo flen;” you belong honest man, only no got chance.’  
He then tore the note up, and throwing the fragments into the waste-paper 
basket, added, “Just now hav settee counter, all finishee; you go, you please.”  
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That is to say, ‘Our accounts are now all settled, you can leave when you 
like.’” 
Benjamin Chew Wilcocks left Canton in December 1827.47 
Wilcocks' $72,000 debt, cancelled by Howqua II in 1827, dates to the failure of 
William Waln in the Panic of 1819. 48  Waln, Wilcocks' Philadelphia agent, sometime 
employer, and later father-in-law,49 also a debtor to Conseequa,50 failed that 
summer.51  According to Hunter, the $72,000 debt was the total sum “placed at the 
disposal” of Wilcocks by Howqua II over two to three years after Wilcocks suffered 
serious losses in about 1819.  Howqua's original 1819 loan to Wilcocks, and the 
cancellation of that debt in 1827 were certainly generous acts, but it is an error to 
view them as acts of charity alone.  They are the more understandable when the 
services are considered, that Wilcocks rendered over many years helping Chinese 
merchants collect debts in Philadelphia, Providence, New York, and other American 
cities.  Howqua II had good reason to feel gratitude.  Among other things, these 
services helped reduce his potential collective guaranty exposure in the event of 
failure of his hong merchant creditor colleagues.52  It is also true that Howqua II and 
Wilcocks were friends.  “You and I are No. 1, 'olo flen;' you belong honest man, only 
no got chance.” 
In the midst of his afflictions, several years earlier, Conseequa wrote his friend 
Peter Dobell in Philadelphia complaining about his financial and legal problems.  
The 3 April 1813 letter, in pidgin English with an addition by Alexander Pearson, 
survives in a vandalized condition. 
“I have very trouble because all that money America gentlemen owe for 
me.  .  .  .  I have see hardly any money, now I have very much trouble, owe 
so much money, no can pay I fear broke.  Mr. Ingersoll I know very good 
man, very good head, only I fear [words deliberately obliterated] talk story 
so have spoil me too.  paper along with this can show how much money, 
who man owe, I chin chin you look -- take care.” 
Pearson added, 
“For the foregoing I have served as an amanuensis to your friend 
Conseequa.  I cannot help thinking that he had met with a great deal of more 
harsh & ungrateful treatment for such liberality of accommodation (to some 
whom I hope you will not meet with in America) than it is for the credit of 
foreigners to this country & of human natives generally, that he should have 
been subjected to, however I need not amplify on that subject to you.”53 
Ten months later, in February of 1814, the frustrated and perplexed hong 
merchant appealed directly to President James Madison.  This letter survives in the 
National Archives of the United States in its Chinese original, with contemporary 
English and Portuguese translations.  There is no record of action taken in response 
to the appeal, or that any reply was made to Conseequa's letter, which may be 
natural enough.  The letter was sent in the middle of the War of 1812 between 
Britain and the United States, and the White House, the official residence of the 
addressee, was burned by British troops in August 1814, six months after the letter 
was sent.  In “The Petition of Conseequa, a Hong Merchant of the City of Canton in 
China,” Conseequa (Pan Kun) recites the fairness of his dealings, the willingness 
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with which he had granted credit to Americans, and complains that his debtors 
have evaded and failed to pay him.  “Many who do not labour under inability to 
pay their debts, or who do not acknowledge that they are unable, object to pay 
them, as he thinks upon frivolous grounds, and involve the Claims upon them in 
tedious litigation.”54 
“When the American merchants (who owe me money) come to Guangdong 
and live in Canton, Kun cannot accuse them, because the law of our country 
prohibits Chinese subjects from accusing the barbarians.  This is why Kun must 
beg Your Excellency, the President of the United States, since Kun hears that the 
law of your noble country is impartial, and that no matter whether a man is rich 
or poor, an American or an alien, everyone is equal before the law.  Kun is an 
alien from a remote region and ignorant of the usages and forms proper to 
presenting his case to your honorable country.  Again, because great distance lies 
between us, I cannot present all my evidence (that the American merchants owe 
me money) to you.  Therefore, your decision on this case may reach me after an 
interval of several years.  The reason for presenting this petition is to appeal to 
Your Excellency for an impartial judgment.  
I hope Your Excellency will not listen to the one-sided story of your 
dishonest merchants, but judge this issue fairly.  .  .  .  If the American 
merchants do not return my money, then my whole family will suffer 
substantially.  Not only will I lose my principal for continuing my business, 
but foreign merchants will not have any faith in me.” 
Conseequa said that he had asked an English friend to present his petition and 
evidence, which he hoped the President would act on both for his sake, and in the 
interest of the reputation of American citizens in China. 
“Formerly, I trusted the Americans.  I therefore sold goods to them on 
credit.  If they do not return the price of my goods, they will cause the 
bankruptcy of Kun's family.  In the future, who will trade with the subjects of 
Your Excellency, the President of the United States?” 
6E. The Collective Guaranty of Debt, 1815-1828. 
During the period 1815 to 1828 the total liability on account of foreign debt that was 
charged to the hong merchant body under the collective guaranty was 1,725,000 
taels ($2,395,833), an average of 123,214 taels ($171,130) annually.  The trend of 
significant increases in average annual liability, evident since the imposition of the 
collective guaranty in 1780, continued apace.  The average annual charge in this 
fourteen year period was up eight percent (8%) from the prior fifteen years, in 
which charges averaged 113,733 taels ($157,963) annually (1800-1814).  The 
assessments of that period were up forty percent (40%) on average from the prior 
twenty years, in which charges averaged 81,050 taels ($112,569) annually (1780-
1799).  The trend of increases of the average annual amount charged as collective 
liability for the defaulted foreign debts of members of the outer seas guild during 
the period 1780 through 1828 is summarized in the following table: 
 
 






Increase in Annual 
Average from Prior Period 
[Taels/(Dollars) (Percentage)] 
    1780-1799 1,621,000/(2,251,388) 81,050/(112,569) (No prior period.) 
1800-1814 1,706,000/(2,369,444) 113,733/(157,963) 32,683/(45,394) (40%) 
1815-1828 1,725,000/(2,395,833) 123,214/(171,130) 9,481/(13,167) (8%) 
    The guaranty burden on the outer seas guild was growing steadily worse.  When the 
New York legislature looked to the Canton Guaranty System as inspiration for 
proposed banking reform, at the end of this period, it was not made aware of this 
gradually worsening debt burden. 
Collective guaranty liability during the period 1815 through 1828 was limited to 
the cases of Conseequa, the Manhops, Pacqua (successor to Loqua) and Poonequa.  
Foreign creditors submitted claims in Chinese debt proceedings, and, again, the 
Canton officials enforced the collection of foreign loans which were illegal under the 
Eight Regulations.  These “junior” firms failed after their receiverships ended.  As of 
1818, the receivership trustees for these merchants decided that conditions among 
them had not improved sufficiently.  As recorded by the British EIC, 
“The considerate and judicious support, which the Hongs so unhappily 
circumstanced have received from the Hon'ble Company may be considered 
to have re-established them; but instead of having employed their restored 
credit wisely and correctly, we apprehend they have, in this season 
especially, perverted it to their own Detriment and that of their Creditors.” 
The EIC resolved to restrict advances to the junior hong merchants to amounts 
needed for current business only.55  It ended its practice of nearly a decade of 
advancing money needed to purchase tea for the coming season.  The advances 
were believed to have driven prices up while discouraging attention to quality, and 
it had become difficult to track the cash.  The EIC noted a “very strong case of 
necessity” for the change.  “[I]t would be impolitic to hazard the Company's 
Property in a Country where our footing is at all times precarious and where there is 
no mode of counteracting or of punishing the misconduct of the Merchants on 
whose behalf the advances may be made, but such as involves the subversion of the 
system we are desirous to uphold.”56  Termination of the former practice of 
advancing cash for the use of the weak junior merchants, just as the receivership 
was nearing its end, did not help their position in the marketplace. 
The trusteeship of Conseequa's Liquan hong came to an end in 1819,57 but the 
firm still owed money to the EIC and other foreign creditors.  By the end of the 1821-
2 season, all of the trust debts (pre-1813 obligations) of the other junior merchants 
had been paid, except for $200,000 still due from the Xicheng hong (Pacqua [Exchin 
III] as successor proprietor) and $630,000 owed by the Fulong hong (Manhop I and 
Manhop II proprietors).  The EIC had proposed in each of the two prior years that 
this residual debt should be paid out of the Consoo Fund, but the hong merchant 
body repeatedly rejected its proposal.58 
In the summer of 1822, Pacqua (Exchin III) was petitioned against by Parsi 
country trader creditors.  He was jailed on 18 October 1822.  The hong owed about 
195,000 taels ($270,833) in government duties and fees, $167,000 to Americans and 
$330,000 to its Parsi creditors.  The government debt was paid with “loans from his 
friends and a generous donation of forty thousand taels from Howqua and 
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Mowqua.”59  As the duties arrearage had been paid, Governor-General Ruan Yuan 
and the Hoppo saw no need to close the Xicheng hong.  They directed Howqua II as 
head merchant to work out a settlement with foreign creditors.  The EIC supported 
the effort by agreeing that the debtor hong could retain its two shares of tea business 
to facilitate payment to foreign creditors, a usual EIC strategy.  The Parsis 
negotiated hard and Howqua II ultimately agreed to pay sixty percent of their debt.  
With that deal struck, Pacqua was released from jail in December 1822 and allowed 
to return to business.  Management of the two dedicated shares of EIC business, 
however, was vested by creditor agreement in hong merchant trustees.  The trustees 
were charged to: first, generate profits to pay creditors under the original 1813 
junior hong merchant trust; and, second, to pay new creditors as possible.  Trustee 
operations generated $100,000 for 1813 trust creditors, which was paid in the Spring 
of 1824.  Domestic Chinese creditors received nothing.  An 1822 petition to the 
Governor-General by green tea merchants, complaining of 130,000 taels ($180,555) 
due the from the Xicheng hong, was answered with a directive to the hong 
merchants to take care of the matter, which accomplished nothing.60 
For its part, Conseequa's Liquan hong limped forward from trusteeship with 
unpaid old debt to the EIC, accumulating new liabilities as it did business.  Its EIC 
debt had dropped to $280,169 (201,851 taels) by the end of the trusteeship.  In its 
final years, EIC debt ranged from a high of $579,696 (417,649 taels) to a low of 
$342,630 (246,852 taels).61  Its asset situation remained difficult, with continuing but 
declining collections of proceeds of loans made in the early 1800s.  Benjamin Chew 
Wilcocks, for example, had owed Conseequa approximately 300,000 taels ($416,667) 
as of November 1813.62  Pursuant to a written release delivered to Wilcocks on 1 
April 1820, Conseequa agreed to discharge that debt for a mere $40,000.  The 
settlement seems to have been in the nature of a desperate final deal, and some 
subsurface grumbling is evident from its text.  Much or all of the money paid by 
Wilcocks was almost certainly taken by the British EIC as Conseequa’s dominant 
creditor.  The EIC was represented at the settlement table by James Brabazon 
Urmston, who signed the release as President of the Select Committee of the EIC 
and Chief for all Affairs of the British Nation in China.  The British EIC even 
supplied the paper on which the release was prepared.63  It is no small irony that 
Urmston himself ended up heavily in debt to hong merchants, and was later 
removed from office for that very reason.64 
Conseequa's debt to the EIC had reached the total sum of 400,000 taels ($555,200) 
by September 1821 when his firm failed again.  The other nine hong merchants 
privately agreed to pay his debt in five annual installments, on EIC insistence 
(baited by doling out corresponding shares of Conseequa's former EIC business to 
the others).65  Stripped of its EIC contracts, the hong was mortally wounded. 
The third failure of the Liquan hong came two years later, with the 5 August 
1823 death of Pan Changyao.  Burdened with about 372,000 taels ($516,336) in 
foreign debt, the hong closed its doors forever.  Creditors petitioned Governor-
General (and acting Hoppo) Ruan Yuan, seeking payment under the collective 
guaranty.  After considerable proceedings, many creditor objections, and the 
liquidation of family property in Fujian, the Governor-General ordered the hong 
merchants to reach an agreement with creditors.  The debt was thereafter discharged 
by the hong merchant body in five equal installments, without interest, with the first 
150 CHAPTER 6 
two installments being paid to the EIC only.  This commitment was eased by 
continuing recognition by the EIC of the transfer of Conseequa’s three shares of EIC 
business to other hong merchants, with the profits to be used for debt payment, 
with “a moderate interest.”  The case was reported to the Emperor.  The firm's debts 
had been contracted by Conseequa, who was dead, and not by his son Pan Ruiqing, 
who had worked for the firm in its final years.  The son was ordered stripped of his 
purchased official titles, but was not otherwise punished.66 
The affairs of Pacqua's Xicheng hong were still troubled.  In April 1823 Pacqua, 
Manhop II (Fulong hong) and Poonequa had been jailed for failure to pay monies 
owed to the government.  Early in 1824 Hoppo Dasan approved admission of a 
shopkeeper as partner of the Xicheng hong, seeking to improve its affairs, without 
beneficial effect.  The hong was petitioned against yet again, found to be insolvent, 
and was reported to the Emperor in October 1826.  The Xicheng hong was found to 
owe 149,769 taels ($208,012) in duties and other debt to government, 477,216 taels 
($662,800) to foreign creditors, and an unknown but substantial debt to Chinese 
creditors.  The sale of firm assets yielded little and the hong merchants were ordered 
to pay the total balance due, some 618,904 taels ($859,589).  The foreign debt was 
paid in five equal annual installments without interest.  Pacqua was ordered 
banished to Ili, but his departure was delayed for over a year due to frontier wars.  
He finally left in August 1828, with the hong merchant body and the EIC each 
contributing 1,500 taels to “alleviate the hardships” of his journey and exile.67 
Although the 1813 trust debts of Poonequa (Mai Jinting of the Tongtai hong) had 
been fully paid as of 1822, that firm remained on the edge.  Poonequa died five years 
later in January 1827, leaving an insolvent hong.  The hong merchants and tea 
merchant creditors offered to help Poonequa’s son run the hong and pay its debts.  
The son instead chose to immediately flee Canton.  Hoppo Wenlian declared the 
Tongtai hong insolvent, and ordered its assets sold to pay debts.  The hong 
merchants were required to pay 110,000 taels ($152,778) in duty and contribution 
debt of the failed hong, plus 86,000 taels ($119,444) to its foreign creditors.  The 
foreign debts were thereafter paid in three annual installments without interest, 
starting in February 1828.68 
Partial payment in satisfaction of the remaining balance of the receivership debt 
of the Fulong hong of the Manhops was made in December 1823, under a negotiated 
compromise with creditors.  On account of this over ten year old debt ($630,000), 
creditors received a lump sum payment of $310,000 (just under 50%).  The money 
came from relatives and friends of the debtors ($60,000), from a loan by the 
American John Perkins Cushing ($160,000), and from current season EIC profits.69  
The Fulong hong of the Manhops struggled to remain in business but failed five 
years later in 1828.  In a bizarre stroke, the son of its founding partner Inqua 
materialized in Canton in 1827 like a foreshadowing angel of death, demanding 
shares of the firm and its recent profits.  Seventeen years earlier, in 1810, Inqua the 
father had run off, abandoning the hong and leaving his partner Manhop I to deal 
with roughly 700,000 taels ($972,222) in debt to foreign creditors, plus unpaid 
customs duties as well as debts to Chinese creditors.  Inqua's son had since grown 
up, had served as a minor official in Beijing and was able to wield influence.  He 
severely harassed Manhop II through the Nanhai magistrate and the Hoppo but the 
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matter finally came before the Governor-General who considered and rejected the 
son’s claim.70 
The demise of the Fulong hong followed the no less remarkable disappearance of 
30,000 bales of cotton - valued at about 900,000 taels ($1,250,000) - from its 
warehouses.  Safely stored as of November 1827, the massive cotton inventory had 
vanished as of February 1828.  Foreign creditors believed it had gone either to shady 
secret partners of the firm or in payment to Chinese creditors (the Chinese New 
Year when debts were required to be settled fell on 15 February 1828).  The hong 
was petitioned against by Magniac & Co. but the Governor-General did not want to 
act, as he was only the acting Hoppo.  On 7 April 1828, Yanlong arrived at Canton as 
the new Hoppo, and on 10 May 1828 Manhop I was declared insolvent and the case 
was reported to the Emperor.  After asset liquidation, the Fulong hong was found to 
owe 262,600 taels ($364,722) in duties to the government, and 792,000 taels 
($1,099,300) to foreign creditors (Americans and Indian country traders).  The 
Hoppo ordered the hong merchant body to pay the arrears of customs duties, and to 
pay the foreign debt without interest over eight years.  The time payment term was 
reduced to seven years in response to creditor protest, and finally to six years.71  
Manhop II, the nominal head of the Fulong hong, was ordered banished to Ili.  He 
was rumored to have left Canton with $10,000 and several servants.  The EIC sniffed 
in its records that he had set out on his journey “in a style better suited to the station 
of a wealthy mandarin than that of a degraded bankrupt merchant about to undergo 
his punishment.”72 
Burdened by this string of failures, the Consoo Fund remained stressed during 
the years 1815-1828.  The trend of increase of average annual liability continued.  It 
is true that the percentage of annual increase was not as sharp as it had been 
between the two prior periods, and that all of the failures in this period were junior 
hongs that had been placed in receivership in the period 1800-1814, but there were 
otherwise few other reasons for optimism.  The guild stood sharply divided 
between the weak and a few strong hongs.  The government continued to draw 
heavily on the hong merchants for payments to support state needs, but it began to 
do so more carefully.  A policy of deferral of the collection of assessed taxes, 
implemented on imperial approval in 1819 and continued through the outbreak of 
war in 1839, demonstrates that the Chinese government understood that the hong 
merchants had reached the limit of their financial ability.  Restraint was in order at 
Canton, and the guild should not be unusually pressed. 
In the winter of 1828-1829, legislators began to consider a proposal for a bank 
guaranty fund that took its inspiration from the success of the Canton Guaranty 
System.  At Albany, in the State of New York, these legislators were not informed of 
the precarious financial condition of most of the hong merchant body and of the 
Consoo Fund.  At Canton, in China, the hong merchants were denied the pause and 
opportunity to rebuild that they so badly needed.  In the years that followed, 1829-
1842, their collective guaranty liability for the debts of failed colleagues once again 
soared. 
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CHAPTER 7:  
THE LAST YEARS OF THE CANTON SYSTEM, 1829-1842 
As of 1829 the British EIC had become deeply concerned about the depleted number 
and feeble financial condition of the hong merchants.  In response, it imposed a five 
month trade embargo from 1829 into early 1830 in an unsuccessful attempt to force 
reform of the Canton System.  Just four years later, the EIC itself left the Canton 
trade, its charter terminated as the result of the legislative efforts of British private 
traders and manufacturing interests which saw bright promise in China.  New 
participants poured into the trade, increasing exports and driving up prices. 
The departure of the EIC meant the end of the annual fixed share tea purchase 
contracts it had long made with the hong merchants, and also the end of the bailout 
loans the EIC often made as a lender of last resort to keep its hong trading partners 
in business.1  The bailout loans had always depended on future revenues the EIC 
contracts would generate for the hong merchants.  The EIC assumed that its hong 
debtors would be able to repay their loans from the proceeds of its contracts, or that 
the EIC would be able to simply offset the debt.  As the EIC closed down, there was 
a general realization in the marketplace that the entire Canton Guaranty System had 
been founded on much the same assumption.  Creditors whose claims were being 
paid over time had assumed that the surviving hongs would be able to pay their 
guarantor obligations with income from stable tea contracts.  As the English private 
trader W. S. Davidson stated in his 1830 testimony before the Select Committee of 
the House of Lords: 
“I often selected bankrupts to deal with because I could seldom deal with 
the merchants on fair terms; some of them were satisfied with the certain 
profits on the Company's business and did not covet other business very 
much  .  .  .  They [the bankrupt hongs] gave much better prices; too often (I 
suspect) they gave higher prices than they could afford to in the actual state 
of the market.  .  .  .  [He had contracted with them] constantly and in large 
sums entrusted money to them.  .  .  .  I knew they [i.e. the stronger hongs] 
had shares in the Company's business and I felt assured they would be able 
to pay me, which they were.”2 
With the EIC contracts terminated, such assumptions could no longer be made.  
Trade boomed, but under uncertain conditions as the terms of contracting and 
trading were being worked out on a daily basis.  Credit was exceptionally tight.  
Domestic suppliers to the hong merchants were anxious about how they would be 
paid and were reluctant to extend more than modest credit.  The struggle that 
ensued between suppliers and hong merchants brought on a number of hong 
failures, which occurred just as the Panic of 1837 ricocheted around the world from 
London through to China. 
The crisis of 1836-7 exposed the Canton Guaranty System as irreparably 
damaged.  Several hong merchants were found to be insolvent.  Creditors wondered 
how the guild could possibly pay the enormous debts of these hongs.  The surviving 
hongs offered no concrete reason to believe that they would be able to perform their 
promises to pay, and they sought long repayment terms to boot. In this crisis of 
confidence, foreign creditors increasingly looked to the Chinese government, which  
  












Figure 8. The foreign factories at Canton in about 1825-1835. 
Oil painting by a Chinese artist.  (Private collection.  Photograph by courtesy of 
the Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.) 
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had imposed and long enforced the collective guaranty, to pay these private debts.  
In a February 1838 letter to Lord Palmerston, Charles Elliot, British Superintendent 
of Trade at Canton, stated that the Chinese government had in effect guaranteed 
payment of the hong merchant foreign debts as the quid pro quo for the privations 
the foreigners were forced to suffer in abiding by the restrictive rules of the Canton 
System.3  Private creditors expressed the fear that without Chinese government aid, 
the hong debts “will either never be paid, or else liquidated at so remote a period as 
to amount to a total loss of their immediate trading capital.”4  The failure to pay 
hong merchant debts -- which one pamphleteer spoke of as a transfer of British 
capital to Chinese citizens5 -- became a bloody shirt that British traders waved as 
they sought war against China in 1839. 
7A. The Hong Merchants, 1829-1842. 
The pressing problem in 1829 was whether the hong merchants had the financial 
ability to conduct the trade that was being done.  In the wake of the massive 
Manhop II failure of the year before (involving 1,054,600 taels -- $1,464,722 -- in debt 
owed to foreigners and the government), the guild had shrunk to seven merchants.6  
Of this number, only three -- Goqua II, Howqua II, and Puankhequa III -- were 
believed to be truly solvent.7  Yet even Goqua had sought an EIC loan to pay taxes 
in June 1828, as he had done often before.  He pleaded “deficient capital” and told 
the EIC that “no one will help me with a loan.”8  The hong of Chunqua III was on 
the edge, and that of Mowqua II was tottering.9  Kinqua I and Fatqua II were known 
to be heavily in debt, but were believed to be able to meet current commitments. 
The British EIC and other foreign traders feared that the imminent failures 
would reduce the number of hongs to the point that the survivors could easily 
control prices against EIC interest, i.e., that they would combine and exert 
monopoly force in opposition to its own.  New foreign trade merchants were 
needed, but the EIC understood that the financial burdens of the collective guaranty 
and official exactions discouraged entry.  Reform was therefore seen as badly 
needed, for without changes to the system itself qualified merchants would never 
enter the guild.  The EIC could see that the officials had been unable to attract new 
merchants: “the Hoppo was said to have reduced his fee from 70,000 to 10,000 taels, 
the Viceroy had been authorized to waive the requirement that all the old Hong 
Merchants should jointly guarantee the new, the old Hongists all professed their 
eagerness to obtain new colleagues -- and yet none came forward.”10  These concerns 
generated intense debate within the Canton Committee of the EIC, which finally 
voted to withhold its trade and to press hard for an improvement of trading 
conditions at Canton. 
The EIC sought sweeping free trade reforms in communications to the Canton 
officials which began in September 1829,11 but it received nothing more than 
acceptance of some small changes in exchanges with Governor-General Li Hongbin 
over the following six months.  All the while, the EIC kept its vessels and their 
inbound cargoes out of port.  The Governor-General “issued a mandate to the 
merchants, expressing his surprise that they had not produced others to act as their 
colleagues, and offering to remit all fees payable in the interval before the arrival of 
the new Hoppo.”12  The Governor-General then ordered the hong merchants “to 
find out among their intimate friends substantial people to undertake the 
situation.”13  The EIC knew perfectly well that this would accomplish nothing.  “It 
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never can be expected while the obnoxious Regulations exist which make a Hong 
Merchant a slave for life to the Govt. and render him liable for debts incurred by 
others, and responsible for the conduct of men over whom he has no control, that 
any Person of Common Sense will expose himself to ignominy, and his Family and 
Property to Ruin, for the sake of at best a very precarious hope of advantage.”14  In 
its records for 1829, the EIC noted two concrete reasons no qualified candidate 
would come forward. 
“First, because the Hong Merchants are often subjected to insult, extortion 
and vexatious detentions at the Hoppo’s office, by the King Ching [Jingcheng] 
Secretary, the attendants, the clerks, and to a degree that it is difficult for the 
human feelings to bear.  Therefore people are unwilling to become Hong 
Merchants.  A rich merchant’s son15 has been heard to say, ‘[ningwei yizhi kou, 
buwei yangshang zhishou]’ (Shall rather be a dog than a Hong Head Merchant).  
Secondly, according to the old regulations, when once a man entered the 
Hong, he became a prisoner for life.  Although by the toil and labor of many 
years, he had attained affluences, was now old and his health declining, and 
owed no one anything, he was not allowed to retire and return home.  A 
Hong Merchant16 has said: ‘I would willing[ly] give eight tenths of my 
property to government, if they would allow me to retire, go home, and 
enjoy the remaining two tenths.’  This being the case, how can an Invitation 
succeed in bringing any to purchase the hateful responsibility of a Hong 
Merchant?”17 
Nonetheless, the EIC recognized that the “peremptory and urgent tone” of the 
mandate from the Governor-General “may possibly compel the merchants to induce 
their relatives and friends to enter into the foreign trade.”18 
The standoff between the EIC and the Canton officials further damaged the 
already weakened hongs.  In a letter sent on 30 December 1829 the hong merchants 
reminded the EIC that they had contracted for black teas, and made advances on 
green teas, in reliance on promises to buy that the EIC had not performed.  The 
Chinese New Year was imminent, no money was coming in, and the squeeze 
threatened to put them “in a deplorable position.”19  The EIC coldly replied that the 
merchants “must endure the consequences of the refusal of the Chinese authorities 
to admit the justice of the Committee's contention, and to remedy the grievances 
from which the Company's trade suffered.”20  Yet within two months, without any 
material change on the Chinese side, the EIC quietly folded, returning to Canton in 
February 1830 and bringing its vessels in to conduct the season's now long-delayed 
trade.21 
The fulminating servants of the EIC realized in the end that the Company 
depended as much on the continuance of its enormous trade as did China, although 
the effects of the fruitless embargo fell most immediately and harshly on citizens of 
China.  In November 1829, William Jardine noted the distress prevailing at Canton.  
The tea merchant and silk weaver suppliers, in particular, had become “very 
discontented.”22  The embargo improved nothing and, instead, unsettled the trading 
community.  The alarm it raised among suppliers to the hongs, in particular, soon 
bore bitter fruit. 
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In 1829, the Hoppo sent a memorial to the throne which stated that the reason 
the foreigners were misbehaving was because there were too few hong merchants to 
control them.  Liberalized rules for hong licensing were proposed and implemented 
on imperial approval.  Under new rules effective in 1830, hong licenses became 
available on a one or two year provisional basis.  If the new merchant proved able to 
“trade fairly, maintain good credit, pay all taxes, and not go bankrupt” within that 
period, then a permanent license would be issued for which only two incumbent 
hong merchants would be required to serve as financial guarantors.23  The new rules 
provided a mechanism for admission of the weak candidates who came forward in 
response to the Governor-General's mandate. 
Six merchants joined the outer seas guild in 1830.  Four were admitted early in 
the year, timed to the period of British pressure,24 and the last two in September.  
These admissions briefly brought the hong merchant body up to thirteen, but 
membership had fallen to ten by year end, after the August 1830 failure of the 
Dongsheng hong of Chunqua III and the near instant collapse of both of the 
September hongs.25  The six new hong merchants, the first new merchants to join the 
guild in almost twenty years, were:26 Mingqua (Minqua),27 Hingtae, Saoqua,28 
Pwanhoyqua (Punhoyqua),29 Chingqua and Tuckune.  William Jardine grumbled in 
March 1830: 
“We have now four or five new Hongs, one conducted by a Tea merchant, 
one or two men from Macao, who have some money and some character but 
who have been engaged in the opium trade -- and one of them has visited the 
cold country passage free [i.e. been banished to Ili].  The others are mere 
adventurers without money and without character -- or rather with so very 
so-so character -- broken down opium brokers, dismissed Hoppo's pursers, 
etc.  What is to become of this newfangled nonsense I know not.”30 
Although all the new hong merchants had thin backgrounds and thin capital, 
Hoppo Zhongxiang charged each handsomely for the privilege of entry.  Minqua, 
Hingtae and Saoqua are said to have paid 42,024 taels ($58,367) each for their 
licenses.31  Another source estimates that fees of from $30,000 to $50,000 per 
admission went to the Hoppo personally, plus another $30,000 to his subordinates.32 
Of the new hongs, the Xingtai (“Hingtae”) hong of the brothers Yan Qiqang 
(titular head) and Yan Qixiang (active manager) was the most important.  Their new 
hong went up like a rocket over the Canton marketplace in the early 1830s but blew 
up spectacularly in the crisis of 1836-7.33  The brothers were young, described as 
having been boys or adolescents at the time their father died in the late 1820s.  The 
father, a shroff or goldsmith who did business under the prominent name Sunshing, 
left an inheritance of $50-$60,000 that his sons used to start the Xingtai hong.  The 
firm was also known as Sunshing, due to its association with the father.34  The 
brothers were hungry for business and enjoyed apparent success, transacting a 
fourth or a fifth part of Canton's entire legal foreign trade at their peak.35  Beneath 
the veneer of success, however, the firm had no capital to fall back on.  Its licensing 
fees, alone, had exhausted the Sunshing inheritance.  As Yan Qixiang explained in a 
19 April 1837 letter to William Jardine, his largest creditor: 
In 1830, I began business with a limited capital; after deducting expenses 
of hanging out my signboard, beginning business, and buying packing 
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houses and furniture, not a cash remained to me.  In that year on account of 
the English ladies coming up to Canton, I was confined to prison for more 
than a month and found myself minus a lac of dollars [$100,000].  In the fifth 
year happened Lord Napier's affair.  I was detained several months in prison 
and did little business.  My expenses at the offices of the Viceroy and the 
Hoppo and other places were not less than another lac [$100,000].36 
Chingqua and Tuckune, the last two hong inductees of 1830, were especially 
weak and did not survive the year.  Shortly after he opened the Maosheng Hong, 
Chingqua (Lin Yingkui) was appointed security merchant for a ship commanded by 
a Captain Yales.  When Chingqua failed to pay the 2,500 taels ($3,472) in 
measurement and other fees that were due for that ship, his license was revoked 
and the other hong merchants were ordered to pay the customs debt.  The other 
September admittee was the Tuckune (Teyuan) hong.  Its licensed proprietor was 
Tam Hoanfun, who operated in partnership with a silk goods trader known as 
Lawune (Luo Yuan).  A gift of three pairs of gold watches was made to the Hoppo 
on behalf of the Tuckune hong soon after it opened, but Lawune failed to inform the 
recipient that the valuable gift had not been paid for.  When the vendor Mr. Just 
petitioned the Hoppo to compel the Tuckune hong to pay $990 due for the gift that 
the Hoppo had in his own hands, the embarrassed Hoppo immediately revoked the 
hong's license.37 
The Canton authorities continued to try to rebuild the membership of the hong 
merchant body after 1830.  Samqua and Tungqua (also known as Fuksune) (Wang 
Datong of the Fuquan hong)38 were admitted in 1832, bringing the number of hongs 
up to twelve.  Samqua (Wu Tianyuan), the proprietor of the Tongshun hong, had 
the local nickname of “Maiji Shuang” (chicken-seller Shuang) because he (Shuang) 
formerly sold chickens.39  The 1835 admissions of Footae and Lamqua briefly 
brought membership to a 1780-1842 period high of fourteen.  Footae (Yi Yuanchang) 
had been an outside shopman  His Futai hong was effectively shut down within two 
years when foreign creditors seized its stock in trade, estimated to have been worth 
$10,000.  The firm was revived by bringing in a partner, the son of a trader of birds 
and other goods with a less than pristine history (“Tommy Birdman”), and it 
survived as a minor hong.40  Lamqua (Luo Futai), unrelated to the Canton artist who 
used the same business name, also suffered from inadequate capitalization.  His 
Dongchang hong was sanctioned for a smuggling incident and quietly went out of 
business in 1837, with the arrears it owed to the Consoo Fund ordered assumed by 
the surviving hong merchants.41  Takqua (Rung Yuguang), admitted as the 
proprietor of the Anchang hong in about 1836, has the distinction of being the last 
hong merchant ever licensed.  His firm was ordered closed just three years later in 
1839 by Lin Zexu for allowing outside merchants to sell tea to foreigners under its 
cover.42  The new admissions did not improve the ability of the hong merchant body 
to handle the trade that was being done.  Writing in May 1834, Joseph Coolidge of 
the American firm Russell & Co. rightly anticipated that “[m]any of the hongs must 
fail.  Several  .  .  .  are not worth one cash.”43 
The Canton officials promulgated two new regulations concerning hong debts 
during this period.  On 27 April 1830 the Hoppo issued a mandate to the hong 
merchants requiring the immediate disclosure of all debts due to foreigners, and 
stating that debts not so declared would not be recognized in Chinese debt 
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proceedings.44  Five years later, in 1835, Governor-General Lu Kun announced a new 
approach to hong debts.  The hong merchants would be required to fully report all 
of their foreign debts as of the end of each trading season, and to pay such debts as 
far as practicable.  Unreported debts would be treated as illegal loans and would not 
be enforceable or covered by the Consoo guaranty.45  These regulations were not 
enforced and they had no effect on the payment of debts of hongs which failed after 
their promulgation. 
Hong admission regulations were tightened in the international financial crisis 
year 1837 by Governor-General Deng Tingzhen.  No new members would be 
allowed to come in except to replace retiring, insolvent or deceased hong merchants.  
When a new member was selected as qualified, all the incumbent hong merchants 
would be required to sign a financial guaranty bond, as in the old days.  These 
regulations might be said to have had some effect.  No new members thereafter 
joined the outer seas guild.46 
7B. Trading Conditions, 1829-1842. 
Difficult trading conditions continued to plague the hong merchants in the early 
1830s.  The market for imported cotton remained flat, as in the 1820s.  In 1829 some 
hong merchants still held cotton they had purchased two years earlier.47  Then a 
series of unusually cold years, beginning in 1831, destroyed the late harvests and 
reduced agricultural production.  Guangdong and neighboring provinces 
experienced food shortages.  As the regional economy suffered demand for 
imported goods fell in turn.48 
The hong merchants were also sharply affected by changes which followed the 
abolition of the China trade monopoly of the British East India Company.  The 
British trade, legal and illegal, was enormous.  Much of it was illegal, with opium 
constituting two-thirds of the value of all British imports into China in the period 
1833 through 1842.49  The balance was legal, and had been conducted through 1834 
on an orderly contractual basis with the licensed hong merchants.  The Canton 
community learned quickly that the British Parliament had voted late in the 
Summer of 1833 to terminate the EIC monopoly effective as of the Spring of 1834.  
This major looming change and its consequences were warily anticipated by the 
market.50 
With the huge EIC tea business thrown open, new British traders rushed in.  
There was a sharp increase in demand for teas for export, and prices soared.  The 
EIC, withdrawn from direct involvement, still strongly influenced the trade.  In 
England it held large quantities of its teas in warehouses, supporting high prices.  At 
Canton it acted as a banker, with some $2 million in its treasury.  Through its China 
Agency, the EIC financed tea purchases by the new entrants.  The hong merchants 
happily received its cash, in preference to the Indian cotton or British manufactured 
goods brought in by the incumbent private traders and agency houses.  Responding 
to high prices for tea, the hong merchants sent much of this cash upcountry to 
increase production.  As the price of Chinese export goods rose, the price of imports 
-- other than opium -- fell.  Competition forced these imports out onto the market 
and, as the Canton Agency recorded, “'the readiest buyers were the neediest Hong 
Merchants, who purchased them at long credits to resell them immediately among 
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their countrymen for cash.”51  Much of the Hingtae debt was for credit purchases of 
this character.52 
As the prices of export goods increased, domestic Chinese suppliers grew 
increasingly worried about the credit risks they were running.  Suppliers of the 
black teas favored in England pressed the hong merchants for prompt payment.  As 
of 1836 the “black tea men” refused to deliver even previously contracted teas 
without first receiving cash or some form of security in advance.53  Similar pressure 
came from other suppliers, such as vendors of silk piece goods, the prices for which 
had tripled between 1833 and 1838.54 
In 1835, Puankhequa III was suspended from trading for failing to pay 32,000 
taels ($44,444) in duties.55  The condition of the formerly eminent Guangli hong of 
Mowqua II (Lu Wenjin) sharply darkened the same year.  The firm had barely 
survived crunches in 1829 and again in 1832, paying 12% interest on some $1.5 
million in loans from Chinese and foreign creditors out of thin trading profits and 
the 6%-8% estimated annual return on its large landholdings.56  Mowqua II lived 
well and put up a good front.  Those appearances were over by 1835.  He was 
imprisoned for debt in December 1835, and died soon after his release early in 1837, 
the result of judicial beatings and mistreatment while in prison.  The Guangli hong 
was found to owe more than $600,000 to foreign creditors, and a larger amount to 
domestic creditors.57 
The crisis of confidence of 1836-7 broke in this precarious context.  Willing 
lenders could no longer be found, and credit was frozen.  The hong merchants and 
certain foreign traders responded by trying to negotiate a program for the 
restoration of strictly short term credit with foreign suppliers.  As agreed, hong 
purchasers would be able to discount the payment of imported goods at the rate of 
1% per month plus a ten day grace period, after which the hong merchant could be 
petitioned against for debt.  Domestic Chinese cotton dealers disrupted the new 
system by using inferior silver to pay for cotton imports the hong merchants sold 
them58 
The credit crisis of 1836 broke the Xingtai (Hingtae) hong, against which foreign 
creditors submitted $2,738,768 in claims.  The Tianbao hong of Kinqua (Kingqua) 
(Liang Chengxi) was also exposed as insolvent, owing foreigners $1 million.59  
Writing in February 1837, William Jardine described the bleak conditions at Canton 
and the danger that these failures could bring down all of the hong merchants. 
“I am convinced that not one of the recently made Hongs are free from 
debt, and except Howqua and Puankhequa there is now not one hong with 
$20,000.  If we break one, we may break the whole; and if we do break the 
whole, the Hoppo will quickly make six or eight more, charging them 40,000 
taels each for the privilege.  These would of course be men of no property 
and little character who would in a few years break in their turn.  This is a 
gloomy picture but it is a true one.”60 
The large number and size of claims made it impossible to offsets debts with credits.  
The balance of the Consoo Fund was inadequate, and there was no practical way to 
collect credit balances due to the fund from individual hong merchants.  The EIC 
had formerly held such credits on its books on behalf of individual merchants,  
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Figure 9. The hong merchant Mowqua II (Lu Wenjin). 
Oil portrait by Lamqua, painted in the 1830s.  (Private collection.  Photograph by 
courtesy of the Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.) 
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but those days were over.61  The international financial crisis of 1837 made the rapid 
recovery of debts desirable, but there was little hope. 
7C. The Collective Guaranty of Debt, 1829-1842. 
The thirteen year period 1829 to 1842 saw massive hong failures and large amounts 
of debt thrown onto the hong merchant body.  The hong merchants were ordered to 
assume and pay the largest foreign debts ever experienced by the guild, at a time 
when the guild collectively was in a very weak condition.  The 1830 failure of the 
Dongsheng hong of Chunqua III produced a 418,000 tael ($580,555) charge, directed 
to be paid over three years.  The 1837 failure of the Xingtai hong (Hingtae) produced 
a 1,656,000 tael ($2,261,439) charge, ordered to be paid over eight years.  Last came 
the Kinqua (Kingqua) failure of 1838 and the 720,000 tael ($1,000,000) liability it 
exposed, which was ordered to be paid over ten years.62 
The total collective guaranty liability that was charged to the hong merchant 
body between 1829 and 1842 was 2,794,000 taels ($3,880,555), which averages out to 
186,266 taels ($258,703) annually over these thirteen years.63   These assessments 
represent another forty percent (40%) increase from the prior period.  The trend of 
large increases of the average annual hong merchant collective liability for foreign 






Increase in Annual 
Average from Prior Period 
[Taels/(Dollars) (Percentage)] 
1780-1799 1,621,000/(2,251,388) 81,050/(112,569) (No prior period.) 
1800-1814 1,706,000/(2,369,444) 113,733/(157,963) 32,683/(45,394) (40%) 
1815-1828 1,725,000/(2,395,833) 123,214/(171,130) 9,481/(13,167) (8%) 
1829-1842 2,794,000/(3,880,555) 186,266/(258,703) 63,052/(87,573) (40%) 
This data is examined in two additional tables, attached as Tables One and Two.  
Table One, entitled “Hong Merchant Collective Guaranty Liabilities, 1780-1842,” 
sets out the dates and amounts of the liabilities that were imposed.  Table Two, 
entitled “Hong Merchant Annual Collective Guaranty Responsibility for Foreign 
Debt, 1780-1842,” is a bar chart showing the average liability imposed annually over 
this sixty-two year period.  Table Two, which is another treatment of the 
percentages of increase shown in the preceding summary table, demonstrates that 
the average annual burden increased significantly over the course of this period.  
Table One sets out the source data with which the summary table and Table Two 
were prepared.  It also shows that the annual assumption burden on the hong 
merchants was even worse than is shown in those tables.  In addition to defaulted 
foreign debt (the subject matter of Table Two), the hong merchants were also 
required to pay taxes left unpaid by failed colleagues, in full and immediately.  
Unfortunately, much of the tax assumption data has not survived.  The fifth column 
of Table One sets out the amounts of tax debt ordered to be assumed, where that 
information is known.  These three tables demonstrate that there were steady heavy  
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Table 1  Hong Merchant Collective Guaranty 
Liabilities, 1780-1842 
  
Hong Merchant Collective Guaranty Liabilities, 1760-1842 
 
Year of Name of  Foreign Debt  No. (and Average Tax Debt 
Failure Debtor  Assumed  Amount) of Annual Assumed 
     (in Taels)*  Installments  (In Taels) 
 
1780  Yngshaw  600,000  10 (60,000)  Amount 
  and Kewshaw       Unknown1 
1784  Seunqua  166,000  10 (16,600)  None 
1790  Eequa   255,000  6 (42,500)  None 
1795  Gonqua  600,000  6 (100,000)  None 
1809  Fonqua  259,000  3 (86,333)  None 
1810  Ponqua and  1,447,000  10 (144,700)  Amount 
  Gnewqua II        Unknown2 
1823  Conseequa  372,000  5 (74,400)  None 
1826  Pacqua  475,000  5 (95,000)  None 
1827  Poonequa  86,000   3 (28,667)  110,0003 
1828  Manhop  792,000  6 (132,000)  262,6004 
1830  Chunqua  418,000  3 (139,333)  $41,2265 
1835  Fatqua II  None   None   300,0006 
1837  Hingtae  1,656,000  8 (207,000)  Unknown7 
1838  Kinqua  720,000  10 (72,000)  None 
 
* Amounts given in round numbers. 
 
Source of the data in the first four columns of this table: Ch'en, Insolvency, p. 96, Table 
2.7, "Foreign Debts Assumed by the Body of Hong Merchants, 1760-1843. 
                                                
1  Kuo-tung Ch'en and Weng Eang Cheong agree that Yngshaw and Kewshaw had unpaid 
customs duties but disagree as to the amount and whether such debt was or was not satisfied 
from asset sales.  Ch'en, Insolvency, p. 206 (150,000 taels, partially satisfied from asset sales, the 
balance paid by the hong merchants); Cheong, Hong Merchants, pp. 152 and 186 n.103 (175,000 
taels [$243,055], recovered by the state from asset sales, information attributed to Henri Cordier 
without further citation). 
2  Ponqua owed 88,000 taels in duties, Gnewqua II 89,000 taels in duties, and the two jointly 
owed another 30,000 taels for piracy control at the time of their failure.  It is unclear whether 
these debts were satisfied from asset sales.  Morse, Chronicles, Vol. III, p. 150 and Vol. IV, p. 83; 
Cheong, Hong Merchants, pp. 92 and 123 n.49 (Ponqua owed 80,000 taels in duties and 
Gnewqua II owed $89,000 in duties). 
3  Ch'en, Insolvency, pp. 347-8. 
4  Ch'en, Insolvency, p. 351. 
5  Ch'en, Insolvency, p. 359. 
6  Ch'en, Insolvency, p. 364. 
7  The Xingtai hong owed customs and other tax debts, which the hong merchants were ordered 
to pay.  Ch'en, Insolvency, p. 367. 
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Table 2 Bar Chart: Collective Guaranty Liability, 
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increases over time in the average annual burden of collective liability.  Table One 
indicates that tax debt was a significant -- if inadequately known -- part of this 
burden.  The tables show that the liabilities that were charged to the hong merchants 
in the last years of the Canton System, 1829-1842, were unprecedentedly large.  They 
placed a severe burden on the hong merchants at a time when they were struggling 
to survive. 
Tax collections by the Chinese government from the hong merchants were also 
failing in the years after 1829.  Extensions of tax obligations to the government 
dating back to 1819, and other current accommodations, are recorded in detail in a 
memorial presented jointly to the Emperor by Governor-General Deng Dingjin and 
Hoppo Yugun on 29 April 1839.  As of that date, the total arrearage owed by the 
hong merchants to the government stood at 1,464,282.732 taels ($2,033,726).64  The 
details in this memorial are especially important as information on the hong 
merchants becomes scarce in official records of the last years of the Canton System. 
The opium problem and its ramifications crowded out customary official 
recordkeeping.65  On the Western side, the EIC had exited the trade and stopped its 
pen.  As the Canton officials and their supervisors in Beijing had long paid close 
attention to hong finances and ability to pay, tax collection leniency and extensions, 
on approval from Beijing, provides strong proof that the hong merchants' 
diminished financial capacity was genuine.  The entire hong merchant body was at 
the edge, and the officials at Canton and in Beijing knew it.  Despite these 
conditions, there is no evidence of any attempt to measure foreign debt risk subject 
to the collective guaranty, or to adjust the amount of the hangyong tax on the trade in 
accordance with anticipated risk, during this or indeed in any earlier period. 
The joint memorial sent to the Emperor on 29 April 1839 demonstrates that tax 
payment punctuality was no longer the rule as of 1839, and that it had not been for 
many years.  An 1819 hong merchant commitment to advance 600,000 taels 
($833,333) to pay for Yellow River works had been repeatedly deferred.  As the hong 
merchants were unable to pay the pledge when it was made in 1819, the funds were 
drawn from the provincial treasury, subject to repayment by the hong merchants.  
Despite successive deadline extensions, all duly reported, some 136,151 taels 
($189,098) of the original 1819 pledge remained to be repaid twenty years later in 
1839.66  The hong merchants made a further 600,000 tael ($833,333) pledge to support 
the war in Kashgar in 1826.  Payment of that now thirteen year old promise had 
been deferred until after the 1819 Yellow River works obligation was paid in full.67  
That entire amount remained due in 1839.  In 1835 the hong merchants were 
assessed 60,000 taels ($83,333) for reconstruction of the Bocca Tigris forts, of which 
sum 39,162 taels ($54,392) had not yet been paid.68  They had also been ordered to 
pay 316,613 taels ($439,740) in tax and other obligations due to the government from 
the Maosheng (Chingqua) and Wanyuan (Fatqua II) hongs, which had failed in 1831 
and 1835 respectively, on account of which nothing had been paid.69  As of 1839, the 
hong merchants had recently been ordered to pay tribute and ginseng assessments 
due to the Court for the years 1836-9, and other debts, totaling another 534,978 taels 
($743,025), but had failed to pay the full sum, leaving 372,357 taels ($517,162) still 
due.70  The memorial details arrearages due from individual hong merchants, item 
by item.  “We pray your Majesty to set them the limit of one year.  If after the time 
limit they fail to pay up, they should all be sent to the district prison, as a 
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warning.”71  The hong merchant Kinqua II was singled out for immediate 
punishment. 
“His failure to pay in spite of numerous pressings shows that he 
purposely plays with the matter.  It is inconvenient to protract our leniency.  
We therefore pray for Imperial sanction to put Liang Chen-hsi of Tienpao 
Hong into the prison of Nanhai Hsien, and to allow him one more year for 
the payment of all that he owes to the Government.  In case of failure after 
the time limit is up, he should be exiled and whatever debts remaining to be 
paid should be assigned to the other merchants of the Co-Hong on the pro-
rata basis.”72 
The other hong merchants, however, needed more time to pay.  The memorial 
states plainly that the time for payment of all of the listed debts -- save the deferred 
Kashgar war pledge of 1826 -- “has arrived.  However, if we collect the debts 
together with the current revenue, it would be too heavy a burden for the 
merchants.”  The officials accordingly requested further extensions and deferrals.73  
Professor Chiang Ting-fu, who located and published this memorial in 1932, rightly 
observes that “the mere fact that such enormous debts existed and tended to 
increase was a sure sign that some disease was eating away the vitals of the Co-
Hong not long before the Treaty of Nanking officially pronounced its demise.”74 
The first to fall in the final act of the Canton System drama was the Dongsheng 
hong of the Chunquas.  This was a venerable firm by hong licensing standards.  It 
had been founded in about 1787 by Chunqua I (Liu Dezhang) and was first licensed 
in 1794.75  The founder had engaged in sharp practices and exploited his Beijing 
connections, which may explain why his firm lasted so long.  When Chunqua I died 
in December 1824, management passed to Chunqua II (Liu Chengshu) who traded 
for three seasons, sold his interest to Inqua (a tea merchant) for 100,000 taels 
($138,888), and left Canton.  The firm became a three member partnership, with Liu 
Dung (Chunqua III), younger brother of Chunqua II), as its official head.  Outside 
partner Inqua soon found that he had been defrauded.  Assets had been exaggerated 
and large debts had been kept secret from him.  In the summer of 1829 the hong's 
insolvency became public.  Unable to pay its tea merchant suppliers, the firm 
surrendered title deeds to some of its property to them.  Foreign creditor alarm 
about the insolvency of this important hong, and efforts to have Chunqua II brought 
back to Canton (rumor had it that he had made off with $600,000), form the 
backdrop to the five month EIC trade embargo of 1829-30.  Debt proceedings were 
commenced and the Dongsheng hong was officially declared insolvent on 19 
August 1830.  Its debts were found to be slightly under 648,000 taels ($900,000), 
which was reduced to 418,000 taels ($579,193) through the liquidation of its 
remaining assets.  The hong merchant body was directed to pay this sum in three 
annual installments, without interest, and also to pay $41,226 in customs duties due 
to the government.  Chunqua III was imprisoned and beaten.  He hanged himself in 
jail in 1831.  In 1830 Chunqua II briefly returned to Canton, without any funds, and 
was gone again by the summer. 76  He thereafter remained at large, seeming to have 
achieved -- at the dear expense of Inqua -- as close to a secure retirement from the 
trade as had been achieved in many years. 
The Wanyuan hong of the Fatquas, a chronically weak firm run by the son of its 
founder, failed in 1835.  Licensed in 1808 by Fatqua I (Li Xiefa), the hong had long 
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been in financial difficulty and is known to have borrowed money at very high 
interest rates.  Fatqua I was assisted at times by loans from Mowqua II, a relative, 
and the British EIC.  When the father died on 25 April 1822, Fatqua II (Li Yinggui) 
succeeded as head of the hong, but he found himself saddled both with unpaid 
customs duties and large fees the Hoppo charged for a successor license.  
Withdrawal of the EIC in 1834 posed a mortal challenge, as the hong had limited 
itself to EIC trade since about 1817.  Foreign creditors had nothing to complain 
about in its failure, as the Wanyuan hong had no foreign debt.  Its failure was a 
matter of great woe to the hong merchants, as the firm owed about 300,000 taels 
($416,667) in unpaid customs duties.  This arrearage was ordered to be assumed by 
the hong merchants and paid in two years, but, as of 1839, it had not been fully paid.  
There is no record of punishment of Fatqua II, if any.77 
The crisis of confidence of 1836 brought on the most famous hong failure, the 
Xingtai (Hingtae) hong of Yan Qiqang and Yan Qixiang.  The brothers had 
aggressively built up their business in the six year span of its existence, and were 
deeply involved in importations and other ventures with Jardine, Matheson & Co.  
Jardines was the hong's largest creditor, owed about $2 million.78  Yan Qiqang said 
that his fall was the result of over-trading, market miscalculations, and excessive 
draw for family expenses, but the more true causes were undercapitalization of the 
firm and excessive payments taken by the Canton officials.  The firm had 
overinvested in cotton supplied by Jardines, on which it was said to be losing 
$500,000 annually.79  In the wake of the Xingtai failure, William Jardine reassured 
Hollingsworth Magniac in London as to the stability of their own firm by pointing 
out that the Consoo Fund was legally bound to pay the Xingtai debt.  Michael 
Greenberg, the author of an invaluable study of early nineteenth century British 
trade with China, calls Jardine's appeal “to the despised laws of China  .  .  .  an 
ironic instance of the devil having a use for the Scriptures.”80 
Unable to extend or to refinance its enormous debt, the Xingtai hong stopped 
payment at the end of 1836.  Debt proceedings were commenced by foreign 
creditors on 21 April 1837.81  Governor-General Deng Tingzhen appointed a 
committee of three senior hong merchants and three foreigners, who met at the 
Consoo House, to examine and then administer the payment of claims against the 
insolvent hong.  This procedure was revolutionary in at least two respects.  For the 
first time, foreigners became involved together with Chinese in the evaluation of 
claims against a hong debtor.  Second, also for the first time, the Cohong's account 
books were opened for review and inspection by foreign creditors.82 
Of a total of $2,738,768 in submitted claims, the committee recommended their 
allowance in the reduced amount of $2,470,332 (90%) as claims against the debtor.  
Hard negotiations then ensued concerning payment, which took much of the year 
(amid worldwide depression, the Panic of 1837).  The hong merchants initially 
proposed a twenty year repayment period, but the time allowed was gradually 
brought down to eight (effectively nine) years.83  The committee was granted control 
of the assets of the Xingtai hong on 30 November 1837,84 and on 3 December 1837 
the hong merchant body was formally ordered to pay foreign debt in the assessed 
amount of 1,656,000 taels ($2,261,439) in eight annual installments without interest.85  
The joint Chinese-foreign committee for the administration of the Xingtai claims 
finally closed its account book in 1844, when the debts had been fully paid.86 
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During the 1837 proceedings before the Governor-General on the Xingtai debts, 
creditors demanded that their claims against the Tianbao hong of Kinqua  (Kingqua) 
(Liang Chengxi) should be included.  Founded in 1808 and able to support a large 
extended clan at its peak, the Tianbao hong had long since fallen on hard times and 
had become involved in high interest rate borrowing that worsened its problems.87  
In 1831, a British observer stated that “Kinqua has dipped deep into barter with 
Americans, parsees, and free-traders generally.  He has been on the verge of ruin for 
years, and is only saved by the good management of an honest, intelligent, 
shopkeeper, whom he has taken into partnership.88  The withdrawal of the EIC, the 
firm’s lack of capital, and the credit crisis of 1836-7 left the Tianbao hong struggling 
to pay its debts, which were estimated at 720,000 taels ($1,000,000).  As the hong was 
still able to do business, it was permitted to continue trading, but the hong merchant 
body was ordered to assist the Tianbao hong by paying its $1 million in old foreign 
debt over ten years, with six percent (6%) interest (an unprecedented concession).89 
Foreign creditors also pressed Governor-General Deng Tingzhen for similar 
treatment of their overdue claims against the Guangli hong of Mowqua III (Lu 
Jiguang).  Known as the most opulent of the hongs during the time of Mowqua I (Lu 
Guanheng) (1792-1812), the firm had been ruined in the following twenty years.  
Excessive debt and spending had been the subject of struggle within the Lu family.90  
A British observer stated in 1831 that “Mowqua [II], the hong merchant, is a 
debauchee.  His brother, who conducts the business of the hong, is a respectable 
man; but his credit has not been good for some time past, and he is only kept up by 
Howqua's assistance.”91  Mowqua II was imprisoned for debt in December 1835, and 
died soon after his release early in 1837, as the result of judicial beatings and 
mistreatment in prison.  He owed more than $600,000 to foreign creditors, and a 
larger amount to domestic creditors.  Investigation showed that the assets of the 
Guangli hong exceeded its debts.  The Canton officials arranged for the continuation 
of the hong under Mowqua III, a son or third brother.92  While these debts remained 
unpaid in 1837, the officials were wary of the consequences of directing the hong 
merchants to pay the debts of another firm that was still able to transact business.  
Foreign creditor attempts to force the hong merchants to pay the accumulated debts 
of the Guangli hong were accordingly rebuffed. 
Only a small part of the amounts due on account of the Xingtai and Kinqua 
(Kingqua) debts had been paid as of the outbreak of the Opium War.  In accordance 
with the British Treaty of Nanking, $3 million in hong merchant debt repayment 
was delivered to the British consul at Canton on 23 July 1843.  Of this sum, 
$1,266,102 was applied to Xingtai (Hingtae) debts, $922,432 went to Kinqua 
(Kingqua) debts, and $354,692 went to debts of the Guangli hong (Mowqua III).93  It 
had taken a war for British private traders to get the foreign debts of the failed hong 
merchants paid in full. 
The thirteen year period following its adoption as a model by the State of New 
York were the last years of the Canton Guaranty System.  At the end of this final act, 
it was terminated, abolished together with the Canton System by the Treaty of 
Nanking in 1842.  Ironically, in New York, the legislature observed the thirteen year 
anniversary of the Safety Fund – also battered by the worldwide depression of 1837 
-- by amending the statute to limit liabilities of the fund. 
  






Figure 10. “The Broken Hong Merchant or the Empty Tea Chest.” 
British print satirizing the professed financial plight of His Royal Highness the 
Duke of Sussex by reference to the financial condition of the hong merchants of 
Canton.  A. Ducôté lithographer, published by T. M. McLean, London 18 
November 1838.  (Private collection.  Photograph by permission.) 
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In its final scene, at Canton, the Consoo Fund stood silent.  A series of massive 
debts were ordered paid out of the fund in the mid-1830s, but it did not have assets 
to pay any material part of these claims, nor hangyong tax revenue adequate to pay 
them for years to come.  The fund had never had any independent existence, nor a 
disinterested defender, nor had any effort ever been made to anticipate, adjust 
premiums for, or to maintain reserves sufficient to pay claims.  When the 
predictable storm hit, the fund failed.  The imprudent activities that led to these 
claims were probably obvious to the other hong merchants who did business at 
Canton.  The severe risks arising from this trading almost certainly would have been 
revealed had any independent scrutiny been carried out for the benefit of the 
Consoo Fund.  Nothing was unforeseeable about the calamity, even if the timing of 
the final crisis was perhaps accelerated by financial difficulties worldwide in the 
period 1834 through 1837 and thereafter. 
The hong merchant guild, as guarantors, were unwilling to commit to pay the 
collective liability for these huge losses except over many years, and there was 
doubt whether the hong merchants could meet even a negotiated payment schedule.  
War followed, and these liabilities presently became a demand obligation of the 
Chinese government as some private British creditors had demanded.  Although 
China tendered the payment in July 1843, the final burden of a large part of these 
charges fell on the last few apparently successful hongs.  They presumably raised 
the necessary funds by asset liquidations on a massive scale at a time of financial 
distress.  It may not be pure coincidence that Howqua II (Wu Bingjian) died on 4 
September 1843, just six weeks after the $3 million was delivered to the British.94  In 
the last scene of the tragedy, not even “too big to fail” entities were spared from 
loss.
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contributed $1,000,000; Footae, $90,000; Mowqua, $60,000; Pwankhequa, $130,000; 
Kinqua, $70,000; Samqua and Gouqua, $100,000 each; Punhoyqua, $70,000; 
Mingqua, $20,000; Saoqua about $20,000.  The balance it is supposed came out of the 
Consoo fund. -- Chin. Rep., Aug. 1843.”) 
94  Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 877. 
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CHAPTER 8:  
FROM SAFETY FUND TO BANK DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
The Safety Fund statute of the State of New York, the first bank deposit insurance 
law ever enacted,1 was conceived and drafted late in the year 1828 by Joshua 
Forman.  He initially circulated the proposal to several leading bankers in New York 
City and Albany, and seemingly received their approval in principle before he 
presented the plan to Martin Van Buren,2 newly elected as Governor in November.  
The unlimited guaranty program he proposed had no precedent.  As David A. Moss 
explains, “Forman recommended a radical plan for mandatory bank liability 
insurance, the first of its kind in America and probably the world.  .  .  .  Forman’s 
scheme was extraordinary because it aimed to manage money risk through an 
unprecedented combination of compulsory risk spreading (bank insurance) and risk 
reduction (ongoing bank supervision), a surprisingly modern approach for the 
1820’s.”3 
As Joshua Forman explained, the Safety Fund had been inspired by Chinese 
government regulation of the hong merchant monopoly of Canton. 
“The propriety of making the banks liable for each other was suggested 
by the regulation of the Hong merchants in Canton, where a number of men, 
each acting separately, have by the grant of the government the exclusive 
right of trading with foreigners, and are all made liable for the debts of each 
in case of failure.  The case of our banks is very similar; they enjoy in 
common the exclusive right of making a paper currency for the people of the 
state, and by the same rule should in common be answerable for that paper.  
This abstractly just principle, which has stood the test of experience for 
seventy years, and under which the bond of a Hong merchant has acquired a 
credit over the whole world, not exceeded by that of any other security, 
modified and adapted to the milder features of our republican institutions, 
constitutes the basis of the system.”4 
In the foregoing passage, Joshua Forman does not simply look to Canton as the 
source of the idea of a guaranty fund.  The business community of the State of New 
York was already familiar with the concept of guaranty or insurance in various 
forms.  The collective guaranty enforced among the hong merchants of Canton was 
a prominent example.  Forman instead directly linked the requirement that such a 
fund must be maintained to the enjoyment of rights or privileges granted by 
government.  At Canton, the hong merchants were licensed by the Chinese 
government and were granted monopoly rights.  As a condition of this exercise of 
sovereignty in their favor, the hong merchants were required to guarantee the debts 
of other merchants within the monopoly.  The case of the New York banks, in 
Forman’s view, was “very similar.”  The banks existed by virtue of a charter granted 
by the New York legislature, and had been granted “in common the exclusive right 
of making a paper currency for the people of the state,” itself an exercise of the 
sovereign power of issuing money.  It was just that this exercise of sovereignty in 
favor of the banks should be conditioned on the maintenance of a fund to assure 
that all of this currency was sound.  In Forman’s words, “by the same rule [the 
banks] should in common be answerable for that paper.”  This connection between 
monopoly privileges granted by government and the conditioning of such grants on 
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advantages to the state or to society has roots in the mercantilistic system of colonial 
America.5  Since all banks profited from the use by the public of banknotes they 
issued pursuant to governmental authority, the banks should guarantee that the 
public would suffer no loss from the use of these notes.6  
The preceding four chapters reviewed the experience of unlimited collective 
responsibly for debt among the hong merchants of China during the years 1780 to 
1842.  This chapter considers the experience of this transplant in the United States of 
America, taking the idea from its introduction in 1829 through to the 1933 adoption 
of national bank deposit insurance.  The reception by a society that was already 
recognized as strongly individualistic of a Chinese practice that imposed liability on 
a collective basis is itself notable.7  The history begins with Joshua Forman, 
proponent of the Safety Fund, the person who recognized and transplanted the 
Chinese idea in 1829.  The New York State legislature enacted a bank guaranty fund 
law that year, but it did not adopt the Canton Guaranty System.  While the Chinese 
example was understood to have been a success, it was nonetheless “modified and 
adapted to the milder features of our republican institutions.”  The New York Safety 
Fund was thus established as a separate institution, unlike the example at Canton.  It 
had distinct employees and officers and maintained its own accounts.  New York 
also provided for ongoing scrutiny of the insured banks by the commissioners of the 
fund, another important difference.  The Safety Fund offered unlimited coverage, as 
did the Chinese model, but did not mandate participation by all of the New York 
banks.  It ended up paying all of the claims that were made against the fund, but 
needed considerable time to pay these claims, as had typically happened at Canton.  
Although the Safety Fund failed, the idea of a guaranty fund remained attractive, 
and a series of states enacted their own bank guaranty statutes in the course of the 
following century.  Each offered unlimited coverage, each tended to require all 
banks to participate, and each failed in its turn.  Proponents began to press for the 
adoption of national bank deposit insurance, especially in the wake of the Panic of 
1907, to be structured so as to avoid the problems experienced by the state guaranty 
funds.  It was believed that the idea required only certain further modifications and 
national implementation to make it entirely successful.  After years of effort, 
national deposit insurance found its moment in the banking crisis of 1933 and was 
enacted into law.  Deposit insurance has remained in effect in the United States since 
then, and has inspired bank deposit insurance in many other countries, a 
complicated history that is outlined in the following Chapter Nine.  
8A. Joshua Forman. 
Energetic and curious, Joshua Forman (1777-1848) is a solid example of the type of 
entrepreneur who pursued land development in the United States in the early 1800s.  
Tall, friendly and well-connected, a skilled orator and a conversationalist, Forman 
was an effective proponent both of projects to improve the State of New York and of 
his own development efforts.  He impressed others with the depth of his applied 
knowledge, and repeatedly reached out to gather information from far away.  This 
willingness to gather helpful information from disparate and distant sources is 
evident in Forman's interests in canals, salt production and banking.8 
Born in Dutchess County in 1777, Joshua Forman graduated from Union College 
in 1798, studied law in Poughkeepsie and New York City, and moved with his wife 
in 1800 to Onondaga County, then almost a wilderness.  In the course of his life he  
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Figure 11. Joshua Forman, 1777-1848. 
Oil portrait.  (Collection of the Onondaga Historical Association Museum and 
Research Center, Syracuse, New York.  Photograph by permission.) 
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wore many hats -- variously lawyer, judge (Court of Common Pleas of Onondaga 
County from 1813 to 1823), member of the New York Assembly (elected in 1806 for 
one term), and a merchant -- but his core occupation was always in real estate 
development.  In 1808, as a newly elected member of the New York Assembly, 
Forman introduced and carried a resolution to develop a canal between the 
tidewaters of the Hudson River and Lake Erie.  In framing the proposal and 
pressing for construction of the Erie Canal, Forman drew on direct knowledge of the 
region and his research into canal development in Europe.  Although he is not 
known to have worked directly in banking, Forman's real estate and trade 
experiences seem to have contributed to a practical understanding of the need for 
sound currency in areas in the process of development.9 
In 1819 Forman moved to the site of the City of Syracuse, of which he is 
recognized as a founder, and began to develop some 250 acres at the heart of the 
present city which he then controlled.  Forman was active in commerce, but always 
in ways that supported or benefited from his development efforts.  He variously 
owned a tavern, an inn, and grist mills, and organized a plaster company and 
saltworks to utilize gypsum deposits and salt resources near Syracuse.  Forman was 
a pioneer in the production of salt by solar evaporation in America, and sought out 
and engaged technical assistance from New Bedford, Massachusetts.10 
Shortly before he advanced the proposal for Safety Fund legislation, in about 
1826, Forman suffered serious reverses in his real estate investments.  These stresses, 
in the context of the international economic crisis of the years 1825-26, seem to have 
focused his active mind on issues of banking stability and credit.  Forman was 
under so much strain that he applied for a public job for the income he needed to 
pay his bills and stay in Syracuse, but was turned down.  The disappointed, 
perchance embittered, founder of Syracuse moved of necessity to New Brunswick, 
New Jersey where he had an interest in a copper mine.  The banking crisis thus 
deepened in the State of New York while Joshua Forman was in the State of New 
Jersey trying to rebuild his fortune.  The guidance he provided on banking reform 
came on visits from New Jersey to New York, with Forman said to have spent most 
of the Winter of 1828-29 in Albany at the request of Governor Van Buren, working 
with legislators and others on plan issues.  Forman's wife Margaret died in New 
Jersey in 1828.  His fortunes had recovered sufficiently by the Safety Fund year of 
1829 that he was able to purchase about 300,000 acres of land in Rutherfordston, 
North Carolina to which he moved.  Forman supported himself developing and 
selling that tract, remarried, and became a leading member of his new community, 
among other things serving as vice president of the temperance society.  Joshua 
Forman suffered a stroke in about 1844 and died in North Carolina in 1848.11 
While the origin of Forman's specific knowledge of regulatory practice at 
Canton, China is unknown, New York State was then the center of American 
knowledge about commercial practices at Canton.  As of the late 1820s, the port of 
New York had established a position of clear dominance over the trade from the 
United States, with large numbers of voyages coming and going from China.  
Hundreds of New Yorkers invested in these voyages, and many New York firms 
were leaders in the trade.  One well known example is the merchant John Jacob 
Astor.12  It is possible that the very scale and complexity of the early China trade 
from New York has thwarted scholarship.  In his 1997 study of American trade with 
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China, Jacques Downs observed that “New York City, oddly enough, needs more 
exploring.”13  In 1829, Joshua Forman treated hong merchant practices as common 
knowledge.  He states that “the bond of a Hong merchant has acquired a credit over 
the whole world, not exceeded by that of any other security.”  (Emphasis added.)  
There was no need to identify sources, because his audience already understood the 
topic.  The commercial context suggests that this is true, and the litigation 
experience of the hong merchant Conseequa in American courts, including courts in 
the State of New York (see pages 141-146, above),14 conforms broad knowledge of 
hong merchant practices.  A review of articles in the Albany Argus newspaper in the 
early months of 1829, as it covered the debate on the Safety Fund legislation, 
conforms with this reading.  No mention appears in this coverage of the hong 
merchants or of the Chinese inspiration for the reform proposal.  Forman’s portrayal 
of the condition of the hong merchants seems to have been accepted by his audience 
as entirely correct.  The Safety Fund was intensely debated by the public and by the 
New York legislature, on its merits, but no reference is known to have been made in 
that debate to the Chinese experience that inspired the proposal. 
8B. The Banking Crisis in the State of New York. 
The banking crisis experienced in the State of New York in the years leading up to 
1829 had its roots in a currency shortage.  There was simply not enough coined 
United States currency to meet demand.  Americans of the era relied on a 
hodgepodge of foreign coins which were accepted as legal tender.  Nor was there 
enough silver coin to meet the demands of commerce.  Paper banknotes made due.  
Printed in large numbers, banknotes represented the bulk of the money supply in 
the early United States.  Banknotes are estimated to have constituted between 
seventy and eighty percent of circulating currency in the 1820s and 1830s.  Hard 
coin may have represented as little as eleven percent of the money supply by 1835.15 
This flood of banknotes was entirely generated by private banks.  There was no 
paper United States currency, and the United States Constitution prohibited the 
states from producing money.16  The depreciated state and federal paper of the 
revolutionary era -- still remembered in the expression “not worth a Continental” -- 
had left a bitter aftertaste.  Paper currency was produced by banks, which were 
individually chartered in various states.  Colonial era reservations about the 
chartering of banking corporations had been overcome,17 and the number of private 
banks had increased rapidly.  There were three chartered commercial banks in 1790.  
That number was up to 28 as of 1800, had climbed to 212 by 1815, stood at 328 in 
1820, and had reached a total of 584 chartered commercial banks in the United States 
as of 1835 -- “and that despite a war, an embargo, and a deep recession in the late 
1810s and early 1820s.”18 
“Bank currency,” as Howard Bodenhorn explains, “was the lifeblood of 
commerce in early America and nowhere was its animating influence more 
profound than in areas of recent settlement.”19  Paper currency served economic 
development in at least two ways.  First, it facilitated investment, in all forms and 
places.  Second, off in the countryside, it fostered commerce by minimizing the 
inefficiencies and constraints of barter transactions.20  This lifeblood -- paper 
currency -- was badly needed, and it was generally accepted.  While there was 
wariness about paper of distant or questionable origin, which was discounted 
accordingly, the rapid growth of the medium stands as evidence of popular 
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confidence in the issuing private banks.  Americans can be trusting people.  The 
promise to pay embodied in all early banknotes was supported by the handwritten 
ink signatures of two bank officers.21  There was an expectation that specie or other 
good collateral sat in the vaults to back up the paper notes, and that the promises to 
pay of most bankers -- typically leading citizens -- were good and reliable. 
The year 1809 saw the first failure of a private bank in the independent United 
States, together with the first string of bank failures.  This debacle, vividly described 
by Jane Kamensky in The Exchange Artist, was set in motion in Boston, 
Massachusetts in 1806.  An ambitious young man, Andrew Dexter, Jr., used 
connections and financial legerdemain to build up a network of interconnected 
banks, in places such as Pittsfield (Massachusetts), Gloucester (Rhode Island), Keene 
(New Hampshire), Bucksport (Maine) and Detroit (in the pre-statehood Michigan 
Territory).   Dexter's banks were invariably sited in inconvenient or distant locales, 
as part of a calculated effort to retard the redemption of their paper for silver.22  The 
coterie of Dexter banks issued and circulated among themselves a vast number of 
banknotes with minimal backing throughout 1807 and 1808.23  The first to fail, the 
Farmers' Exchange Bank of Gloucester, Rhode Island, had issued over $600,000 in 
banknotes in the prior year but held only $86.48 in specie on its closing in 1809.24  
Dexter used much of the paper his banks produced to construct a seven-story 
building in Boston, Massachusetts, the Exchange Coffee House.  Unfortunately, the 
Embargo imposed by President Jefferson in December 1807 stalled the coastal 
economy into early 1809 and Boston real estate was blighted.  The project failed and 
large numbers of common workers and merchants ended up ruined, the 
embarrassed final holders of bad paper generated by the Dexter banks.25  This 
complex and costly banking fraud became national news when it was exposed in 
1809.26  As Jane Kamensky relates, the wave of failures of Dexter banks in 1809 gave 
rise to “an acute loss of confidence not just in banknotes, but in confidence itself.”27 
As private banks grew in number, the use of the paper currency they printed 
became ever more complicated.  Even on the best of days, every user had to cope 
with a web of uncertainties and discounts relating to the financial condition, 
distance from source, and even forgery of the various banknotes issued by many 
bank suppliers.28  Not every day was the best.  Private banknotes were supposed be 
redeemable in coin, but redemption could be, and was, suspended during periods of 
crisis,29 or might be frustrated by fraud of the Dexter type.  On the worst of days, 
one or more issuing banks failed.  Bank failure meant currency failure.  As bank 
failures often occurred in the context of a panic or an economic downturn, the 
timing of the loss of use of paper money tended to be horrific.  Good tender and 
acceptable one day, the paper of a failed bank became useless the moment that bank 
stopped payment of its obligations.  This risk was profoundly frightening.  The 
chance that a now useless banknote might be partially paid, years later, from the 
proceeds of liquidation of assets of a failed issuing bank provided little solace to the 
public. 
The State of New York had been experiencing banking strain for over a decade 
when Martin Van Buren was sworn into office as Governor on 1 January 1829.  
Several banks had failed during the Panic of 1819, which affected the availability of 
all forms of currency, specie and banknotes.30  Conditions remained difficult 
through the turbulent 1820s, which brought more bank failures.  Corruption became 
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an urgent public concern, as the state directly (and individual legislators covertly) 
were believed to have been using the licensing of financial institutions as an 
opportunity to exact fees that affected their supervisory judgment.31  As David A. 
Moss relates, “[t]he sensational ‘conspiracy trials’ of 1826 (in which several well 
known and highly regarded New York City residents were tried for financial fraud), 
along with a new round of bank and insurance company failures in 1827, reignited 
public hostility against the ‘moneyed institutions’ and set the stage for major new 
reforms of New York’s banking system.”32  Alarmed about the condition of the 
banks, the legislature denied all applications for new or renewed bank charters in 
1827 and again in 1828.  As of 1829, the charters of the majority of the state's banks 
were up for renewal within the next two or three years, and there was deep concern 
that some banks were in an unsafe and unsound condition.33  The public was 
anxious about the currency they issued.34  Banking matters were a prime concern of 
the legislature and reform became a top priority of the new Governor. 
8C. The 1829 New York Safety Fund Statute. 
The Safety Fund proposal would seem to have been presented to Martin Van Buren 
by Joshua Forman in December of 1828.  On Tuesday, 6 January 1829, five days after 
being sworn in as Governor, Van Buren delivered a message on the banking crisis to 
the New York Senate and Assembly.  He had received a reform plan, which would 
soon be submitted to them for consideration.  In the view of the Governor, currency 
stability was vitally important. 
“we should keep constantly in view the important consideration, that the 
solvency of the banks, and the consequent stability of their paper, is the 
principal and almost the only point, in which the public has much interest.  .  
.  .  Our chief duty in this respect, is, to see that the farmer, when he 
exchanges his produce or estate -- the mechanic his wares -- the merchant his 
goods -- and all other classes of the community their property or services for 
bank paper, -- may rest contented as to its value.” 
“The idea” upon which the reform plan was based, the Governor stated, while 
novel, “is not entirely new to the commercial world, although it has not heretofore 
been applied in this form.”  The Governor believed that the currency of the New 
York banks (“our paper”) would derive a competitive advantage from the proposed 
reform.  New York banknotes would achieve new power at home and in the nation -
- “the consequent high character and correspondent circulation it would give to our 
paper -- the expulsion from circulation of the doubtful paper which now engrosses 
it, and the substitution in its place of that issued by banks in full credit.”35  The 1829 
“Safety Plan” program to strengthen the New York banks and their currency was 
thus strategic, implemented as part of an ongoing contest for economic primacy 
between the adjacent states of New York and Pennsylvania.36  The stronger New 
York could make its banks and currency, the stronger the state's development 
prospects and future were apt to be. 
On 24 January 1829, Joshua Forman presented the Governor with a letter, his 
reform plan, and a detailed list of objections and answers.  The package was 
provided to the legislature two days later, with a message of support from the 
Governor.  In this final formal presentation, which was printed in the newspapers 
and reprinted as a forty-two page pamphlet,37 the competitive advantages of the 
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proposed system for the state were emphasized.  According to Forman, the Safety 
Fund, if enacted, “would at once give to our state as high a credit and respectability 
in her monied concerns, as she stands pre-eminent in commercial rank among the 
states of the Union.”38 
Despite the prior outreach to bankers that had been made by Joshua Forman and 
Martin Van Buren, legislation calling for a tax on and ongoing supervision of the 
state's banks proved highly controversial.  The city banks, in particular, objected 
that the tax would fall too heavily on them and that such problems as existed largely 
concerned the smaller country banks.  An anonymous pamphlet, which came out 
after the Act had become law, doubted that adequate supervision could be 
accomplished and challenged the justice of holding only banking corporations 
responsible for each others' debts. 
“The author of this novel system, Mr. J. Forman, has told us, in his expose 
to the governor, that “the propriety of making the banks liable for each other, 
was suggested to him by the regulation of the Hong merchants of Canton, 
where a number of men, each acting separately, have, by the grant of 
government, the exclusive right of trading with foreigners, and are all made 
liable for the debt of each, in case of failure.”  Now, upon this principle, all 
the other corporations of this state ought to be made liable for the debts of 
each other in case of failure, as well as the banks.  The fire and marine 
insurance companies; the turnpike, rail road, and canal companies, and 
particularly the manufacturing companies.  They all enjoy exclusive 
privileges, as well as the Hong merchants or the New-York banks; and it 
would be just as reasonable to pass an act, compelling each of these 
corporations, transacting a like business, to pay an annual per centage on 
their capital, as a fund to indemnify their creditors from loss, in the event of 
their failure, as it is to compel the banks to do it.  Would such a proposition 
be sustained by the legislature?  We think not.”39 
After much debate, key concessions, and political wrangling, all within the short 
time period of six weeks, the Safety Fund Act was passed by the New York 
Assembly with a large margin on 18 March 1829, and by the New York Senate two 
weeks later.  As with the adoption of deposit insurance at the federal level a century 
later, bank reform legislation that imposed liability on a collective basis enjoyed 
strong popular support and moved rapidly.  As Martin Van Buren had in the 
meantime resigned as Governor to become Secretary of State under President 
Andrew Jackson, the Safety Fund bill was signed into law by the state's new 
Governor, Enos T. Throop, on 2 April 1829.40 
Under the enacted statute, the Safety Fund was funded through the contribution 
by each participating bank of a total of three percent of its paid-in capital.  Payments 
were to be made in six annual installments of one-half of one percent.  If the fund 
was depleted, banks were made subject to emergency assessments not to exceed 
one-half of one percent of paid-in capital per year, until the fund was replenished.  
All newly chartered banks, and all banks renewing old charters, were required to 
participate in the fund.  All creditors, banknote holders and depositors alike, were 
entitled to be paid in full from the fund to the extent the proceeds of liquidation of a 
failed bank proved inadequate.  Administration was placed in the hands of three 
commissioners who were charged with conducting a quarterly inspection and audit 
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of each bank, and given powers to seek court injunctions if any violation of statutory 
standards was detected.41  Its provisions for a common fund, for mandatory 
supervision, and even its name, were all new in American law.42 
Passage of the Safety Fund Act brought the former charter issuance backlog to an 
end, and the New York legislature eagerly licensed many new banks.  While 
criticism of the statute continued,43 the city banks, which had initially been reluctant, 
decided that they would -- or must -- participate.  The Safety Fund operated 
smoothly for about a decade, but experienced a profound shock with the Panic of 
1837.  Many of its member banks had made loans to western land speculators, and 
the three (3) commissioners who were supposed to supervise these ninety (90) banks 
had variously missed or failed to confront numerous problems.44  Regulatory 
forbearance was exposed in the Panic of 1837 to have created a class of “zombie 
banks.”  These banks had been allowed to trudge slowly along and to do business 
although they were deeply insolvent -- “avoid[ing] the finality of death through the 
black magic of blanket liability guarantees.”45  As Howard Bodenhorn relates: 
“As promising an idea as the Safety Fund was, it failed to bring any real 
stability to new York's banking system.  Its first (and only) test came during 
the panic of 1837 when the failure of just eleven members effectively 
bankrupted the system.  Reimbursements to creditors of failed banks 
exceeded $2.5 million, while the fund realized only about $150,000 on assets 
forfeited by those banks.  More importantly, creditor claims were disbursed 
so slowly that many frustrated creditors, mostly banknote holders, sold their 
claims at cents on the dollar.  Despite its promise, the Safety Fund failed to 
protect the payments system or bank creditors individually.”46 
When New York adopted free banking as an alternative in 1838 and permitted 
licensed free banks to leave the Safety Fund, many did.  Free banks were required to 
back their total issue of circulating banknotes with bonds and mortgages to an equal 
value on deposit with state officials.47  An amendment to the Safety Fund statute in 
1842 which restricted coverage to banknotes (it was claimed that there was 
uncertainty whether deposit liabilities were covered under the original banknote-
focused law)48 provided internal relief by reducing liabilities chargeable to the 
fund.49  The fund struggled on until its last member bank charters expired in 1866, 
and ultimately paid all of its liabilities, albeit after extended delay.50  Banking 
historian Howard Bodenhorn provides its epitaph: “Adverse selection and moral 
hazard ultimately undid the Safety Fund, but they were assisted by ineffectual 
supervision, ineffective to nonexistent portfolio restrictions, everything from 
marginally legal activities to outright fraud, and some politically motivated 
regulatory forbearance.  The mixture was combustible, and it led to the Safety 
Fund’s failure.”51 
8D. Early State Bank Guaranty Programs. 
The safety fund concept -- the idea that a guaranty fund could ease the pain of 
failure for noteholder or depositor members of the public -- has had a lasting 
influence in American banking thought.  The New York model was copied, with 
some revisions and adaptations, by other states in the nineteenth century and again 
by other states and then by the United States government in the twentieth century.  
Of the contemporary guaranty programs, several had periods of success, but all 
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ultimately failed.  In addition to the New York program (1829-1866), safety funds 
were employed in the states of Vermont (1831-1866), Indiana (1834-1866), Michigan 
(1836-1842), Ohio (1845-1866) and Iowa (1858-1865).52  The Vermont and Michigan 
statutes were fairly direct copies of the New York Safety Fund, with only minor 
changes having been made.53  The other statutes varied in details from but took their 
inspiration from the New York model.54  The primary objective of these early 
statutes was the protection of the value of banknotes issued by state-chartered 
banks.  This need was reduced by the rise of free banking, which provided another 
means of protecting banknotes.  The need was then effectively eliminated by the 
introduction of national banknotes during the Civil War.  Under the National 
Banking Act of 1863, federal banknotes were protected both by the deposit of United 
States government bonds to equal value with the U.S. Treasury and by an explicit 
federal government guarantee.  The imposition in 1865 of a heavy national tax on 
the banknotes of state banks brought the colorful and chaotic era of their use to a 
close.55  In the years that followed, deposits with American banks grew rapidly and 
soon far exceeded banknotes in their significance.  As of the year 1870, the amount 
of deposits stood at about twice, and by the end of the 1800s exceeded by seven 
times, the amount of banknotes in circulation.56 
The shock of the Panic of 1907, at the outset of the twentieth century, had a 
number of effects on American banking.57  At the national level, Congress 
responded in 1913 by establishing the Federal Reserve System.  The twelve Federal 
Reserve banks, operating under the supervision of the Federal Reserve Board in 
Washington, D.C., became the first American central bank since the demise of the 
Second Bank of the United States in the 1830s.58 
Interest in bank deposit insurance at the federal level was renewed in the wake 
of the Panic of 1907.  It repeatedly came before Congress in draft legislation that 
then stalled.  Starting in 1886, and continuing through adoption of the National 
Banking Act of 1933, some 150 bills were introduced in Congress to implement a 
national program of deposit insurance.59  As summarized by Carter Golembe: 
“During the first decade of the new century forty-five additional bills 
were introduced in Congress, most of them in the 60th Congress in 1907-9.  
Deposit insurance was included in the original Federal Reserve Act as passed 
by the Senate, but was omitted from the bill passed by the House and 
eliminated in the Conference report.  From two to eight proposals for deposit 
insurance or guaranty were submitted in each Congress from the 61st in 
1909-11 to the 71st in 1929-31.  In the 72nd Congress twenty-one separate bills 
were introduced, reflecting the impact of the depression, and one of these 
was passed by the House of Representatives in 1932.  In the first ten weeks of 
the 73rd Congress in 1933, fifteen more such bills were submitted.”60 
Among the states, the losses and dislocations of the Panic of 1907 impelled 
action.  Over the following ten years, eight states adopted deposit insurance 
programs which were generally compulsory for state-chartered banks.  The state 
programs were funded by assessments on bank deposits, and the interests of 
depositors were protected without a maximum coverage limit per depositor.61  
These programs built on the legacy of the nineteenth century safety fund laws, 
which also generally provided unlimited coverage.  In 1911, the United States 
Supreme Court rejected a Constitutional challenge to the first of the eight programs, 
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the Oklahoma statute of 17 December 1907 (enacted one month after the State of 
Oklahoma was admitted to the Union).  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for 
the Court, stated that “the device [of bank deposit insurance] is a familiar one.  It 
was adopted by some states the better part of a century ago, and seems never to 
have been questioned until now.”62  The early twentieth century state deposit 
insurance programs suffered large losses during the 1920s.  All had ended up 
insolvent or inoperative as of 1933, their failures being variously ascribed to the 
cyclical hazards of agricultural finance, excessive risk taking by bank lenders, or 
neglect by officials charged with supervising the insured banks.63 
8E. Implementation of National Deposit Insurance in the United States. 
The year 1933 found the United States in the midst of the Great Depression, gripped 
by a banking panic that reached its peak early in March.  Just four months earlier, on 
8 November 1932, Franklin Delano Roosevelt had been elected President by a 
landslide, carrying forty-two states as against the six that favored Herbert Hoover.  
His election was spurred by popular suffering and demands for reform in the wake 
of the stock market crash of October 1929.  Banking reform was urgently demanded.  
Some 4,000 banks had ceased operations by March 1933.  The number of closures 
soared to 9,000 by year end, resulting in depositor losses of about $1.3 billion.  
Notices that checks drawn on out of town banks could not be honored greeted 
inaugural guests on arrival at hotels in Washington, D.C.  As of 4 March 1933, 
Inauguration Day, every state in the Union had declared a bank holiday.64 
Urgent consideration of bank issues and banking reforms occupied the early 
days of the Franklin Roosevelt administration.  Two days after his inauguration, the 
President declared a national bank holiday, ordering the nations' banks closed as a 
first step to breaking the panic.  A series of reforms and measures to restore financial 
order were then brought through Congress, and some -- but not all -- of the 
shuttered banks were gradually permitted to reopen.  Among proposed reforms 
that were considered but rejected in these early hours was bank deposit insurance.  
The idea had many strong opponents including the President himself.  Yet on 16 
June 1933 Roosevelt directed the nationwide implementation of deposit insurance 
by signing the Banking Act of 1933, which he called “the second most important 
banking legislation enacted in the history of the country.”  Writing in 1960, Carter 
Golembe rightly called the Act “the only important piece of legislation during the 
New Deal’s famous ‘one hundred days’ which was neither requested nor supported 
by the new administration.”  In 2009, Charles Calomiris described deposit insurance 
as “the main surviving legacy of the banking legislation of the New Deal – a stark 
reminder of the power of crises to change the course of banking regulation.”65  Just 
as in New York State in 1829, public outrage over banking conditions had reached 
the point at which fundamental changes to the banking system had become 
politically possible.66 
While deposit insurance had popular support, the drive to see it made law came 
from members of the United States Congress.  By the 1930s, the introduction of 
deposit insurance legislation had become something of an annual tradition in 
Washington, D.C., much like watching the cherry trees blossom.  Momentum for 
deposit insurance built with the banking crisis.  In April of 1932, before the election, 
Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama -- a leading proponent -- is said to have 
told House Speaker John Nance Garner: “You know, this fellow Hoover is going to 
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wake up one day soon and come in here with a message recommending guarantee 
of bank deposits, and as sure as he does, he’ll be re-elected.”  Garner is said to have 
replied: “You’re right as rain, Henry, so get to work in a hurry.  Report out a deposit 
insurance bill and we’ll shove it through.”  The Steagall bill, H.R. 11362, was passed 
by the House of Representatives on 25 May 1932 but went no further.  Henry 
Steagall found himself unable to convince Senator Carter Glass to include deposit 
insurance in banking reform legislation then pending before the Senate.67  During 
the Presidential campaign of 1932, Franklin Roosevelt showed no enthusiasm for 
deposit insurance.  In correspondence, he called the guaranty plan “quite 
dangerous.”  “It would lead to laxity in bank management and carelessness on the 
part of both banker and depositor.   I believe that it would be an impossible drain on 
the Federal Treasury to make good any such guaranty.”68 
John Nance Garner was carried by the Democratic Party election victory from 
the position of Speaker of the House to Vice President of the United States.  Garner 
pushed for deposit insurance in conversations with Roosevelt before their 
inauguration, but got nowhere.  “It won't work, Jack,” the President-elect replied. 
“The weak banks will pull down the strong.”69  In office, Garner's first disagreement 
with Franklin Roosevelt was on this subject.  “You'll have to have it, Cap'n,” said 
Garner, “or get more clerks in the Postal Savings banks.  The people who have taken 
their money out of the banks are not going to put it back without some guarantee.”70  
Roosevelt remained firm in opposition. 
The President's aversion to deposit insurance was neither ideological nor the 
product of interest group pressure.  He was familiar with the policy debate and the 
arguments pro and con and doubted the proposed reform due to the high risk of 
loss indicated by a historical record of failure.71  Roosevelt had direct experience 
with the subject matter.  He had been employed from 1921 to 1928 as a Vice 
President with the Fidelity and Deposit Company of Maryland, the fourth largest 
surety bonding company in the nation.72  He had a working knowledge of guaranty 
risk which had been developed over his years of employment with the F&D (as he 
called the company).  That facility is evident in the President's response to a 
question posed at his first press conference on 8 March 1933, four days after he was 
sworn into office. 
“Q:   Can you tell us anything about guaranteeing of bank deposits? 
THE PRESIDENT:   I can tell you as to guaranteeing bank deposits my 
own view, and I think that of the old Administration.  The general 
underlying thought behind the use of the word “guarantee” with respect to 
bank deposits is that you guarantee bad banks as well as good banks.  The 
minute the Government starts to do that the Government runs into a 
probable loss.  I will give you an example.  Suppose there are three banks in 
town: one is 100 percent capable of working out, one 50 percent and another 
10 percent.  Now, if the Government assumes a 100 percent guarantee, it will 
lose 50 percent on one and 90 percent on the other.  If it takes on a 50 percent 
guarantee, it will lose nothing on the first and second, but will lose a lot on 
the 10 percent solvent bank.  Any form of general guarantee means a definite 
loss to the Government.  The objective in the plan we are working on can be 
best stated this way: There are undoubtedly some banks that are going to pay 
one hundred cents on the dollar.  We all know it is better to have that loss 
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taken than to jeopardize the credit of the United States Government or to put 
the United States Government further in debt.  Therefore, the one objective is 
going to be to keep the loss in the individual banks down to a minimum, 
endeavoring to get 100 percent on them.  We do not wish to make the United 
States Government liable for the mistakes and errors of individual banks, and 
put a premium on unsound banking in the future.  
Q:   That is off the record?  
THE PRESIDENT:   Yes.”73 
In the early months of 1933 an intense debate raged among supporters and 
opponents of bank deposit insurance.  Opponents included the President, his 
Treasury Secretary, the Federal Reserve, and the larger banks and banking 
organizations.74  Rome C. Stephenson, President of the American Bankers 
Association, said that the very mention of the topic could induce “every sign of 
incipient apoplexy” in a banker.  The bankers fought the proposal to the last ditch.75  
All of the arguments and historical evidence on the subject of deposit insurance, 
which had been accumulating since 1829, were advanced.  Leading proponents 
included Representative Henry Steagall of Alabama (a Democrat), who was 
associated with unit bankers, and Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg of Michigan (a 
Republican), also a champion of the small banks.  The proponents were buoyed, and 
ultimately carried the day, by mounting support from a populace outraged by the 
banking crisis and news headlines of disclosures of bank abuses revealed in 
investigatory hearings conducted by the U.S. Senate Committee on Banking and 
Currency.76  As Mark Flood concludes in his examination of the 1933 debate about 
deposit insurance, “[o]ne of the casualties of the [prevailing] anti-banker sentiment 
was the bankers’ battle against deposit insurance.”77 
Proponents of the proposed legislation emphasized the existence of coverage 
ceilings in the bill, as opposed to the unlimited guarantees which had contributed to 
the failure of the state systems.78  Proponents rejected the applicability of historical 
examples of guaranty fund failure,79 arguing that these had involved only narrow 
risk pools, such as excessive agricultural loan exposure.  They insisted that the 
proposed reform would comply with the fundamental principle of insurance that 
there must exist wide and general distribution and diversification.  Opponents, for 
their part, denied that the “deposit insurance” proposal was “insurance” at all. 
“Insurance involves an old and tried principle.  The essence of insurance 
is the payment by the insured of premiums in actuarial relation to the risk 
involved.  Under the terms of the permanent plan, however, the costs or 
premiums are not charged according to the risk.”80 
Missing from the proposed legislation was the principle of “selected risk,” i.e., 
that insured parties are differentiated by risk and charged different premia in 
accordance with their risk classification.  One opponent accordingly warned that an 
“inexcusable” scrambling of terminology was involved.  “Guarantee is where you 
make the good bank pay for the poor one.  Insurance is where you make those who 
get the benefit pay for it.”81  Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University, 
speaking to the Savings Bank Association of Massachusetts in September 1933 after 
the bill had become law, summarized this argument and drew it to a moral hazard 
conclusion. 
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“For it is to be remembered that the weak banks get the same insurance as 
the strong ones, and, unlike the situation in other kinds of insurance, the bad 
risk pays no more for its insurance than the good one.  This means 
competition among banks in slackness in the granting of loans.  The bank 
with the loose credit policy gets the business and the bank with the careful, 
cautious credit policy loses it.  The slack banker dances and the conservative 
banker pays the fiddler.  If the conservative banker protests, the slack one 
invites him to go to a warmer climate.  Soon all are dancing and the fiddler, if 
paid at all, must collect from the depositors or from the taxpayers.”82 
On 1 May 1933 Senator Glass introduced a new bill, proposing the creation of the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which came before the Senate for debate 
two weeks later.  Senator Vandenberg proposed an amendment to immediately 
insure deposits of up to $2,500, and the bill, thus amended, was passed with only six 
votes in opposition on 25 May 1933.  Legislation proposed by Representative 
Steagall had been passed by the House of Representatives on 23 May by a vote of 
262 to 19, and both bills now went to conference committee.  There they sat stalled 
in the face of Presidential opposition, notably to the prospect of a 100 percent 
guarantee.  At a cabinet meeting on 23 May 1933, Franklin Roosevelt said he would 
veto the entire banking bill if deposit insurance was not removed.  Such a veto 
would have come at a heavy political cost, for the bill had strong Congressional 
support, and Huey Long claimed that if the bill was vetoed there were enough votes 
to override.  Senator Glass told Roosevelt that, if insurance was not put into the 
administration bill, Congress would include it anyway.  Glass had now yielded to 
public opinion because “Washington does not remember any issue on which the 
sentiment of the country has been so undivided or so emphatically expressed as 
upon this.”   In correspondence dated in early June 1933, FDR stated that he was 
trying to make the draft bill “as sound as possible” and that he was “doing 
everything possible to correct it.”  Roosevelt had decided that the time had come to 
reach a deal.  On 12 June he agreed to accept a capped and delayed program, under 
which deposit insurance would not become operative until 1934.  The bill was 
reported out of the committee and on 13 June, after brief debate, both the House and 
the Senate voted to accept the conference report and approve the bill.  Three days 
later, on 16 June 1933, Franklin Roosevelt signed the Banking Act of 1933 into law.83 
The new law provided for the implementation of deposit insurance in two 
stages.  The first stage was a temporary program of six months only, effective 1 
January 1934, under which deposits were insured for up to $2,500 for any one 
depositor.  The second stage was a distinct permanent plan, slated to take effect by 1 
July 1934.  The temporary plan was then extended, and the permanent plan delayed, 
by the Banking Act of 16 June 1934.  The Banking Act of 1935 then revised the 
permanent plan, so that it resembled the temporary plan, and it became effective on 
23 August 1935 as so revised.84  As Mark Flood notes, 
“Under the temporary plan, coverage ceilings were conservative, the 
insurance corporation was emphatically segregated from the federal 
taxpayer, chartering standards for national banks were raised, and 
supervisory authority was broadly increased.  These characteristics were 
retained under the permanent plan of the Banking Act of 1935.  As such, 
deposit insurance, as construed in the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935, 
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succeeded in simultaneously protecting the small depositor and leaving the 
banker answerable to both supervisors and large depositors for the quality of 
his management.”85 
Under the extensions of the temporary plan, the insurance limit was raised to 
$5,000 per depositor, which had been found to provide full coverage to 98 percent of 
depositors.  The Banking Act of 1935 maintained this coverage limit.  Insured banks 
would now be charged a premium of one-twelfth of one percent of their deposits, 
payable twice annually, which was a sharp reduction from the one half percent 
charged under the temporary plan.  The 1935 Act expanded the supervisory powers 
of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and required all member 
banks of the Federal Reserve System to insure their deposits with the FDIC.  
Nonmember banks with deposits of under $1 million could obtain insurance with 
FDIC approval, but had to agree to submit to examination.86  While deposit 
insurance became mandatory in the United States for all federally-chartered banks 
and savings institutions, as is evidenced by the FDIC coverage sticker that is 
commonly seen at American banks, insurance coverage is not universal, as among 
certain state-chartered banks. 
Having given in and decided that he would support the deposit insurance plan, 
as modified, Franklin Roosevelt became its proud parent.  He congratulated Carter 
Glass for the success of the legislation but also took credit for himself (to the 
amusement or outrage of various observers).  Raymond Moley, a key adviser, wrote 
that “Roosevelt at first endured and then embraced it.  .  .  .  I am convinced that 
finally he made himself believe he had favored it from the beginning.”87   On one 
such occasion, Vice President Garner winked and commented, “I see Roosevelt is 
claiming credit for the guarantee of bank deposits.”88  The Republican party made a 
political point of this, insisting that the Republicans deserved credit for the popular 
reform, not FDR.  In 1936 the Republican National Committee issued a press release 
publicizing an October 1932 letter in which Franklin Roosevelt had sharply 
criticized deposit insurance, stating that for “a number of reasons of sound 
government finance, such a plan would be quite dangerous.”  According to an 
article in The New York Times, the Republican National Committee “declared that 
Federal deposit insurance was put through by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg, 
Republican, 'in the face of the strongest opposition from Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and from the banks almost as a unit.'“89  It is possible that the idea of deposit 
insurance had struck a chord with the President, despite his strong reservations 
about the notion of unlimited bank guaranty.  The idea came from New York, 
originated during the governorship of Martin Van Buren, another New Yorker of 
Netherlands heritage who later became President of the United States, and was 
inspired by Canton hong merchants with whom his grandfather had done 
business.90 
The bank deposit insurance program that was implemented in the United States 
in the 1930s is significantly different from the collective guaranty program that was 
enforced among the hong merchants of Canton between 1780 and 1842.  The concept 
had evolved in the course of its transplantations.  The United States and Chinese 
programs each concerned businesses operated under government license.  Each 
involved a fund, maintained with the proceeds of a form of tax, that was intended to 
pay the claims of creditors against members of the licensed group.  One program 
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was local, and the other national.  The imperial Chinese system lacked independent 
management, existence, or accounts.  The modern United States program involves 
independent administration, distinct accounts and accounting, and government 
oversight of the program itself.  At Canton, the Consoo Fund was heavily drawn on 
by the government for other purposes, with the result that adequate liquid funds 
were never available to pay claims when losses occurred.  In the United States, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and other deposit insurers have always held 
their insurance funds free from government draw, although funds on hand have not 
always been adequate to pay losses that have arisen.  Under the Chinese program, 
the risks that were taken by members of the insured guild were not subject to 
regulatory scrutiny.  As a result, some of the hong failures, and the scale of the 
losses involved, came as a surprise.  The United States program involves ongoing 
examiner scrutiny of the risks taken by insured banks, with the objective that losses 
and bank failures ought not to come as a surprise.  In the United States, in 1933, the 
liability of the deposit insurance fund was limited.  This was a key objective of 
President Roosevelt.  At Canton, the liability of the Consoo Fund was unlimited.  
While the modern United States bank insurance program thus differs in key respects 
from the structure of the Canton program, its experiences after 1933, the subject 
matter of the following chapter, yet echo other aspects of its Chinese prehistory.
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CHAPTER 9:  
EIGHTY YEARS OF BANK DEPOSIT INSURANCE 
This work set out to answer certain questions about the transplantation of a Chinese 
idea to the State of New York and the further progress of that idea through the 
adoption of national bank deposit insurance in the United States.  The preceding 
chapters have taken the idea through Manchu officials at the port of Canton, the 
New York State legislature, and on to Washington, D.C. at the moment of the 
banking crisis of 1933.  This short chapter takes the story forward from then.  It is a 
sketch.  The worldwide history of bank deposit insurance is enormously complex.  It 
is also the matter of headlines.  The international financial crisis of 2007-2008, which 
at first seemed to simply be an emergency involving securitized American 
mortgages, broke as work on this study began.  That crisis moved into a new phase, 
casting a shadow over European public finance, banking and the Euro currency, as 
this chapter was being written.  An international history of bank deposit insurance 
is thus not only outside of the scope of this study, but it is probably premature as 
well.  That eighty year history -- dull at the outset, and dramatic in its more recent 
phases -- is outlined in the following pages.  This sketch frames the context for 
consideration of the original questions posed in this study in the next and final 
chapter. 
The eightieth anniversary of the introduction of national bank deposit insurance 
in the United States in 1933 is imminent.  The federal deposit insurance program has 
now operated for a longer time period than both the New York Safety Fund (1829-
1866), which lasted for thirty-seven years, and the Canton Guaranty System (1780-
1842), which expired in its sixty-second year.  This is ripe old age by any standard, 
and for much of this period the United States experienced a remarkable calm in the 
affairs of its insured banks.  Starting in the 1960s, and more rapidly in the 1990s and 
thereafter, many nations have adopted bank deposit insurance programs.  The 
earliest programs were inspired by success in the United States.  The accelerating 
implementations of more recent years have tended to be in response to program 
initiatives, or market conditions, such as the perceived need to implement bank 
deposit insurance lest bank deposits take flight from uninsured to insured locales. 
An enormous scholarly literature and large amounts of learned journal, 
newspaper and online commentary have developed regarding bank deposit 
insurance.  Much of this material is technical, concerned with the implementation or 
operation of deposit insurance programs, or is focused on deposit insurance in the 
context of economic theory.  Some is polemical, produced, for example, in response 
to the American savings and loan crisis of the 1980s or the international financial 
crisis that began in 2007.  Some history of deposit insurance appears in this 
literature, but usually only to address or illustrate current operating problems.  No 
general history of bank deposit insurance in the United States has been written.  
Important early contributions were made by scholars such as Carter Golembe (1960) 
and Bray Hammond (1957),1 but most of the history of federal deposit insurance has 
taken place since those works were published.  Much of the work needed for a 
general history has been done, by scholars such as Charles W. Calomiris and David 
A. Moss.  Their work is primarily found in scholarly journals or in essay collections 
such as U.S. Bank Deregulation in Historical Perspective (2000).2  The Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation produced a useful company history to mark its 
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fiftieth anniversary in 1984, but even that official history is now almost thirty years 
old.3   The adoption of deposit insurance programs in many nations worldwide is an 
important further development that also calls for a general history, but it too 
remains to be written.  All of this experience may simply be too young and too 
much in flux for a useful general history to be written at this time.  Valuable work 
toward an understanding of the international experience with deposit insurance has 
nonetheless been produced in various languages and formats, some of which is 
cited below.  Perhaps the most useful book produced to date is Deposit Insurance 
Around The World: Issues of Design and Implementation (2008).4 
9A. Federal Deposit Insurance in the United States. 
The federal deposit insurance law was popular at the time of its adoption and for a 
long time it had excellent press.  This period of calm ran well into the 1960s, 
carrying with it a generally sunny view of the effects of the 1933 statute.  In 1963 
deposit insurance was pronounced by leading economists to be “the most important 
structural change in the banking system to result from the 1933 panic,” and “the 
structural change most conducive to monetary stability since state bank notes were 
taxed out of existence immediately after the Civil War.”5 
With the United States enjoying relative calm after the Great Depression and 
World War II, and the deposit insurance system appearing to function well, 
coverage limits gradually crept up.  As noted at pages 193-194 above, the original 
limit was $2,500 under the temporary plan of 1933, but was promptly raised to 
$5,000 effective 30 June 1934.  The coverage limit was raised to $10,000 in 1950, to 
$15,000 in 1966, to $20,000 in 1969, and to $40,000 in 1974.  The coverage limit was 
next raised to $100,000 in 1980, and then to $250,000 on 3 October 2008.6  These 
figures, which marched ahead of the inflation rate, are somewhat illusory.  First, it 
was always possible to multiply FDIC coverage through simple structuring, even 
within a single bank.7  Second, even in the calm early years of deposit insurance, the 
FDIC was already trying to give 100 percent coverage to all depositors (i.e. coverage 
in excess of stated limits).  The 'no depositor loss' objective was often achieved 
through some type of merger or purchase and assumption transaction, in which the 
failed bank was combined with a healthy successor.  Depositors were entirely 
satisfied but the final accounting was necessarily somewhat opaque.  Senator 
Fulbright challenged this policy in Congressional hearings in 1951, asserting that 
Congress had never intended for the FDIC to provide above limits coverage and 
that a failure of cost calculation was obviously involved.8 
It was a short leap from an undeclared policy of seeking to provide 100 percent 
coverage to all depositors, to an implicit policy of too big too fail.  Under a too big to 
fail policy, all creditors of those select large financial institutions which are 
considered to be somehow vital to the economy or society are paid in full by the 
insurer (or by government, i.e. the taxpayer, as a last resort).9  In the United States, 
this doctrine rose out of the wreckage of the Continental Illinois National Bank in 
1984.  Then the seventh largest bank in the United States, and considered 
indispensable, the bank was allowed to fail only in the sense that its ownership and 
management were changed.  It became an 80 percent owned investment of the 
FDIC.  This very generous treatment was seen as setting a new precedent.  
Questioning the Comptroller of the Currency in congressional hearings, an 
exasperated Congressman McKinney said that with this transaction, 
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“We have a new kind of bank.  And today there is another type created.  
We found it in the thrift institutions, and now we have given approval for a 
$1 billion brokerage deal to Financial Corporation of America.  Mr. 
Chairman, let us not bandy words.  We have a new kind of bank.  It is called 
too big to fail.  TBTF, and it is a wonderful bank.”10 
Now embraced worldwide, and especially in the course of the financial crisis 
that began in 2007, the “too big to fail” doctrine has been defined as involving 
grants of “discretionary government support [to] a bank's uninsured creditors who 
are not automatically entitled to government support.”11  The result has been, per 
James Grant, that “the government's credit, in the estimation of the average public 
depositor, [had] superseded the credit of the bank that kept his money.  By the 
1980s, with the evolution of the doctrine that some banks were too big to fail, the 
government [has thus] become the silent partner of even uninsured depositors.”12 
As Congressman McKinney indicated in his questioning of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, a long period of banking calm in the Unites States was spectacularly 
undone in the savings and loan (thrift) bank crisis of the 1980s.  Deregulated, and 
given a green light to move heavily into speculative real estate and other lending far 
removed from their traditional home mortgage lending business, the “thrifts” ended 
up massive losers when real estate values fell.  Large numbers of savings and loan 
institutions failed, and their deposit insurance fund was wholly inadequate.  Policies 
of regulatory forbearance, which permitted insolvent institutions to continue as 
(what have become known as) “zombie” banks, motivated to employ risky 
strategies with which to try to return to solvency, only made matters worse.  The 
final bill to the United States government for losses associated with the savings and 
loan disaster was $153 billion, or about 2 percent of United States gross domestic 
product, which was raised from taxpayers and the banking industry.13 
The rise of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) and the 
Federal Home Loan Mortgage Association (Freddie Mac) tracked the decline of the 
savings and loan industry.  These quasi-public corporations, which had been active 
for many years in support of American home ownership, became increasingly active 
in buying up residential mortgages in and after the 1980s.  Enjoying a set of 
privileges typically enjoyed only by federal agencies, but actually owned by private 
shareholders, they could sell bonds and raise money at interest rates significantly 
less than their private competition.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac packaged the 
hundreds of billions of dollars of mortgages they acquired as mortgage-backed 
securities, and sold them, guaranteeing these mortgages against default.  Together 
with another federal mortgage guarantee program called the Government National 
Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae), these corporations owned or guaranteed nearly 
half of all United States mortgages by the year 2003.  Banks became heavily involved 
with the mortgage related activities of Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mac, 
which collectively supported a large amount of United States mortgage debt.  The 
close association of these corporations with the United States government and 
enjoyment of privileges associated with government status led investors to believe 
that their guarantee enjoyed the implicit backing of the United States Treasury.14 
This assumption was tested in the financial crisis of 2007-8 when Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac reported crippling losses on guarantees of subprime mortgage loans.  
They were placed in federal receivership on 6 September 2008 and holders of 
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existing common and preferred stock were largely wiped out.  In conservatorship, 
the claims of bondholders -- which included financial institutions worldwide -- were 
honored with payment in full due to U.S. government concern about the potential 
risks to the global financial system posed by their threatened default.  “Thus,” in the 
view of Robert Pozen and many other seasoned observers, “the bailout vindicated 
the widely held perception that the bonds of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were 
indeed the moral obligations of the federal government.”15  While the rescue was not 
performed by a deposit insurance fund, it supported government interests in 
keeping deposit insurance solvent, for a failure or a material loss of confidence in 
these corporations might have had severe effects on mortgages held as collateral by 
insured banks.  The United States Treasury has since provided massive capital 
support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship.  As the full extent of 
their losses depends on the default rates of outstanding mortgage loans, the value of 
which remains uncertain, the amount of the bill that taxpayers will have to pay is 
unknown.  Total United States government losses from the failures of Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac were estimated as of 2010 in the amount of not less than $160 
billion and possibly as much as $1 trillion.16  In addition, in the financial crisis of 
2007-8, the FDIC guaranteed for a period of up to three years 100 percent of over 
$300 billion in the debts of banks, thrifts, and their holding companies.  The final out 
of pocket cost of these accommodations, and of myriad other extensions of 
governmental support to financial institutions worldwide in and after these 
troubled years, is unknown.17 
9B. The International Progress of Bank Deposit Insurance. 
Since its introduction as a national program in the United States in 1933, bank 
deposit insurance has swept the world.  The first national deposit insurance 
programs, after the United States, were introduced in India and in Norway in 1961.  
During the long period of bank insurance calm that prevailed in the United States 
from the 1930s through the 1960s, deposit insurance made slow progress 
elsewhere.18  As of 1980, only twenty nations had explicit bank deposit guaranty 
programs.  That number stood at forty-nine by January 1995, had increased to 
eighty-seven by the end of 2003, and now exceeds one hundred nations.  Deposit 
insurance programs were first implemented in European countries in the 1970s and 
1980s, and are now required within the European Union.19  The EU Directive on 
deposit-guarantee schemes, adopted in the wake of the 1991 failure of the Bank of 
Credit and Commerce International and amended in 2009, requires the insurance of 
individual bank accounts up to a coverage limit of €100,000.20  Ironically, it was only 
recently, and just as the bank deposit insurance programs in the originating United 
States were being wrenched by the budget-busting excesses of the savings and loan 
crisis and then the subprime mortgage debacle, that the adoption of bank deposit 
insurance accelerated worldwide. 
Deposit insurance has powerful and well-intentioned friends.  Since the 1990s, 
the International Monetary Fund has recommended deposit insurance as part of its 
crisis management advice.  The World Bank supports the introduction of national 
deposit insurance programs, through advice and by providing adjustment loans for 
the initial capital of funds in certain countries.21 
Details of the many deposit insurance programs that have been adopted 
worldwide vary greatly.  Typically, membership is compulsory for chartered 
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banks.22  Coverage limits differ, but averaged as of 2003 at $20,660 per deposit in all 
countries, ranging from a low of $120 in the Ukraine to a high of $243,520 in 
Norway.  Limits tend to be higher in more developed countries.23  Coverage limits 
have soared worldwide in response to the financial crisis that began in 2007.  In The 
Netherlands, for example, the limit was raised from €20,000 to €40,000 in 2007, after 
the failure of Van der Hoop bankiers N.V., and to €100,000 in turn as of 7 October 
2008, in response to international conditions.24  Limits within the EU were raised 
generally to €100,000 under the 2009 amendment to the EU Directive on deposit-
guarantee schemes, cited above, which also reduced the permissible delay before 
funds had to be paid out to depositors.  National boundaries mean less in an era of 
capital fluidity.  Weak banks offering high interest rates, in jurisdictions with high 
amounts of insurance coverage, may draw deposits away from more solvent banks 
in less heavily insured jurisdictions.  The adoption of bank deposit insurance, and 
increases in the amounts of insurance coverage, have been advocated as means of 
preventing capital flight.25 
Explicit deposit insurance programs are not universal.  They are not found in the 
People's Republic of China, Israel, or in many African countries.  Asian countries 
have been slow to adopt deposit insurance.  It has existed in India since 1961, in 
Japan since 1996, and in the Republic of China (Taiwan) since 1985.  In China, 
deposit insurance exists in practice, but it is implicit only.  Protection has been 
extended by the Chinese government to retail depositors on a case by case basis.  
Australia, New Zealand and Hong Kong held out through the financial crisis of 
2007-8, after which each adopted deposit guarantee programs.  Hong Kong imposed 
a blanket guarantee of all bank deposits with the goal of preventing capital from 
moving to other, perhaps safer, venues.  Many previously adopting countries -- over 
forty -- responded to the 2007-8 international crisis either by sharply increasing 
coverage limits, or by removing them entirely (said to be on a temporary basis).26  
This spirit proved highly contagious.  In Europe, as Robert Pozen writes, “Ireland 
jumped out ahead of the European Union by quickly announcing a blanket 
guarantee of all bank deposits.  In order to prevent local deposits from moving to 
Ireland, soon afterward many of the larger European countries like England and 
Germany offered higher or blanket guarantees of deposits at their banks.”27 
The cost of these extensive guarantees has yet to be tallied.  As of early 2012, 
losses from explicit bank guaranty programs in Asia have been minimal.  European 
guaranty losses may be significant, as the result of the subprime loan crisis that 
began in 2007, the subsequent Euro debt crisis, and application of too big to fail 
policies.  Ireland will be a big loser, as the state has provided a blanket guaranty of 
bank debt.  The extent of the property-related losses of the Irish banks are unknown, 
but could be in the range of €106 billion euros ($10.6 trillion.)  Of this liability, 
Michael Lewis recently wrote: “Ireland gave its promise.  And the promise sank 
Ireland.”28  In Iceland, the failure of the tiny nation's three leading banks produced 
outsized losses reckoned in the range of $100 billion.29  The amount of private bank 
and public guaranty fund losses that will result from the financial problems of 
Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal and France are unknown.  The estimates are 
disheartening and have tended to grow. 
China has its own domestic banking problems -- and not just the recent growth 
of a shadow banking sector seeking to serve underbanked parts of its populace.  The 
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Chinese people are remarkably thrifty,30 and that is a virtue.  Their banks however 
have incurred staggering losses, for example in bad real estate loans and in loans 
made to advance public policy objectives.  As of 2008, China had, in effect, 
recapitalized its four leading banks in the amount of about $350 billion.  In the 
words of Patrick Honohan, “The recapitalization of China's big banks has already 
entailed one of the largest fiscal or quasifiscal outlays for any banking system in 
history.”31  Yet this is hardly the end of China's banking problems.  The nation's 
stimulus response to the global financial crisis of 2007-8 saddled provinces and cities 
with RMB 10.7 trillion ($1.7 trillion) in bank debts which they were not able to pay 
within a few years as originally planned.  Chinese banks were instructed as of 
February 2012 to undertake a massive rollover of these loans, extending maturities 
by as much as four years, in order to avoid a wave of defaults.32 
China has long offered implicit deposit insurance protection33  The magnitude of 
the protection extended to its leading banks may be seen as an extension of that 
policy.  At the individual level, household depositors have been protected thus far, 
but even that protection is not unlimited.  The central government, which has used 
state funds to support the obligations of insolvent institutions under its control, has 
signaled that failures of local institutions are to be the responsibility of local 
governments.34 
Debate has gone on inside China for years concerning the adoption of explicit 
bank deposit insurance.  Although deposit insurance rules are said to have been 
prepared by the People's Bank of China, the concept remains controversial.35  China, 
which provided the regulatory example that inspired American deposit insurance in 
the nineteenth century, has proven reluctant to explicitly set out on the same road.  
Its reluctance is somehow fitting.  Bank deposit insurance programs -- which have 
been billed as both “modern” and “American” -- actually carry embedded within 
them traces of collective responsibility and imperial monopoly regulation from 
China's own pre-revolutionary past.  China is wrestling today with whether this 
innovation properly belongs in the dustbin of history or whether it might have a 
role in assuring the orderly continuance of its modern economic miracle.
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CHAPTER 10:  
EPILOGUE 
The hong merchants have long had a reputation as wealthy men.  In the late 1600s, 
the poet Chu Dajun wrote of silver “piling up” in the thirteen hongs.  Customs taxes 
collected from their trade were a key part of the revenues of the imperial Court in 
Beijing, representing 38% on average of the so-called “surplus quota” taxes that 
were directed to the Imperial Household Department (neiwufu) during the period 
1796 to 1821.  The Department viewed Canton as a “rich” post, and sent indebted 
officials there as an opportunity to restore their fortunes and pay off debts to the 
state.  The hong merchants lived well.  Some supported large extended families, had 
magnificent houses and gardens, and collected books and art,1 practices which 
caused foreign creditors to sputter.  Summarizing the Canton scene, a French trader 
stated that “The Mandarins wanted tranquility in their nation and the [hong] 
merchants opulence in their homes.”2 
The hong merchant of the port of Canton, China was one of the first great 
international brands.  That brand was marketed both as an image and as a 
reputation for value and creditworthiness.  The image is familiar today, in the form 
of the august portraits of Chinese businessmen that were brought home by or were 
sent to trading partners worldwide, and in anecdotal accounts of the munificence of 
hong merchants.  Through the years 1780 to 1842, the trend in hong merchant 
portraiture is toward grandeur.  The austere style of earlier portraits gives way to a 
more magnificent, colorful and Western presentation.  The actual trend of hong 
merchant fortunes in this period was instead one of decline, with the notable 
exception of Howqua II, who was growing more wealthy.  The trend in portraiture 
runs contrary to economic reality.  The portraits are somewhat misleading -- or 
perhaps the appropriate word is aspirational.  They present grand images of hong 
merchants in the success they hoped they would attain, but largely did not. 
To Western traders in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these painted 
images were of almost no consequence.  Hong merchants built up their high 
standing with trading partners through commercial reliability and daily practices 
which assured that value was delivered to the customer.  The Canton trade 
functioned efficiently, as a whole, and on those rare occasions when teas turned out 
to be bad on delivery in the West, hong merchant sellers gave full credit to foreign 
buyers, even years after the original sale.  The collective guaranty by the entire hong 
merchant body of the foreign debts of its members, in particular, was important to 
the Western trading community.  It meant that for many years any hong merchant's 
promise to pay was rock solid.  The commitment of a hong merchant could be relied 
upon anywhere.  As Joshua Forman stated in 1829, “the bond [i.e. the promise to 
pay] of a Hong merchant has acquired a credit over the whole world, not exceeded 
by that of any other security.”  For all the value the foreign traders found in the 
collective guaranty, it was not a promotional feature that the hong merchant guild 
either sought or desired.  It was imposed, and strictly enforced, by the Chinese 
government as part of a regulatory system that sought to maintain security in and 
tax revenue flow from an enormous foreign trade upon which China had become 
dependent.  The Canton Guaranty System assured that the licensed hong merchants  
  





Figure 12. A hong merchant. 
Oil portrait by Spoilum, painted ca. 1800.  (Private collection.  Photograph by 
courtesy of the Martyn Gregory Gallery, London.) 
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of Canton paid their foreign debts in full and made good for any problems in trade. 
The Canton Guaranty System yielded significant benefits for the parties 
involved.  The collective guaranty raised foreign confidence in the ability of the 
hong merchants to perform their commitments.  This served both Chinese and 
foreign interests in stabilizing the foreign trade from Canton.  In modern times, 
similarly, the public good is seen as advanced by bank deposit insurance, which 
discourages citizens from keeping money in mattresses, and also by automobile 
insurance guaranty funds, which decrease uninsured driving. 
In daily practice, the Canton program was understood to mean that the financial 
commitments of guild members would be fulfilled.  This contributed to an 
international brand image of equal strength – and honor – among all of the hong 
merchants.  For the Chinese state, and for foreign creditors, it minimized the 
amount of effort that had to be devoted to debt collection disputes and thus made 
the trade the more efficient.  As designed, it advanced the Confucian ideal of 
maintaining harmony in trade.  It may have accomplished this objective in some 
cases in the short term, but over time the growing amount of undischarged debt 
damaged many surviving firms and yielded a final bounty of disharmony.  The 
system had a funding mechanism – the hangyong tax – that might have covered 
creditor claims had the Chinese state abstained from taking these tax revenues from 
the Consoo Fund.  Without independent existence, or interested local parties able 
and willing to defend it, the fund proved powerless to protect its assets from the 
needs of the state and of the guild members who ran the fund.  By helping the most 
frail perform their imprudent contracts, and fostering a global image of equal 
creditworthiness (“not exceeded by that of any other security”), the collective 
guaranty contributed to a misleading appearance of hong merchant wealth.  The 
hong merchants had good commercial reasons to join in building that image, as the 
appearance of strength gave them status in the marketplace and attracted foreign 
customers.  Opulent lifestyles, plus grand images in portraits sent to the West, 
supported a gilded image.  Unfortunately, in many cases the image of wealth was 
founded on little more than the equation of (a) being able to pay large expense bills 
on a regular basis with (b) being rich. 
The economic reality of hong merchant existence was utterly different.  In his 
study of hong insolvencies, Kuo-tung Ch'en concludes that most of the hong 
merchants “labored under incessant financial difficulties.”3  Their situation was 
“particularly bad” between 1760 and 1843.  As he states, 
“During that period, thirty-seven Hong merchants closed business.  .  .  .  
Of that thirty-seven, only two retired with substantial fortunes.  Four 
disappeared from all accounts without notice.  Eight were closed down by 
the local authorities on account of their incompetence or infringement of 
laws.  Three stopped business upon their death.  The remaining twenty 
merchants were publicly declared bankrupt.  These bankrupts were always 
heavily indebted to the foreign traders, the government, as well as to their 
own countrymen who either provided merchandise for them or lent them 
money.”4 
Hong merchant insolvency was “not only common but also perennial.”5  Ch'en set 
out to find its causes, examining, among other things, the profitability, 
 EPILOGUE 217 
 
capitalization, borrowing and expenses of hong firms.  During the nineteenth 
century, by Ch'en's estimate based on British EIC records, the total import and 
export business of the entire hong merchant body averaged more than ten million 
taels ($13,888,889) annually, or roughly one million taels ($1,388.889) per hong.6  His 
examination of each of the principal lines of hong merchant business -- their trades 
in tea, woolens and cotton -- indicated basic profitability in these areas,7 but also a 
nagging problem of capitalization.8 
Few of the hong merchant firms had the money they needed to do business on 
the scale in which they were engaged.  They took high interest rate loans from 
foreigners, or found other precarious ways to raise funds, out of necessity because 
credit was not available from domestic sources.9  Ch'en finds that, on average, the 
hong merchants carried heavy expenses in running their businesses, in making the 
deposits for tea purchases required by inland suppliers, in supporting extended 
families, in high living, in paying the debts of failed hong merchants, and in paying 
frequent demands for money by the Canton officials.10  While these averaged 
expenses largely consumed the merchants' averaged profits, Ch’en found exactions 
by the Canton officials to have been particularly harmful.11 
Continual ad hoc demands by Chinese governmental bodies and officials for the 
payment of discretionary fees, known as kejuan dashui, are familiar throughout 
Chinese history.  These exactions have attained recent prominence as part of an 
answer to a question posed by William C. Kirby in 1995 -- Why have mainland 
Chinese been so reluctant to do business in the form of a corporation with statutory 
limited liability?12  In their solution to the “Kirby Puzzle,” J. Ray Bowen II and 
David C. Rose pointed to government exactions as the primary cause.  As they 
explain, 
“the practice of kejuan zashui has the effect of making the government, and 
not the firm owner, the residual claimant on any private firm's income.  This 
makes public trading of privately owned shares too risky, effectively 
depriving PPCs [privately owned, publicly traded corporations] of their 
principal advantage over other firm governance structures in China.  As a 
result, all significant economic activity is driven into either state-affiliated 
enterprises or highly secretive family firms.”13 
A climate in which exactions by government were uncertain, or, worse yet, 
increased when the firm seemed to be doing well, trained generations of Chinese 
business owners to be cautious when dealing with government.  Scholarship has 
related these demands to an “obsession with secrecy” in the Chinese family firm, to 
business activity tending to be coordinated by relationships rather than by contracts 
which might require government involvement, and to a preference for business 
operation in family form.14  The record shows that the hong merchants were 
frequently required to pay discretionary fees, in the nature of kejuan dashui, and also 
that there was little trade information that they could keep secret from the 
government.  To the extent they engaged in legitimate trade, for example in allotted 
shares of the tea contracts of the British EIC, the Canton officials could easily track 
their business, and officials were able to adjust their “expectations” to the conditions 
of the moment.15 
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At Canton, the expenses analyzed by Ch’en outstripped the operating profits 
and capital of most of the hongs.  While records indicating the original capital of the 
hongs are rare, such records as have been found indicate that such capital tended to 
be meagre.16  Once a hong merchant found himself in need of money, as Ch’en 
explains, he 
“was in fact thrown into a vicious cycle, in which he was constantly 
compelled to raise funds with all kinds of methods detrimental to his own 
interest.  When his indebtedness increased and his imminent need grew, he 
was obliged to engage in the detrimental practices in a much more extensive 
way than before.  The insolvency of a Hong merchant then became 
chronic.”17 
The ultimate causes of the many hong merchant insolvencies, according to Ch'en, 
were a lack of sufficient capital, poor financial management and official exactions.  
This toxic mix destroyed many of the hongs and discouraged new merchants from 
joining the guild.  The hong merchants became “a group of reluctant people whose 
capital and ability were always insufficient to carry on the enormous volume of 
their business.  Their insolvency and ultimate failure, no doubt, was but a matter of 
course.”18 
This insolvency analysis is incomplete, as Kuo-tung Ch'en admits.  It is primarily 
based on British EIC records.  These are only part of a commercial whole, of which 
the remaining records are largely missing.  While Ch'en carefully probes various 
categories of hong revenues and expenses, his study necessarily relies on selected 
data.  Business skill, experience, and luck varied considerably from merchant to 
merchant, and from year to year.  Furthermore, trading results during the period 
1780 through 1842 often depended on wars and international economic downturns 
over which the hong merchants had no control and of which they typically had little 
or no warning.  Under these conditions, average data can be misleading.  Just as the 
British EIC did two centuries earlier, Ch'en faults the hong merchants for poor 
management, but he fails to identify any corrective measures which, if taken, would 
have saved any number of hongs from insolvency.  The “incessant financial 
difficulties” under which the hong merchants labored from 1760 through 1842 
indicate problems of a systemic character.  Solving these problems -- within the 
rules of the Canton System -- exceeded the skills of virtually all of the hong 
merchants.  These were experienced traders and some had considerable business 
talent.  Accomplishing the revival of a financially troubled hong firm, within this 
system (including the scarcity and high cost of credit), would represent a challenge 
even to a modern business school graduate or turnaround management consultant. 
Kuo-tung Ch'en identifies lack of capital as a chronic problem among the hong 
merchants, and there is abundant evidence that he is correct.  Inadequate business 
capital was a problem from the early days of the hong merchant system through to 
its final years, in which several merchants found that they had no working capital 
left as of the first day they did business.19  In analyzing the financial plight of the 
hongs, however, Ch'en does not factor in the repayment expectations of domestic 
sources of capital.  This might follow from the fact that records of original or later 
investments in hong businesses are scant, but a paucity of investment evidence is 
not good cause to omit consideration of repayment.  As Ch'en discusses,20 and as 
Paul Van Dyke details in his new study of the eighteenth century hong merchants, 
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family alliances, joint ventures and partnerships were in common use among the 
hong merchants to conduct their growing trade with the West.  While the details of 
such arrangements in the early nineteenth century remain unclear, there is no doubt 
that they existed.  They may have been common.  Whether characterized as equity 
or debt, or viewed as some hybrid of the two, or if the combination involved jointly 
held lineage property, the person or persons who advanced assets to a hong 
expected a financial return.  To the extent such capital came from family or kinship 
sources, these demands weighed heavily on the affected merchants.  If there was 
indeed no net income left after expenses, these hong merchants were in grave 
trouble already, for there were never going to be funds to provide a return on 
investment for sources of capital, let alone cash to set aside to save the business in 
an hour of need. 
The Ch'en analysis avoids singling out particular culprits for the hong merchant 
insolvencies.  He calculates profit on average, tallies up the various expenses of the 
hongs on average, and concludes that little if anything remained after expenses in 
the average case.  This analysis is accurate as far as it goes.  It is certainly in accord 
with the limited available evidence.  The Xingtai hong merchant Yan Qixiang thus 
explained, after the 1836 failure of his firm, that “In 1830, I began business with a 
limited capital; after deducting expenses of hanging out my signboard, beginning 
business, and buying packing houses and furniture, not a cash remained to me.  In 
that year on account of the English ladies coming up to Canton, I was confined to 
prison for more than a month and found myself minus a lac of dollars [$100,000].”21  
The hong opened for business with no capital, and then, as if by a snap of the 
fingers, its net worth was transformed into negative $100,000.  So it was with the 
weakened hongs of the later years.  For these marginal firms, any material expense 
could become the straw that broke the proverbial camel's back.  The problem, 
therefore, seems to lie on the expense side of the ledger. 
With but one exception, the categories of hong firm expenses Ch'en reviewed 
and averaged are current expenses.  Business operating cost, household expenses, 
and even ostentatious living, were all expenses that were paid in the year in which 
they were incurred.  Taxes assessed by government, exactions demanded from 
individual hongs by the Canton officials, and advances as security for future 
purchases of tea, were all, for the most part,22 payments of current year charges.  
Payments by hong merchants as their collective responsibility for the debts of failed 
hongs, alone, represented the current payment of debts which had been incurred in 
the past.  The fact that they were channeled through the Consoo Fund, and currently 
paid to foreign creditors from that source, does not alter the status of these 
payments as the weight of the past.  Ch'en averages the total cost to the guild of 
collective responsibility for foreign debt at about 150,000 taels ($208,333) annually.23  
This figure understates the true guaranty burden as the guild was also forced to pay 
the tax debts of failed hongs to the state, much of which are unknown.24  See 
Chapter Seven, Table One (list of debt assumptions including the amounts of 
unpaid taxes also required to be assumed, where known).  In this instance the use of 
an annual average becomes truly misleading, for, as is detailed in Chapters Four 
through Seven above, the average annual burden of collective liability for foreign 
debt had increased steadily during the period 1780 to 1842.  The initial average 
foreign debt assumption burden of the years 1780 to 1799 was 81,050 taels ($112,569) 
annually.  That average rose to 113,733 taels ($157,963) annually between 1800 and 
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1814 (a 40% increase), to 123,214 taels ($171,130) annually in 1815-1828 (an 8% 
increase), and then soared to 186,266 taels ($258,703) annually in the derniers jours of 
1829-1842 (another 40% increase).  This increase trend is shown as a bar chart in 
Chapter Seven, Table Two. 
The dead weight burden of the old foreign debt and tax obligations of failed 
hongs steadily increased precisely as the overall financial health of the hong 
merchant body gradually declined.  It may well be that thin capitalization and 
inadequate access to credit were ultimate causes of many hong merchant 
insolvencies, but it was the mounting burden of collective liability that pushed these 
firms over the edge.  Ch'en fingers official exactions as an accelerant,25 and rightly 
so, but it was the steady growth of the guaranty burden that undid the barely 
profitable economics of the hong merchant order.  The old debts became 
combustible.  The cash required to feed this mounting fire deprived the hong 
merchants of the money they needed to operate in the present and fund the future.  
The collective guaranty carried the debt conflagration into the surviving hongs and 
many of them were consumed by it in their own turn. 
Chapter One introduced the Canton Guaranty System in the context of the 
parallel financial crises of the year 1829.  In that year, a collective liability regulation 
that was applied locally among the hong merchant guild at Canton became the 
inspiration for bank guaranty fund legislation that was enacted in the State of New 
York.  The idea had been transplanted before, within China into the regulated salt 
and ginseng trades, and even in the thirteenth century from China into Russia.  It 
was then transplanted again, from New York State to Washington, D.C., where it 
inspired national deposit insurance in the United States, and in turn from the United 
States across the world as large numbers of nations followed and adapted this 
‘American’ innovation to meet local conditions. 
The remarkable journey of this legal idea conforms with the model introduced 
by Alan Watson in 1974 in Legal Transplants.  Watson states that “foreign law can 
be influential even when it is totally misunderstood.”26  In this case, the basic 
Chinese rule was understood, but its record in China was totally misunderstood.  
The New York legislature knew nothing of the troubled history of the Canton 
Guaranty System.  As Joshua Forman states, the structure of the Chinese system was 
“modified and adapted” for use in New York.  In other words, he found parts of the 
Chinese system unsatisfactory.  This also conforms with Watson’s model.  “[A] time 
of transplant is often a moment when reforms can be introduced,” as happened in 
New York.  Watson quotes Jeremy Bentham: 
“I would venture to lay down the following propositions: 1st, That the 
English law is a great part of it of such a nature, as to be bad everywhere: 
2nd, But that it would not only be, but appear worse in Bengal than in 
England: 3rd, That a system might be devised, which, while it would be 
better for Bengal, would also be better, even for England.”27 
Each stage of the reception of this venerable idea has proven to be, and has been 
taken as, the occasion for reform and adaptation to its new purpose.  Watson also 
posits that “reception is possible and still easy when the receiving society is much 
less advanced materially and culturally.”28  New York State was a raw growing 
commercial power in the United States in 1829.  Joshua Forman himself was a 
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developer, and his banking reforms were motivated in large part by development 
concerns.  It may be argued that Canton was less advanced in 1780.  However that 
may be, the conditions that existed in the Chinese ginseng business in 1739 (less 
than a century after the Manchu conquest) were certainly primitive.  At every stage, 
as Watson teaches, the adoption of a legal transplant was eased because it was 
shown to have come from an authoritative source.29  In 1829, the banking reform 
was based on a practice that was said to have achieved seventy years of success in 
imperial China and worldwide.  The innovation was significant, involving the 
reception of an idea that sought to impose liability on a collective basis by a society 
that was already recognized as highly individualistic.  As of 1933, it had been tested 
in numerous American states, and wanted only, so it was said, national 
implementation and a few more adjustments to operate with complete success.  
Since 1933, the idea of deposit insurance has been adopted in large numbers of 
countries, due, for the most part, to years of success enjoyed by the system in other 
nations.  At each stage, the system was validated by its association with perceived 
success (or near success) in a context respected by the adopting society.  At its 
source, collective responsibility for debt among the hong merchants of Canton was 
terminated in 1842, and its demise was mourned by no Chinese and by few if any 
foreigners.  A century and a half later, a far more advanced system of risk sharing 
that grew out of this idea -- bank deposit insurance -- is thriving in transplanted and 
adapted form in many countries worldwide. 
Three questions were posed in Chapter One about the idea that first inspired 
bank deposit insurance in the United States.  First, was the Chinese idea of collective 
legal responsibility for debt accurately transmitted to the New York legislature in 
1829?  Second, was the actual experience of the Canton Guaranty System accurately 
transmitted to the New York legislature in 1829?  Third, do either the Chinese idea 
of collective legal responsibility for debt or the experience of the Canton Guaranty 
System offer any lessons for contemporary bank deposit insurance?  It was also 
asked, who won under the Canton Guaranty System, who lost, and why? 
As noted above, question one is answered in the affirmative.  The Chinese idea 
of collective legal responsibility for debt was accurately transmitted to the New 
York legislature.  Joshua Forman provided a correct description of the basic practice 
of collective financial responsibility at Canton.  His three sentence description is 
incomplete, but the missing details had no bearing on the idea that served as 
Forman's model.  The security and tax collection duties of the hong merchants were 
omitted, but these components had no part in the Safety Fund Forman proposed.  It 
is also possible, as Forman suggests, that his educated audience already knew the 
basic structure of the Canton System. 
Question two is answered in the negative.  The actual experience of the Canton 
Guaranty System for hong merchant creditors was not accurately transmitted to the 
New York legislature in 1829.  It was certainly the view of some foreign creditors, in 
1829, that the Canton Guaranty System was then a success -- that it had stood the 
test of experience for many years, and that under it “the bond [i.e. promise to pay] 
of a Hong merchant has acquired a credit over the whole world, not exceeded by 
that of any other security.”  Forman's bright view of the Canton Guaranty System 
contained two errors, one technical, the second profound.  First, the Chinese system 
was not even fifty years old, as opposed to the seventy year pedigree Forman gave 
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it.30  Second and more fundamentally, Forman failed to report the terrible financial 
condition of the hong merchants to the New York legislature in 1829.  It is likely that 
he did not know of the crisis of that year, and newspaper evidence indicates that 
this news did not reach the general American public.  There was considerable 
newspaper coverage of hong failures, and of payments of hong debts under the 
collective guaranty, but only a creditor's lesson was drawn from this news.  The 
other hong merchants were paying old debts under the guaranty, and, by inference, 
all was well on the Canton waterfront.  Joshua Forman was unaware of the degree 
to which the Canton Guaranty System contributed to the hong firm failures.  This is 
an excusable oversight.  Information on hong merchant finances was closely 
guarded in his time.  The understanding we now have of the negative effects of the 
collective guaranty of debts is the fruit of modern scholarship, using source material 
which was largely confidential when these events occurred. 
The third question is answered in the affirmative.  Many of the tribulations 
experienced under the Canton Guaranty System are immediately familiar today.  
While the parallels to present day regulatory experience are imperfect, they can be 
telling: 
(A)  At Canton, the state-enforced collective guaranty system failed to 
anticipate, reserve for, or tax adequately to cover the foreign debt default risk 
that it was supposed to cover.  For its part, modern bank deposit insurance has 
been criticized since its inception as not representing “true” insurance at all.  
This charge is based both on the fact that premiums are not assessed in actuarial 
relation to the risks involved and because collected premiums have proven 
inadequate to cover losses incurred. 
(B)  At Canton, a reserve fund -- the Consoo Fund -- was created but it was 
soon depleted and was then regularly drawn on by government for other 
purposes with the result that funds were not available to cover losses when hong 
failures occurred.  While modern bank deposit insurance has not, to date, 
accumulated reserve balances in amounts large enough to attract the notice of 
government, these funds have often been depleted by losses, as in the Savings 
and Loan crisis in the United States, with the result that governments have had 
to advance additional monies to prevent deposit insurance funds themselves 
becoming insolvent. 
(C)  In China, as discussed in Chapter Three above (pages 55-56 above), strict 
protective laws were enacted in order to prevent loan losses that would have to 
be paid from the Consoo Fund under the collective guaranty.  It was illegal for 
foreigners to make and for hong merchants to accept foreign loans.  These 
protective laws were not enforced.  Today, it is a popular if controversial view 
that many insured bank losses have resulted from illegal conduct.  Prosecutions 
for violations of law that led to losses suffered in the financial crisis of 2007-8, for 
example, have been few. 
(D)  At Canton, as analyzed in Chapter Three above (pages 56-57 above), 
systemic disincentives existed which discouraged official enforcement of the 
existing protective laws.  In modern times, disincentives to the enforcement of 
protective laws are more subtle, such as the existence of the “revolving door,” 
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whereby key persons are influenced by the prospect of subsequent employment 
by financial institutions, consulting firms, or even governments. 
(E)  Two centuries ago, as reviewed in Chapters Four through Seven above, 
foreign lenders made risky and imprudent loans to Chinese hong merchants, 
confident that the collective guaranty would protect them from the 
consequences.  For their part, hong debtors repeatedly took desperate risks in 
the vain hope of returning to profitability.  Today, such conduct may be 
recognized as examples of “moral hazard,” i.e., excessive risks taken when 
insurance coverage shields parties from the economic consequences of their 
actions.31  Contemporary examples of moral hazard include the imprudent 
behavior of some weak banks, which have attracted deposits by offering 
abnormally high interest rates or have made high interest rate loans to dubious 
borrowers, and also the laxity of bank customers when their deposits are fully 
insured. 
(F)  At Canton, when losses loomed, attempts were made to dodge the 
guaranty system.  Such evasions, as in the Gnewqua II and Ponqua receivership 
of 1810, invariably ended badly.  The Canton Guaranty System ended up bearing 
heavier losses accrued through the time of exposure.  Some critics see attempts 
to evade bank capital requirements and national guaranty schemes in certain of 
the increasingly complex structures used in modern international banking.  If 
that is true, such evasions ended badly in the financial crisis of 2007-8. 
(G)  Furthermore, something in the nature of a “too big to fail” policy was 
observed at Canton during the period 1780 to 1842.  Its objective, as under the 
modern doctrine, was the protection of key firms whose continued operation 
was believed to be vital to the economy and to society.  The Qing government, 
however, did not bail out firms that it believed were vital to the economy.  To 
the contrary, “too big to fail” status (the modern term was not used) protected 
fortunate key hongs from excessive exactions by government (kejuan dashui).  
The existence of a well recognized limit on how much money the state or its 
officials could extract from the hongs is evidenced, for example, by the deferral 
from 1819 through 1839 on imperial approval of large amounts of taxes that 
were due to Beijing from the hong merchants.  The government could easily 
have demanded payment of these taxes in full from the senior hong firms, but it 
avoided doing so out of concern that they would fail, and the entire Canton 
System with them. 
In sum, a number of parallels exist between the experiences of the Canton Guaranty 
System and those of the modern bank deposit insurance programs. 
The context is certainly very different between the foreign trade that was 
conducted at Canton in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and that of the 
operations of insured banks in the present day.  Nonetheless, some problems 
experienced under the Canton Guaranty System anticipate, to a remarkable degree, 
problems of bank deposit insurance systems today.  While the Canton system 
experienced heavy losses, and those losses are instructive, at least two factors that 
restrained risk taking in the 1700s and 1800s are largely absent today.  First, debts 
under the Canton Guaranty System were incurred and were largely paid in the form 
of silver coin.  Currency was valuable metal, not printed paper founded on public 
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credit and subject to added production in accordance with state needs.  Hard 
currency could not be easily multiplied.  Second, with the exception of the British 
East India Company, none of the parties who were involved in transactions covered 
by the Canton Guaranty System were limited liability entities.  Almost all of the 
parties involved were individuals or partnerships subject to unlimited personal risk.  
Unlimited exposure restrained risk taking (in most cases).  In the modern era, 
transactions that are covered by bank deposit insurance are often made among 
entities organized as one of any number of types of limited liability entities, often 
organized under the law of remote foreign jurisdictions.  These barriers further 
separate the parties taking economic risk from the consequences of that risk.  The 
Canton Guaranty System operated in a radically different environment.32 
Despite all of these differences, the historical record of the Canton experience 
offers valuable lessons to the modern world.  These include: (1) that the tax that 
supports a deposit insurance fund must be based on an assessment of the risk of loss 
that the fund has undertaken to pay; (2) that the fund and its insureds must be 
subject to strong independent supervision; (3) that laws enacted to avoid risk 
contingencies must be enforced, with care taken to avoid any disincentives to 
enforcement of those laws; and (4) that both corruption and the diversion of 
premium revenues intended for the fund must be strictly prohibited.  None of these 
controls were observed at Canton between 1780 and 1842.  Perhaps most important, 
(5) bank deposit insurance funds must avoid the unlimited commitment to pay 
losses that was made under the Canton system.  Unlimited coverage impaired the 
economic incentives for insureds to protect themselves.  The mounting burden of 
unlimited liability for losses incurred brought the Canton Guaranty System and 
those exposed under it to the edge of ruin. 
With respect to the last question posed at the outset of this study, it is easiest to 
identify losers.  The hong merchants lost, weakest to strongest, from bottom to the 
top.  The weight of old debt, undischarged and demanding full payment, was rolled 
forward by the guaranty and contributed to the failure of many surviving hongs.  
There can be no doubt that various factors, such as official exactions, contributed to 
the large number of hong merchant insolvencies, but the ever increasing burden of 
collective liability for debt stands out as a leading cause of failure.  It is difficult to 
conceive even of the “too big to fail” hongs as winners, for at the end they were 
tapped to pay hong debts and other obligations after the Opium War.  The details of 
how these funds were raised are unclear, but it is doubtful for example that the $3 
million that was paid to the British on 23 July 1843 was held as ready cash at that 
time.  The asset liquidations that were necessary to raise these funds must have been 
painful even for the “successful” firm that was forced to raise cash at this difficult 
point in time. 
It might be said that foreign creditor firms, the guarantee beneficiaries, were the 
clear winners under the Canton Guaranty System.  With respect to the imprudent 
creditors, that is certainly the case.  Some foreign creditors courted enormous losses 
and were spared from ruin by the collective guaranty.  It seems remarkable enough 
that William Jardine exposed over $2 million of assets of his own firm and its 
constituents in credit extended to the frail young Xingtai Hong.  Yet more 
remarkable is the note of calm with which Jardine assured his London partner that 
this enormous sum would be paid under the collective guaranty.33  Jardine was 
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absolutely right, and his claims were paid in full.  As for the other foreign firms at 
Canton, including those firms which were more prudent extending credit, the 
answer whether they were “winners” is less clear.  The British EIC had understood, 
from the dawn of the Canton Guaranty System, that a guaranty is never free.  To the 
extent that creditor claims would be paid, payment necessarily came out of the 
trade, driving up costs, potentially narrowing profits, and increasing the ultimate 
cost to consumers in the West.  Furthermore, capital that might have been profitably 
used elsewhere was locked up during the time period over which hong debts were 
repaid, without interest.  These were not reasons to fail to take advantage of the 
system when it existed, to file and to demand full payment of claims, but they 
narrowed the creditor’s advantage at the end of the day. 
In the 1930s, banker opponents feared that the adoption of deposit insurance in 
the United States would result in the entire banking industry being dragged down 
by careless practices.  Shortly after the National Banking Act of 1933 became law, 
Professor Edwin W. Kemmerer of Princeton University warned of its consequences.  
In the new era, 
“The bank with the loose credit policy gets the business and the bank 
with the careful, cautious credit policy loses it.  The slack banker dances and 
the conservative banker pays the fiddler.  If the conservative banker protests, 
the slack one invites him to go to a warmer climate.  Soon all are dancing and 
the fiddler, if paid at all, must collect from the depositors or from the 
taxpayers.” 34 
Kemmerer’s words were prescient in substance and in metaphor.  The professor 
anticipated a now infamous statement by an American banker, made as the crisis of 
2007-2008 set in.  Citigroup was going to stay in the market for United States 
subprime loans.  It intended to dance on.  Chuck Prince, chief executive of 
Citigroup, stated in July 2007 that “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, 
things will be complicated.  But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up 
and dance.  We’re still dancing.”35 
The quotation from Kemmerer also provides a fitting epitaph for the hong 
merchants under the Canton Guaranty System.  They failed in droves.  Collective 
responsibility cast the debts of failed merchants onto survivors, many of whom 
failed in turn.  The end of the China monopoly of the British EIC triggered a crisis of 
confidence in 1834, with foreign and domestic creditors wondering alike how the 
fiddler could ever be paid.  Foreign eyes turned to the Chinese government, which 
had enforced the system of collective guaranty since 1780, to pay the massive sum 
the Consoo Fund and the hong merchants seemed unable to pay.  The Opium War 
followed soon thereafter, an unpleasant echo of the British gunboat diplomacy that 
caused the Canton Guaranty System to be adopted in 1780, resulting in payment in 
full of all outstanding hong debts in July 1843.  The metaphorical fiddler was paid 
by the Chinese state, which drew heavily from firms that had been considered, until 
this point, too big to fail. 
Loss can be painful, as can be the recognition of loss.  An unlimited guaranty can 
be painful as well, and its ramifications potentially disastrous.  An unlimited 
guaranty delays or prevents the recognition of loss.  More fundamentally, it delays 
or prevents the education -- the market discipline -- that should follow from every 
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instance of loss.  Where undischarged, debt accrues interest and grows.  Where an 
unlimited guaranty exists, that ever increasing burden is shifted to the guarantor.  
President Franklin Roosevelt expressed concern in 1932, at the dawn of bank deposit 
insurance, that the unlimited guaranty of bank deposits might prove “an impossible 
drain” on the national treasury.  In the too big to fail era, unlimited guarantees of 
debt threaten to drag down banks, guaranty funds, and even national treasuries, the 
prudent with the imprudent.  Professor Kemmerer saw the fiddler being paid, “if 
paid at all,” ultimately by depositors or taxpayers.  This has begun to occur.  If 
private parties are not made to bear some material part of the burden of losses 
arising from their own insured transactions, then this process will continue.  It is 
right to be concerned that at some future point, as unrecognized losses continue to 
be passed through to governments and taxpayers under state commitments of 
unlimited guaranty, that this burden will test mathematical possibility.
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Appendix 1.   
The Original Five Regulations (1760) 
Modern Translation.  Full text of the New Regulations Made to Control 
Foreign Merchants,” dated 29 January 1760, as translated by Lo- shu Fu, A 
Documentary Chronicle of Sino-Western Relations (1644-1820) (Tucson: 
Univ. of Arizona Press, 1966), pp. 224-6: 
The ministers of the grand council deliberated and reported: “The Viceroy of 
Liang-Kwang, Li Shih-yao, in a memorial suggested regulations to control and 
restrain the foreign barbarians as follows: 
“(1) The barbarian merchants should be prohibited from passing the winter 
in the provincial capital:  On investigation, the viceroy found that originally foreign 
trade had been limited to a fixed period, namely, from the time that the foreign 
ships put into port until their subsequent departure.  Foreigners were not allowed to 
remain secretly in the Interior.  Recently, the fact that in some cases hong merchants 
owed them money which they did not pay gave the barbarians a pretext for 
remaining in the provincial capital.  Inevitably there would arise intrigues between 
the foreign and the Chinese merchants which might lead to trouble.  Consequently 
the viceroy now petitioned that in the future after the foreign merchants sell out 
their goods and collect their money, they should return to their own country 
according to our time limit.  Even if they have not liquidated their debts with our 
hong merchants, they ought to live in Macao temporarily.  They should hand their 
goods over to the hong merchants as their agents to sell the goods.  The following 
year they can collect their money and return to their own country. 
“This legislation is intended to prevent the barbarians from living in the Interior.  
We should approve what the viceroy has petitioned, but we are afraid that when the 
corrupt hong merchants hear that the foreign merchants cannot stay long in the 
Interior they will purposely delay the sale of their goods.  If such a thing happens 
and an accusation is made, the local magistrates must punish the treacherous hong 
merchants according to law.  They should not be spared! 
“(2) When the foreigners arrive in Kwangtung they must reside in the 
factories of the hong merchants and be under their control and supervision:  On 
investigation the viceroy found that when the barbarian merchants came to 
Kwangtung and lived in the factories of the hong 
[start Documentary Chronicle page 225] 
merchants, they were not allowed to come and go as freely as they pleased.  If 
they are not ordered to live in the factories of the hong merchants who had been 
officially registered, we shall have difficulty in knowing whether they engage in 
intrigue and when they come and go.  Again, if their business is not managed by the 
hong merchants, there will be more abuses. 
“This regulation should also be approved as the viceroy has petitioned.  
Hereafter we order foreign merchants to reside at the factories of the hong 
 APPENDIX 1 229 
 
merchants who are under our strict jurisdiction.  If their rooms and houses are not 
large enough to house the foreigners, then we should order that the hong merchants 
rent houses and send men to take care of them.  We do not allow traitors to enter 
and depart at will, to trade privately with them.  However, the hong merchants 
should not exploit them by raising their rent as they see fit, now that we have the 
situation really under control.  We order the local magistrates to watch carefully and 
sternly prohibit such abuse. 
“(3) We should forbid Chinese merchants from borrowing capital from the 
foreign barbarians and we should forbid the foreigners from hiring Chinese as their 
servants:  On investigation, the viceroy found that the barbarian merchants who 
always came to Kwangtung are allowed to sell out the goods they bring and 
purchase other goods to take back to their own countries.  No contraband should be 
secretly exported.  Recently, the hong merchants and people of the Interior 
borrowed money mostly from the barbarians in order to do their business and to 
share their profits. 
“We should approve what the viceroy has petitioned and order the hong 
merchants who had borrowed foreign money to report the truth.  We should set a 
time limit within which they should be required to pay off their debts.  Then they 
will be no longer subject to further investigation.  Hereafter, if anyone violates the 
prohibition and borrows money from the foreigners and engages in intrigue with 
them, he should be punished according to the law by which we punish criminals 
who communicate with a foreign country, borrow money or hold their goods or 
money without payment.  The money which they borrow should be confiscated by 
the government. 
“Originally the foreigners brought their own boys to serve them because they 
were not allowed to hire people of the Interior.  Hereafter, if any shameless Chinese 
(with the exception of interpreters and agents) are so greedy for money that they are 
willing to be hired, they should strictly be prohibited from this practice by the local 
magistrates.  If the local magistrates let them enjoy indulgences, then they, too, 
should be punished. 
“(4) We should strictly prohibit the old abuse, namely, the hiring of our 
people by foreign merchants to transmit their news and letters:  On investigation, 
the viceroy found that the barbarians coming from afar and 
[start Documentary Chronicle page 226]  
going to the hongs to trade, should not be allowed, under the pretext of 
gathering news, to hire coolies for the transmission of news, and thus communicate 
with the treacherous merchants of the Interior. 
“We should approve what the said viceroy has petitioned and order the hong 
merchants and coolies to show everything they carry for the foreigners to the local 
magistrates for their scrutiny and investigation.  If any disobey this order, we 
should forthwith punish the men who, acting on behalf of the foreigners, look for 
and hire the coolies.  We should also punish the men who transmit letters for the 
foreigners. 
“When the Westerners living in Macao have official business and desire to send 
a letter to the Imperial Board of Astronomy, the foreign chief should petition our 
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maritime sub-prefect to forward it to the viceroy and respectively communicate 
with the Board of Astronomy and the throne.  This regulation should also be 
approved as the viceroy has petitioned. 
“(5) We should consider detaching officers from other garrisons to send 
them to the places where foreign ships anchor in order to examine and control their 
ships:  On investigation the viceroy found that whenever the foreign ships anchor, 
unfortunate incidents occur because they bring in their crews, men of cruel and 
violent character. Moreover, traitors and the tankas may secretly win over these 
men to their plots. 
“The said viceroy reported that at Kwangtung we used to have one garrison 
regiment of one officer and twelve soldiers to maintain order, but that was not 
enough.  We should allow the said viceroy to select a candidate of the rank of major 
under command of the viceroy's brigade to be specially stationed there to supervise 
the officers of the guard houses both for defense and for patrol.” 
The Emperor approved this memorial. 
231 
 
Appendix 2.   
The Original Five Regulations (1760) 
Contemporary Translation.  Full text of the “Regulations for the Control of 
Trade at Canton, 1760,” as set out in Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of 
the East India Company Trading to China 1635-1834 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1929), Vol. V, pp. 94-98 (Appendix AK): 
The merchants seperately received a Chop from the Tsongtou which is said to be 
published by the Emperors Order in Consequence of the Representation under Him 
by the above mentioned Magistrate. 
The following is a Translation of the Chop wch. came from Court. 
FOU Minister of State and Accounts presents this Memorial in obedience to your 
Majestys Orders given to the Council called Kiunki, to deliberate on the Memorial of 
Ly Tsongtou of the Provinces of Canton and Quangsi who proposes some 
regulations regarding Foreigners. 
1st. He represents the Residence of Foreigners at Canton in the Absence of 
the Ships, and demands that it may be forbid.  He says the Foreigners commonly 
arrive in the Fifth and Sixth Month, and return about the Ninth or Tenth Month.  If 
any of them are under the necessity of staying on their affairs, the Custom formerly 
was that they should go to Macao, Now many of them under the pretence of their 
Affairs not being finished live secretly at the Capital, and it is difficult to avoid bad 
consequences happening from it, which may be the occasion of much trouble.  He 
demands that after they have loaded their Ships, they may be ordered to return 
home at the usual time, and if there be any who have not settled their Affairs with 
the Hongists, that they are obliged to go [to] Macao, and that their unsold goods be 
left with the Hongist to sell for them in their Absence, that in the following 
Monsoon they may return to their respective Kingdoms &c. 
There is then a fixed certain time for the European Vessells to come and return.  
The Custom is that none should remain secretly in the Interior parts of this 
Kingdom.  At present because the Merchants have not paid their Debts, and that 
they have not finished their affairs with them, the Foreign Merchants make this 
pretence to live at the [provincial] Capital, endeavor to know the prices of Goods, 
and to buy them at Cheap rates to make a Profit on them.  The People of the 
Country intrigue with them and are guilty of base Tricks.  At present the Tsontou 
demands, that after the Foreign Merchants have finished their affairs, they return to 
their respective Ships.  That they should have no pretence to remain in the Interior 
parts of the Country, 
[start Chronicles page 95]  
To have comers & goers occasions irregularities and disorders, wch are against 
the good  Rules and Orders of the Country.  The Merchants or Hongists must settle 
all their accounts justly by the time of the departure of the Ships, and punctually 
pay what they are indebted, If any Merchandize or Goods are unsold, the Merchants 
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must among them bring affairs to a Conclusion, and must not prolong their Debts 
from Year to Year.  Both parties must act with Sincerity and fidelity, and not 
occasion losses, and oblige the Mandarines to assert their Authority.  The Foreign 
Merchants should return at their usual time, They deliver their Goods to the 
Hongists to sell for them, If there be any who abuse the Credit given them, and are 
Guilty of Rogueries, and it should come to the Knowledge of the Mandarines, they 
shall be severely Judged according to the laws of the Country, and punished 
without any Grace. 
If the Foreigners should not have finished their Affairs, and they will in the 
mean time live at Macao, They will in this case do as they Judge convenient to 
themselves, it is not necessary to oblige them to return to Europe, by which they 
must suffer great difficulties & Losses. 
2nd. He represents the necessity of Ordering the Hongists to watch the 
Foreigners who live in their Hongs with the Strictest Attention.  The Custom is for 
Foreigners on their arrival to take apartments in the Hongs.  At present there are 
Vagabonds who build Handsome houses to allure Strangers for which they receive 
great Rents, who let them do many bad things, who come and go, occasion trouble, 
carry on illicit trade, defraud the Customs, and commit several such like disorders.  
Hereafter none but the approved Hongists must be permitted to lodge, and trade 
with the Europeans.  If the Foreign Merchants commit disorders, and Violate the 
Laws, and the lower Mandarines do not prevent it they shall be broke, and rendered 
incapable of Serving &c.  The Hongist must carefully watch, and keep in order, the 
Foreign Merchants who live in their Hongs.  If the appointed Hongists, and the 
Linguists are in Collusion with them to commit Villanies, The Tsontou demands 
that hereafter the Guilty should be punished, That they will not be allowed to 
dispose of the houses at their pleasure, that all abuses be suppressed, and that the 
Foreign Merchants should not suffer Losses. 
3rd. He represents, concerning the money lent by Foreigners, and the 
Chinese who are in their Service, And he demands that these abuses be forbid.  At 
present numbers of Foreigners lend their Money that remains unemployed in trade, 
to the Merchants 
[start Chronicles page 96]  
of this Country, who go into other Provinces to trade, they make Contracts with 
them, and make use of them for sundry purposes.  If the people of this Country do 
hereafter on any pretence whatsoever take up money of Foreigners, he requires that 
they should be severely punished.  Foreign Merchants are allowed only to sell their 
Merchandizes they bring with them.  And to purchase what they have occasion to 
carry away, any other Trade has been long since prohibited, they are not permitted 
to send their Goods into other Provinces for their Accounts, At present there are 
many Peoples of the Country who trade with the Europeans Capital.  It is by such 
like Intrigues that Lieou- Ya-Pien has occasioned so much trouble.  And this 
prohibition is of great Consequence to the Country.  He demands that the Hongists 
be obliged to finish all their Accounts, and affairs, before the return of the Ships; If 
they act contrary to such Orders, if they don't settle their Accounts, and if they are 
guilty of any Rogueries, that they be severely punished, and that all the Goods also 
of those who borrow money be Confiscated. 
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Foreigners also bring with them Servants sufficient for their use, formerly they 
could only take few of the people of this Country into their Service.  Hereafter none 
but the established Linguists and Compradores are allowed of, and if any others 
presume to enter into the Service of the Europeans, the Inferior Mandarines must be 
acquainted with it, That it be ordered the Linguists take care this Prohibition be 
strictly observed, and if there be any who Act contrary to it they shall be strictly 
punished. 
4th. He represents that the Foreigners hire people to carry Lettrs into the 
Country, and demands that this Abuse be totally forbid.  There are many Foreigners 
who to carry on their trade send Peoples into the Province of Nankin, Chet-kiang 
and others, and even hire Post Horses to inform themselves of the price of Goods, as 
Hong- shing-y did when the Mandarines sent expresses to Seize the Criminals, the 
said Criminals received Intelligence before the arrival of the Orders by which means 
they Evaded them and fled from Justice, Lieou-Song-Ling of the Tribunal of 
Mathamaticks has twice given Intelligence that Que-Gan, Kouening, Fang-Cheou-Y 
and others desired to be called to Court to be employed in the service of the 
Emperor, and that it was by Lettrs he received from Macao, which gave him 
information thereof.  These Lettrs were brought by Chinese and this is what must 
for ever be forbid &c.  Foreigners take Hongs to trade in but under pretence of 
informing themselves of the price of Goods, they must not hire people to carry 
Lettrs 
[start Chronicles page 97]  
or otherwise have such Connections with the Country People; this is an Abuse 
that must be entirely Abolished. The Tsongtou requires that the said Lettr carriers be 
severely punished, that if it is necessary to communicate any affairs, the Report be 
made to the Mandarines, in Order for them to judge what is requisite to be done.  If 
after these Orders there be any who undertake to carry Letters, that those who are 
employed in these affairs and the Letter Carriers be severely punished.  As to the 
Foreigners of Macao, if they have any affairs, for the Service of the Emperor, to 
communicate to the Tribunal of Mathematicks, the Procurator must give 
information to the Mandarine called Hany-Fang-Tong-Tchy [the Kunming Fu] who 
will make his report to the Tsongtou, and he will accordingly as he may think 
proper send the necessary advices to Court, He demands that it should be the 
Tsongtou to treat on these affairs. 
5th. He represents that some Mandarines of War should be stationed to 
watch and keep the Foreign Ships in Order.  The Foreign Ships enter into the River 
and anchor at the place called Whampo, each Ship Crew consists of 100 to 200 Men.  
The Custom has hitherto been for a Mandarine of the Corps called Hie-Piao to be 
there with Soldiers to keep a good watch and prevent Disorders.  But this force is 
not sufficient, He therefore demands that a Reinforcement of a Mandarine called 
Cheou-Pei [Shou-pei] be added, that every thing be well looked after, and for the 
support of the said Augmentation, that Eight Tales per Month be taken out of the 
Receipt of the Customs.  That the Body of Guards in the Neighbourhood to appoint 
a Vessell with Soldiers to pass backwards and forwards, and that they keep a strict 
look out, which is to be continued until the departure of the Ships.  The Foreign 
Ships have a great number of People, many of them are of a wild brutish Nature, 
and may easily occasion trouble, The Villainous Boat Men connect themselves wth 
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them, wch occasions continual disturbances. The Tsontou desires besides the 
Mandarines who according to the antient Custom are on Duty, another be 
appointed with the Command of 100 or 200 Men, which will with difficulty be 
sufficient to keep the Foreigners in Order.  There must then be another Mandarine 
called Cheou-Pei of the Corps call Tou-Piao who must always be on Guard, prevent 
Disorders, and from time to time give all necessary Intelligence for the Expence and 
Charges of those on Duty according to the Ancient Custom Eight Tales per Month is 
allowed.  To defray the Expense of this Reinforcement Eight Tales must also be 
allowed, and the whole force must be on Duty until the Departure of the 
[start Chronicles page 98]  
Ships, and if they do not diligently do their Duty, the Superior Mandarines must 
break the Inferior Ones. 
We have examined and deliberated on all of Above mentioned Articles, and 
judge it necessary they be complied with, for which purpose we present this 
Memorial to your Majesty, Humbly imploring your most gracious Light, and 
through your profound Penetration to receive your Instructions, that your Orders 
may be communicated to the Tribunal, to be by them transmitted to the Tsongtou, 
that he may conform thereto, and Effectually see them observed. 
The Emperors answer was, that it be done according to their Request.
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Appendix 3.   
The Eight Regulations (1831) 
Contemporary Translation.  Full text of the “Eight Restrictions on 
Foreigners,” as set out in Hosea Ballou Morse, The Chronicles of the East 
India Company Trading to China 1635-1834 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1929), 
Vol. IV, pp. 293-301 (Appendix AB) (footnotes in the original, have been 
renumbered): 
Order from the Governor [Viceroy], communicated by the Namhaeheen on the 
subject of Eight Restrictions on Foreigners.  Dated 12th, received 20th May, 1831. 
Puan, the Namhaeheen, etc. hereby issues an order to the Hong Merchants with 
which they are required to make themselves fully acquainted.  A Communication 
has now been received from the Kwangchowfoo, which being opened is as follows: 
‘On the 19th day of the 2d Moon of the 11th Year of Taoukwang (March 9, 1831) 
a communication was received from Kwae the Poochingsze, stating that on the 9th 
day of the 2d moon of the 11th year of Taoukwang (February 27) he had received 
the following communication from Le the Cabinet Minister and Governor. 
‘It appears that on the 6th day of the 2d moon of the 11th year of Taoukwang 
(Feby 24th) I, the Governor, united with Choo, the Fooyuen and Chung the Hoppo, 
in sending a respectful Memorial to the Emperor, explaining old regulations, 
intended to guard against outside barbarians, and deciding on the circumstances 
that required modification by addition or diminution.  Besides waiting til the 
Vermillion Pencil’s reply be received, when it shall respectfully be recorded and 
communicated, I also take the original of the memorial to his Majesty and 
communicate it forthwith.  When sent to the Sze, let him pass it to the Foo, to deliver 
to the Hien, that he may make it known to the local civil and military officers, and 
may also order the Hong Merchants to act in obedience to it.  Oppose not.’  
Accompanying is a Copy of the original Memorial. 
I, the Namhaeheen, having received this forthwith issue a copy of it, for 
obedience thereto.  When it reaches the said Merchants, let them immediately obey, 
and act according to the tenor thereof.  Oppose not.  A special order — 
Annexed is a copy of the original Memorial. 
Dated Taoukwang 11th Year 4th moon 1st day. 
  May 12th 1831. 
Regulations to guard against foreigners proposed to the Emperor by Governor 
Le, Deputy Governor Choo and Hoppo Chung, in Council.  February 24th 1831, 
Communicated to foreigners by 
[start Chronicles page 294] 
an order of Government dated May 12th.  Received at Macao May 20th. 
236 APPENDIX 3 
A memorial to explain old regulations intended to guard against outside 
barbarians, and also certain deliberations to modify them by additions and 
diminutions, that the same may be obeyed and kept.  Looking up we pray for the 
sacred glance at the business. 
Canton Provincial City being near the Coast and the place where foreign ships 
go and come, it is extremely fitting that the guard against them and watch over 
them should be perfectly complete and close. 
During the reign of Kienlung the English foreign merchants having violated the 
prohibitions of the Celestial Empire, the then Governor Le-she-yaou1 proposed to 
the Emperor and had enacted five regulations to guard against outside barbarians 
which were available to keep them under control: but through length of days they 
have gradually been neglected and the execution of them relaxed. 
In the 9th year of Taoukwang the English foreign merchants having long 
deferred entering the Port because they solicited a diminution of the Port charges 
and again last year having secretly taken foreign women to live in the Factories, and 
by stealth conveyed them to Canton, which things were reported to the Emperor at 
the time, although the said foreigners repented and did not end as they had begun 
with perverted opposition; still the disposition of Barbarians being deceitful and 
crafty, it is absolutely necessary to carry into effect with severity the inhibitory 
orders and to strengthen the guards against them. 
But as to the old regulations that were enacted, present and former 
circumstances are different; and there are some points which require 
consideration and modification to suit the times, and then the whole may be 
obeyed and kept. 
We, calling to our aid the Treasurer and Judge with the old regulations [and] 
deliberated on the modifications which the times require — and have charged the 
civil and Military Officers; the soldiers and police to exert themselves in keeping up 
a constant patrol and guard.  And have required the Hong Merchants and Linguists 
to be faithful in examining and searching into what is going on.  Thus when 
strictness inside has become a habit — or established customs inside are enforced 
with strictness — disturbances fro outside barbarians will be eradicated: and, 
seemingly the principles of a good Charioteer in restraining and soothing his horse 
will be more thoroughly carried into effect. 
Having reverently associated with us the Hoppo Chung, we unitedly present 
with profound respect this Memorial, and send 
[start Chronicles page 295] 
a fair Copy of the Eight regulations which have been deliberated on for the 
Emperor’s inspection — prostrate praying for His Majesty’s Sacred perusal and 
instructions. 
A Copy of the original regulations to guard against foreigners, together with the 
alterations which have now been made and arranged under eight topics is hereby 
reverently presented for His Majesty’s perusal. 
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1st. Foreign Merchants must not remain over the Winter at Canton.  This is 
an old regulation that should be modified to keeping up at all times a guard against 
them. 
When this regulation was originally framed the foreign Ships came to Canton 
and anchored during the 5th and 6th moons; during the 9th or 10th they returned to 
their respective Countries, they were not allowed to remain in Canton City to find 
out the price of goods; to make purchases and acquire profit; and to go backwards 
and forwards having intercourse with Native Chinese, which originated traitorous 
connexions.  If the goods in their Hongs were not all sold, and they wished for the 
time being to live at Macao they were permitted to suit their convenience. 
On searching it is found that in the time of Kienlung the foreign vessels which 
came to Canton did not exceed 30 or 40, but now they amount to 70 or 80, or even 
100. 
Of late years the English Company’s Barbarian Ships have arrived in succession 
during the 7th or 8th moons, and having exchanged their Cargoes, have left the Port 
in the 12th moon, or onward to the 1st and 2nd moons of the ensuing Year. 
The said Nation’s Company’s Chief and foreign merchants, after the Company’s 
ships were gone and affairs completed requested permits to go to Macao and reside 
there, till the 7th or 8th moons when the said Nation’s merchant ships came to 
Canton Province and then they requested permits to go up to Canton City to 
superintend the Commerce. 
Exclusive of these, there are the several Nations of India and America whose 
foreign ships come to Canton.  Their trade is coming and going at uncertain 
intervals, by no means like the English Company’s.  Of these under one Man’s name 
there may be one or two ships in a Year that come to Canton; or three or four ships, 
or an individual may have no ship at all, but only goods consigned to him to sell in 
some other ship.  These foreign Merchants all remain at Canton to manage their 
affairs.  As the foreign ships are now double what they were formerly, and the time 
of their anchoring is uncertain — beside, as they have remained at Canton, 
transacting their Commercial Affairs, for many years with mutual tranquility, it is 
doubtless unnecessary 
[start Chronicles page 296] 
to restrict them positively to the 9th or 10th moon to return to their own country. 
Hereafter if foreign Merchants do indeed arrive early at Canton City and all their 
goods be sold, then according to the old regulations, let them reverse their oar at the 
appointed time, but if they arrive late on the 8th or 9th moons, and require time to 
sell their goods, let the Hong Merchants be charged to keep a strict oversight and 
control over the Foreign Merchants residing in Canton.  At the same time dealing 
justly to make haste to pay the price of things; not being allowed to contract debts 
and persist in delaying. 
Let the foreign Merchants of all Nations when their goods are sold and business 
finished — whatever the time may be go home with their Ships or go down to 
Macao and reside there; they must not intentionally delay their departure.  By this 
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modification, foreigners will all be prevented from lingering long in Canton, and 
traitorous Natives will rarely have a pretext for forming illegal connexions. 
2nd. Borrowing foreign Merchants money — it is right to eradicate the evil 
of contracting debts. 
When the regulations were originally established native merchants violated 
prohibitions by borrowing money of foreign Merchants, and strung on, being led by 
hooked connexions.  At that time their offences were punished according to the 
law for ‘Forming connexions with foreign nations and borrowing money to 
defraud.’  The money borrowed was prosecuted for and confiscated. 
This old law against Hong Merchants’ borrowing money of foreign Merchants 
was long strictly acted on.  But the Hong Merchants when foreign Merchants left the 
port, eventually made a vague statement (whether they were indebted for 
balances or not) that affairs were concluded.  These are unworthy of credit and 
the gloss should be done away with. 
Hereafter beside prosecuting and punishing according to law the Hong 
Merchants who borrow money of foreigners and string on and are led by hooked 
connexions with them — the foreign Merchants who trade with Hong Merchants 
must be made every year, when their affairs are concluded, to give in to the Hoppo, 
a voluntary written declaration, for his examination, whether there be any 
outstanding claims or not.  Then should the Hong Merchant fail, the foreign claims 
which have been previously reported will be paid by instalments, those that have 
not been reported, even if prosecuted for, will not receive any attention from 
Government. 
And it must be ordered that all balances due by Hong Merchants must be paid 
within three months.  Procrastination will 
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not be permitted and when they are paid the foreign Merchant’s receipt must be 
presented to Government and preserved on record.  If payment be not made 
within the limited period, it is allowed to the foreign merchant to prosecute.  If he 
does not choose to prosecute he may do as he pleases; but if he prosecute after the 
period has expired, Government will pay no attention to his claims.  This is to 
eradicate the trick of old and new claims being made to radiate upon each other. 
3rd. The original interdict was to prevent foreign Merchants having 
Natives to serve them.  This requires a little modification.  The original regulations 
ran thus.  That foreign Merchants living in the factories were strictly interdicted 
from employing any other Natives than Linguists and Compradores. 
It is found by research that of the Natives who have been given to foreigners to 
serve, there had heretofore been a class denominated Shawan2 (quasi dicat Sand 
Literate) these have long been interdicted and it is right, still to act according to the 
old prohibitions, and severely interdict them.  But recently the foreign Merchants of 
various Nations who have come hither have much increased.  They continually 
require people to look after their goods; to watch their gates; to carry water and to 
carry goods, and the black demon Slaves which the foreign Merchants bring are by 
nature very stupid and fierce; if they (the foreign Merchants) be compelled to use 
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entirely black demon slaves, it is really apprehended that there will be such a large 
collection of them, that in going out and in they will wrangle with the natives, and 
the arrangement turn out to be the creation of disturbance. 
It is right to request that hereafter the people necessary in the foreign factories, 
for taking care of Cargo, keeping the gate, carrying water, and carrying goods be 
hired by the Compradore from among Natives, and he shall report their names and 
surnames to the Hong Merchants, who, with the said Factory’s Compradore, shall 
be made responsible for searching into what they do and controlling them. 
Should any of these people instruct and seduce the foreign Merchants to act 
traitorously, let the Hong Merchants and Compradore report them to Government 
and request that they might be prosecuted. 
4th. After the foreign Merchants enter the port and anchor, let there be at 
that place as heretofore Military Officers and soldiers appointed to search and 
examine.  In the Hong Merchants factories where foreigners live — let them be 
under the restraint and control of the Hong Merchant, to prevent disturbances. 
The regulations originally enacted were, that when the foreign 
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ship had entered the Port and anchored at Whampoa, Military Officer and 
twelve soldiers should be sent from the Kwangheep; these were to construct a mat 
shed and keep guard.  A Military Officer was also to be selected sent from the 
Suhpeaou, to search and examine — And from the adjacent Military Station a row 
boat was to be sent, to unite with another boat sent from the left wing of the middle 
division in searching and examining.  After the Ship left the Port they were to be 
recalled.  In these arrangements there is no occasion to make any change.  But from 
length of days these orders are considered mere form.  It is right to make continually 
a secret search, and if the Military become remiss and steal repose, to punish them 
severely forthwith. 
As to foreign Merchants lodging in Hong Merchants factories, it has heretofore 
been the duty of Hong Merchants to govern and control them.  The purchases of 
goods made by them must pass through the hands of a Hong Merchant.  This was 
originally designed to guard against the traitorous Natives misleading them, 
teaching them and egging them on.  Hereafter the foreign Merchants dwelling in the 
Hong Merchants Factories, must not be allowed to presume of their own accord to 
go out and in, lest they should Trade and carry on clandestine transactions with 
traitorous Natives. 
The boats on Canton river in which they go must not be allowed to set sail and 
go fast; lest they rush against Native boats on the River and wrangle and quarrel.  
They must not be allowed to wander about the Villages and Market places near 
Canton in order that bloody affrays may be prevented. 
5th. Foreigners clandestinely taking foreign females to dwell in the 
factories, at Canton, their ascending to sit in shoulder chariots (sedan chairs) must 
both be interdicted. 
It is found on enquiry that the foreigners of every Nation bringing wives and 
women servants to Canton City to dwell has long been strictly interdicted; but last 
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year the English Chief violated the laws and brought them.  They have already been 
expelled and driven back to Macao.  It is found out that the woman he brought to 
Canton, was brought by the said foreign Merchant from his own Country.  The 
women servants who followed them were Portuguese of Macao hired to serve. 
Hereafter it is right to issue strict orders to the Chief foreign Merchants of every 
Nation disallowing them bringing foreign women to Canton to reside.  If they are 
wilfully to disobey then trade will be forthwith stopped, and they immediately 
sent under escort to Macao.  At the same time let it be made the duty of Custom 
house Cruizers, officers and soldiers in the event of meeting foreigners carrying 
females to Canton to intercept them and send them back. 
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Further let orders be given to the Tungche of Macao to transmit orders to the 
Portuguese foreign Headman Weileto, and the Fanchae (or foreign ‘Envoy) that 
hereafter other foreigners hiring women to serve are allowed to reside at Macao 
only — it is not allowed to the Macao Authorities to permit them being taken to 
Canton.  If there be disobedience to this Order — Weileto alone will be responsible. 
As to foreigners using chairs in Canton, it all arose from traitorous vagabonds 
giving them, and chair-bearers coveting gain.  Besides ordering foreigners of every 
Nation to Yield obedience and that hereafter they must not at Canton City ascend 
the shore in Sedan Chairs; let it be strictly interdicted for traitorous Merchants to 
give chairs to, or hire chair bearers for foreigners.  And if chairmen scheming to 
obtain gain dare to disobey this order as soon as it is discovered let them be seized 
and severely prosecuted. 
6th. It is right to make it a duty of Custom House Cruizers officers and 
soldiers, with more strictness and care to interdict and prevent foreigners from 
conveying musketts and guns to Canton. 
The interdict against foreigners bringing muskets or guns with them to Canton 
was originally very strict; but last year there was a foreigner who suddenly and by 
stealth conveyed muskets and guns to a foreign factory in Canton, violating in an 
extreme degree old regulations.  Hereafter let it be the duty of Custom house 
Cruizers Officers and soldiers, to be faithful in endeavoring to find out such 
attempts; or if; still worse, should they know of them and connive at them, let the 
said Officers and men be immediately brought up, tried and sentenced. 
7th. In case of English Company’s Captains3 going backwards and 
forwards in boats; and foreign Merchants cargo vessels receiving clearances to quit 
the Port, it is right to obey the standing regulations. 
Of the foreign ships that trade the Company’s Captains, when it occurs they 
have public business to attend to, go backward and forward in San pan boats, to 
interdict and stop which is difficult.  It is right to allow them as heretofore to go in 
boats.  If they carry contraband goods, let the Custom house officers and soldiers 
examine strictly and report for the management of the Affair.  But heretofore, there 
must be a foreign headman or Captain in her before a Sanpan boat is allowed to go 
with a flag 
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set.  If there be no headman or ship Captain in her it must not be allowed, 
irregularly to sail a boat with flag — Still let the old regulation be adhered to [to] 
prevent confusion. 
In going from Macao to Whampoa and Canton and from Canton to Whampoa 
and Macao, let a permit4 be requested.  They must not go and come when and as 
they please.  Doing so will be an offence that will be enquired into. 
As to foreign Merchants Cargo Vessels receiving a Red Chop (or Clearance) to 
quit the Port, heretofore application has been made to the Custom House.  Let it still 
be the duty of the Custom House to inform the forts on every such occasion, that 
they may examine and let go, and so stoppages and disturbances be prevented. 
8th. It is necessary to make arrangements concerning foreigners presenting 
Petitions: whether a distinction would not be made in Affairs of importance, and it 
be settled when they must be presented for them and when they themselves may 
present them. 
There must be explicit and fixed regulations determining whether the Hong 
Merchants are to present Petitions for foreign Merchants or they are to present them 
themselves; then a confused way of acting, and one exceeding what is proper may 
be prevented.  Let an order be issued to the English and other foreign Merchants 
requiring their obedience thereto, — that hereafter, if any very important affair 
occur, which it is absolutely necessary to convey to the Governor’s Office, let the 
Petition be delivered to the Senior Hong Merchant or Security Merchant to present it 
for them.  It is not allowed that foreigners should presume to go the City Gate and 
deliver it to the Military Officer on Guard.  When they present a Petition one or two 
foreigners only are allowed to proceed with it.  They are not allowed to take a 
number of men with them to blazon abroad the Affair. 
If the business be of a common place nature, and the Hong Merchants have not 
refused to present it for them; or the topic be one which it was improper to present; 
then the foreigner who shall perversely offend and take a number of people to the 
City Gate to present a Petition, that foreign Merchants trade shall forthwith be 
stopped one Month, and he be disallowed to buy or sell any goods, thereby to 
chastise his disrespect. 
Petitions concerning ordinary topics of Trade, must be presented at the Hoppo’s 
Office; and ordinary Petitions 
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concerning local occurrences must be presented to the Macao Tungche, or the 
Heangshan Hien; or the Macao Tsotang — in all which cases it is allowed to appeal 
as usual.
                                     
1  Tradition says that this Governor had a share in Puankhequa’s house. 
2  Shawan is the Chinese mode of pronouncing the English word ‘servant.’ 
3  Skippers. 
4  A Red Chop. 
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Appendix 4.   
The Eight Regulations (1835) 
“The new regulations for foreigners, which were prepared by their excellencies 
the governor, fooyuen, and hoppo, on the 28th of the 1st moon of the 15th year of 
Taoukwang, (Feb. 25th, 1835) have received the approbation of his majesty, with 
solemn injunctions that thenceforth they be strictly obeyed.  Copies of these 
regulations, with the hoppo’s seal stamped upon them, have recently been 
circulated among the residents in Canton.  The regulations are eight in number; 
for a translation of them the reader is referred to the third volume of the 
Repository, pages 580-584.”  Chinese Repository, Vol. 4, page 199 (August 1835). 
Contemporary Translation.  Full text of the “Eight Regulations,” 
promulgated 8 March 1835, with their official transmittal, as published in 
the Chinese Repository, Vol. 3, pages 579-584 (April 1835): 
Document from the hoppo, containing a memorial from the Canton government 
to the emperor, with eight regulations restrictive of foreign trade. 
Pang, by imperial appointment, superintendent of the maritime customs of 
Canton, &c. &c., issues this order to the hong-merchants, requiring their full 
acquaintance with the contents thereof.  I have received the following 
communication from the governor: — 
“Whereas I the governor united, on the 28th day of the first moon, in the 15th 
year of Taoukwang, with your excellency the hoppo, and Ke, the lieutenant-
governor of Kwangtung, in framing a respectful memorial concerning restrictive 
regulations decided on for the direction of the trade and of barbarians: We must 
now await the receipt of a reply in vermilion [i.e. in the imperial handwriting], 
when the same shall be reverently recorded and communicated to you. 
“A communication is at the same time addressed to the governors of the 
metropolitan provinces [Chihle and Keangnan], and of Minche [Chekeang and 
Fuhkeen], and to the lieut-governors of the provinces of Keangsoo, Chekeang, and 
Fuhkeen, requesting that they will issue general orders to all civil and military 
officers along the coast within their jurisdiction, strictly to command that the 
merchant ships, hereafter, when resorting to Canton to purchase foreign goods, 
shall one and all repair to the chief custom-house of Canton, and request a stamped 
manifest, enumerating the goods and their quantities; likewise to disallow private 
purchases; and also to maintain strict investigation, that if any vessels from the sea, 
bringing home transmarine goods, be found on examination to be without the 
stamped manifest of the custom-house, such goods may be immediately regarded as 
contraband, and examination made and punishment inflicted, according to the 
regulations. 
“Instructions also are given to the tungche of Macao, for him immediately to 
give strict orders to the pilots, the compradors, and so forth, that they may obey and 
act accordingly.  Hereafter, they are imperatively required to adhere to the 
regulations established by memorial to the emperor; they are to be careful in 
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piloting vessels; and they must not unlawfully combine (with foreigners) to 
smuggle; if the barbarian ships go out or come in contrary to the regulations, or if 
the barbarians clandestinely go about in small boats to places along the coast, 
rambling about the villages and farms, the said pilots are to be assuredly brought 
with strictness to an investigation: if there be any sale or purchase of contraband 
goods, or stealthy smuggling of goods liable to duty, and the compradors do not 
report according to the truth, they also are to be immediately punished with rigor; 
and are decidedly to have no indulgence shown to them. 
“Instructions are likewise given to the poochingsze and anchasze to examine and 
act in accordance with the tenor of the copy of this memorial; and immediately to 
transmit directions to the civil and military officers along the coast (of the province) 
to act in obedience thereto; also to command the hong-merchants and linguists to 
enjoin orders on the barbarian merchants of every nation, for them to obey and act 
accordingly.” 
This coming before me the hoppo, I unite the circumstances, and issue this order.  
When the order reaches the said merchants, let them act in obedience to the tenor of 
the copy of the memorial, and enjoin orders on the barbarian merchants of every 
nation, that they may pay obedience thereto.  Oppose.  An to special order.  
Annexed is a paper containing a fair copy of the memorial, as follows: — 
“A reverent memorial concerning restrictive regulations determined on for the 
direction of the trade and of barbarians, is hereby presented, imploring the Sacred 
Glance to be cast thereon.  With reference to barbarians from beyond the outer seas 
coming to Canton to trade, since the time when, the in 25th year of Keenlung [1760], 
restrictive enactments were fixed by a representation (to the throne), there have also 
been further regulations from time to time determined on; viz., in the 14th year of 
Keaking [1810], and in the 11th year of Taoukwang 
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[1831], by several former governors and lieut.-governors; and on representation 
(to the throne) the same have been sanctioned, obedience has been paid to them, 
and they have become established laws.  These have been complete and effectual.  
But during the length of days they have been in operation, either they have in the 
end become a dead letter, or there have gradually sprung up unrestrained offenses.  
Last year, the English Company was ended and dissolved.  The said nation’s 
merchants come at their own option to trade.  There is none having a general 
control.  Although commands have been issued to the said nation’s barbarian 
merchants to send a letter home to their country, to continue the appointment of a 
taepan, who shall come to Canton for the direction and control (of affairs); yet as the 
merchants are now many, and individuals are mingled together, while affairs are 
under no united jurisdiction, it is necessarily required that regulations should be 
enacted and published, that they may be obeyed and adhered to.  But the affairs of 
time have variations of present and past; and since the English barbarians’ 
Company is dissolved, the attendant circumstances of commerce are also slightly 
different from what they were formerly. 
“Besides those old regulations, respecting which it is unnecessary further to 
deliberate, but which may all, as formerly, continue to be distinctly enumerated in 
plain commands; and besides the regulations regarding the management of 
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barbarian debts, and regarding the strict seizure of smugglers, which have already 
been specially represented; there are still regulations which require to be 
reconsidered, for the purpose of adding or altering.  These we, your majesty’s 
ministers, calling into council with us the poochingsze and the anchasze, have fully 
deliberated upon.  The rules of dignified decorum should be rendered awe-striking 
in order to repress overstepping presumption; the bounds of intercourse should be 
closely drawn, in order to eradicate Chinese traitors; the restraints on egress and 
ingress should be diligently enforced; the responsible task of investigation and 
supervision should be carefully attended to: then surely in the restrictive enactment, 
there will be unceasingly displayed minute care and diligence.  At the same time the 
hong-merchants should be strictly commanded to deal fairly and equitably; each 
regarding highly his respectability in order that all the foreigners, thoroughly 
imbewed with the sacred dew of favor, may universally quake with awe, and be 
filled with tender regard.  Looking upwards, to aid our sovereign’s extreme desire 
to soothe into subjection the far-coming barbarians, and to give weight and attention 
to the maritime guard: we respectfully join these expressions in a reverent and duly 
prepared memorial; and also take the eight regulations which we have determined 
on, and making separately a fair copy thereof, respectfully offer them for the 
imperial eye: prostrate, supplicating our sovereign to cast the sacred glance thereon, 
and to impart instruction.  A respectful memorial.  Taoukwang, 15th year, 1st moon, 
28th day.  (Feb. 25th, 1833.) 
“We respectfully take eight additional and altered regulations, restrictive of the 
barbarians, whereon we have deliberated and decided, and have attentively made a 
fair copy thereof, we with reverence offer them for the imperial perusal:” 
1. The outside barbarians’ ships of war convoying goods are not permitted to 
sail into the inner seas.  It is requisite to enforce with strictness the prohibitory 
commands, and to hold the naval force responsible for keeping them off. 
On examination it appears, that the trading barbarians may bring ships of war to 
protect their goods themselves.  This has been the case for a long time past.  But the 
regulation hitherto existing, only permits them to anchor in the outer seas, there 
waiting until the cargo vessels leave the port, and then sailing back with them.  They 
are not allowed to presume to enter the maritime port.  From the period of the reign 
of Keaking onwards, they have gradually failed to pay implicit obedience to the old 
rule; and last year there was again an affair of irregularly pushing in through the 
maritime entrance.  Although the said barbarians, sailing into the shallow waters of 
the inner river, can effect nothing in the least; yet restrictive measures always should 
be perfect and complete.  With regard to the line of forts at the Bocca Tigris, there 
are now some additional erections and some removals in progress: and at the same 
time more cannon are being cast, and measures of preparation and defense are 
being determined on.  It is, besides this, requisite to enforce with strictness the 
regulations and prohibitions. 
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Hereafter, if a ship of war of any nation convoying goods presumes to enter 
either of the maritime ports of Cross Harbor or the Bocca Tigris, the barbarians 
merchants’ cargo vessels shall have their holds altogether closed, and their trade 
stopped, and at the same time the (ship of war) shall be immediately driven out.  
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The naval commander-in-chief also shall be held responsible, whenever he meets 
with a ship of war of the outside barbarians anchored in the outer seas to give 
commands immediately to all officers and men of the forts, that they apply 
themselves to the object of keeping up preventive measures against the same; also to 
lead forth in person the naval squadron, to cruize about with them in guard of all 
the maritime entrances, and to unite their strength to that of the forts, for the 
purpose of guarding against (any such ship of war).  Should the officers or soldiers 
be guilty of negligence and indolence, they shall be reported against with severity.  
It is imperatively necessary that the power of the naval and land forces should be 
exerted in unbroken concert, that the barbarian ships may have no way of 
irregularly pushing through. 
2. When barbarians stealthily transport muskets and cannon, or clandestinely 
bring up foreign females or foreign sailors, to the provincial city, the hong-
merchants shall be held responsible in all points for investigating the matter. 
It appears on examination, that barbarians may carry with them one sword, one 
rapier, and one gun each; this the regulations do not prohibit.  But if they presume, 
besides this, to bring cannon and muskets or other military weapons, or foreign 
females, up to the provincial city, the fixed regulations hold the officers and men of 
the guard-houses responsible for finding out and stopping them.  The guard-
stations have indeed the responsible task of searching and discovering; but the 
barbarian merchants at Canton, dwelling in the outside barbarians’ factories, the 
apartments which they occupy are all rented by them from the hong-merchants.  
The said merchants’ ears and eyes are close to them: they certainly cannot be 
ignorant (of anything they do); it is evidently befitting that they should, on all 
points, be held responsible for investigating and finding out (whatever is done). 
Hereafter, the barbarians of every nation shall be altogether disallowed bringing 
up muskets, cannon or other military weapons, or foreign females or sailors, to the 
provincial city.  If any should clandestinely bring them up, the hong-merchant from 
whom their factory is rented, shall be held responsible for discovering and 
preventing it, and for disallowing them to be brought into the factory; and for at the 
same time repairing to the local magistrate to present a report (of any such attempt).  
Should he suffer, connive at, and conceal such attempt the said hong-merchant shall 
be punished according to the law against clandestine intercourse with outside 
nations.  The officers and men of the guard-stations who fail to discover such 
misdemeanors shall also be severally tried and rigorously punished, as guilty of 
‘failing to investigate and willfully conniving.’ 
3. Pilots and compradors of barbarian ships must have licenses from the 
tungche of Macao; it must not be allowed that they should be privately hired. 
It is found on examination that in the office of the tungche of Macao, there have 
hitherto been appointed 14 pilots: and whenever a barbarian ship arrives in the sea 
outside the Bocca Tigris, a report should be made to the said tungche, that he may 
command a pilot to take the ship into port.  For the provisions and necessaries 
required by the barbarian merchants on board the ship, a comprador should be 
employed; who is also selected from among men conspicuous in their native place 
for substance and property, and is appointed by the said tungche to fill the station.  
Of late, there has constantly been a set of vagabonds in the outer seas, falsely acting 
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in the capacity of pilots; who artfully make away with the goods of barbarians, and 
then run off.  There has also been a class of vagabonds who craftily assume the 
name of compradors, and unlawfully combine for the purpose of smuggling and 
other illegalities.  When the thing is discovered, and search is made for them, their 
names and surnames having been falsely assumed, there are no means of finding 
and bringing them to trial. 
Hereafter, the tungche of Macao, when appointing pilots, shall ascertain fully 
their age and outward appearance, their native place and habits of life, and shall 
give them a place on the list (of pilots), and a sealed and signed waist-war- 
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rant.*  A list also shall be kept of them, and a full report respecting them sent to 
the office of the governor and to the custom-house, to be there preserved.  When a 
barbarian ship is to be piloted in, a sealed license shall be given to them, stating 
explicitly the names and surnames of the pilot and master of the ship, which when 
the guard-stations have verified, they shall let the ship pass on.  Any men without 
the sealed and signed waist-warrant, the barbarian ships must not hire or employ.  
With regard to the compradors required by the barbarian ships, when anchored at 
Macao or Whampoa, they must all have waist-warrants given to them by the said 
tungche; and must be subject at Macao to examination by the said tungche, and at 
Whampoa, to examination by the Pwanyu heen magistrate.  If the barbarian ships 
come in or go out contrary to the regulations, or if the barbarians go about 
clandestinely in small boats, to places along the coast, rambling among the villages 
and farms, the pilots shall be brought to a strict investigation.  And if there be any 
trading in contraband goods, or any stealthy smuggling of goods subject to duty, 
and the compradors do not report the same according to the truth, the offense shall 
be rigorously punished. 
4. With regard to hiring and employing natives in the barbarian factories, there 
must be limits and rules clearly settled. 
On examination it appears, that it was formerly the regulation, that the trading 
barbarians should not be permitted to hire and employ any natives except linguists 
and compradors.  In the 11th year of Taoukwang, it was, on representation (to the 
throne), permitted, that in the barbarian factories, for gatekeepers, and for carriers of 
water and carriers of goods, natives might be hired for (foreigners) by the 
compradors.  But the silly populace earnestly gallop after gain, and possess but little 
shame.  And adjoining the provincial city, are many persons who understand the 
barbarian speech.  If the barbarians are allowed to hire them at their own pleasure, it 
will be difficult to prevent unlawful combinations and traitorous procedure.  It is 
evidently befitting that a limit and rule should be fixed, and that a special 
responsibility should be created. 
Hereafter, in each barbarian factory, whatever be the number of barbarians 
inhabiting it, whether few or many, it shall be permitted only to employ two 
gatekeepers and four water-carriers; and each barbarian merchant may hire one 
man to keep his goods.  It shall not be permitted to employ any more than this 
limited number.  The comprador of the barbarian factory shall be held responsible 
for hiring these men; the linguists shall be held responsible for securing, and filling 
up the places of the compradors; and the hong-merchants shall be held responsible 
 APPENDIX 4 247 
 
for securing and filling up the places of the linguists.  (This will be) a shutting up 
rule, extending through progressive grades.  If there be any illicit combination or 
breach of law, only the one who hired and stood security shall be answerable.  At 
the same time commands shall be given to the superintending hong-merchant, to 
make out monthly a fair list of the names and birthplaces of the compradors and 
coolies under each barbarian’s name, and hand it in to the district magistrate, to be 
kept in the archives, ready at any time to be examined.  As to the carriers of goods, 
the linguists shall be commanded to hire them miscellaneously, when the time 
comes (that they are required); and when the business is finished to send them back.  
With regard to natives being hired to become the menial attendants of barbarian 
merchants, under the name of shawan [servants], it shall still be for ever prohibited.  
Should merchants hire coolies beyond the limited number, or clandestinely hire 
shawan as menial attendants, the linguists and hong-merchants shall both receive 
punishment. 
5. With regard to barbarians sailing vessels about in the inner rivers, there 
should be reductions and limitations severally made, and the constant practice of 
idly rambling about should be prohibited. 
It appears on examination, that the barbarian trading vessels, when they enter 
the port, anchor at Whampoa.  In going to and fro between Canton and Macao, the 
English Company’s skippers only have hitherto been permitted to travel in flag-
bearing sampan boats.  This kind of sampan is a boat with a rather large hull, and a 
deck over it; rendering it easy to carry in it military weapons and 
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contraband goods.  Now that the Company has been dissolved, all the flag-
bearing sampan vessels should be done away with.  As to the barbarians residing in 
the foreign factories, they are not permitted to presume to go in and go out at their 
own pleasure.  In the 21st year of Keaking [1816], when governor Tseang was in 
office, it was arranged, that on three days, viz., the 8th, 18th, and 28th of every 
month, they should be permitted to ramble about once, in the neighborhood.  Of late 
years, the barbarians have continually disobeyed the old regulations; it is 
imperatively necessary to enforce powerfully the prohibitory commands. 
Hereafter, all the barbarians, when their ships reach Whampoa, if they have any 
business requiring them to go to and fro between Canton and Macao, or to 
interchange letters, are only permitted to use uncovered small sampans; they may 
not again use flag-bearing sampan vessels.  When the small sampans pass the 
custom-houses, they must wait until they are searched; and should they have in 
them contraband goods, or cannon or other military weapons, they must be 
immediately driven out.  The barbarians residing in the factories shall only be 
allowed to ramble out on the 8th, the 18th, and the 28th, three days of each month, 
in the neighboring flower gardens, and the Haechwang sze temple [on Honan].  
Each time there must not be more than ten individuals; and they must be limited to 
the hour of five in the evening to return to their factories.  They must not be allowed 
to remain out to sleep, or drink liquor.  If, when it is not the day that they may 
receive permission, they should go out to ramble, and they exceed the number of ten 
individuals, or if they go to other villages, hamlets, or market-places, to ramble 
about, the hong-merchants and linguists shall both receive punishment. 
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6. When barbarians petition on any subject, they should in all cases petition 
through the medium of the hong-merchants, in order that the dignity of government 
may be rendered impressive. 
On examination it appears, that the written characters of outside barbarians and 
the central flowery people are not of the same nature.  Among them [the former], 
there are some who have a rough idea of Chinese characters; but they are 
unacquainted with style and god diction, and are ignorant of the rules required for 
maintenance of dignity.  When they petition on affairs, their expressions are devoid 
of intelligent signification, and there is always much that is difficult to explain.  
They also, in an irregular manner, adopt epistolary forms, and confusedly proceed 
to present papers themselves; greatly infringing the dignity of government.  
Moreover, that for one and the same barbarian affairs, petitions should be 
presented, either through the medium of the hong-merchants, or by barbarians 
themselves, is an inconsistent mode of acting. 
Hereafter, on every occasion of barbarians making petitions on any affair, they 
must always have the hong-merchants to petition, and state the circumstances for 
them.  It is unnecessary that they should themselves frame the expressions of the 
petitions.  If there be accusations to be brought against a hong-merchant on any 
affair, and the hong-merchants may, perhaps, carry it oppressively, and refuse to 
petition for them, then the barbarians may be allowed to go themselves to the offices 
of the local magistrates and bring forward their charges; and the hong-merchants 
shall be immediately brought to examination and trial. 
7. In securing barbarian ships by hong-merchants, there should be employed 
both securities by engagement and securities by rotation, in order to eradicate 
clandestine illegalities. 
It is found on examination, that when barbarian ships come to Canton the old 
rule is, that they should be secured by all the hong-merchants in successive rotation; 
and that if they transgress the laws, the security-merchant shall alone be 
responsible.  Afterwards, it was apprehended, that securing by rotation was 
attended with offenses of grasping and oppressive dealing; and all the keang keo 
barbarian [i.e. country] ships were permitted themselves to invite hongs to secure 
them.  Now, the Company has been dissolved; and the barbarian ships that come 
are scattered, and without order; if the responsibility of being secured by the hong-
merchants in rotation be again enforced, as formerly, it is apprehended that offenses 
of extortionate oppression will arise.  And yet if suffered themselves to choose their 
securities, it is difficult to insure that there will not be acts of unlawful combination. 
[start Chinese Repository page 584] 
Hereafter, when the barbarian ships arrive at Canton, they shall still as formerly, 
be permitted to invite hongs in which they have confidence , to become their 
engaged securities; and all the trade in goods, the requesting of permits, the 
payment of duties, and the transaction of public affairs, shall be attended to by the 
engaged security-merchant.  In the payment of duties, the tariff regulations shall be 
conformed to; it shall not be allowed to make the smallest fractional addition.  At 
the same time, to each vessel shall be appointed a security by rotation, the duty of 
which, each hong-merchant shall fulfill in his successive routine.  It shall be his 
special duty to examine and investigate affairs.  If the engaged security-merchant 
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join with the barbarian to make sport of legal practices and traitorous machinations, 
or secretly add to the amount of duties, or incur debts to the barbarians, the 
security-merchant by rotation shall be held responsible for giving information 
thereof, according to the facts, that the other may be brought to an investigation, 
and that the debts may be reclaimed.  If the security by rotation connive, he shall 
also, on discovery, be brought to an investigation. 
8. If barbarian ships on the seas, clandestinely sell goods chargeable with duty, 
the naval forces should be held responsible for finding out, and seizing the same.  
Also communications should be sent to all the seaboard provinces, to examine and 
investigate. 
It appears on examination, that when the barbarian ships of every nation bring 
goods to Canton, it is reasonably required that they should enter the port, pay 
measurement charges and duties, and sell off through the medium of the hong-
merchants.  But the said barbarian vessels continually cast anchor in the outer seas, 
and delay entering the port; and some even do not at all enter the port, but return 
and sail away; not only storing up and selling opium, but also, it is feared, 
clandestinely disposing of foreign goods.  We, your majesty’s ministers, on every 
occasion of such being reported to us, have immediately replied, by strict directions 
to the naval forces to urge and compel them to enter the port, or if they will not 
enter the port, to drive them instantly away, and not permit them to loiter about.  
We have also appointed officers at the various maritime entrances, to seize with 
strictness smuggling vagabonds.  In repeated instances, men and vessels going out 
to sea to sell opium have been seized, and on investigation, punishment has been 
inflicted.  But the province of Canton has a line of coast continuous along the 
provinces of Fuhkeen, Chekeang, Keangsoo, and Teentsin [Chihle].  Traitorous 
vagabonds of the several provinces sail in vessels of the sea on the outer ocean, and 
clandestinely buy and sell goods, dealing with the barbarians, and then carry back 
(their purchases) by sea.  This class of traitorous dealers, neither entering nor 
leaving any of the seaports of Canton, there are no means of guarding against or 
seizing them.  And the foreign goods having a divided consumption, the amount 
that enters the port is gradually lessened; the consequences of which on the duties 
are great. 
Hereafter, the naval commanders-in-chief should be held responsible for giving 
commands to the naval vessels to cruize about in the outer seas in a constant course; 
and if there be any dealers approaching the barbarian ships, clandestinely to 
purchase foreign goods, immediately to seize them and give them over for trial and 
punishment.  Also, regulations should be established that vessels of the sea, of 
whatever province, when wanting to purchase foreign goods, shall all repair to the 
chief custom-house of Canton, and request a sealed manifest, enumerating the 
goods and their quantities; and that none should be permitted to make private 
purchases.  Communications should be sent to the provinces of Fuhkeen, Chekeang, 
&c., that general orders may be issued requiring obedience to be paid to this, and 
that strict search may be maintained in all the seaports, that if any sea-going vessel 
bring back foreign goods, and it appears that she has not the sealed manifest of the 
custom-house, they shall be immediately regarded as contraband, and, on legal 
investigation, the vessel and cargo confiscated. 
Taoukwang, 15th year, 2d moon, 10th day.  [March 8th, 1835.] 
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• This is a piece of wood with characters cut thereon, to be carried about the 
person; hence called a waist-warrant. 
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Appendix 5.   
The Eight Regulations (Per W.C. Hunter) 
Contemporary Translation.  Full text of the “Eight Regulations,” in an 
undated version, from William C. Hunter, The 'Fan Kwae' at Canton Before 
Treaty Days 1825-1844 (London: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1882), pp. 28-30 
(italics and footnotes in the original) (footnotes renumbered): 
The authorities framed eight regulations for the especial government and control 
of these divers people from afar.  They date from the year 1760, and are curious 
enough to recall.  Never having been abrogated, they were assumed to be in force 
always.  They were confirmed by an edict of the Emperor Kea-King [the Jiaqing 
Emperor] in 1819, after a revision in 1810.  Some of them came to be disregarded by 
the foreign community, particularly those referring to the Gardens, the Honam 
Temple, and pulling in their own boats on the river; but so far as regards women 
entering the Factories, an infringement of them in this essential particular took place 
in 1830, as will be seen hereafter.  The chief sufferers in the event of a disregard of 
any important item of the regulations would of course be the Hong merchants.  The 
'Eight Regulations' were now and then brought to the Factories by a Linguist, as an 
intimation that they were not to be considered a 'dead letter.' Translated into 
English they read thus —  
Regulation 1. — All vessels of war are prohibited from entering the Bogue.  
Vessels of war acting as convoy to merchantmen must anchor outside at Sea till  
their merchant-ships are ready to depart, and then sail away with them. 
Regulation 2. — Neither women, guns, spears, nor arms of any kind can be 
brought to the Factories.  
Regulation 3. — All river-pilots and ships' Compradores must be registered at the 
office of the ‘Tung- Che’1 at Macao.  That officer will also furnish each one of them 
with a licence, or badge, which must be worn around the waist.  He must pro- 
[start Fan Kwae page 29] 
duce it whenever called for.  All other boatmen and people must not have 
communication with foreigners, unless under the immediate control of the ships' 
Compradores; and should smuggling take place, the Compradore2 of the ship 
engaged in it will be punished. 
Regulation 4. — Each Factory is restricted for its service to 8 Chinese (irrespective 
of the number of its occupants), say 2 porters, 4 water-carriers, 1 person to take care 
of goods (‘godown coolie'), and 1 ma-chen (intended for the foreign word 
'merchant'), who originally performed all the duties of the 'House Compradore,' as 
he is styled to-day. 
Regulation 5   prohibits foreigners from rowing about the river in their own boats 
for 'pleasure.'  On the 8th, 18th, and 28th days of the moon 'they may take the air,' as 
fixed by the Government in the 21st year of Kea-King [Jiaqing] (1819).  All ships' 
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boats passing the Custom-houses on the river must be detained and examined, to 
guard against guns, swords, or firearms being furtively carried in them.  On the 8th, 
18th, and 28th days of the moon these foreign barbarians may visit the Flower 
Gardens and the Honam Joss-house,3 but not in droves of over ten at one time.  When 
they have 'refreshed' they must return to the Factories, not be allowed to pass the 
night 'out,' or collect together to carouse.  Should they do so, then, when the next 
'holiday' comes, they shall not be permitted to go.  If the ten should presume to 
enter villages, public places, or bazaars, punishment will be inflicted upon the 
Linguist who accompanies them. 
Regulation 6. — Foreigners are not allowed to present petitions.  If they have 
anything to represent, it must be done through the Hong merchants. 
Regulation 7. — Hong merchants are not to owe debts to foreigners.  Smuggling 
goods to and from the city is prohibited.  
Regulation 8. — Foreign ships arriving with merchandise must not loiter about 
outside the river; they must come direct 
[start Fan Kwae page 30] 
to Whampoa.  They must not rove about the bays at pleasure and sell to rascally 
natives goods subject to duty, that these may smuggle them, and thereby defraud 
His Celestial Majesty's revenue 
                                     
1  An assistant-magistrate.  Up to 1848 Macao was under the joint government of 
the Portuguese and Chinese. 
2  At this time the ships' Compradores were engaged at Macao, and not at 
Whampoa. 
3  Buddhist Temple. 
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1. Introduction. 
This is a study of the Chinese idea that inspired bank deposit insurance in the 
United States of America.  The idea of being held responsible based on membership 
in a group has ancient roots in Chinese history.  The unifying first Emperor Qin Shi 
Huang Di employed collective responsibility in military and social organization.  
The principle also had its financial application, being used to compel the payment of 
money to the state much in the same way it was used to compel action by subjects of 
the Emperor.  In the eighteenth century, Qing Dynasty regulators required 
merchants who conducted certain key businesses monopolized for the benefit of the 
imperial court to assume collective liability for the debts of other firms in the 
monopoly.  The hong merchants of Canton, China, who held a monopoly of China’s 
maritime foreign trade with the West, were forced to accept collective liability for 
the unpaid foreign debts of other guild members in 1780.  This practice, validated by 
association with the famous hong merchants of Canton, was taken by the legislature 
of the State of New York in 1829 as inspiration for the first bank deposit insurance 
statute ever enacted.  This Safety Fund (1829-1866) inspired the adoption of similar 
programs by thirteen other American states in turn.  While all of these programs 
had failed by the early 1900s, strong interest had grown in a national insurance plan, 
as an improvement on the state guarantee fund concept.  National deposit insurance 
was implemented in the United States under the Banking Act of 1933, adopted in 
the economic crisis of that year, and has been in force ever since.  Judged to be a 
success, much as the State of New York had understood the Chinese experience in 
1829, the American model of national deposit insurance has been followed around 
the world.  Explicit bank deposit insurance programs exist today in over one 
hundred nations, for which the inspiration can be traced back to Qing Dynasty 
China through the early national United States of America. 
2. Parallel crises (1829). 
The transplantation to the United States occurred in the context of parallel financial 
crises in the year 1829.  At Canton, in China, the group of hong merchants who were 
licensed to conduct China's maritime foreign trade was depleted in number, deep in 
debt, and experiencing severe difficulty recruiting new members.  In the State of 
New York, in the United States, a series of bank failures had raised concerns about 
the trustworthiness of the paper currency which the state permitted private banks to 
print and circulate.  The public was alarmed about the reliability of private 
banknotes, politicians were blamed for chartering weak banks, and the legislature 
responded by refusing to either renew old bank charters or grant any new ones until 
the issue was resolved.  Although the world was closely bound by ties of 
international trade in 1829 and information was moving with increasing speed 
between East and West, news of these crises did not travel.  Just as the crisis in New 
York was unknown in Canton, the crisis in Canton was likewise unknown in New 
York.  The British East India Company pressed the Chinese authorities at Canton for 
urgent trade reforms.  Unsuccessful, it imposed an embargo of trade which ran from 
October through February 1830.  The embargo also accomplished nothing.  In 
January of 1829, in Albany, in the State of New York, reform proponent Joshua 
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Forman premised his novel proposal for bank deposit insurance on the following 
confident words: 
“The propriety of making the banks liable for each other was suggested by 
the regulation of the Hong merchants in Canton, where a number of men, 
each acting separately, have by the grant of the government the exclusive 
right of trading with foreigners, and are all made liable for the debts of each 
in case of failure.  The case of our banks is very similar; they enjoy in 
common the exclusive right of making a paper currency for the people of the 
state, and by the same rule should in common be answerable for that paper.  
This abstractly just principle, which has stood the test of experience for 
seventy years, and under which the bond of a Hong merchant has acquired a 
credit over the whole world, not exceeded by that of any other security, 
modified and adapted to the milder features of our republican institutions, 
constitutes the basis of the system.” 
While the New York legislature did receive accurate information about the idea of 
collective liability for foreign debt among the hong merchants of Canton, it did not 
learn of the problematic actual experience of the Canton Guaranty System. 
3. The development of the Canton Guaranty System. 
The Manchu rulers of Qing Dynasty China developed the system which licensed 
and regulated the hong merchants.  After years of careful preparation, the Manchu 
took Beijing in 1644 and achieved a surprisingly rapid conquest of Northern China.  
Progress proved more difficult in the coastal South, where the struggle raged on 
another forty years.  After the devastated region was brought under control, the 
Kangxi Emperor opened the South to maritime foreign trade.  The regional economy 
responded quickly and positively to the stimulus.  The Manchus sought the benefits 
of trade, but at the same time felt it important to maintain public order among the 
trading communities and to assure the flow of customs tax revenues to Beijing.  
During the eighteenth century a body of rules was evolved through experiments 
and a series of crises to advance these objectives.  The regulatory structure that was 
developed for Canton – the “Canton System” -- drew on Manchu and Chinese 
traditions, discussed in Chapter Two of this study. 
The Canton System relied on licensed official merchants (guan shang), known 
popularly as the hong merchants.  The Chinese government granted these 
merchants a monopoly of maritime foreign trade but required that they perform 
security and tax collection functions in return.  A collective guaranty of the foreign 
debts of guild members -- the Canton Guaranty System (1780-1842) -- was imposed 
on the hong merchants in 1780 as a modification of formal foreign trade rules which 
had originally been promulgated in 1760.  Collective liability for debt had 
previously been imposed on merchants who operated other businesses 
monopolized for the Emperor by the Manchu Imperial Household Department 
(neiwufu), but no clear record survives of the sequence of or reasons for introduction 
of the practice in these enterprises.  The practice of collective liability was 
introduced among the hong merchants of Canton in several stages, starting in 1754. 
Foreign creditors frequently asserted claims against the hong merchant body 
under the collective guaranty in the years after 1780.  Their claims were received by 
the Canton officials in an orderly process, significantly better than that available to 
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Chinese subjects seeking to collect debts, in which claims were allowed (or 
disallowed) under Chinese law and ordered paid by the hong merchants over a 
period of years without interest.  The evolution of this system of regulations, and 
the Chinese processes for enforcement of debt, are examined in Chapter Three of 
this study. 
Payments from the hong merchants under the collective guaranty, and other 
obligations from the hong merchants to the state, were paid out of the Consoo Fund, 
which was established in 1780.  The fund received a modest initial cash contribution 
from the hong merchants, and thereafter received the proceeds of the hangyong tax 
on foreign trade.  Levied from 1780 until the end of the Canton System in 1842, the 
hangyong tax was collected in the base amount of 3% but was occasionally increased 
to as much as 7% depending on the exigencies of the moment.  The Consoo Fund 
was originally held in the form of specie in chests in the Consoo House, the guild 
hall of the hong merchants.  This cash was exhausted within a decade and while the 
fund continued to receive the proceeds of the tax, no effort was ever made to adjust 
the amount of that tax to actual or anticipated loss contingencies.  Funds required to 
make payments from the Consoo Fund were collected from the hong merchants as 
needed on a cash call basis. 
The Qing government enacted laws to prevent the losses that were required to 
be paid from the Consoo Fund.  Loans from foreigners to hong merchants were 
declared illegal under laws regularly proclaimed from 1760 forward.  These laws 
were not enforced.  Furthermore, disincentives existed which discouraged 
enforcement of protective laws by officials.  Foreign traders made imprudent loans 
to hong merchants, and the indebted merchants engaged in desperate practices in 
unsuccessful attempts to raise the money needed to pay their debts with interest in 
the years after 1780.  Stern enforcement of harsh penalties for debt, including 
beatings and the banishment of failed hong merchants to Xinjiang, did not help 
matters.  All the while, Qing officials assisted foreign lenders in collecting these 
illegal loans. 
4. Strains on the Consoo Fund. 
The Consoo Fund was strained from its beginning in 1780.  Despite the resources 
devoted to it, the guild stood depleted in number, reduced by the massive failures 
of the year 1780 and saddled with 600,000 taels ($833,333) in foreign debt ordered 
paid over ten years on account of those failures.  Although several firms were 
admitted in the twenty year period through 1799, many failed.  Hong merchant 
scholar Weng Eang Cheong speaks of "a wholesale extinction of merchants recruited 
before 1790."  These firms were casualties of the perennial dilemma of inadequate 
capital and lack of access to affordable credit with which to conduct a growing 
trade.  The failures also mark the end of the period in which the Canton trade was 
dominated by chartered European state trading corporations and hong firms that 
specialized to their needs.  Additional failures resulted in further draws on the 
Consoo Fund in the period 1780 through 1799, analyzed in Chapter Four.  In the last 
years of the eighteenth century, the Consoo Fund was also heavily drawn on by the 
Chinese government and officials, both for military needs and pirate suppression in 
these increasingly troubled times, and also in the form of exactions for venal 
purposes. 
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Foreign creditors, notably the now dominant British East India Company, 
recognized that the Consoo Fund was experiencing strain in the early years of the 
nineteenth century.  The trade was sharply impacted in these turbulent years by 
cycles of European wars, and by domestic problems including piracy that 
threatened trade on the China coast.  For a few hong merchants, these were years of 
opportunity and gain.  Most hong merchants knew this as an arduous period.  The 
record of Conseequa provides a dramatic example of the problems experienced by 
hong merchants in this transitional era.  Admitted to the guild in 1796, Conseequa 
was ambitious and traded with many different foreigners.  He extended large 
amounts of credit to the newly arriving Americans in the years before and after 
1800.  These credit extensions to independents soured due to wars and the American 
trade embargo of 1807-1809, and Conseequa found himself massively indebted to 
the British EIC.  This history is discussed in Chapters Five and Six of this study. 
For its part, the British EIC understood by 1800 that calls on the collective 
guaranty inevitably brought price increases from the guarantors, or led to more 
hong failures which decreased competition among sellers to it.  It therefore 
exercised restraint as a creditor during the period 1800-1814, the subject of Chapter 
Five of this study.  The British EIC avoided making demands on the collective 
guaranty, and instead sought to collect debts outside the guaranty system if 
possible.  Yet its two main attempts at evasion ended badly.  Its attempted 1810 
receivership of the hongs of Gnewqua II and Ponqua was promptly terminated by 
the Canton authorities, who arrested the Chinese receiver and banished him to 
Xinjiang.  The 1813 trusteeship of five junior hong merchants, including Conseequa, 
was not terminated because no attempt was made to interfere with operations under 
official license.  In both cases, massive losses were ultimately charged to the hong 
merchant body under the collective guaranty.  This period also saw heavy 
government exactions from the guild.  The Canton officials drew on the Consoo 
Fund for myriad purposes, ranging from military campaigns and the suppression of 
coastal piracy (largely successful as of 1810), to Yellow River flood control, to famine 
relief, to the Emperor’s birthday in 1809 (at a cost of 120,000 taels [$166,667]), and 
also for venal uses.  In contrast to the average annual collective guaranty charge for 
unpaid foreign debt in the period 1780-1799, some 81,050 taels ($112,569), the 
average annual charge of 113,733 taels ($157,963) for the period 1800-1814 had 
increased sharply, up forty percent (40%) from the average for the prior period. 
5. ‘Too big to fail’ and the end of the Canton Guaranty System. 
The period 1815 to 1828 is the subject of Chapter Six of this study.  These years saw a 
rebound of trade, with the end of the wars, and ongoing business changes related to 
the rise of the illegal trade in opium and increasing operations by merchants who 
traded outside of the official monopoly.  Four of the five junior hongs which had 
been placed in receivership by the British EIC in 1813 failed in this period, including 
Conseequa’s Liquan hong which was formally shuttered after the proprietor’s death 
in 1823.  The average annual charge under the collective guaranty during this period 
was 123,214 taels ($171,130), an eight percent (8%) increase from the prior period.  
The hong merchant body had become sharply divided by this point, separated 
between a very few successful firms and a majority that struggled to survive. 
While information on government exactions during this time period is scant, an 
1839 memorial to the Emperor shows official recognition that the hong merchants 
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were at their financial limit.  The hong merchants had committed in 1819 to pay 
600,000 taels ($833,333) for Yellow River flood control work, and then committed in 
1826 to pay another 600,000 taels ($833,333) to support the war in Kashgar.  Payment 
of these pledges, absolute on their face, was then repeatedly deferred on imperial 
approval through 1839.  Twenty years later, 136,151 taels ($189,098) of the 1819 
pledge still had not been paid, and none of the 1826 pledge had been paid.  It is 
apparent that the Qing government had, in effect, recognized certain leading hongs 
as being “too big to fail.”  While these firms might theoretically have been pressed to 
pay all tax and guaranteed foreign debt, the Canton officials realized that a high risk 
existed that they too could be broken and that, without them, the entire Canton 
System would fail.  In this context, functional “too big to fail” status protected, 
notably, the preeminent Yihe hong of the senior hong merchant Wu Bingjian 
(Howqua II) from excessive government exactions, in contrast to the direct or 
indirect state subsidies that characterize modern “too big to fail” doctrine. 
In the last years of the Canton Guaranty System, the hong merchants suffered 
massive losses and the system was then brought to an end by the First Anglo-
Chinese or Opium War (1839-1842).  This final fourteen year period, the subject of 
Chapter Seven of this study, begins in 1829.  In that year the British EIC imposed a 
local trade embargo in an unsuccessful attempt to force reform of the Canton 
System, and the New York legislature took the distant Canton System as inspiration 
for banking reform.  Within five years, the China monopoly of the British EIC had 
been terminated.  As the EIC closed up its operations, Chinese and foreign creditors 
alike began to question the ability of the hong merchants to continue to trade 
profitably.  Creditors had counted on the hong merchants’ stable long term contracts 
with the EIC as supporting their ability to pay debts – both individual debt and 
collectively assumed debts.  Without the EIC contracts, the ability of hong debtors to 
repay debt could no longer be readily assumed. 
A crisis of confidence ensued, which was worsened by two massive hong 
failures that occurred as the depression of 1837 swept around the globe.  The hong 
merchants told foreign creditors that they would not be able to pay the debts 
involved for many years.  British creditors began to look to the Qing government, 
which had enforced the guaranty system, to pay these large private debts.  The 
average annual charge the hong merchants were ordered to pay under the collective 
guaranty during this period stood at 186,266 taels ($258,703), a dramatic forty 
percent (40%) increase from the prior period.  Only a small part of these amounts 
had been paid as of the outbreak of the Opium War.  In accordance with the British 
Treaty of Nanking, a $3 million lump sum repayment of hong merchant debt was 
delivered to the British consul at Canton on 23 July 1843. 
6. Transplantation of collective responsibility. 
There was a belief at the time of each of the transplantations considered in this study 
that the idea had enjoyed prior success, but that the idea as received would function 
best with some modification.  Thus, although the Chinese idea of collective 
responsibility for debt was understood to have “stood the test of experience for 
seventy years,” some adjustment was warranted.  It was accordingly “modified and 
adapted to the milder features of our republican institutions,” in the words of 
reform proponent Joshua Forman.  The guaranty fund, with mandatory public 
supervision, that New York implemented in 1829 was considered enough of a 
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success to be followed by thirteen other states which adopted their own guaranty 
fund plans.  The troubled experience of these state guaranty funds did not tarnish 
the idea of a collective guaranty fund that would pay depositors in case of bank 
failure, but rather increased belief that a larger national pool and a program more in 
the nature of insurance was required.  This history, the subject of Chapter Eight of 
this study, produced national bank deposit insurance in the United States of 
America, enacted in the banking crisis of 1933. 
Years of banking calm, following national adoption of deposit insurance, 
validated the plan in the United States.  Its success was never free of controversy, 
which surrounded, for example, the gradual adoption of a ‘no depositor loss’ policy 
in the early years of the program, and the “too big to fail” policy of more recent 
years.  The American deposit insurance experiment has since been followed, with 
substantial local variation, in more than one hundred nations around the world, as 
discussed in Chapter Nine of this study.  This progress is doubly remarkable.  First, 
an idea that is collectivist in its essence became a cornerstone of banking regulation 
in the United States, a nation which is often thought of as highly individualistic.  
Second, this collectivist idea has traveled from the United States across the globe. 
During the sixty-two years in which it was enforced, the Canton Guaranty 
System produced significant benefits as well as severe problems for the merchants 
and officials who worked with and within the system.  It encouraged more open 
dealing with all members of the guild, and also avoided disruptions of trade by 
providing a system for the orderly determination and payment of foreign debts, 
which contributed to the strength of the hong merchant brand.  It also encouraged 
reckless behavior by hong borrowers and foreign lenders.  The failure of many hong 
firms was hastened by the heavy debts they were forced to pay under the collective 
guaranty.  Some of the problems experienced under the Canton Guaranty System 
are strikingly similar to problems critics have noted with modern deposit insurance 
programs.  Its history speaks to issues of the extent of guaranty, proper tax level, 
protective laws and their enforcement, evasions of the system, imprudent behavior 
by depositors and bankers (moral hazard), too big to fail institutions, and even 
confidence in the guaranty system itself, all of which are of global concern today.  
These topics are addressed in Chapter Ten of this study, its Epilogue. 
The historical record of the Canton Guaranty System, never previously 
examined, offers a number of valuable lessons to the modern world.  These include: 
(1) that the tax that supports a guaranty fund must be based on measured risk of 
loss; (2) that the fund and its insureds must be made subject to strong independent 
supervision; (3) that laws enacted to avoid risk contingencies must be enforced; and 
(4) that both corruption and the diversion of fund assets must be strictly prohibited.  
None of these controls were observed at Canton between 1780 and 1842.  Perhaps 
most important, (5) guaranty funds should avoid the unlimited commitment to pay 
losses, as was promised at Canton.  Unlimited coverage impaired the economic 
incentives for insureds to protect themselves under the Canton Guaranty System, 
and the mounting burden of unlimited liability for losses incurred brought the 
system itself and those exposed under it to the edge of ruin. 
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1. Inleiding 
Dit onderzoek behandelt het Chinese idee dat ten grondslag ligt aan het 
depositogarantiestelsel in de Verenigde Staten. Het idee om verantwoordelijkheid te 
baseren op het lidmaatschap van een groep heeft diepe wortels in de Chinese 
geschiedenis. De eerste keizer die China verenigde, Qin Shi Huang Di, gebruikte 
collectieve verantwoordelijkheid als middel tot militaire en sociale organisatie. Het 
beginsel vond bovendien een financiële toepassing, als dwangmiddel voor 
betalingen aan de staat, die zich laat vergelijken met de wijze waarop onderdanen 
van de keizer tot bepaalde afdrachten en activiteiten werden gedwongen. In de 
achttiende eeuw, onder de Qing Dynastie, verlangden regelgevende instanties van 
kooplieden die werkzaam waren in relevante bedrijfstakken, dat wil zeggen in 
bedrijfstakken die door middel van een monopolie werden geëxploiteerd ten 
behoeve van het keizerlijk hof, dat zij een collectieve aansprakelijkheid op zich 
namen voor de schulden van andere bedrijven in het monopolie. De Hong-
kooplieden uit Canton, voorzien van een monopolie op de Chinese buitenlandse, 
overzeese handel met het Westen, werden aldus in 1780 gedwongen collectieve 
aansprakelijkheid te accepteren voor de onbetaalde buitenlandse schulden van 
andere gildeleden. De wetgever van de staat New York nam dit gebruik, dat aan 
gezag had gewonnen door de verbinding met de beroemde Hong-kooplieden, in 
1829 tot uitgangspunt voor de eerste formele wetgeving die over 
depositogarantiestelsels werd uitgevaardigd. Het zogeheten Garantiefonds (“Safety 
Fund”, 1829-1866) heeft op zijn beurt de overname van gelijksoortige stelsels 
beïnvloed in dertien andere staten van de Verenigde Staten. Hoewel al deze stelsels 
het hadden begeven aan het begin van de 20ste eeuw, was de belangstelling voor een 
nationaal garantiestelsel sterk gegroeid, bij wijze van verbetering op de 
garantiefondsen die slechts opereerden op het niveau van de afzonderlijke staten. 
Een nationaal depositogarantiestelsel werd in de Verenigde Staten geïmplementeerd 
als onderdeel van de “Banking Act” van 1933, die was aangenomen onder invloed 
van de economische crisis van dat jaar, en heeft sindsdien voortbestaan. Vanwege 
de perceptie van succes, die doet denken aan de wijze waarop de staat New York de 
Chinese ervaringen van 1829 had begrepen, heeft het Amerikaanse model voor een 
nationaal depositogarantiestelsel sindsdien over de gehele wereld navolging 
gekregen. Expliciete depositogarantiestelsels bestaan thans in meer dan honderd 
landen; en uiteindelijk kan de inspiratie voor ieder daarvan worden herleid tot het 
China van de Qing dynastie via de vroege Verenigde Staten van Amerika. 
2. Parallelle crises (1829) 
De transplantatie van het stelsel naar de Verenigde Staten geschiedde in het jaar 
1829 in de context van een parallelle financiële crisis. In Canton was het gilde van 
Hong-kooplieden dat op basis van vergunningen de Chinese overzeese handel met 
het buitenland dreef getalsmatig geslonken en overladen met schulden, terwijl de 
groep als geheel grote moeite had om nieuwe leden te werven. In de staat New York 
leidde het omvallen van een aantal banken tot een vertrouwenscrisis over de 
betrouwbaarheid van het papiergeld dat private banken met toestemming van de 
staat drukten en circuleerden. Men was bezorgd over de betrouwbaarheid van 
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private bankbiljetten; politici kregen het verwijt dat zij te gemakkelijk vergunningen 
hadden verleend aan instabiele banken; en het antwoord van de wetgever daarop 
was een weigering om oude bankvergunningen te vernieuwen of nieuwe af te 
geven totdat het probleem was opgelost. Hoewel de wereld in 1829 reeds nauw was 
verbonden door internationale handelsbetrekkingen, en informatie steeds sneller 
tussen Oost en West kon reizen, kwam het bericht van deze crises wederzijds niet 
aan. Net zoals de New Yorkse crisis niet bekend was in Canton, was de crisis in 
Canton evenzeer onbekend te New York. De Britse Oost-Indische Compagnie (EIC) 
drong aan bij de Chinese autoriteiten in Canton op dringende hervormingen van de 
handel. Toen dit onsuccesvol bleek, legde de EIC een handelsembargo op van 
oktober tot aan februari 1830. Dit embargo leverde ook geen resultaat. Maar 
tezelfdertijd legde Joshua Forman, een verklaarde voorstander van 
bankhervormingen, in januari 1829 in Albany, New York, de volgende optimistische 
woorden ten grondslag aan zijn vernieuwende voorstel voor een 
depositogarantiestelsel:  
“De redelijke oplossing om de banken voor elkaar aansprakelijk te maken 
werd gesuggereerd door de regeling van de Hong-kooplieden in Canton, 
waar een aantal lieden, optredend voor eigen rekening, krachtens een 
vergunning van de overheid het exclusieve recht heeft om handel te drijven 
met buitenlanders, en waar allen aansprakelijk zijn voor ieders schulden in 
geval van faillissement. De situatie van onze banken is zeer vergelijkbaar; zij 
genieten tevens gezamenlijk van het exclusieve recht om papiergeld voor de 
burgers van de staat te drukken, en dienen krachtens dezelfde regel 
gezamenlijk aansprakelijk te zijn voor die valuta. Dit algemeen billijke 
beginsel, dat de toets der ervaring zeventig jaren heeft doorstaan, en 
krachtens hetwelk het schuldpapier van een Hong-koopman een 
kredietwaardigheid heeft verkregen over de gehele wereld die niet wordt 
geëvenaard door enige andere zekerheid, ligt ten grondslag, omgevormd en 
aangepast aan de mildere eigenschappen van onze republikeinse 
instellingen, aan het huidige systeem.” 
Hoewel de New Yorkse wetgever wel degelijk over accurate informatie beschikte 
ten aanzien van het concept van collectieve aansprakelijkheid voor buitenlandse 
schulden onder de Cantonese Hong-kooplieden, was hij zich niet bewust van de 
problematische daadwerkelijke ervaringen met het Cantonese garantiestelsel. 
3. De ontwikkeling van het Cantonese garantiestelsel 
De Manchu-heersers van China onder de Qing-dynastie ontwikkelden een 
systeem dat voorzag in de uitgifte van vergunningen aan de Hong-kooplieden en de 
regulering van hun activiteiten. Na jaren van zorgvuldige voorbereiding hadden de 
Manchu in 1644 Beijing ingenomen, waarna zij hun verrassend snelle verovering 
van Noord-China konden voltooien. De opmars bleek moeilijker in het zuidelijke 
kustgebied alwaar de strijd nog veertig jaar woedde. Nadat de inmiddels verwoeste 
regio onder controle was gebracht, opende de Kangxi keizer het Zuiden voor de 
buitenlandse overzeese handel. De regionale economie reageerde snel en positief op 
deze stimulans. De Manchus zochten de voordelen van handel, maar achtten het 
tegelijkertijd van belang om de openbare orde te handhaven onder de verschillende 
handelsgemeenschappen en om de stroom van douane-inkomsten naar Beijing 
zeker te stellen. Aan de hand van experimenten en een aantal crises werd tijdens de 
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achttiende eeuw een samenhangend geheel van regels ontwikkeld om deze 
doeleinden te verwezenlijken. De regels die voor de handel in Canton werden 
ontwikkeld – het “Cantonsysteem” – putten uit Manchu en Chinese tradities, zoals 
besproken in Hoofdstuk 2 van dit onderzoek. 
Het Cantonsysteem berustte op een klasse van officiële, vergunde kooplieden 
(guan shang) die doorgaans bekend staat als die van de Hong-kooplieden. De 
Chinese regering verleende deze kooplieden een monopolie op de overzeese 
buitenlandse handel maar verlangde in ruil daarvoor dat zij functies vervulden op 
het gebied van de veiligheid en de belastinginning. Een collectieve garantie voor de 
buitenlandse schulden van gildeleden – het Cantonese garantiestelsel (1780-1842) – 
werd in 1780 aan de Hong-kooplieden opgelegd als een aanpassing van de regeling 
voor de buitenlandse handel die eerder was afgekondigd in 1760. Voordien was al 
een collectieve aansprakelijkheid ingevoerd voor de schulden van handelaren wier 
bedrijf door het Keizerlijk Huishoudelijk Departement (neiwufu) van de Manchu 
was gemonopoliseerd ten behoeve van de keizer. Er zijn echter geen duidelijke 
bronnen overgeleverd die illustreren wat de volgorde van, of de reden voor, de 
invoering van deze praktijk was in de verschillende bedrijfstakken. In ieder geval 
werd in verschillende stadia vanaf 1754 een praktijk van collectieve 
aansprakelijkheid geïntroduceerd onder de Hong-kooplieden van Canton. 
In de jaren na 1780 stelden buitenlandse crediteuren geregeld vorderingen in 
tegen de groep van Hong-kooplieden onder vigeur van de collectieve garantie. Deze 
vorderingen werden door de Cantonese autoriteiten in behandeling genomen 
volgens ordentelijke procedures die significant beter waren dan het systeem dat 
Chinese onderdanen ter beschikking stond wanneer zij vorderingen wensten te 
innen, aangezien deze Chinese vorderingen naar Chinees recht werden toegelaten 
(of afgewezen) en de Hong-kooplieden slechts werden verplicht tot terugbetaling 
zonder rente over een periode van vele jaren. De ontstaanswijze van dit systeem en 
de Chinese procedures voor het innen van vorderingen worden in Hoofdstuk 3 van 
dit onderzoek behandeld.  
Betalingen door de Hong-kooplieden onder de collectieve garantie, en de 
nakoming van andere verplichtingen aan de Staat, werden verricht vanuit het 
Consoo-fonds dat opgericht werd in 1780. Het fonds ontving een bescheiden initiële 
storting in baar geld van de Hong-kooplieden en ontving daarna de opbrengsten 
van de hangyong belasting op de buitenlandse handel. Deze hangyong belasting, die 
werd geheven van 1780 tot aan het einde van het Cantonsysteem in 1842, bedroeg in 
beginsel drie procent maar werd wel eens verhoogd tot wel zeven procent, 
afhankelijk van de noden van het moment. Het Consoo-fonds werd aanvankelijk 
gehouden in de vorm van baar geld dat lag opgeslagen in kluizen in het Consoo 
Huis, de gildehal van de Hong-kooplieden. Dit geld was binnen tien jaar uitgeput; 
en hoewel het fonds belastingopbrengsten bleef ontvangen, werd geen enkele 
moeite gedaan om het bedrag van die belasting aan te passen aan de actuele of 
voorzienbare kans op verlies. Het geld dat nodig was om betalingen te verrichten 
uit het Consoo-fonds werd door de Hong-kooplieden naar vereiste bijeengebracht, 
op de grondslag van voortdurende bijstortingen. 
 De Qing regering nam wetten aan om verliezen te voorkomen die uit het 
Consoo-fonds betaald zouden moeten worden. Zo werden de leningen van 
buitenlanders aan Hong-kooplieden illegaal verklaard door verschillende wetten 
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die vanaf 1760 regelmatig werden uitgevaardigd. Deze wetten werden echter niet 
nageleefd. Een aantal negatieve prikkels gaf lokale bestuurders bovendien reden om 
niet toe te zien op de handhaving van beschermingsbepalingen. Buitenlandse 
handelaren sloten onvoorzichtige leningen af ten behoeve van de Hong-kooplieden, 
en de met schulden overladen kooplieden gaven zich over aan wanhopige 
praktijken in hun onsuccesvolle pogingen om het geld bijeen te halen dat zij nodig 
hadden om hun schulden met rente te betalen in de jaren na 1780. Een stricte 
handhaving van de strenge straffen voor het onbetaald laten van schulden, 
waaronder lijfstraffen en verbanning van failliete Hong-kooplieden naar Xinjiang, 
deed de zaken geen goed. Onderwijl gaven ambtenaren van de Qing-overheid 
assistentie aan buitenlandse geldschieters bij het innen van deze (nominaal) illegale 
leningen. 
4. Het Consoo-fonds onder spanning 
Vanaf zijn aanvang in 1780 stond het Consoo-fonds onder druk. Ondanks alle 
middelen die tot zijn beschikking stonden was het gilde in aantal geslonken, 
gereduceerd door de grootscheepse faillissementen van het jaar 1780, en 
dientengevolge opgezadeld met 600,000 tael ($833,333) aan buitenlandse schulden 
die betaald moesten worden over een periode van tien jaar. Hoewel verschillende 
handelshuizen werden opgenomen in de periode van twintig jaar tot aan 1799, 
gingen vele ook ten onder. De Hong-geleerde Weng Eang Cheong spreekt van "het 
massaal uitsterven van kooplieden die voor 1790 werden gerecruteerd." Deze 
handelshuizen werden slachtoffer van het voortdurende probleem van 
onvoldoende kapitalisatie en gebrek aan toegang tot betaalbaar krediet om de 
groeiende handel te financieren. De instortingen markeren ook het einde van de 
periode waarin de Cantonese handel werd gedomineerd door de geoctrooieerde 
Europese compagnieën en door Hong-firma’s die zich toelegden op hun behoeften. 
Bijkomende faillissementen leidden tot verdere aanslagen op het Consoo-fonds in 
de periode van 1780 tot 1799, zoals behandeld in Hoofdstuk 4. In de laatste jaren van 
de achttiende eeuw werd het Consoo-fonds daarnaast veelvuldig benut door de 
Chinese regering en door overheidsfunctionarissen, zowel voor militaire doeleinden 
als ook voor de onderdrukking van piraterij in deze steeds getroebleerdere tijden, en 
bovendien voor onttrekkingen ten behoeve van omkopingspraktijken. 
Buitenlandse crediteuren, in het bijzonder de intussen dominant geworden EIC, 
erkenden dat het Consoo-fonds onder spanning stond in de beginjaren van de 
negentiende eeuw. De handel werd in deze turbulente jaren sterk benadeeld door 
cycli van Europese oorlogen en door binnenlandse problemen, waaronder piraterij, 
die de handel aan de Chinese kust bedreigden. Voor een paar Hong-kooplieden 
waren dit jaren van kansen en winst. De meeste Hong-kooplieden kenden dit echter 
als een moeilijke periode. Het verslag van Conseequa geeft een dramatisch 
voorbeeld van de problemen die Hong-kooplieden ondervonden gedurende deze 
overgangsperiode. De ambitieuze Conseequa, die in 1796 werd opgenomen in het 
gilde, dreef handel met zeer veel buitenlanders. Hij verleende grote kredieten aan 
de nieuw gearriveerde Amerikanen in de jaren voor en na 1800. Deze 
kredietverlening aan onafhankelijke handelaren kwam in gevaar door oorlogen en 
door het Amerikaanse handelsembargo van 1807-1809, en Conseequa bemerkte dat 
hij zwaar in het krijt stond bij de EIC. Deze ontwikkelingen zijn besproken in 
Hoofdstuk 5 en 6 van dit onderzoek.  
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Van zijn kant begreep de EIC tegen 1800 dat aanspraken op de collectieve 
garantie onvermijdelijk leidden tot prijsverhogingen door de garantieverleners, of 
leidden tot meer Hong-faillissementen, wat de onderlinge concurrentie vervolgens 
verminderde tussen de leveranciers aan de EIC. Om die reden betrachtte de 
compagnie als crediteur terughoudendheid gedurende de periode 1800-1814, het 
onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 5 van dit onderzoek. De EIC vermeed het om aanspraak 
te maken op de collectieve garantie en probeerde in de plaats daarvan voor zover 
mogelijk voldoening te krijgen buiten het garantiesysteem. De twee voornaamste 
pogingen tot het vermijden van het garantiesysteem liepen echter slecht af. Een 
poging in 1810 om de Hongs van Gnewqua II en Ponqua onder curatele te stellen 
werd onmiddellijk beëindigd door de Cantonese autoriteiten, die de Chinese curator 
arresteerden en verbanden naar Xinjiang. De curatele van vijf junior Hong-
kooplieden in 1813, inclusief Conseequa, werd daarentegen niet stopgezet zolang 
geen poging werd gedaan om de bedrijfsvoering onder het monopolie te 
beïnvloeden. In beide gevallen werden enorme verliezen uiteindelijk ten laste 
gebracht van het gilde van Hong-kooplieden onder vigeur van de collectieve 
garantie. Deze periode kende ook grootschalige heffingen die door de overheid aan 
het gilde werden opgelegd. De Cantonese bestuurders onttrokken geld aan het 
Consoo-fonds voor velerlei doelen, variërend van militaire campagnes en het 
onderdrukken van piraterij in de kustgebieden (grotendeels succesvol vanaf 1810) 
tot de beheersing van overstromingen van de Gele Rivier en het verlichten van 
hongersnood, en van cadeaux voor de verjaardag van de Keizer in 1809 (voor een 
bedrag van 120,000 tael [$166,667]) tot aan steekpenningen. In contrast met de 
gemiddelde jaarlijkse kosten voor de collectieve garantie voor onbetaalde 
buitenlandse schulden in de periode 1780-1799, ongeveer 81,050 tael ($112,569), 
waren de gemiddelde jaarlijkse kosten sterk gestegen voor de periode 1800-1814, te 
weten tot 113,733 tael ($157,963), ofwel met veertig procent ten opzichte van het 
gemiddelde over de vorige periode. 
5. ‘Te groot om te vallen’ en het einde van het Cantonese garantiestelsel 
De periode van 1815 tot 1852 is het onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 6 van dit 
onderzoek. Deze jaren kenmerkten zich door een heropleving van de handel, 
samenvallend met het einde van de oorlogen, alsook door voortgaande 
veranderingen in de bedrijfsvoering die gerelateerd waren aan de opkomst van de 
illegale handel in opium en aan de toenemende activiteit van kooplieden die buiten 
het officiële monopolie werkten. Vier van de vijf junior Hongs die in 1813 onder 
curatele waren geplaatst door de EIC gingen in deze periode ten onder, inclusief 
Conseequa’s Liquan Hong, die formeel werd gesloten na het overlijden van de 
eigenaar in 1823. De gemiddelde jaarlijkse kosten onder de collectieve garantie 
gedurende deze periode bedroegen 123,214 tael ($171,130), een stijging van acht 
procent ten opzichte van de eerdere periode. De groep van Hong-kooplieden was 
tegen deze tijd sterk verdeeld geraakt in een select aantal succesvolle firma’s en een 
meerderheid die moeite had te overleven. 
Hoewel de informatie over door de overheid opgelegde heffingen voor deze 
periode gering is, toont een memorandum aan de Keizer uit 1839 dat ook officieel 
werd erkend dat de Hong-kooplieden aan hun financiële limiet zaten. De Hong-
kooplieden hadden in 1819 toegezegd om 600,000 tael ($833,333) te betalen voor 
werkzaamheden ter preventie van overstromingen van de Gele Rivier, en 
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vervolgens in 1826 om nog eens 600,000 tael ($833,333) te betalen als steun voor de 
oorlog in Kashgar. De betaling van deze toezeggingen, in principe onontkomelijk, 
werd niettemin met keizerlijke goedkeuring herhaaldelijk uitgesteld tot en met 1839. 
Twintig jaar later was 136,151 tael ($189,098) van de toezegging uit 1819 nog steeds 
niet betaald terwijl niets van de toezegging uit 1826 was nagekomen. Het moge 
duidelijk zijn dat de Qing overheid in feite bepaalde leidende Hongs had erkend als 
“te groot om te vallen” (“too big to fail”). Hoewel deze firma’s in theorie onder druk 
konden worden gezet voor de betaling van alle belastingschulden en de 
gegarandeerde buitenlandse schuld, realiseerden de Cantonese bestuurders zich dat 
een groot risico bestond dat zij zouden omvallen, terwijl zonder hen het gehele 
Cantonsysteem zou instorten. In deze context beschermde de feitelijke status van “te 
groot om te vallen” in het bijzonder de vooraanstaande Yihe Hong van de senior 
Hong-koopman Wu Bingjian (Howqua II) tegen excessieve heffingen door de 
overheid, in tegenstelling tot de direct of indirecte staatssteun die de moderne 
toepassing karakteriseert van de doctrine van “te groot om te vallen”. 
In de laatste jaren van het Cantonese garantiestelsel leden de Hong-kooplieden 
enorme verliezen. Het stelsel werd ten slotte beëindigd door de eerste Anglo-
Chinese, of Opiumoorlog (1839-1842). Deze laatste periode van vijftien jaar begint in 
1829 en is het onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 7 van dit onderzoek. In dat jaar legde de 
EIC een locaal embargo op aan de handel in een onsuccesvolle poging om een 
hervorming van het Cantonsysteem te forceren, terwijl de wetgever in New York dit 
systeem uit het veraf gelegen Canton tezelfdertijd juist als inspiratie nam voor een 
hervorming van het bankwezen. Minder dan vijf jaar later was het Chinese 
monopolie van de EIC opgeheven; en toen de EIC zijn activiteiten beëindigde, 
begonnen zowel de Chinese als de buitenlandse crediteuren zich af te vragen of de 
Hong-kooplieden hun handel nog met winst konden voortzetten. Crediteuren 
hadden gerekend op de stabiele langetermijn-contracten van de Hong-kooplieden 
met de EIC als een fundament voor hun vermogen om schulden te betalen – zowel 
hun individuele schuld als collectief opgelegde schulden. Zonder de contracten van 
de EIC kon het vermogen van Hong-schuldenaren om geleend geld terug te betalen 
niet langer als vanzelfsprekend worden aangenomen. 
Een vertrouwenscrisis was het gevolg, die nog verergerd werd door twee grote 
Hong-faillissementen die ontstonden terwijl de depressie van 1837 de wereld 
overging. De Hong-kooplieden gaven buitenlandse crediteuren te kennen dat zij de 
bewuste schuld nog jarenlang niet konden betalen. Britse crediteuren keken 
vervolgens naar de Qing-overheid, die het garantiestelsel in stand had gehouden, 
om deze grote particuliere schulden te betalen. Gedurende deze periode bedroegen 
de gemiddelde jaarlijkse kosten die aan de Hong-kooplieden werden opgelegd 
onder vigeur van de collectieve garantie 186,266 tael ($258,703), een dramatische 
stijging van veertig procent ten opzichte van de eerdere periode. Slechts een klein 
gedeelte van dit bedrag was terugbetaald ten tijde van het uitbreken van de 
Opiumoorlog. Volgens de bepalingen van het Verdrag van Nanking werd 
uiteindelijk een bedrag van $3 miljoen ineens, ter zake van de schuld van de Hong-
kooplieden, op 23 juli 1843 overgedragen aan de Britse consul te Canton. 
6. Transplantatie van collectieve verantwoordelijkheid 
Ten tijde van ieder van de transplantaties die in dit onderzoek zijn betrokken, 
bestond de gedachte dat het principe van collectieve verantwoordelijkheid in een 
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eerder stadium succes had genoten, maar dat dit principe, zoals het voorlag, het 
beste zou functioneren na enige aanpassing. Hoewel het Chinese idee van 
collectieve verantwoordelijkheid voor schulden werd begrepen als een idee “dat de 
toets der ervaring zeventig jaren heeft doorstaan”, was enige aanpassing daarom op 
zijn plaats. Het werd dientengevolge “omgevormd en aangepast aan de mildere 
eigenschappen van onze republikeinse instellingen”, in de woorden van de 
hervormer Joshua Forman. Het garantiestelsel met verplicht staatstoezicht dat New 
York instelde in 1829 werd als voldoende succesvol beschouwd om door dertien 
andere staten te worden nagevolgd, die hun eigen depositogarantiestelsels 
invoerden. De moeizame ervaringen met deze staatsgarantiefondsen tastten 
vervolgens het idee niet aan van een collectief garantiestelsel dat spaarders zou 
uitbetalen in het geval van bankfaillissement, maar versterkten juist de gedachte dat 
een groter, nationaal fonds en een systeem meer in de lijn van verzekering benodigd 
was. Deze ontwikkeling, het onderwerp van Hoofdstuk 8 van dit onderzoek, had de 
invoering van het nationale depositoverzekeringstelsel in de Verenigde Staten ten 
gevolge, zoals dat werd ingevoerd tijdens de bankencrisis van 1933. 
Jaren van rust in de bankensector, volgend op de nationale invoering van de 
depositoverzekering, bewezen de waarde van het systeem in de Verenigde Staten. 
Het succes was echter nooit zonder controverse, die bijvoorbeeld kleefde aan de 
geleidelijke invoering van een beleid van “geen verlies voor spaarders” in de 
beginjaren van het systeem, en aan het “te groot om te vallen” beleid van meer 
recente tijden. Het Amerikaanse experiment met depositoverzekering is sindsdien 
nagevolgd, behoudens (aanzienlijke) locale verschillen, in meer dan honderd landen 
verspreid over de wereld, zoals wordt besproken in Hoofdstuk 9 van dit onderzoek. 
Deze ontwikkeling is op twee vlakken opmerkelijk. Allereerst ontwikkelde een idee 
dat in essentie collectivistisch is zich tot een hoeksteen van de bancaire regelgeving 
in de Verenigde Staten, een land dat doorgaans als hoogst individualistisch wordt 
beschouwd. Ten tweede heeft dit collectivistische idee vanuit de Verenigde Staten 
over de gehele wereld gereisd. 
Gedurende de tweeënzestig jaar waarin het heeft bestaan, leverde het Cantonese 
garantiestelsel zowel significante voordelen als serieuze problemen op voor de 
kooplieden en regeringsfunctionarissen die met en binnen dat systeem werkten. Het 
moedigde aan dat men opener omging met alle leden van het gilde en vermeed 
verstoringen van de handel, door een systeem te bieden voor de ordentelijke 
vaststelling en betaling van buitenlandse schulden, wat bijdroeg tot de kracht van 
het handelsmerk van de Hong als geheel. Het moedigde tevens roekeloos gedrag 
aan van Hong-geldnemers en buitenlandse crediteuren. Het faillissement van vele 
Hong-firma’s werd bespoedigd door de zware schulden die ze verplicht waren te 
betalen onder het collectieve garantiestelsel. 
Enige van de problemen die opkwamen onder het Cantonese garantiestelsel 
vertonen een opvallende gelijkenis aan de tekortkomingen die critici hebben 
opgemerkt in moderne depositogarantiestelsels. De geschiedenis daarvan vindt 
weerklank in de aandacht voor zaken als de omvang van de garantie, het meest 
doeltreffende niveau voor belastingen, de invloed van wettelijke 
beschermingsbepalingen en hun handhaving, ontwijking en ontduiking van het 
stelsel, roekeloos gedrag van spaarders en andere crediteuren en van bankiers 
(“moral hazard”, de premie op het nemen van gevaarlijke beslissingen), instellingen 
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die “te groot om te vallen” zijn, en zelfs in het vertrouwen in het garantiestelsel zelf: 
elk van dezen is tegenwoordig van mondiaal belang. Deze onderwerpen komen aan 
bod in Hoofdstuk 10 van dit onderzoek, de Epiloog. 
De geschiedenis van het Cantonese garantiestelsel, die als zodanig niet eerder is 
bestudeerd, biedt een aantal waardevolle lessen aan de hedendaagse wereld. Onder 
andere: (1) dat de belasting die een garantiestelsel ondersteunt gebaseerd moet zijn 
op een berekend risico van verlies; (2) dat het fonds en zijn verzekerden onderwerp 
van strict onafhankelijke supervisie moeten zijn; (3) dat wetten die zijn aangenomen 
om onvoorziene risico’s te vermijden streng moeten worden nageleefd; en (4) dat 
niet alleen corruptie maar ook het wegsluizen van activa van het fonds streng 
verboden moet zijn. Geen van deze controlemechanismen werd nageleefd in Canton 
tussen 1780 en 1842. Wellicht het belangrijkste (5): garantiefondsen dienen de 
toezegging te vermijden om zonder limiet verliezen te compenseren, zoals dat in 
Canton eertijds was beloofd. Onbeperkte dekking verlaagde de economische prikkel 
voor verzekerden om zichzelf te beschermen onder het Cantonese garantiestelsel, en 
de groeiende last van ongelimiteerde aansprakelijkheid voor opgelopen verliezen 
bracht het stelsel zelf, en degenen die daaraan blootgesteld waren, tot de rand van 
het bankroet.  
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